The Gallipoli Campaign

The Gallipoli Campaign Background to the Gallipoli Campaign The point had been reached by Christmas of 1914 where a stalemate existed on the Western Front in Europe, where neither side could outflank the other to deliver a knock-out blow. In England, where tens of thousands of young men were now being trained as part of Kitchener s New Army, some politician s (the Easterners) favoured consideration of an alternative Eastern front option, which was in contrast to the BEF s military leaders (the Westerners) who felt that all of the nation s resources should be directed to the Western Front. Winston Churchill, the most prominent Easterner, asked the question Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders? It was in the context of this stalemate that Churchill, in his role as Minister for the Navy ( officially First Lord of the Admiralty) in the Asquith Government Cabinet, came up with an ambitious off the cuff, poorly planned and under resourced strategy against Turkey, to knock that Empire out of the War and so provide a mechanism to break the deadlock on the Western Front. 1

The Gallipoli Campaign This map of Europe & the Near East provides an overview of the three theatres of the War in early 1915. The Strategic Objectives of the Gallipoli Campaign: 1. Remove the Ottomans as an important German ally, and thereby block the German supply route from the East. 2. Open a vital supply route to Russia, enabling the Russian army to be supplied with arms, ammunition, troops and supplies. 3. Enable Russian grain and oil to be transported to its allies in the West. 4. Encourage wavering Balkan states such as Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania to join the war with the Allies against Germany. 5. If these four outcomes could be achieved, it would force Germany to transfer many of its troops from the Western Front to the East, and make a significant contribution to enabling the Allies to win the War. While these objectives were sensible, the manner in which the plan was carried out was terrible, as we shall see. 2

The Dardanelles To better understand the events that occurred with the Gallipoli Campaign it is helpful to an appreciation of the geography of the region. The above map shows the three seas that were critical to the plan The Aegean, the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea, connected by two narrow stretches of water - The Dardanelles Strait and the Bosporus, on which the then Turkish capital city of Constantinople (today s Istanbul) is located. In order to capture Constantinople, British naval planners in January 1915 came up with an Operations Plan whereby battle ships of the British and French navies would simply sail in to the Dardanelles Strait and bombard and destroy the old Turkish coastal forts located on both sides of the Strait. After disabling the forts, the main naval attack force would then advance on Constantinople, situated on the far northeast edge of the Sea of Marmara. Then, a small army of approximately 100,000 men would follow on to clean up and occupy Constantinople and the Ottoman territories along the Dardanelles. With the conquest of the Ottoman Empire, Allied ships could then sail to and from Russian ports at their whim. At this point there was no Plan B. At this juncture we should also consider the reasons for French involvement in the Gallipoli Campaign. While the French government and its military leaders in France enthusiastically supported the approach of the Westerners to defeat the Germans on French soil, in the event that the Dardanelles campaign was successful and the Ottoman Empire was defeated, by having an involvement the French were ensuring that at the conclusion to the War they would get a share of the former Turkish territories. 3

This next map shows a magnification of the 61 kilometres long Dardanelles Strait, with its widest width being of six kilometres at Erin Keui Bay, and its narrowest being just 1.2 kilometres wide. It also indicates the locations of the sixteen (historic) Turkish fortresses, located on both sides and at various points along the Straits. Finally, it shows the lines of submerged mines, strategically positioned to prevent enemy ships from proceeding through the Strait. 4

The Naval Assaults - 19 th February > 18 th March 1915 However, British Naval Command was convinced that the Ottomans empire was weak and would quickly crumble when faced with the might of British and French naval power. The Allies began their naval campaign on 19 th of February 1915 with a series of daily raids by small flotillas of naval ships against the Turkish forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles. In each of the smaller naval attacks before 18 th March the British & French warships sailed into the entrance of the Dardanelles and from the area before the first line of mines and fired (ineffectively) at the various forts on either side. 5

This Turkish post card simply but clearly illustrates the problem the ships of the British and French navies experienced when they attempted to destroy the Turkish forts. The trajectories of their big guns were not appropriate for the job. Big naval guns were primarily designed to shoot at enemy ships over long distances of 10-30 kilometres In the confined space of the Dardanelles and firing at close targets just a few kilometres away, many of the Allied naval shells simply overshot their targets and exploded harmlessly. 6

What the Nusrat Did However in withdrawing on each occasion just before the first line of Turkish mines the Allied ships undertook a U turn arc into Erin Keui Bay. Noticing this habit the Turks arranged for a small minelayer the Nusrat to sail one night and lay a string of mines in that bay. 7

The Defeat of 18 th March Soon after the main allied naval attack was launched on the 18th March, British under Rear Admiral John de Robeck, his majestic fleet of (ageing) battleships, cruisers and destroyers sailed in to break open the Strait. However soon after the fleet advanced in formation and fired at the forts they again began their turnaround into Erin Keui Bay when a number of them encountered mines in the field laid by the Nusrat. As a consequence three ships were sunk, three put out of action and the remainder of the fleet was hastily withdrawn, never to return to the field of battle. On the 18 th March 1915 Tactical Plan A Had failed miserably and at that point Plan B had not even begun to be contemplated. However the naval attacks had warned the Turkish government that the Allies were contemplating an offensive on the Dardanelles, and hence they they began bringing in extra troops to the Peninsula and reinforced their positions. 8

Gallipoli Plan B Commodore Keys, Admiral de Robuck and General Sir Ian Hamilton. Operations Plan B Whereas under Plan A the army was to play a secondary and supporting role to the Navy, under Plan B the situation was suddenly reversed, and the Army was now required to play the primary role. 9

Plan B Operation Following the Royal Navy s capitulation the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) had just 36 days to plan and execute the most difficult exercise ever attempted to that point in modern warfare a large scale seaborne assault on a well prepared and well defended enemy shore. 10

Plan B operations can best be viewed as three separate plans. 1. The primary objective of the main Allied force (comprising the 29 th Division of the British army) was to land at a number of points on the tip of the Peninsula at Cape Helles and work its way up along the east side of the Peninsula and destroy the Turkish guns located along the coast, thereby allowing the Navy to again play a role in the capture of Constantinople. Specific British Objectives: By the end of day one it was expected that the British forces at Cape Helles would have captured the village of Krithia, and more importantly the 180 metre high hillock of Achi Baba just beyond the village, which would give them observational and artillery dominance over the surrounding countryside. 2. A second landing operation required two divisions of Australians and New Zealanders to land some 20 kilometres further up on the west side of the Peninsula. The ANZACs objective on the first day was to move some two kilometres from the landing beaches and take the Sari Bair Ridge and Koja Timen Tepe (Hill of the large pasture) which rises to 971 feet above sea level, codenamed Hill 971. On day two the ANZACs would then move in a south easterly direction and take another small hill called Maltepe, from where they would be able to interdict any Turkish forces from the north attempting to move south against the British forces. 3. While the British made their attack at Cape Helles, a French infantry force at the same time would launch a feint attack on the other side of the Dardanelles at Kum Kale in an attempt to divert the Turks into thinking that would be where the Allies main offensive would take place. 11

The Allied Attacks This map again shows the locations for each of the three attacks. The British troops in their attack were designated to go ashore at five different beaches at the end of the Peninsula (S / V (The main landing) W / X&Y) Meanwhile the two ANZAC divisions were to land some 20 kilometres further up the Peninsula at Z Beach. 12

River Clyde Landing The British Landings at Cape Helles The British took a very different approach to the ANZACs with their landings. Their multiple landings were preceded by a pounding from British warships at dawn, followed by their troops landing in broad daylight. The landing Plan adopted by Major General Aylmer Hunter-Weston largely ignored air reconnaissance reports on Turkish troop and artillery dispositions as he arranged for a series of simultaneous 10.00am daylight landings at each of the five Cape Helles beaches. Having first announced his intentions with a naval barrage, this left the Turks waiting in anticipation of the landings. In landing their troops at V Beach, the British took a novel approach. The SS River Clyde, a converted collier ship with 2,000 men on board, was intentionally grounded on the rocks just below Sedd al Bahr one of the key forts guarding the entrance to the Dardanelles. The Turks were prepared and expected the landing the Irishmen of the crack 29 th Division were sitting ducks. With little or no protection as they exited the RIver Clyde they were met with a hail of machine gun bullets from the Turkish fort. Many of the Irish infantry died, in the water, on tenders, and on the bow of the River Clyde. Reports from observer planes overhead reported that the sea literally ran red with British blood. Meanwhile at Y Beach the British force their landed without incident, and a small force of British infantry actually moved into the undefended village of Krithia. However they withdrew soon after as Hunter Weston failed to send in support troops to sieze the opportunity. For the duration of the Campaign the British forces would never again get close to the viilage of Krithia, which was subsequently strongly defended by the Turks. 13

This widely viewed painting depicts a number of myths about the AIF landing at ANZAC Cove on April 25 th and promotes the traditional story we ve long been fed that the Australian landings at Z Beach on the western side of the Gallipoli peninsula had been carried out under British direction, that the soldiers landed in the wrong place, that the landing had occurred in the dawn, and that there was a massacre on the beaches. In this lesson I will present an alternate view of the commonly accepted folklore of the ANZAC landings, largely based on the evidence provided in Hugh Dolan s book, 36 Days, which provides a far more fascinating, complex and uplifting version of our history. Dolan asserts that the Australians planned their own landing, using the best technology available at the time, including aerial reconnaissance with planes from the world's first aircraft carrier. The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force for the Gallipoli campaign was commanded by Sir William Hamilton, who made one of his better calls in the campaign by allowing the ANZAC divisions, led by British Army officer Lieutenant-general William Birdwood and his Australian staff team to have control over how and exactly where they would make their landings. A key person in the ANZAC planning team was Major Charles Villiers Stuart, an intelligence officer on secondment to the AIF staff from the British Indian Army. 14

HMS Ark Royal HMS Ark Royal was the world s first aircraft carrier. Major Charles Villiers-Stuart was on secondment to the ANZACs from the British Indian army. He had never been in a plane in his life before, but on April 14, 1915 was a passenger on a two man flight that took off from the island of Tenedos, (his first of many such flights) that overflew the Turkish positions behind the Z beach designated for the ANZAC landing. As a consequence of his and other aerial observations over the Turkish defended Peninsula Villiers-Stuart was able to accurately map enemy positions and build a plaster cast topographic model of the area to assist Staff planning. 15

The ANZAC Landing Plan In making this decision the AIF planning team actually employed cutting edge technology which gave them a clear sense of what they were getting into. Z Beach encompassed a length of coastline from Gabe Tepe, a small cape (labelled as Kaba Tepe on the map below), northwards to a collection of buildings known as Fisherman s Hut. From these Villiers-Stuart constructed a plaster 3D model of the beach and the surrounding hills. It s apparent from these maps and photos that the ANZACs had a fairly good idea of what they were heading in to. It became clear that the original landing site nominated by the British was on a nice flat beach, which, based on the reconnaissance, also happened to be the site of a camp of some 8,000 Ottoman soldiers. Birdwood and his staff made some big decisions. Using Villiers-Stuart s intelligence, the landing beach was shifted to the north, on either side of a yet smaller cape, Ari Brunu. This was an area that was less well guarded by Turkish guns but had much more difficult terrain to deal with. Next, the decision was made to land troops on the beach in between the setting of the moon and the rising of the sun, under the cover of darkness, and before dawn. 16

The Gallipoli Campaign This map of Europe & the Near East provides an overview of the three theatres of the War in early 1915.. Strategic Objectives of the Gallipoli Campaign: 1. Remove the Ottomans as an important German ally, and thereby block the German supply route from the East. 2. Open a vital supply route to Russia, enabling the Russian army to be supplied with arms, ammunition, troops and supplies. 3. Enable Russian grain and oil to be transported to its allies in the West. 4. Encourage wavering Balkan states such as Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania to join the war with the Allies against Germany. 5. If these four outcomes could be achieved, it would force Germany to transfer many of its troops from the Western Front to the East, and make a significant contribution to enabling the Allies to win the War. 17

Grid Maps This slide shows an image of the type of map they were working with: The map is divided into numbered grids which are further subdivided into 5 x 5 grids. These smaller cells are then designated with letters (with no e s) running left to right and then top to bottom. On some maps these smaller cells are further subdivided into yet smaller divisions. With map likes these, locations were accurately referenced with the grid number and letter. So on the map above, for example, Anzac Cove was referenced as 224g and 224l Most significantly, Villiers-Stuart observed from the air that in the hills and gullies beyond the apparently flat and benign Z beach (as viewed from the sea) where it was initially proposed the ANZACs would land, there were thousands of well entrenched Turkish infantry supported by artillery batteries, placed there for just such a landing. 18

ANZAC Day One Objectives ANZAC Day One Objectives Sari Bair > Mal Tepe Recall: The objective of the ANZAC landing was twofold to capture the heights of the Sari Bair range which dominate this part of the peninsula and to force a way inland to a hill known as Mal Tepe, overlooking the Straits and the Turkish lines of communication to the south, so that they could block the way of Turkish troops heading down the Peninsula to fight the British. 19

The Crazy Terrain at ANZAC Richard Carlyon Gallipoli The biggest problem was the terrain, these ravines and washaways that had been thrown together by a lunatic. With the various ANZAC battalions reached the beach, they immediately headed up the ridges in an attempt to quickly gain the high ground and they went straight into chaos, as units became disoriented, lost, mixed up and often leaderless. 20

Key Events at Gallipoli Landings - 25 th April - 1915 2 nd Krithia on 6 th May - British & ANZAC attacks Turkish Offensive on 19 th May Armistice 24 th May August 6 th - British Offensives Lone Pine The Nek Chunuk Bair Suvla Bay Landing Withdrawal 21

The Turkish Attack of 19 th May By mid-may the initial attempt to seize the Dardanelles had failed. The British clung to the small gains they had made. On the 19 th May 1915 the Turkish army now mounted a major attack to drive the Australians and New Zealanders from Anzac. In the darkness of the early hours of that morning Turkish soldiers rushed downhill in waves against the waiting ANZACs. The Turks were met with a concentrated fire that kept them from entering the Anzac trenches, except in one or two places. For about six hours the Turks pressed their attack only to be driven back. Over 10,000 Turkish soldiers were hit and an estimated 3,000 lay dead between the lines, while the Australians and New Zealanders lost 160 dead and 468 wounded. 22

The 24 th May Armistice The Turkish bodies lay out in the open sun until 24 May when a truce was arranged to permit burial of the dead. A Turkish officer is led blindfolded through the Anzac lines to discuss a truce to bury the Turkish dead after the attack of 19 May 1915. (Australian War Memorial H03952) Anecdote of the dum dum bullets. 23

By 5 May 1915 the ANZACs were left holding a slice of Turkey 1.5 kilometres from north to south and 0.5 kilometres at its widest point. This position was held, with small but insignificant additions of territory to the north during the August offensive, until the end of the campaign. During May and June the British undertook a number of operations at Cape Helles, designed to push their line towards Achi Baba and hopefully to break out to the north. All of these actions the First Battle of Krithia (28 April), the Second Battle of Krithia (8 May) and the Third Battle of Krithia (4 June) failed. For the Second Battle of Krithia, the 2nd Brigade (Victoria) AIF and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade (about 8000 men) were sent to Helles. On the morning of 8 May, the New Zealanders gained about 360 metres of ground with considerable losses. Late that afternoon, the Australians made a charge over open ground towards the village of Alçitepe (Krithia), suffering similar losses without even reaching the front line. This was the only occasion when Australian and New Zealand infantry fought at Helles, although artillery units also served there. During May and June the British undertook a number of operations at Helles, designed to push their line towards Achi Baba and hopefully to break out to the north. All of these actions the First Battle of Krithia (28 April), the Second Battle of Krithia (8 May) and the Third Battle of Krithia (4 June) failed. For the Second Battle of Krithia, the 2nd Brigade (Victoria) AIF and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade (about 8000 men) were sent down to Helles. On the morning of 8 May, the New Zealanders gained about 360 metres of ground with considerable losses. Late that afternoon, the Australians made a charge over open ground towards the village of Alçitepe (Krithia), suffering similar losses without even reaching the front line. This was the only occasion when Australian and New Zealand infantry fought at Helles, although artillery units also served there. 24

The August Offensives The August Offensive was the last major attempt made by the Allied forces at Gallipoli to break the stalemate that had persisted since the landings on 25 April 1915. 25

The August Offensives In July General Hamilton developed a new plan, whereby he would land a another British army at Suvla Bay. This photograph, taken from the site of the Nek battlefield, shows the blue arch of water that fronts Suvla Bay. The photograph shows how flat and undulating the terrain is in the area abutting Suvla Bay. In the background the photograph also shows hills which surround the flat land These hills surround the flat land, creating a basin. Hamilton s plan was for his army to land on the benign flat land and to move rapidly to take possession and set up defensive positions in the surrounding hills which were at that time unoccupied by the Turks, who were focussed on the British at Cape Helles and with the ANZACs. 26

To ensure the Turks would be discouraged from diverting troops to the Suvla area, Hamilton planned for a series of feint attacks to take place at around the same time as the landings, right along the ANZAC line to confuse the Turks as to where the main attack would be launched. The first feint attack at Cape Helles merely consisted of the Allied artillery firing a small number of shells at the Turkish lines in front of Krithia, with minimal effect. The second diversionary attack began at Lone Pine late on the afternoon of 6 August 1915, which succeeded in taking a heavily defended complex of Turkish trenches which had no strategic value. This attack cost the lives of 2,000 men of the 1st Infantry Brigade, and seven VCs and many more citations would subsequently be given out to create a legend and cover over what was clearly a disaster. The third and most complicated attacks involved three sub sets of actions, which required an incredible level of co-ordination and even more luck. First, an AIF force led by John Monash was to march north of ANZAC Cove and then make sweep around and through impossibly difficult terrain to attack and capture Hill 971 (a day one objective). Second, the New Zealanders were required to make their way up the steep and defended Rhododendron Ridge to take the high ground at Chunuk Bair. When they had succeeded in doing this, they were then to attack down the Sari Bair Ridge and attack the Turkish defenders above the Nek. At that moment, the Light Horsemen at the Nek were expected to cross some 60 metres of open uphill ground and attack the Turks from the other side. 27

The Lone Pine Feint The second diversionary attack began at Lone Pine late on the afternoon of 6 August 1915, which succeeded in taking a heavily defended complex of Turkish trenches which had no strategic value. This attack cost the lives of 2,000 men of the 1st Infantry Brigade, and an unheard of seven Victoria Crosses and numerous other citations would subsequently be given out to cover the disaster and create a legend. The ground captured during the battle amounted to a mere total of about 150 metres across a 300 metre front. 28

Hopping the bags... this scene from much-hailed movie Gallipoli, starring Mel Gibson and Mark Lee, shows the moment the Australian first wave went over the top to charge the nearby Turkish trenches. Incredibly, the men were told to charge with bayonets fixed but no bullets in their rifle chambers Reminiscent of the French Offense le Outrance philosophy. Why would an Australian commander have issued that order when it was obvious that the New Zealanders could not launch a simultaneous attack on the rear of the Turks? 29

Outcome of the Offensives What happened! The Monash force became hopelessly lost and ended up attacking the wrong hill (Q Hill), and suffered heavy casualties in the process. During the night of the 6 th August the New Zealanders reached and briefly took Chunuk Bair before being pushed back again by Turkish reinforcements. This clearly meant that the NZ downhill attack in support of the Nek diversion could not subsequently happen. Despite the fact that it was obvious that the New Zealanders were not making their attack from the rear, in the pre-dawn morning of the 7 th August three successive waves of 200 Light Horsemen were ordered to make suicide attacks across open ground towards strongly entrenched Turkish infantry and machine guns. 375 men were killed or wounded as a consequence. This was the attack depicted in the final scenes of Peter Weir s film Gallipoli. While there has been a tendency to blame British incompetency for this disaster at the Nek, AIF Lt. Colonel John Antill was in fact responsible for issuing the order for the third wave to proceed. This photo was taken in 1919 from the Turkish trenches at the Nek showing the tiny battlefield ( just the size of three tennis courts) and illustrates the impossible terrain that the Australian solders were ordered to cross with unloaded rifles. In what circumstances (if any) would you consider it reasonable for a (soldier / unit of soldiers) to disobey a command from a senior officer? 30

Suvla Bay Suvla Bay After the British troops landed at Suvla Bay without incident, the Commanding Officer (General Stopford) ordered them to remain stationary near the landing site until all equipment and particularly artillery could be off loaded and deployed, before he would consider moving units to move out and take their (initially undefended) objectives. By the time the British made a move towards the ridges the next day the Turks had sent in reinforcements which prevented the British from achieving their objectives while causing high casualty rates in the process. This was a clear case of command incompetence which blew away any of the advantages that had been achieved by the expensive diversionary attacks. On 21 August, an attack was put in at Hill 60 to improve communications between Anzac and Suvla. This attack, and a later one on 27 August, was unsuccessful and the casualties heavy. It was the last Allied offensive on Gallipoli. 31

32

Following on from the delivery of the Ashmead-Bartlet / Keith Murdoch Letter to British PM Asquith and his Cabinet, Ian Hamilton was quickly replaced in October 1915 by General Charles Monroe, who made an immediate assessment of the situation to determine the best way forward. With the coming of winter and the lack of preparedness for such on the Gallipoli Peninsula consideration was given to making a tactical withdrawal of the Allied troops. This need was heightened when Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, thereby providing a direct rail route between Germany and Turkey, which would enable their introduction of devastating howitzer style artillery to the Peninsula. The major problem with a withdrawal of the magnitude necessary was that in the process the British were expected to suffer casualties in the order of 30,000 > 50,000 men. Monroe s advice to the British government was that withdrawal was the best option. Kitchener then made a personal tour of inspection of the Peninsula in the first week of November and subsequently advised the British Cabinet that a decision for withdrawal should be made. On 26 th November the Peninsula was hit by heavy rain and snow blizzards, for which they were completely unprepared and a number of men died from exposure. On 8 th December orders were received for a withdrawal from ANZAC with the task to be completed by Dec 20th. 33

The Evacuation This decision marked one of the most positive aspects of the campaign for the Allies and responsibility for planning for the withdrawal from ANZAC was given to AIF General Cyril Brudenell- White. The challenge was to remove large numbers of men, animals and equipment from ground constantly overlooked by enemy observers, without alerting them as to what was happening. Secrecy was therefore paramount. 34

Ruses Brudenell-White devised a number of ruses including: Periods of no rifle fire, particularly at night, to induce the Turks into accepting intervals of inactivity Landing what appeared to be additional re-inforecements on boats during daylight - & removing them again at night Gradually reducing the number of troops holding the front lines as men were evacuated at night. The decoy rifle with water timer Men playing cricket and two up in the open to present a picture of normality. The evacuation plan had three key stages: In the preliminary stage, men and equipment were removed in a similar fashion to winter preparations. Then, in the intermediate stage, troop numbers were significantly reduced, leaving enough soldiers to hold off a major Turkish attack for only a week. In early December, before the evacuation began, there were more than 50,000 men at Suvla and more than 41,000 at Anzac. By 18 December, the last phase of the withdrawal, only around 19,500 men remained on these two fronts. The remaining troops were withdrawn over two nights in the final stage of the evacuation from 18 20 December 1915. The last group of Australians left Anzac at about 4:00am on the morning of 20 December 1915 while the last boats left Suvla at around 5:00am. 35

Evacuation Remarkably the withdrawal of all troops from ANZAC and Suvla were completed by Dec 20 without a casualty and the process was repeated again at Cape Helles in early January 1916. The successful evacuations from the Gallipoli battlefields are often presented as a victory of sorts, in much the same way as Dunkirk would be in the next war. There was much speculation that the Turks had actually guessed the Allies withdrawal intentions and allowed them to leave unmolested. Whatever the case, the planning of the withdrawal was much more imaginative and innovative than that which had preceded the initial landings on 25 th April! 36

Turkish, British & French Memories of Gallipoli Video 10 Minutes - Video Transcript The aim of the Gallipoli campaign is to capture Constantinople, to force a way through the Dardanelles Straits so that we can gain the Allies can gain access to Russia; Russian wheat can come out and theoretically munitions can go into Russia. It also, hopefully, would relieve pressure on Egypt and the strategically vital Suez Canal and it was supposed to be an imaginative way to bring Britain's sea power to bear and try and circumvent the stalemate on the Western Front. In short, the Gallipoli campaign was a disaster and the outcome was humiliation for the British Empire. It withdrew without capturing even the first day's targets. The argument is made that it did weaken the Ottoman Army and that paid off several years down the line when the British Empire forces are fighting in Palestine. So the Ottoman Empire's experience in the First World War is almost entirely wall-to-wall disaster and Gallipoli, or Canakkale as they would call it, is one of very few victories that they achieve and it's celebrated as such from the start. The key date for the Ottomans is the 18th of March when the British think that they've just called a halt to their naval assault and are pragmatically going to try and achieve their objectives in another way. The Ottomans think they've scored a major victory and they're correct and that is commemorated from the start the ordinary Ottoman soldier, known as 'Mehmetcik' is celebrated. After the war, what happens in the Ottoman Empire is it, in the wake of defeat, the Ottoman Empire is broken up and after a War of Independence led by Mustafa Kemal, the Republic of Turkey is established. Once that is in place, and Kemal is president, we start to see the role of Mustafa Kemal in the Gallipoli campaign being emphasised much more and it so happens that he was involved in two pivotal moments. Both in repelling the attacks of the ANZACs on the 25th of April, and in the August Offensive pushing the New Zealanders and others off Chunuk Bair and pushing back the attack at Suvla. So, Ataturk is celebrated during his lifetime. But it is important to say that when Turkey's looking to create a history for itself, a founding myth for a new nation, it's not Canakkale that it turns to. It's all about the War of Independence. So bear this in mind, everything we're saying about how Turkey remembers Gallipoli, it is of a lesser order of importance than the War of Independence Interesting things have happened in the way Turkey remembers Canakkale in the 21st century. The AKP party has been in power since 2002 and Erdogan as Prime Minister from 2003 and the AKP is less sympathetic to Ataturk's vision of a secular Turkey, and there's a steady move to kind of downgrade Ataturk's position in all of this and they have invested an awful lot of money in improving the infrastructure in Gallipoli. Busloads of Turkish people are transported to visit Gallipoli and go and learn more about it. There is a greater embrace of the Ottoman history as Gallipoli, as part of the First World War more generally and so they've made a much bigger deal of the 18th of March and they've responded really to Australia's intense interest in Gallipoli and grown more interested in it in the last 10-15 years as a result. Yes, well it harks back to a pre-republican time. And I gather that this is a greater religiosity in how people behave when they are at Gallipoli just of late and the tour guides on the peninsula have noticed this behaviour of praying at grave sites in a way that would never have happened in earlier years. France's memory of Gallipoli is interesting in that, it's almost nonexistent and yet, France's losses are actually marginally greater than Australia's. France is a really important part of the campaign in terms of its input of soldiers and ships. Two or three French ships are lost on the 18th of March with all hands on deck. But for France, they were also fighting on the Western Front, where it was a matter of life or death for the country and so, when France remembers the war, not unreasonably, it's that that they focus on. If they remember any kind of exotic eastern adventures at all, it's Salonika which comes after Gallipoli. So there's one memorial in France in Marseilles where the soldiers set off from but that's actually not Gallipoli specific, it's a memorial to the Orient and so the memory has almost disappeared and with it, that is matched by a historiographical neglect, which is just beginning to be addressed. But we know relatively little of what happened to French veterans, what they did. The situation in Britain is very curious because of course the British input into the campaign is by far the greatest. It's a British campaign. The professional British soldiers fight in the most important part of the peninsula and have huge losses compared to the Australians, and yet, when they come to commemorate it a year later, the decision appears to be made that for the interest of imperial unity, Gallipoli will be an ANZAC occasion. So on the 25th of April, 1916, there's a parade through the streets of London 2,000 Australian and New Zealand soldiers marched through the streets to a ceremony at, or a service, at Westminster Abbey attended by the King and Queen and Kitchener and Hamilton, the commander-in-chief from Gallipoli and so forth. And it's reported in the Times newspaper as ANZAC Day, not Gallipoli Day, ANZAC Day. So just one part of the soldiers of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force are focused on in Britain and it's not the British. 37

President Erdogan > Gallipoli prayer > Nationalism > Sharia Government > rewriting Turkish history 38

Turkish Views of Gallipoli Gallipoli - Memorial at Anzac Cove by Ataturk. "Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmets to us where they lie side by side here in this country of ours You, the mothers, who sent their sons from faraway countries wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace, after having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well." Ataturk, 1934 The Turkish government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has removed from a revered Anzac Cove memorial the familiar words attributed to Turkey s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, likening Australia s dead Johnnies to Ottoman Mehmets and welcoming them to rest in his country s soil. The renovation of the 1985 monument has heightened suspicions in Australia and Turkey that the refurbished memorial could reflect a growing Islamist interpretation by the Erdoğan administration of Australia s part in the 1915 British-commanded Anzac invasion of and later retreat from Gallipoli. 39

Gallipoli Aftermath The failure of the Gallipoli Campaign in 1915 was primarily blamed on British politicians and most particularly Winston Churchill. This then enabled the Westerners faction in the British military to hold sway by adopting a Western Front first strategy of victory at all costs (Attrition). The meaning of Attrition would become evident at the Somme & Passchendaele They were blamed because they made the decision to redeploy resources (men, weapons and artillery shells) from the Western Front, against the advice of the British GHQ in France (the Westerners). 40