The Last Ottomans: Passivity and resistance within the Muslim community of Western Thrace during the 1940s Kevin Featherstone & Dimitris Papadimitriou London School of Economics & University of Manchester Hellenic Observatory Research Seminar 16 March 2010
AHRC Project: the Original Puzzle The basic assumption: a context for conflict History Ethnic mosaic Geography Other minority groups involved in conflict International relations Outcome Passivity. Neither resistance nor collaboration during WWII Non-engagement (with either side) during the Civil War Non-intervention by Turkey. The difficulty of explaining non-action ; scope of study enlarged.
Focus expanded International relations: minorities as assets Why didn t Turkey play the Western Thrace card? National level: Greek strategies & position of Muslims Why didn t Western Thrace become a major theatre of resistance? Why wasn t there a major W. Thrace front during the civil war? Local level: examine Muslim society and identity What accounts for the weakness of ELAS and DSE in Western Thrace? Why did the minority remain neutral?
Very few accounts of 1940s Western Thrace Memoirs of local guerrillas Scholarly work by Kotzageorgi and Chatzianastasiou Over 24 national and local archives Greek Foreign Ministry and Regional Archives Turkish Republican & Ottoman Archives Bulgarian State Central Archives US National Archives UK Public Records Office Extensive use of local newspapers and propaganda material Trakya and Savaş, Προοδευτική, Πρωία Nearly 100 personal interviews In both Greece and Turkey Sources Limitations Between history and politics (impact on interviews & availability of sources) No German archives / no interviews with Bulgarian refugees
Minority Cleavages Ethnic differentiation Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks (Rhodopes) vs Turkish-speaking Turks (plains) Roma community isolated Parallel co-existence with other local ethnic groups Widespread endogamy No major inter-ethnic violence before the war Islamic Traditionalists vs Kemalist modernisers Influential Islamic dissidents settle in Western Thrace (Mustafa Sabri) Conflict over education, use of Arabic, fez etc By the late 1930s, the Kemalists on the rise, but not dominant Distinction between towns, yaka and balkan communities Limited contact (very basic infrastructure) Localised structures of representation - No single leadership Political orientation Traditionalism social organisation around family Anti-communism (linked to mistrust of Russia) Volatile party-political affiliation (by mid 1930s, support for Popular Party)
Experience of Violence Belomorie (41-44) Pattern of Violence Pomaks, as lapsed Bulgarians, become the main target Turks in the lowlands, comparatively better fate Campaign of Bulgarisation against Muslims very limited success Parallel with the Greek-Orthodox community Economic conditions Turks in the lowlands suffer similar fate to the Greek-Orthodox In the Rhodopes the only reported cases of famine Resistance Activity No Muslim involvement in local resistance groups Greek resistance very weak in Xanthi and Komotini (stronger in Evros) No organised attempt by EAM/ELAS to penetrate the minority (a paradox) Exit strategy Only available through Turkey 10-12,000 (Turks and Pomaks) exercised it (many casualties) Turkey very reluctant to receive them
Çekiç Ile Örs Arasinda Civil War (46-49) Pattern of territorial control The highlands of the Rhodopes mostly under control of the DSE (Pomaks) By August 1948 compulsory evacuation of Pomak villages by the Greek army Villages and towns in the lowlands targeted on a hit-and-run basis Recruitment & provisions Relations with the Communist guerrillas Ottoman Battalion of DSE Formed in early 1948 led by Captain Kemal (not a local) 500-strong (nature of recruitment unclear) By late summer 1948 move to Drama, followed by massive desertions and dissolution Failure of the DSE to win Muslim hearts and minds Lack of previous penetration by KKE and EAM/ELAS Communist modernity/secularism an alien concept for local customs Guerrilla lifestyle incompatible with Muslim values Fear of Bulgarian and Russian expansionism Increasingly aggressive methods used by the DSE
Çekiç Ile Örs Arasinda Civil War (46-49) Relations with the Greek government Shared anti-communist agenda, but not our war Widespread desertions from the Greek Army Muslim conscription ends in mid-1948 Few court-martials against Muslims Relations begin to strain as militarisation spreads Exit strategy Internal displacement (from highlands to the towns) Emigration to Turkey Estimate of 18,000 (both Pomaks and Turks) Often with the blessing of the Greek authorities Many returned later on
Three Themes Across Occupation & Civil War The strategic relevance of minorities in the international relations of the region: what explains Turkey s approach? The local Muslim society & local politics: what conditions favoured a non-response? The minority & its identity: how far was this shared? How much groupness?
The Minority as a Strategic Asset Realist power politics. 1920 National Pact expressed Turkish irredentism for W. Thrace (called for plebiscite). But strategic concerns and Kemal s own disagreement then trumped concern for kin community 1930 Gr-T Friendship Pact 1941 Turkey s active neutrality. Civil War: Cold War fear of Bulgarian & Soviet expansionism. Strategic interest & absorption capacity: keep them in W. Thrace! Juxtaposed: local Consulate promotes Kemalism
Local Social & Political Conditions Level of hardship & violence not matched by strength of response. Level of resistance much lower than in France, Netherlands, for example. Bitter memories of earlier Bulgarian rule. Rule by fear & repression, but little collaboration. Drama events (Doxato): Sept. 1941. Little engagement by ELAS or EAO. Treated with suspicion, hostility. Similar for KKE & Nat. Army. Contrast: KKE & Macedonia. Exit option: refugees to Turkey.
Identity, Groupness & War Not minority, but minorities differences in experiences of war, suffering socio-ethnic groups; location (mountains, lowlands; type of urban setting) Forced assimilation of Pomaks failed (unlike strategy with Slav-Macedonians ) Economic impact shook lowland social structure Both Greeks & Muslims fled escape
Lack of Groupness : Brubacker 2006 Geography prevented easy contact; war could not be experienced in common Did not act as a group: shared interests, agency & will heavily constrained. When is a nation? (Connor): Lacked shared ancestry. Ethno-symbolic: several ethnies. No primordial nation. Only religion in common. Kemalism created a cleavage. Ottomanism meant little wrt national or civic identity.
Legacies Modernity came via Kemalism, not Greek state (Janos) Greece: idée fixe of minority as a threatening other, a conduit for Turkish irredentism. But posed no threat. Miscalculation by KKE, Greek State Greek policy since Lausanne has reinforced sense of otherness, ceded space for Turkification of the minority
Census Total Turks Greeks Bulgarians Pomaks Jews Armenians Roma Ottoman Census 1881/2-93 281,709 210,594 i (74.8%) 37,681 (13.4%) 31,876 (11.3%) 639 (0.2%) 609 (0.2%) Ottoman Census 1906/7 391,153 283,605 ii (72.5%) 49,142 iii (12.6%) 45,537 (11.6%) 1,616 (0.4%) 949 (0.2%) 201 (0.05%) Bulgarian Census Nov. 1919 220,480 77,726 (35.3%) 32,553 (14.8%) 81,457 (37.0%) 20,309 (9.2%) Allied Census Mar. 1920 206,690 74,730 (36.2%) 56,114 (27.2%) 54,092 (26.2%) 11,848 (5.7%) 2,985 (1.4%) 1,880 (0.9%) iv Greek Census Dec. 1920 191,000 84,000 (44.0%) 68,000 (35.6%) 35,000 (18.3%) Greek Census May 1928 303,171 84,669 (27.9%) 192,372 v (63.4%) 7 (0.002%) 16,740 vi (5.5%) 2,974 (1%) 3,244 (1.1%) 1,435 vii (0.5%) Greek Census Oct. 1940 360,219 97,535 (27.1%) 242,879 (67.4%) 0 15,000 (4.2%) 2,537 (0.7%) 2,268 (0.6%) 0 Bulgarian Census Mar. 1942 216,920 71,301 (32.9%) 96,092 (44.3%) 43,526 (20.1%) Greek Census Apr. 1951 336,954 85,945 (25.5%) 225,792 viii (67.9%) 9 ix (0.002%) 18,664 (5.5%) 34 (0.01%) 549 (0.2%) 1,143 x (0.3%)