FLYING LESSONS for May 21, 2015 suggested by this week s aircraft mishap reports

FLYING LESSONS for May 21, 2015 suggested by this week s aircraft mishap reports FLYING LESSONS uses the past week s mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In almost all cases design characteristics of a specific make and model airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents, so apply these FLYING LESSONS to any airplane you fly. Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers data and recommendations taking precedence. You are pilot in command, and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make. FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC. www.mastery-flight-training.com This week s lessons: A FLYING LESSONS reader sent me this account of his recent experience, as he submitted on an Aviation Safety Reporting System form: I was flying on an IFR flight plan at 9000 feet MSL. The flight plan was direct routing for GPS, which took me just a little south and west of Knoxville [Tennessee]. Knoxville Approach Control called out VFR Cirrus traffic at my 10:00 position and 5 miles, eastbound at 9500 feet. At the time I was in and out of broken clouds. The bases were reported at 6000 feet and the tops around 14,000 feet. I advised Knoxville that I would be unable to see or maintain visual separation from the Cirrus due to IMC and received no response. I then advised Knoxville that I would like to descend to 8000 feet to make sure we didn't have a mid-air collision. 500 feet vertical separation (plus allowable altimeter error) made me very nervous. I realize that ATC is technically only responsible for separating IFR traffic from other IFR traffic and provide additional traffic separation on a time- and equipment-available basis. However, this system is predicated on all those participating following the rules for VFR cloud separation and visibility. Knoxville approach control did not seem very concerned by what I considered a serious potential for a mid-air collision. See http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/ We are on the honor system for maintaining flight visibility and cloud clearance requirements when flying under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). I ve also had VFR traffic reported when I was sure the other pilot must be in or very near the clouds, at least from my vantage point. But there s no way to be certain, especially when you are in obscured visibility and the other airplane is several miles away from you, at a different altitude. It could be that the Cirrus pilot was in fact not maintaining the required cloud clearance for VFR operation in controlled airspace (the figure below shows the VFR clearances required under most, but not all, daytime conditions in the United States. See the Federal Air Regulations for full requirments). If that was indeed the case and the Cirrus pilot was willfully disregarding the rules for visual flight then we d have another tack to take for FLYING LESSONS. 2015 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved. 1

Let s assume, though, that the Cirrus called out by Air Traffic Control was in fact operating legally under visual flight rules. What requirement does that place on the pilot who is on an instrument flight plan and popping in and out of the clouds? Time from Exiting Clouds to Minimum VFR Clearance (Day; U.S. FAA) Ground Speed Clearance 250 kt 180 kt 120 kt 90 kt Above 10,000 ft 1 sm 12.5 sec 17.1 sec 26.1 sec 35.3 sec Below 10,000 ft 2000 ft 4.8 sec 6.5 sec 9.9 sec 13.4 sec Below 1200/700 AGL Clear of clouds 0 sec 0 sec 0 sec 0 sec This table lists the amount of time the pilot of an IFR airplane has to see and avoid a VFR airplane operating at the same altitude at the minimum required cloud clearance distance. The table lists various airplane ground speeds a speed-restricted jet or fast turboprop, a piston twin or older turboprop, a cross country airplane and a light IFR trainer. It assumes the VFR airplane is flying perpendicularly to the IFR airplane s flight path, so they are not pointed at one another (by definition the legal VFR airplane cannot be getting closer to the clouds) and they are not headed in approximately the same direction. In other words, it s a worst-case closure rate, with the rate of closure equaling the IFR airplane s ground speed. When you consider that studies show it takes 10 to 14 seconds to detect another airplane, recognize it as a threat, decide you need to do something to avoid it, physically make the control inputs for avoidance, and for the airplane to respond, you can see that it is vital that pilots of IFR airplanes be very actively scanning outside the airplane at the instant they exit clouds into visual conditions. Another scenario involves an IFR airplane flying an instrument approach procedure into a non-towered airport. After breaking out on final approach, even if only a few hundred feet of the ground, it s possible and entirely legal for a VFR airplane to be scooting through at or below your altitude in Class G airspace, in one mile visibility and just clear of the clouds. This very thing happened to me on the very first IFR approach I flew in actual instrument conditions. I broke out on an NDB approach in a Cessna 172, only to see a white wing flash by with the words Pipeline Patrol clearly and quite largely evident as it crossed between me and the airport a hundred feet or so beneath the base of the clouds. It s even worse when you remember that almost all airplanes are painted white the perfect color to avoid visual detection when first popping out of the clouds into clear skies and, in the case of the IFR airplane exiting the clouds, appearing up against a white backdrop. In some cases there s literally not enough time to see and avoid VFR traffic when popping out of the clouds. This puts some of the collision-avoidance responsibility firmly on the pilot of the VFR airplane. IFR pilots: Immediately begin your outside visual scan as soon as you exit clouds. Remember that see and avoid applies to all aircraft when in VMC, and that includes airplanes on an instrument flight plan and positive Air Traffic Control. Be especially aware that VFR airplanes may be operating in as low as one mile visibility and/or simply clear of the clouds in Class G airspace, such as beneath your final approach course when flying an instrument approach into a non-towered airport. Remember that in many cases there may be as little as 500 feet of vertical separation between you and a VFR airplane. It may make you nervous to know this, if you are both 2015 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved. 2

VFR pilots: talking to the same controller, but if both airplanes are under positive control to include a confirmed altitude, this is enough separation to keep you safe. If you re going to fly to the very closest allowable distances away from clouds, participate in VFR Flight Following (if available). If you re talking to Air Traffic Control you ll be reported as traffic to IFR pilots nearby, and you may have other nearby airplanes pointed out to you. Stick to precise VFR altitudes when anywhere close to minimum cloud-clearance distances. Separation depends in part on at least 500 feet of altitude between IFR and VFR aircraft. Follow the rules, and ensure your altimeter is set to a reported setting within 100 miles of your location at all times (unless your airplane does not have a radio, and even then, you may be able to obtain nearby altimeter settings with an ipad or other non-radio data receiver). Do not climb or descend through holes in the cloud or between clouds, if your climb or descent path takes you close to the visual clearance limits. Climb and descend well away from where IFR airplanes may come charging out of the murk. Be especially cautious when flying near airports when operating in Class G airspace. Get familiar with the instrument approach paths for airports you ll use or fly near, and avoid getting by with one mile and clear of clouds when under the approach or departure routes for IFR traffic. Most times in FLYING LESSONS I conclude by reviewing a particular rule, regulation or best practice that, if followed, virtually eliminates the risk of the hazard being discussed. That s not the case this week. There is no clear-cut solution to the mix of VFR and IFR traffic near clouds, at least not a solution that preserves the freedom of operation for all parties. It will likely become even more challenging as the skies fill with unmanned aerial vehicles. Part of the problem is that the rules for VFR could clearance and visibility haven t changed much since the dawn of aviation regulation, when airplanes flew much more slowly and very little flying, even airline operations, was done in the clouds. There was virtually no chance an airplane would pop out of the clouds aimed at a visual airplane. The chances are still extremely small but it is far, far more likely now than ever before, with so many airplanes operating IFR. The LESSON here is that we all need to be aware of the potential for collision between IFR and VFR airplanes when both pilots are operating within the bounds of legal flight. It s a cautionary tale to remind us all of the need to see and avoid, even when airplanes are flying through the clouds. Questions? Comments? Let us know, at mastery.flight.training@cox.net See http://www.pilotworkshop.com/tip/clearances/qa-tip 2015 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved. 3

Debrief: Readers write about recent FLYING LESSONS: Reader John Townsley writes about last week s LESSON about inoperative warnings and annunciators: Another nice reminder of what I need to think about before each flight. In the absence of an MEL [Minimum Equipment List], wouldn t all of the warning devices (over voltage, stall horn, gear horn, etc.) be airworthiness items? As I understand it, two requirements are necessary to determine airworthiness: 1) meets type design (most surely the warning devices are included); and (2) safe to fly. Minus stall warning, gear warning, etc. neither condition is met unless there is an MEL exception, which then would have an alternate method of compliance. FWIW, the systems knowledge you advocate can be significantly enhanced when pilots participate in required (and optional) maintenance. In general you re correct, John, but there are exceptions. For example, I ve instructed a number of pilots who have installed aftermarket audio gear warning alerts, angle of attack indicators with audio alarms, engine and electrical monitors and similar items. Those would not be required to be operable to satisfy airworthiness, although they would have to be rendered inoperative and placarded if did not work per 14 CFR 91.213d (assuming a U.S.-registered airplane). You re exactly right that participating in aircraft maintenance (to the extent the regulations, the pilot s education and experience, and the chosen mechanic or shop will allow) can do nothing but make the pilot more knowledgeable about the systems of his or her aircraft. Thanks, John. Frequent Debriefer John Rosenberg writes about pilot professionalism: I appreciate Edgar Bassingthwaighte¹s commentary on Air Line Pilots Association s Code of Ethics [in the May 5 th FLYING LESSONS Weekly]. Aside from flying my Bonanza, I am the national chairman of ALPA¹s Professional Standards Committee. I oversee the activities of all ALPA airline ProStan committees. Because our committee is all about professional conduct and pilot behavior, it is only natural that our committee is the guardian of the Code of Ethics. We shepherd the code as it is the quintessential document that defines the expected conduct of behavior of what it is to be a professional airman. I will quote the last line of the code, which is the concluding statement: Having endeavored to his utmost to faithfully fulfill the obligations of the ALPA Code of Ethics and Canons for the guidance of Air Line Pilots, a pilot may consider himself worthy to be called an Airline Pilot. This document never needs to be modified as they got it right the first time. It was written in the late 1950s. The good news is that this code can transcend airline pilots to apply to all pilots. Neither the mission or aircraft matters. It s all about headwork. It s bringing the A game to the airport each and every time when planning and executing any flight. There s no such thing as a casual approach to flying an aircraft. It s deadly serious business. Complacency kills. Your quote promote yourself to captain hits the nail on the head. Fly a Beech as if you were flying a Boeing. I wrote an article in the ABS Magazine last year about what I feel is an under appreciation for FAR 91.3, Pilot in Command. Because of the high accident rate, too many pilots do not fully appreciate what this concept really means. One of the shortest but most powerful and far-reaching of all regulations, 91.3a states: The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft. Consider what that means to you, and about you. John continues: As Edgar said, the obligation to the safe conduct of a flight and for the well being of our passengers is an ethical one. Let s face it, too many accidents and incidents occur because pilots either let their guard down or don t plan well, don't exercise proper judgment, display poor ADM [aeronautical decision making], don t maintain adequate proficiency, or simply don t possess necessary stick and rudder skills. We [in general aviation] are also in a position to have to address "automation complacency due to an obsession with sophisticated, integrated flight guidance systems even in something as basic as a Cessna 172. Many bright, articulate pilots weigh in on these issues in forums such as FLYING LESSONS. For the sake of 2015 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved. 4

lowering the accident rate, I hope the GA community is listening and takes heed. The best piece of advice on flying I ever received came from one of the Saturday morning hangar flyers back around 1970, when I was hanging around the FBO absorbing all the flying wisdom there was to be had. He said, John, flying is a lot like riding a motorcycle. The day you think you have it mastered, the next day it will kill you. See: www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=3efaad1b0a259d4e48f1150a34d1aa77&rgn=div5&view=text&node=14:2.0.1.3.10&idno=14#se14.2.91_1213 www.alpa.org www.alpa.org/about-alpa/what-we-do/code-of-ethics www.mastery-flight-training.com/20131121flying-lessons.pdf www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=3efaad1b0a259d4e48f1150a34d1aa77&rgn=div5&view=text&node=14:2.0.1.3.10&idno=14#se14.2.91_13 Good advice from someone in a position to know. Thanks, John. Comments? Let us learn from you, at mastery.flight.training@cox.net Please be a FLYING LESSONS supporter through the secure PayPal donations button at www.mastery-flight-training.com. Thank you, generous supporters. Share safer skies. Forward FLYING LESSONS to a friend Personal Aviation: Freedom. Choices. Responsibility. Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety, MCFI 2015 Inductee, Flight Instructor Hall of Fame 2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year 2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year FLYING LESSONS is 2015 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. For more information see www.mastery-flight-training.com, or contact mastery.flight.training@cox.net. 2015 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved. 5