MET00010913_0001 WITNESS STATEMENT Page 1of13 Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b Age if under 18: (ifover 18 insert 'over 18') Occupation: FIRE OFFICER This statement (consisting of 12 page( s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true. L DE SIL VO Date: 071021 Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded D (supply witness details on rear) This is my account of the fire at Grenfell Tower in the early hours of Wednesday 14 1 h June 2017. I will mention a number of people all of whom are in the London Fire Brigade (LFB); Group Manager (GM) GOULBOURNE Station Manager (SM) KING and TAYLOR Crew Manager (CM) CODD Firefighter (FF) REP AS, FERGUSON, PETTY, BUTLER, UPTON, OKOH, SIME, O'BEIRNE, DE ST AUBIN and JOSEPH Watch Manager (WM) MERRICK, O'KEEFE, MORRISON and WATSON. I will mention Grenfell Tower and the internal layout of it up to, and including, around the 4rd floor. I joined LFB in Feb 2010, where I was posted to Euston fire station as a firefighter. I remained there for three years and then went to Kentish Town as a crew manager where I stayed for two and a half years. From there I was posted to Acton on promotion as a Watch Manager where I stayed for another two and a half years. I am currently at Chelsea fire station where I am posted as a Watch Manager. I was working from there on the night of the fire and it was just my second tour of duty at Chelsea. I received the normal 17 week initial basic training as a firefighter, which included pump ladder and breathing apparatus (BA) training and all the basic training that you need to be a firefighter. Through the years, I've had courses associated with incident management as a crew manager and a watch manager.
MET00010913_0002 Page 2of13 I have received and delivered regular drills and lectures around procedures to deal with fires in high rise buildings including bridgehead procedures. I was recently at Acton where there are a number of high rise blocks so our training around them was regular. We have a drill tower at every fire station including Chelsea, which we regularly practice on, simulating a high rise incident. A drill tower is a tower with a dry riser pipe that you can plug hose into which mimics a real situation. It's a concrete stairwell that you can, spray jets and use ladders on. Although I've been to many fires in highrise buildings, most of them have been a code 1 which are small fires within flats, which were easily put out with no injuries. I've never been to a highrise fire the size of Grenfell, but I doubt if anyone in the LFB ever has. It was a unique incident in its scale and magnitude. I have had training around bridgehead procedures at a high rise, around how it is set up, entry control, where we plug hose into dry risers and how crews are committed. I have been at bridgeheads before and ran them. As a crew and watch manager, I have attended line managers incident command courses. We learn from both station exercises and borough ones and also training venues that we have such as at Park Royal. I feel that I have had adequate training for being an officer at a bridgehead. I am comfortable with highrise procedure and what should happen at a bridgehead. But whether anyone can train for an incident on the scale of Grenfell, I don't know. At our station at Chelsea, we have a Pump Ladder (PL) and Fire Rescue Unit (FRU). On my watch at Chelsea at the time, we had 11 firefighters and 2 crew managers. The CMs are often in charge of the FRU and also support me in tasks that I assign them. As a watch manager, myself, I am in charge of the watch and the pump ladder and there is a station manager who is in charge of all four watches at Chelsea. At the time of the fire, the Station Manager at Chelsea was Ben KING, but now it is Brett LOFT. The FRU has specialist equipment on board including Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus sets (EDBA). Crews have two types of BA Standard (SDBA) and Extended (EDBA). The standard cylinders on the pump ladder have a working duration of 31 minutes under normal conditions. Under stressful conditions, such as Grenfell Tower turned out to be, the cylinders will last for less time depending on the work rate of the user. The EDBA sets have two cylinders. These last for a longer period of time, working duration of 45 mins, but again it depends on the conditions and work rate of the crews. Each FRU has EDBA sets on board with an officer in charge of the appliance. There are 14 stations within LFB that have FRU s.
MET00010913_0003 Page 3of13 On Tuesday 13 th June 2017, I began my night shift at 20: 00. It was the 1 st of 2 night shifts of that tour of duty. At change of watch, the crew and myself tested our BA sets and completed an inventory of the appliances equipment and ensured it was all secured correctly. We attended a shut in lift at 23:46, and then another shut in lift at 00:30 and a smell of burning at 01: 17. When the call came in for Grenfell Tower, we had just finished up at the smell of burning at Queensgate Gardens and were mobilised to Grenfell Tower at 01:30 and arrived 01:39. I was on the Pump Ladder (PL) with Firefighter (FF) REPAS, who was driving, FF FERGUSON, FF PETTY and FF BUTLER The FRU had the crew of Crew Manager (CM) CODD, FF UPTON who was driving, FF OKOH and FF SIME. The driver heard that G271 (North Kensingtons PL) was at the scene of a fire and was requesting additional appliances. We had completed our incident at Queensgate Gardens and, on the MDT, changed our status, to status 6. This means that we are available for mobilising. Immediately after, we were mobilised to Grenfell Tower. Our initial information was limited. I was told on my pager to go to Grenfell Tower but I didn't have the full address. At that stage there was nothing on the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance. I had not been to Grenfell Tower previously but my crew knew roughly where it was so we headed that way. I contacted control on the main radio for more information and proceeded to the incident. There was quite a lot of radio traffic, mainly from other crews asking for more detailed information about the call also. Whilst en route, just a few minutes away, more information, including the address came through on the pager. I knew where the fire was and I knew it was in a highrise residential building. On the radio, heard that the incident was being made up quickly, that more and more appliances were being requested. I heard that Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls were in progress. I knew that it was likely to be a dynamic situation that we were going to. FSG is when someone is unable to leave their premises due to the effects of fire and call 999 and the phone operator at control will stay on the line to the resident in order to get information from them such as their location, their conditions, how many people are trapped. As much information as they can and provide advice. A command unit is mobilised specifically to deal with FSG and collate the information. From there the information will be given to firefighters at the scene who will attempt to rescue the occupants. Grenfell Tower is not on my ground but I had a crew that knew the area so we had no problems with knowing where we were going. We approached the incident from the south and I got my first look at the tower. I first saw thick black smoke going up from the building and flames also rising and that it was a fully developed fire in a tower block. It was just after l.30am and there was a road closure near to the scene.
MET00010913_0004 Page 4of13 I'm not sure what road that was but I remember a man on a moped stopping us and telling us to follow him to the fire, avoiding the road closure. We followed him along a few different roads and into a road near to the fire and parked up behind about 6 other appliances, which were already there. We parked basically at the back of the queue of appliances, approx 50 meters from the tower. There was a Command Unit (CU) near to the tower, about halfway between where we parked and the tower. I took our Nominal Roll Board (NRB) to them. The NRB is carried by each appliance and details who we are and how many crew we have and who that crew are. So with that, the command unit knows what appliances and what crew members are at the scene. The command unit has 2/3 watch managers and is there to support the Incident Commander around messages, information gathering and resources etc. They take the NRB so that they know what resources they have at the incident. I told my crew to listen for me on their handheld radios. It was a dynamic scene and I saw close up the flames and thick black smoke rising from the building. I left the Command Unit and walked towards the tower to locate the OIC. As I looked, a significant amount of one side was alight, with thick black smoke rising from it. A lot was running through my mind. I knew that there would be people trapped in their flats and knew that I needed to get water supplies going and equipment to the bridgehead. I needed to establish where the fire was, where the bridgehead would be and what sort of measures were already in place. I was arriving at a situation, which was already underway so I knew that I needed to get to grips with what was already going on. I saw an officer at the front of the block. He said that he needed crews with hoses, branches, an Entry Control Board (ECB) and BA sets to go to the bridgehead and asked me to organise them. I remember a crew manager asking me where to site an aerial appliance. There was already one aerial up and running so I told him to look around the other side of the tower to see if one could be safely set up from there. I radioed my crew to meet me at the front of the building with hoses, branches, their BA sets and an ECB. I saw that North Kensington's appliance was pumping from outside. I'm not sure if they were feeding the aerial ladder with water but they were pumping. We took equipment from appliances that were there until we had sufficient to take into the building. At this stage whilst still outside the building, I passed an EDBA crew. He told me that there were 8 people trapped on the roof and the EDBA crew, who were equipped with lines, were going to try to get to the roof to try to rescue them. Once I had the equipment I needed I went into the building to find where the bridgehead had been established. The bridgehead is where, at a fire at a highrise block, BA crews are briefed and committed. It is normally set up two floors below the fire floor in a safe location. Fire normally travels upwards and so
MET00010913_0005 Page 5of13 usually the bridgehead is in a safe position 2 floors underneath it. When I arrived there, on the 2nd floor, the bridgehead was already set up. BA crews had already been committed. The scene was chaotic and noisy but that is normal at that stage for such an incident, It was a small and tight area with a lot of people and noise. There was I stairwell. Watch Manager (WM) O'KEEFE and Station Manager (SM) TAYLOR were at the bridgehead with me along with two entry control officers, FF O'BEIRNE and FF DE ST AUBIN of North Kensington. The entry control officer monitors the crews that have been committed in BA BA crews have air cylinders on their backs. Those sets have an electronic device called a tally, which you must hand in to an entry control officer when you are committed under air. It has the firefighters name and time of entry on and is placed into the ECB and can electronically read information from the BA set of the wearer. That information, which includes current air supply, is displayed on the ECB so that people at the bridgehead know when the air supply of a particular wearer is low. When a firefighter returns, they are responsible for closing down their sets and collecting their tally. That way, we know that he or she has returned and is safe. Whilst committed the firefighter will look at his or her bodyguard which will tells them how much air they have left. So they know when to come out but, using the information on the ECB, we can remind them from the bridgehead if necessary. It's a good, accurate system and is an improvement on the previous one. I was asked by an officer (I'm not sure who) to collate the FSG information. In order to do so, we would normally use a Forward Information Board (FIB). This is a plastic board about a meter high and half a meter wide, which has different sides with different grids on to which you can add information. The templates are for casualty information, high rise, incident plan and incident info. You can use it to write down what flat numbers have FSG in progress. We all carry a chinagraph which is like a pencil that you can write onto plastic with and then wipe it off if you need. When I was handed the board, some information had already been written on it, maybe 3 or 4 flat numbers, floors and number of people in each. I don't know who had previously written that information on there. I was briefed to take the board and continue to collate the FSG information. I used this board to collate a list, which already had information on. Using that information, I assisted with briefing crews to go to certain floors and flats to search for and rescue trapped residents as per the information I had at the time. As crews came in and out, I attempted to update the board to know the progress of each FSG. If trapped by the effects of fire, a member of the public calls 999 and speaks to our control room.
MET00010913_0006 Page 6of13 The call operator takes as many details as they can including the address, floor number, how many trapped, what conditions they are in, where they are in their flat, what is trapping them, whether the flat is smoke logged etc. That information is then relayed to the bridgehead. There is a control information sheet where whoever is receiving the information from control can write it down and take a copy to the bridgehead. The sheer volume offsg calls coming in meant I was receiving information by small pieces of paper (2" x 3"), runners and also by radio with just the floors and flat numbers. The volume of FSG calls was very high. Nothing like I have ever experienced before or trained for. Another problem was the BA crews normally use channel 6 to communicate with entry control. However this channel was proving difficult throughout the incident. There was so much feedback on the channel that it was very difficult to use. Someone tried to lay a repeater on the ground floor bridgehead which is a kind of booster to help with the signal, but that didn't help at all. I've never experienced communications problems on that scale before. That left channel I which is used for fireground traffic, mainly to get information to and from the incident commander. That channel was working but was very busy. FSG information was coming to me by paper, but also by word of mouth (firefighters that could see people at windows) and also by radio. Due to the volume, the information soon narrowed down to just floors and flat numbers. It was very busy and chaotic and I started to realise that my FIB was nowhere near big enough. It's not designed for that many FSG calls. When we were on the 2nd floor, I don't know when, a call came to move the bridgehead to the third floor. I didn't make that decision, I'm not sure who did. I was conscious that I needed to take the FIB with me and that the entry control officers couldn't miss anyone going in or out. It was a constant stream of crews being committed and then returning. I wanted to be sure that we could move without anyone getting missed from either of the boards. I remember a crew returning, we returned their tally' s, briefed a crew going up and then stopped whilst we relocated to the third floor. I remember being last out so I could be sure that everyone had moved. We set up on the third floor. The same officers were on the 3rd floor Bridgehead with the addition of Group Manager (GM) GOULBOURNE and Station Manager (SM) COOK. So the system of using the FIB was still in place when I went to the third floor but I had realised that there wasn't enough space on the board for all of the information that I needed to receive/update. Crews were being committed regularly at this stage. I considered using another board. But that wasn't practical to wait to get another board to the bridgehead before I could continue. I would have missed
MET00010913_0007 Page 7of13 important information. It wasn't a risk that I could take. I looked and saw a big open space on the wall of the building. It is not procedure to use a wall. It's not recommended because if the bridgehead needs to be moved, all of the information on the wall needs to be re written somewhere else and it cant be physically taken with us. However, this was an incident of which none of us had ever witnessed before. It was a challenging situation and I was faced with a problem. I couldn't afford to miss information. If I had done, both the lives of members of the public and firefighters would have put at even greater risk than they already were. I decided to use the wall of the building to record FSG calls. It had the advantage that crews and officers could visually see it, but mainly it was big enough to hold all of the information. I have been shown photos of the writing on the wall. I'll deal with the photos and exhibit them later in this statement but when you look at them, you can see that the wall is full with information. There's no way that a single FIB could hold that volume of information. Looking back, I know that I made the correct decision to use that wall. The bridgehead on the 2nd floor was too chaotic and I said to SM Taylor that we needed a staging area for waiting BA crews away from where we were. A staging area was set up for firefighters waiting to be briefed and committed. This area was used to hold crews prior to going to the bridgehead. Without it, the bridgehead would become too congested and difficult to run. I quickly set up a system on the wall on the 3rd floor, which allowed me to know what FSG calls needed to be actioned. I remember writing "TIC" on the wall. This means Thermal Imaging Camera and I wrote it to remind crews to take one. I wrote the floor numbers from 3 to 23, vertically going up. Next to each floor number I wrote the flat numbers of that floor which received FSG calls. Other officers or firefighters could add to the wall, so not all of the writing was mine, although most of it is. When crews came down, if they were able to tell me that they had been to a certain flat number or had made rescues from certain flats, I was able to record it and update the wall. If I had assisted with briefing a crew to go to a particular flat, I would put a tick next to the flat number. If I received further information to that flat, then I circled it. If a crew did come back and tell me that they had made a rescue from a flat or that it was searched and clear, I would put a cross through the flat number. Occasionally, ifl knew the names of the crew, I wrote their names down so I knew who had been committed to that floor or flat Gust for my own information). If a crew said for example that they had made 3 rescues from a certain floor, I wrote 'three rescues' next to the floor. If I did have FSG
MET00010913_0008 Page 8of13 information that there was one woman, one adult, three children or something, I would add that on, but mostly I was getting just floor and flat numbers. I devised a system, which worked as best it could in unbelievably challenging circumstances. One of the problems I had wasn't with the system on the wall, but with debriefing crews when they came down. Some were out of air or close to it. They were exhausted, dehydrated and in no fit state to tell me what they had done, where they had been, where they made rescues from etc. They needed medical attention and weren't in a position to be questioned. Those that were capable of speaking to me often didn't know where they had been. Conditions were so bad that crews had zero visibility, floor numbers were blacked out and crews simply didn't know from where they had made their rescues. Some had casualties who were either unconscious or semi conscious. They were rightly rushed out to the waiting ambulances outside so I wasn't able to get information as to where they had come from. So I often had crews telling me that they had rescued a casualty but with no other information. The casualty themselves couldn't speak to me so updating my wall was difficult. The BA channel wasn't working well so crews couldn't tell me what they had or hadn't done through that means either. Some were committed to a specific FSG, but before they got there they came across casualties who they needed to help there and then. When we were on the ground floor, we used runners who would take the casualties from the firefighters to the ambulances leaving the firefighters to stay and inform the bridgehead what they had done as best they could. All I could do was not make any assumptions and not rule anything out. Just because crews were briefed to go to a certain flat, it didn't mean that crews had actually reached there. Looking back, because of the sheer size of the job, there was no way I could have. It wasn't a bridgehead issue, it was simply the conditions for the firefighters and casualties. The entry system worked well. I remember a firefighter trying to go up into the building but didn't have a tally to give to entry control. I don't know why he didn't have one but I spotted him and I refused to commit him under air without it. At some point, I remember going to the 4 1 h floor stairwell having heard firefighters shout the word 'casualty' and were struggling to get them down from the 4 1 h floor. I went up and helped bring casualties down. I have been shown some photos taken by the police after the incident. Picture number 47 LDS/1
MET00010913_0009 Page 9of13 Picture number 4 7 is not my writing. It says it was taken on the 4 1 h floor, but I didn't write anything on that floor. LDS/2 and LDS/3 These are identical photos with one being enlarged from the other. This is my writing, Picture 36 is my writing, it is from the 3rd floor Bridgehead. The floor numbers go vertically up from 3 at the bottom to 23 at the top. I have "TIC" written and boxed to remind crews to take a TIC. Next to the floor numbers I have the flat numbers. Ifl did have any further information, like on the J1h floor, I have "4 x 2 people, bathroom". If there is a tick, it means that I've sent crews there and a circle meant that I was getting further information to that floor or flat. If I put a line through them, then that flat had been searched. For flat 122, fire in the kitchen, that's where I wrote the additional information that I had received. I was assisting with briefing crews to go to specific flats for FSG calls but they maybe weren't making it due to having to make rescues on the way or difficulties in getting to that floor and instead doing what they could at whichever floor they were on. I have 3 rescues in brackets next to 113, so I must have been told that they came from 113. On the l 8 1 h floor I have mother and child but no flat number. Flat 161, 2 Out. At the top, I've put CODD and JOHNNY. These are CM CODD and FF JOSEPH. CM CODD is from Chelsea and is on my watch. FF JOSEPH is from Euston. Both were wearing EDBA. I had an FSG on the 23rd floor early on in the incident. I was conscious that I needed to get crews to the top sooner rather than later to make those rescues and we were briefing crews as we had the information and at that early stage I had FSG calls from the 23rd floor. It was soon after we had moved to the third floor that I saw both were ready and available in EDBA. It was still quite early on and although I had seen the building from the outside on my arrival, I could not have anticipated how rapidly the fire was spreading. At that stage it seemed feasible that the stairwell would be protected and clear of smoke and they could reach that floor safely. I assisted in briefing them to go to the 23rd floor, flats 204 and 205 for the FSG callers. One was an officer and I knew he would make a good judgement call in regard to the conditions. I told CM CODD that he may not get there but he is an officer and would have to make the call as to whether it was safe for him to do so as he went up by monitoring the conditions.
MET00010913_0010 Page 10of13 I knew we had to try to rescue people trapped that high up if we could do. The lower writing below the floor numbers isn't mine. There then came another decision where the bridgehead was moved again, this time to the ground floor. I'm not sure why that was but I remember someone saying that there was fire above and below us. Again, I ensured that the entry control officers were in a position to move and we moved out to the ground floor. I was the last one out of the third floor. There was a wall of the building, which was used to record the FSG calls, similar to the one that I had used on the 3rd floor. I wrote on some of the green wall information but didn't start or create it. I'm not sure as to the times of when things happened. It was very busy and intense. But most of the seven and a half hours that I spent in the building at the bridgehead was on the ground floor. I remember there being a Fire Fighter Emergency (FFE) when the bridgehead was on the 3rd floor. This is when a firefighter is in need of rescue or unaccounted for. When that happens an FFE is declared. Firefighter HILLS tally was in the board and he was getting towards the end of his air supply. Communications were proving difficult and his whereabouts became a serious concern. A BA emergency crew was deployed to locate him. He was subsequently found, so I put a line through the FFE on my wall and continued with my tasks. During the incident, as time went on, the command structure developed. That's what happens over time and things became a bit more structured with GM GOULBOURNE' S presence at the bridgehead. GM GOULBOURNE got officers together at the bridgehead for further briefings and I maintained my position there assisting wherever possible. Hours into the incident there was a plan made to clear each floor one by one so that we could confidently say each floor was clear in a methodical manner. LDS/4 and LDS/5 These are identical photos with one being enlarged from the other. Picture 3 is of the ground floor wall. At the top is written "Above 10 EDBA- Below 10 SDBA" At some stage GM GOULBOURNE who was on the ground floor with us instructed that anyone going above the 10 1 h floor should be wearing EDBA and anyone below the 10 1 h should wear SDBA sets. That information was written on the ground floor wall to inform everybody. I didn't write that but the information did get to me and I was aware of it. In my original account I mentioned that I may have written on the beige wall. This was the first time I had seen photos since the incident and initially thought I recognised my writing. Having now seen LDS 9,10 & 11 today I am confident that I only worked in the ground floor lobby area by the stairwell. At no point did I go to the beige wall to the left of the photos.
MET00010913_0011 Page 11of13 LDS/6 -LDS/7 and LDS/8 These are two A3 size photos and one A4 size of the green wall that I have mentioned. Most of it is not my writing, I wrote where it says "183 Daughter 21 or 22" "153-18 1 h" I remember that I received information from a firefighter that came down from the tower and informed me of someone in need of rescue there. On LDS/8 I have contributed to some of the wall but most of it is other personnel. There came a point, again I don't know when, where I was told that there were no more FSG calls in progress. There was no one on the phone to control anymore which meant they were either rescued or no longer responding. I was aware of discussions taking place around the integrity of the building and whether it was going to collapse. Those discussions were taking place above my rank and although I considered it, those decisions were being made by senior officers. I remember on the ground floor standing in 3-4 inches of water. I think a hose must have burst or something. If you dropped something such as a pen, or some gloves, then it was gone. I could see and hear debris falling on the outside, not too far from where we were. At some stage a fan was turned on which circulated smoke throughout the ground floor bridgehead area. The area became very difficult to work in and the fan was switched off and some floor to ceiling windows were smashed to help the ventilation. Firefighters were coming out exhausted and distressed. Some had their whistles going, not the majority, but some. I knew some of them and I helped in removing their sets and tunics and getting them water or oxygen if needed. They had heat exhaustion and had given 110% and some were on the verge of collapse. I remember FF BATE was missing for a time. She is from Euston, call sign A23. Her tally was still in the board and she had been separated from her crew. The radio channel 6 was still not working well and I tried channel 1 to see if anyone on the fireground knew of her whereabouts. She then appeared at the ground floor window, safe, and I gave her the tally and continued with my tasks. There was a time when I was on the ground floor when we were asked to withdraw all BA crews. I don't know the reasoning behind that, it wasn't my decision to make. A short while later, crews were redeployed. I was relieved from the Bridgehead at around 8.30am by WM GODBER ofwhitechapel. I had been in the building, working intensely for approx. 7 and a half hours. I left the building with WM O'KEEFE of Kensington. The tower was nothing like when I had entered. We were escorted out under riot shields by
MET00010913_0012 Page 12of13 the police to protect us from the falling debris. There was still falling debris, which had clearly fallen all night as it was all over the place. I saw for the first time that the whole building was engulfed in fire, was shocked, saddened as it had felt to me during my time inside the tower that we were making rescues and progress. It dawned on me then that there was probably going to be a high death toll. I was exhausted and dehydrated. I made sure that all of my watch were accounted for which they were and then got some food and water. I was then asked by an officer to take up a safety officer posting outside the building. This was a less demanding a roll, ensuring that anyone going in or out did so under riot shields. I had had a bit of a break so agreed to do it. I was there for about 2 hours. Looking back, the radio communications failed us. The FIB was useless for anything over 10 FSG calls. I literally needed the space that the wall gave me to record all of the information that I needed to. I suffered some smoke inhalation whilst inside the building. The couple of weeks after the incident I was coughing and had a tight chest. I recorded my injuries on in a statement as I was asked to do regarding smoke inhalation and slips and trips. Everyone that I met on that night went above and beyond what is expected of them. I was particularly impressed with my entry control officers, FF O'BEIRNE and FF DE ST AUBIN from North Kensington who did an exemplary job on the night. To manage those boards in such a high intensity, high-pressure environment, for such a long period of time with the stakes being so high if they made a mistake, was an outstanding effort. I left the scene at midday and went to Paddington fire station to write some contemporaneous notes. As a crew (of 5) we spoke to a counsellor. I returned to Chelsea approx 17:00 and that evening, at 20:00, we were back on duty for our second night shift. We were told that we could be excused but I felt ok and wanted to be with the watch. After a discussion with the watch I decided we would remain status 7 which means we wouldn't be asked to return to Grenfell or attend any other incidents unless absolutely necessary. Amongst my watch we discussed what had happened on the night and tried to get the appliances ready for the oncoming crews in the morning. The stay put policy is in place for certain residential high rise buildings. The advice is to stay put inside their flats. I don't know whether it was in place at Grenfell Tower and I don't know whether that advice was being given. I just knew that FSG calls were being received and people were trapped in their flats. In my role, I didn't need to know whether a stay put policy was in place or not.
MET00010913_0013 I exhibit the photo of the 4 1 h floor wall as LDS/1 I exhibit the photo of the 3rd floor wall as LDS/2 I exhibit the enlarged photo of the 3rd floor wall as LDS/3 I exhibit the photo of the ground floor beige wall as LDS/4 I exhibit the enlarged photo of the ground floor beige wall as LDS/5 I exhibit the A3 size photo of the right hand side of the ground floor green wall as LDS/6. I exhibit the A3 size photo of the left hand side of the ground floor green wall as LDS/7. I exhibit A4 size photo of the right hand side of the ground floor green wall as LDS/8. I exhibit the 3 photos of the ground floor lobby as LDS/9, 10 & 11. Page 13of13