Evolution of Airline Revenue Management Dr. Peter Belobaba

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Evolution of Airline Revenue Management Dr. Peter Belobaba Istanbul Technical University Air Transportation Management M.Sc. Program Network, Fleet and Schedule Strategic Planning Module 22 : 4 April 2015

Lecture Outline 1. Review: Airline Pricing Differential Pricing Theory 2. Revenue Management Systems Load Factor vs. Yield Strategies RM System Components 3. Single-leg Fare Class Seat Allocation Problem EMSRb Model for Seat Protection 4. Overbooking Models and Practice Mathematical Approaches to Overbooking Denied Boarding vs. Spoilage Costs 2

Airline Revenue Maximization Differential Pricing: Various fare products offered at different prices for travel in the same O-D market Revenue Management (RM): Determines the number of seats to be made available to each fare class on a flight, by setting booking limits on low fare seats With high proportion of fixed operating costs for a schedule, maximize revenues to maximize profits With very few exceptions, virtually all airlines make use of differential pricing and RM: Including most new entrant Low-Cost Carriers (LCCs) with simpler fares 3

Differential Pricing Theory Market segments with different willingness to pay for air travel P1 P2 P3 Different fare products offered to business versus leisure travelers Prevent diversion by setting restrictions on lower fare products and limiting seats available Q1 Q2 Q3 Increased revenues and higher load factors than any single fare strategy 4

BOS-IST Economy Class Fare Structure Turkish Airlines, April 2015 Class One Way Fare Advance Purchase Minimum Stay Change Fee Refunds RT Required Y $1072 None None None Yes No B $934 None None None Yes No M $725 0/3 (TKT) Sat Night $135 No Yes H $612 0/3 (TKT) Sat Night $135 No Yes S $512 0/3 (TKT) Sat Night $135 No Yes E $425 0/3 (TKT) Sat Night $135 No Yes Q $350 0/3 (TKT) Sat Night $135 No Yes L $238 0/3 (TKT) Sat Night $135 No Yes 5

Yield Management = Revenue Management Primary objective is to protect seats for late-booking high-fare demand, given limited capacity: Forecast future booking demand for each fare product Optimize number of seats to be made available to each fare class Optimal control of available seat inventory: On high demand flights, limit discount fare and group bookings to increase overall yield (average fare) and revenue. On low demand flights, sell empty seats at any low fare to increase load factors and revenue. Revenue maximization requires a balance of yield and load factor Balance yield vs. load factor to maximize revenues 6

Revenue Management Strategies EXAMPLE: 2100 MILE FLIGHT LEG CAPACITY = 200 NUMBER OF SEATS SOLD: FARE CLASS AVERAGE REVENUE YIELD EMPHASIS LOAD FACTOR EMPHASIS REVENUE EMPHASIS Y B H V Q $420 $360 $230 $180 $120 20 23 22 30 15 10 13 14 55 68 17 23 19 37 40 TOTAL PASSENGERS LOAD FACTOR TOTAL REVENUE AVERAGE FARE YIELD (CENTS/RPM) 110 55% $28,940 $263 12.53 160 80% $30,160 $189 8.98 136 68% $31,250 $230 10.94 7

Typical 3rd Generation RM System Collects and maintains historical booking data by flight and fare class, for each past departure date. Forecasts future booking demand and no-show rates by flight departure date and fare class. Calculates limits to maximize total flight revenues: Overbooking levels to minimize costs of spoilage/denied boardings Booking class limits on low-value classes to protect high-fare seats Interactive decision support for RM analysts: Can review, accept or reject recommendations 8

Third Generation Leg-based RM System RM Database Revenue Data Historical Bookings No Show Data Actual Bookings Bookings and Cancellations Forecasting Models Reservations/ Inventory System Booking Limit Optimization Overbooking Model Booking Limits RM Models 9

Components of 3 rd Generation RM Demand Forecasting Time series methods applied to historical booking data to forecast demand by fare class for each future flight/departure date Flight Leg Optimization Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) models determine revenue-maximizing mix of seats for each fare class Overbooking Cost-based overbooking models minimize denied boarding and spoilage costs, based on probabilistic analysis of no-shows Revenue increases of 4 to 6 percent typically quoted From overbooking and fare class mix optimization alone 10

Leg-Based Fare Class Mix Optimization Determine the optimal number of seats to make available to each booking class. Given for each future flight leg departure: Total remaining booking capacity of (typically) the coach compartment Forecasts of future booking demand by fare class between current DCP and departure Revenue estimates for each fare (booking) class Objective is to maximize total expected revenue: Protect seats for each fare class based on revenue value, taking into account forecast uncertainty and probability of realizing the forecasted demand 11

Serially Nested Buckets 12

EMSRb Model Calculations To calculate the optimal protection levels: Define P i (S i ) = probability that X i > S i, where S i is the number of seats made available to class i, X i is the random demand for class I The expected marginal revenue of making the Sth seat available to class i is: EMSR i (S i ) = R i * P i (S i ) where R i is the average revenue (or fare) from class i The optimal protection level, 1 for class 1 from class 2 satisfies: EMSR 1 ( 1 ) = R 1 * P 1 ( 1 ) = R 2 13

Example Calculation Consider the following flight leg example: Class Mean Fcst. Std. Dev. Fare Y 10 3 1000 B 15 5 700 M 20 7 500 Q 30 10 350 To find the protection for the Y fare class, we want to find the largest value of Y for which EMSR Y ( Y ) = R Y * P Y ( Y ) > R B 14

Example (cont d) EMSR Y ( Y ) = 1000 * P Y ( Y ) > 700 P Y ( Y ) > 0.70 where P Y ( Y ) = probability that X Y > Y. Assume demand in Y class is normally distributed, then we can create a standardized normal random variable as (X Y - 10)/3: for Y = 7, Prob { (X Y -10)/3 > (7-10)/3 } = 0.841 for Y = 8, Prob { (X Y -10)/3 > (8-10)/3 } = 0.747 for Y = 9, Prob { (X Y -10)/3 > (9-10)/3 } = 0.63 Y = 8 is the largest integer value of Y that gives a probability > 0.7 and we will protect 8 seats for Y class. 15

General Case for Class n Joint protection for classes 1 through n from class n+1 X 1, n n i 1 X i ˆ 1, n n i 1 ˆ 2 i R 1, n n i 1 R X i * 1, n X i We then find the value of n that makes EMSR 1,n ( n ) = R 1,n * P 1,n ( n ) = R n+1 Once n is found, set BL n+1 = Capacity - n 16

Graphical Representation of EMSR Curves and Booking Limits EMSR Y Fare B Fare M Fare Q Fare EMSR curve for the Y class protection At this point, expected revenue will be higher if we allow a B fare booking given the dropping probability to sell an extra Y fare. EMSR curve for the B class BL(B) BL(M) BL(Q) CAP seats 17 17

EMSRb Seat Protection Model CABIN CAPACITY = 135 AVAILABLE SEATS = 135 BOOKING AVERAGE SEATS FORECAST DEMAND JOINT BOOKING CLASS FARE BOOKED MEAN SIGMA PROTECT LIMIT Y $ 670 0 12 7 6 135 M $ 550 0 17 8 23 129 B $ 420 0 10 6 37 112 V $ 310 0 22 9 62 98 Q $ 220 0 27 10 95 73 L $ 140 0 47 14 40 SUM 0 135 18

Dynamic Revision and Intervention RM systems revise forecasts and re-optimize booking limits at numerous checkpoints : Monitor actual bookings vs. previously forecasted demand Re-forecast demand and re-optimize at fixed checkpoints or when unexpected booking activity occurs Can mean substantial changes in fare class availability from one day to the next, even for the same flight departure Substantial proportion of fare mix revenue gain comes from dynamic revision of booking limits: Human intervention is important in unusual circumstances, such as unexplained surges in demand due to special events 19

Revision of Forecasts and Limits as Bookings Accepted CABIN CAPACITY = 135 AVAILABLE SEATS = 63 BOOKING AVERAGE SEATS FORECAST DEMAND JOINT BOOKING CLASS FARE BOOKED MEAN SIGMA PROTECT LIMIT Y $ 670 2 10 5 5 63 M $ 550 4 13 7 19 58 B $ 420 5 5 2 27 44 V $ 310 12 10 5 40 36 Q $ 220 17 20 6 63 23 L $ 140 32 15 4 0 SUM 72 73 Higher than expected Q bookings close L class 20

Leg-Based RM Benefits Increase with Average Load Factor Revenue Gain When Both Airlines Implement EMSRb AL 1 AL 2 16.00% 14.74% 14.00% 12.00% 10.62% 10.00% 8.63% 8.00% 6.00% 5.72% 4.00% 3.85% 2.00% 2.18% 0.00% EMSRb ALF=78% EMSRb ALF=84% EMSRb ALF=89% 21

Flight Overbooking Determine maximum number of bookings to accept for a given physical capacity. Minimize total costs of denied boardings and spoilage (lost revenue). U.S. domestic no-show rates can reach 15-20 percent of final pre-departure bookings: On peak holiday days, when high no-shows are least desirable Average no-show rates have dropped, to about 10% with more fare penalties and better efforts by airlines to firm up bookings Effective overbooking can generate as much revenue gain as fare class seat allocation. 22

Overbooking Terminology Physical Capacity Authorized Capacity Confirmed Bookings No-show rate Show-up rate Passengers Boarded Denied Boardings Spoilage CAP AU BKD <= AU NSR SUR PAX DB SP 23

Deterministic Overbooking Model Based on estimate of mean NSR from recent history: Assume that BKD=AU ( worst case scenario) Find AU such that AU - NSR*AU = CAP Or, AU = CAP/(1-NSR) For CAP=100 and NSR=0.20, then: AU = 100/(1-.20) = 125 How would this model perform in the real world, where NSR is not known with certainty? 24

Probabilistic/Risk Model Incorporates uncertainty about NSR for future flight: Standard deviation of NSR from history, STD Find AU that will keep DB=0, assuming BKD=AU, with a 95% level of confidence: Assume a probability (Gaussian) distribution of no-show rates Optimal AU given CAP, SUR, STD with objective of DB=0 with 95% confidence is: AU = CAP = CAP. SUR + 1.645 STD 1- NSR + 1.645 STD In our example, with STD= 0.05: AU = 100 / (1-0.20 + 1.645*0.05) = 113 25

Probabilistic Model Extensions 1. Reduce level of confidence of exceeding DB limit: Z factor in denominator will decrease, causing increase in AU 2. Increase DB tolerance to account for voluntary DB: Numerator becomes (CAP+ VOLDB), increases AU 3. Include forecasted empty F or C cabin seats for upgrading: Numerator becomes (CAP+FEMPTY+CEMPTY), increases AU Empty F+C could also be overbooked 4. Deduct group bookings and overbook remaining capacity only: Firm groups much more likely to show up Flights with firm groups should have lower AU 26

Cost-Based Overbooking Model Find AU that minimizes : [Cost of DB + Cost of SP] For any given AU: Total Cost = $DB * E[DB] + $SP * E[SP] $DB and $SP= cost per DB and SP, respectively E[DB] = expected number of DBs, given AU E[SP] = expected number of SP seats, given AU Mathematical search over range of AU values to find minimum total cost. 27

COST Example: Cost-Based Overbooking Model Denied Boarding and Spoilage Costs $7,000 $6,000 $5,000 $4,000 $3,000 Optimal AU = 123 DB SP TOT $2,000 $1,000 $0 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 AUTHORIZED LIMIT (AU) CAPACITY = 100 28

Costs of Denied Boardings and Spoilage Denied Boarding Costs: Cash compensation for involuntary DB Free travel vouchers for voluntary DB Meal and hotel costs for displaced passengers Space on other airlines Cost of lost passenger goodwill Spoilage Costs: Loss of revenue from seat that departed empty Average revenue per seat for leg? Highest fare class revenue on leg (since closed flights lose latebooking passengers)? Lowest fare class revenue on leg (since increased AU would have allowed another discount seat)? 29

Voluntary vs. Involuntary DBs Comprehensive Voluntary DB Program: Requires training and cooperation of station crews Identify potential volunteers at check-in Offer as much soft compensation as needed to make the passenger happy US airlines very successful in managing DBs: 2013 involuntary DB rate was 0.92 per 10,000 About 90% of DBs in U.S. are volunteers Good treatment of volunteers generates goodwill 30

2013 US Involuntary DBs per 10,000 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.92 0.5 0 Source: www.bts.gov 31

Current State of RM Practice Most of airlines (legacy and LCC) have implemented 3rd generation Leg RM systems: Revenue gains of 4 to 6 percent, at 75-80% average system load factors Tactical matching of demand to supply channel low-fare demand to empty flights Maintain competitive pricing while controlling dilution About 15-20 leading airlines are implementing 4th generation Network RM systems Further distinguish between local and connecting requests based on network revenue value 32