Estimating the Risk of a New Launch Vehicle Using Historical Design Element Data

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International Journal of Performability Engineering, Vol. 9, No. 6, November 2013, pp. 599-608. RAMS Consultants Printed in India Estimating the Risk of a New Launch Vehicle Using Historical Design Element Data ROBERT CROSS NASA Safety Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Received on April 12, 2013, revised on April 15 and June 10, 2013) Abstract: As part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration s (NASA) Constellation (Cx) Program, a data-based approach was developed to estimate the probability of a loss of vehicle for the Ares I-X flight. This approach, called the Complexity Risk Assessment Method (CRAM), utilizes historical data to estimate the failure probability of elements of given designs. Particular elements are then combined to obtain a generic vehicle design with an associated generic failure probability. The generic failure probability is then further modified to account for features of a new launch vehicle. CRAM is used only for ascent until the vehicle is in a proper and stable orbit. This paper provides a discussion of CRAM as well as an example as applied to the Antares launch vehicle. CRAM is still being refined as part of ongoing methods development with the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) consisting of NASA, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Air Force. 1. Introduction Keywords: NASA, launch vehicle risk, Bayesian analysis, loss of mission, PLOM Previous NASA risk assessment methods involve developing a PRA model for a specific vehicle at a mature state in terms of risk. Since mature vehicle risk and the risk of the first few flights are significantly different based on historical launch records, a historical data-based approach is used to estimate the Probability of Loss of Mission (PLOM) for a new launch vehicle. Specific design elements of historical launch vehicles, such as the type of propulsion or the incorporation of strap-ons, are relevant sources of data that may be utilized to estimate a new vehicle failure probability. Therefore, it is useful to identify specific design elements of launch vehicles and to use historical data to estimate the failure probabilities of those design elements. The specific design elements can then be assembled into a generic launch vehicle that can be compared to the new launch vehicle. The failure probability for the new launch vehicle can be estimated to account for differences in risk of the design elements of the new launch vehicle as compared to the generic vehicle. The approach described in this paper utilizes probability estimates for both the first flight and the 15 th flight. A curve is then constructed that represents an ideal, vehicle-specific curve for the PLOM assuming no failures occur which allows Bayesian analysis to be used and provides consistency with observed launch vehicle experience beyond the first flight. Any failures or significant anomalies during flights would result in a Loss of Mission (LOM) above the ideal curve and could be accounted for using Bayesian analysis. *Corresponding author s email: robert.cross-1@nasa.gov 599

600 Robert Cross 2. Development of the Flight History Database Assembly of a flight history database by rocket types is the first step of CRAM. The rocket types are distiguished by the model and design elements. A sample of the database from Reference 1 is shown in Table 1, and includes: Tabulation of the number of flights for each specific vehicle type (1980 was chosen as starting point because of improvements in reliability from earlier launch history) Specification of high level design information about the design elements of each specific rocket type, including the number of stages, the type of propulsion used, etc. Tabulation of any failures associated with those flights that result in an ascent based LOM (This data is not shown in Table 1) Table 1: Sample of Launch Vehicle Database Launch Vehicle Flights Stages Solids Solid Strapons Liquid - 1st Stage Liquid - Upper Stage Liquid strap ons Athena I 4 3 2 0 0 4 0 Athena II 3 4 3 0 0 4 0 Taurus 7 4 4 0 0 0 0 The complete data includes all types of launch vehicles at various stages of maturity. The database is used in several different ways for the analysis: Estimating of the failure probabilities of particular vehicle design elements Estimating the PLOM of a generic vehicle Estimating PLOM for new vehicles Estimating the mature PLOM of a generic vehicle 3. Categorization of Vehicle Design Element Failures Based on a review of the data, the vehicle design elements that were identified and the associated failure data are provided in Table 2. Ten of the failures in Table 2 are listed as Unknown as to the cause, so they were not able to be categorized into the specific design elements listed in Table 2. Since the overall PLOM is scaled by the average new vehicle PLOM, the unknown failures do not have a direct effect on the overall PLOM. The unknown failures do, however, have an effect on the relative design element values that are used in the scaling process. The vehicle design data are used principally to estimate relative failure probability contributions to generic and new vehicles in order to estimate a relative risk difference. It should be noted that the failure descriptions in many cases are not very detailed, leading to some subjectivity for the categorization.

Estimating the Risk of a New Launch Vehicle Using Historical Design Element Data 601 Table 2: Launch Vehicle Failure History by Vehicle Element Launch Vehicle Design Element Number of Failures Avionics 7 Software 7 Stage Separation 5 Fairing Separation 4 Solid Propulsion 3 Solid strap-on 2 Structure 7 Thrust Vector Control (TVC) 2 Liquid propulsion/first stage - catastrophic 9 Liquid propulsion/first stage - benign 5 Liquid propulsion/upper stage - operational 30 Liquid propulsion/upper stage - start 6 Unknown 10 Total 97 4. New Vehicle First Flight History For new launch vehicles, the outcomes of the first 2 flights were reviewed to estimate the average PLOM. A further discriminator of whether the launch vehicle developer is experienced or not was also found to be a significant factor by the CSWG, and also used in this analysis. The results are shown below in Table 3 for New Vehicle/New Developer (New/New) and Table 4 for New Vehicle/Experienced Developer (New/Experienced). Failures in Tables 3 and 4 are listed as Loss of Mission (LOM) or Loss of Vehicle (LOV), and successes are listed as S. LOVs are considered a subset of LOM. Table 3: New/New Launch Vehicle Results Launch Vehicle 1 st Launch 2 nd Launch Falcon 1 LOV LOV Falcon 9 S S Pegasus S LOM Conestoga LOV N/A Percheron LOV N/A Dolphin LOV N/A ATK I-X S N/A AMROC LOV N/A Table 4: New/Experienced Launch Vehicle Results Launch Vehicle 1 st Launch 2 nd Launch Taurus S S Atlas 5 S S Delta IV S S Delta IV Heavy LOM S Athena I LOV S Athena II S LOV Minotaur S S

602 Robert Cross Reviewing the failures for each category in Tables 3 and 4 yields the first flight estimates shown in Table 5. These values subsequently are adjusted when a new launch vehicle is evaluated based on the complexity of the new vehicle as will be described. The more stages, engines, etc., would result in a higher than average PLOM for a new vehicle and conversely a simpler launch vehicle would result in a lower PLOM estimate. Table 5: New Launch Vehicle Historical PLOM Results Launch Vehicle Type Beta Parameter a Beta Parameter b Beta Mean Beta 5 th Percentile Beta 95 th Percentile New/New 7 4 6.36E-01 3.93E-01 8.50E-01 New/Experienced 3 11 2.14E-01 6.60E-02 4.10E-01 5. Reliability Maturity Point of a Launch Vehicle The vehicle flight data was used to estimate when the reliability of a launch vehicle became mature in terms of reliability. The first step was to try to identify an asymptotic Probability of Loss of Vehicle (PLOV) and flight number where failures remained relatively constant. PLOM and PLOV were assumed to mature at the same point in a vehicle s life cycle. To do this, both US and foreign vehicle data was used as well as crewed and uncrewed vehicles due to the limited number of US vehicles that have long flight histories. Vehicle failure probabilities were reviewed after 15, 25, 50, and 100 flights, and the results are shown in Figure 1. 5.00E-02 4.50E-02 4.00E-02 Conditional POF (after X flights) 3.50E-02 3.00E-02 2.50E-02 2.00E-02 1.50E-02 1.00E-02 5.00E-03 0.00E+00 All flights (58 vehicles, 35 US) 15 or more flights experience (20 vehicles) 25 or more flights experience (14 vehicles) 50 or more flights experience (5 vehicles) 100 or more flights (4 vehicles) Vehicle Maturity Figure 1: Launch Vehicle PLOV after a Given Number of Flights As seen in Figure 1, after the 15 th flight, the estimated failure probability reached its low point and trended up slightly for subsequent flights. Based on this evaluation, the database of launch vehicles and their corresponding failure data was separated into 2

Estimating the Risk of a New Launch Vehicle Using Historical Design Element Data 603 parts, early flights (up to 15) and later flights. For launch vehicles with at least 15 flights, the PLOV after 15 flights was estimated to be approximately 0.024 based on the data in Table 6. This point was chosen because it is the knee in the curve, and has more data associated with it than later flights. The additional failures associated with LOM (i.e., those that did not cause a LOV) were then included after 15 flights resulting in an estimate of 0.033 for PLOM. More detailed behaviors could have been evaluated to determine a more precise maturity level, but further assessment was left for future work. Table 6: Observed PLOV as a Function of Vehicle Experience Failures Flights PLOV All flights (58 vehicles) 73 1678 4.35E-02 15 or more flights experience (20 vehicles) 36 1501 2.40E-02 25 or more flights experience (14 vehicles) 30 1085 2.76E-02 50 or more flights experience (5 vehicles) 25 908 2.75E-02 100 or more flights (4 vehicles) 23 756 3.04E-02 6. Opportunities for Failure of the Design Elements With the design elements defined along with their associated number of failures, the opportunities for failure for each of the design elements were evaluated. Each type of launch vehicle was evaluated to determine its design elements, in relation to the elements identified in Section 3. Several assumptions are used in this effort: Avionics, software, and structure are included globally in that they are not broken down further. Thrust Vector Control (TVC) is assumed to consist of a pitch and yaw mechanism for each solid or liquid propulsion motor/engine. TVC is not included for Strap-on rockets. Separation events are only assumed to occur at staging. Fairing jettison is assumed to occur once on each flight. Separation related failure events associated with strap-on rockets are considered strap-on failures. Failures such as the fairing prematurely releasing are considered structural failure. Upper stage liquid propulsion is treated separately from first stage liquid propulsion, due to the complexity of the air start. In addition, failure data indicates a significant difference in the design element failure probability of the second stage. o First stage failures are further broken down into categories of benign and catastrophic. Benign failures occur due to automatic shutdowns and may not be catastrophic if engine out capability is present. A catastrophic engine failure is considered catastrophic to the launch vehicle regardless of redundancy. o Second stage is also broken down into two categories, initial start and operational failures. Engine restarts are considered operational events. The number of design element flights is the number of vehicle flights times the number of design elements on that flight. For instance, on the Space Shuttle, 2 flights would be the equivalent of 6 first stage engine flights and 4 solid rocket booster

604 Robert Cross flights. The number of design element flights related to upper stage systems is reduced in cases where a launch vehicle failed on the first stage. 7. Design Element Contributions to a Generic Vehicle From the vehicle design data and number of flights of each design element for each vehicle, the design of a generic vehicle was constructed. The vehicle and failure database was divided into early flights (less than 15) and mature flights. The total number of design elements per flight was determined by dividing the total number of design elements flown by the total number of flights using both the designs of the launch vehicles in Section 4 for new vehicles (for both experienced and new developers) and the data after 15 flights for the mature vehicle. Only a single mature vehicle is needed, because at the 15 th flight, all developers are assumed to be experienced. With a generic vehicle defined, the next step is to estimate the failure probability of the generic design. For each of the design elements, the design element failure probability contribution per flight is found by using the failure data and opportunities for the design element failure. The resulting failure contributions per design element are shown in Table 7 for new launch vehicles (only experienced developer is shown to correspond with the example of Antares), and Table 8 for a mature vehicle. The generic rocket failure probability is found by multiplying the average number of design elements (e.g., two 1 st stage engines) in the generic vehicle by the corresponding design element estimate, with the design element multiplier for avionics, software, and structure being 1.0. The TVC contribution is found by adding the total number of liquid engines and solid propulsion motors. No redundancy is assumed for the generic vehicle. Table 7: Design Element Contributions for a New/Experienced Generic Launch Vehicle Design Element Design Element Contribution Total Generic Launch Vehicle Contribution Avionics 9.38E-03 9.38E-03 Software 6.25E-03 6.25E-03 Stage Separation 7.02E-03 1.40E-02 Fairing Separation 9.77E-03 9.77E-03 Solid Propulsion 9.96E-03 1.99E-02 Solid strap-on 5.34E-04 0.00E+00 Structure 3.13E-03 3.13E-03 TVC 3.01E-04 1.23E-03 liquid propulsion/first stage - catastrophic 6.30E-03 2.70E-03 liquid propulsion/first stage - benign 1.05E-02 4.50E-03 liquid propulsion/upper stage - operational 6.57E-03 1.08E-02 liquid propulsion/upper stage - start 4.38E-03 7.20E-03 TOTALS (reliability based) 8.55E-02 For the example in this paper, US launch vehicle data was used to define the system design element contributions for the first flight, but had no failures for TVC. An estimate for TVC was assigned equal to that using US and foreign vehicles since failures had occurred in other launch vehicles. Using a Jeffrey s prior which can be

Estimating the Risk of a New Launch Vehicle Using Historical Design Element Data 605 viewed as being equivalent to assuming 0.5 failures for the TVC would yield a result of 2E-4 which is close to the assumed value. The generic launch vehicle design does not include strap-ons, so there is no contribution. Also, because the generic launch vehicle design is found by the total design elements flown divided by the number of flights, a fractional value may occur for a given design element, which is why the generic launch vehicle contributions are not necessarily a direct multiple of the design element contribution. Table 8: Design Element Contributions to a Mature Generic Launch Vehicle Total Generic Design Element Design Element Contribution Launch Vehicle Contribution Avionics 3.33E-03 3.33E-03 Software 2.66E-03 2.66E-03 Separation 6.93E-04 1.33E-03 Solid Propulsion 1.44E-03 6.66E-04 Solid strap-on 6.78E-04 6.66E-04 Structure 3.33E-03 3.33E-03 TVC 1.10E-04 6.66E-04 liquid propulsion/first stage catastrophic 2.03E-04 6.66E-04 liquid propulsion/first stage benign 6.08E-04 2.00E-03 liquid propulsion/upper stage operational 5.77E-03 1.33E-02 liquid propulsion/upper stage start 2.88E-04 6.66E-04 TOTALS (reliability based) 2.90E-02 For the mature design element contributions in Table 8, both US and foreign data was used because of the relatively low number of launch vehicles with significant flight histories and failures. 8. Estimating PLOM for a New Vehicle The generic launch vehicle total design element failure probability contribution for the first flight of a New/Experienced launch vehicle is shown in Table 7 on the TOTALS row. To estimate the first flight failure probability of a new vehicle, the estimated total design element failure probability contribution of the design elements for the new vehicle is used to modify the generic vehicle first flight PLOM. The design of the new vehicle being evaluated is used to determine its total design element failure probability as was done for the generic launch vehicle. A ratio is made of the new vehicle design element failure probability over that of the generic vehicle. This provides a relative value for complexity in terms of risk. For example, if the new vehicle has more stages, engines, etc., than the generic vehicle it would have a higher than average complexity, and the ratio would be greater than 1.0. The ratio is then used to scale the PLOM for the new vehicle class (e.g., New/Experienced). The new vehicle scaled PLOM is estimated using the following relationships. Let X = New vehicle design element total failure probability, Y = Generic vehicle design element total failure probability Z = PLOM for new vehicle class Then,

606 Robert Cross New Vehicle Scaled PLOM = (X Y) Z PLOM for a new vehicle class is one of two values from Section 4; New/New, or New/Experienced. As was indicated, it was desired to estimate a PLOM for a generic launch vehicle that could be used as a prior failure probability estimate starting with the first flight. With the 15 th flight as the assumed point where the PLOM becomes relatively stable, the next step was to establish a generic vehicle design and design element contributions for flights over 15. As with the first flight analysis, the failures were reviewed and categorized to estimate the relative design element contributions and estimate the mature generic vehicle total failure probability. 9. Estimating a PLOM Curve Using Bayesian Fitting Using the 1 st flight and 15 th flight PLOM estimates, an estimated Bayesian prior for PLOM for the first flight of a new vehicle can be constructed. Assuming zero failures from the 1 st through the 15 th flight, a beta distribution can be fit to the PLOM estimates for these flights. The most direct technique is to fit the means of the beta distribution. The subscripts 1 and 15 refer to the 1 st and 15 th flights respectively: µ 1 = a 1 (a 1 + b 1 ) µ 15 = a 1 (a 1 + b 1 + 14) These equations have 2 unknowns (a 1, b 1 ) that may be solved to estimate prior parameters for the first flight. By substituting the estimated flight values for the means the values for the beta parameters can then be determined. The determined beta distribution can then be used as a prior distribution for a vehicle and then be updated with actual fight data. 10. Estimate of the PLOM for Antares As an application of the methodology, the Antares launch vehicle was chosen. Antares is an expendable launch vehicle being developed by Orbital Sciences Corporation for NASA as a commercial provider for supplying the International Space Station. The first launch of Antares occurred in April 2013 from NASA s Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia. Antares design assumptions related to this analysis are: 2 Stages Propulsion o 2 liquid engines first stage (no engine out capability) o 1 solid motor 2 nd stage All propulsion elements have TVC Table 9 contains the number of design elements, and the corresponding failure probability contribution. No special considerations were necessary (e.g., engine out capability) for Antares, and the total design element contribution was estimated to be 0.0772. This was input to the equation for PLOM for a New/Experienced launch vehicle: Antares estimated 1 st flight failure probability = (0.0772 0.0855 ) 0.214 = 0.193

Estimating the Risk of a New Launch Vehicle Using Historical Design Element Data 607 The final part of the application was to estimate the PLOM of flights subsequent to the first flight. Similar to the analysis performed for first flight, the PLOM for the 15 th flight was estimated by accounting for historical mature design element failure probabilities of other vehicles and use the design element failure probabilities of Antares to develop a ratio and scale the generic vehicle mature PLOM. Design Element Table 9: Antares First Flight Design Element Failure Probability Estimation Antares Design Failure Probability Per Element Total Failure Probability Contribution Avionics 1 9.38E-03 9.38E-03 Software 1 6.25E-03 6.25E-03 Separation 1 7.02E-03 7.02E-03 Fairing Separation 1 9.77E-03 9.77E-03 Solid Propulsion 1 9.96E-03 9.96E-03 Solid strap-on 0 5.34E-04 0.00E+00 Structure 1 3.13E-03 3.13E-03 TVC 3 3.01E-04 9.04E-04 liquid propulsion/first stage - catastrophic 2 6.30E-03 1.26E-02 liquid propulsion/first stage - benign 2 1.05E-02 2.09E-02 liquid propulsion/upper stage - operational 0 6.57E-03 0.00E+00 liquid propulsion/upper stage - start 0 4.38E-03 0.00E+00 TOTALS (reliability based) 7.72E-02 Antares total mature design element failure probability is estimated to be 0.0133. This is then used in the equation for PLOM for the 15 th launch: Antares estimated mature failure probability = (0.0133 0.029) 0.033 = 0.0153 The PLOM of 0.0153 represents the ideal value for the 15 th flight assuming there were no failures of major anomalies that had occurred through flight 14. To estimate the curve of PLOM for flights between the first flight and the 15 th, a beta distribution was assumed for the failure probability and the parameters fit as previously described. The resulting beta parameter estimates for the first flight are a = 0.233 and b = 0.972. Using these beta parameter estimates and performing Bayesian updates with no failures provides the uncertainty ranges for the first and 15 th flights as shown in Table 10. The resulting curve is shown Figure 2. Table 10: Estimated Uncertainty Distributions for Antares Flight Number Beta Mean Beta 5 th Percentile Beta 95 th Percentile 1 st Flight 0.193 2.70E-6 0.814 15 th Flight 0.0153 1.20E-7 0.0759

608 Robert Cross 2.50E-01 2.00E-01 1.50E-01 PLOM 1.00E-01 5.00E-02 0.00E+00 1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 Flight Number Figure 2: Antares Estimated Ideal PLOM by Flight 11. Conclusions The unknowns associated with the launch of a new vehicle are significant and observed failure rates have historically been high. The number of new launch vehicles, and corresponding data, is relatively low, and therefore estimating the failure probability of a new vehicle is difficult. The CSWG has used the experience level of the developer as a discriminator, and CRAM additionally accounts for the high level design elements. The PLOM estimates from CRAM appear to be reasonable and are consistent with observed data for first flights. CRAM also uses historical data to ensure consistency after the first flight with historical data while allowing for Bayesian updating with successes, failures, and anomaly data. As previously mentioned, CRAM is still being refined. The results are highly dependent on the database of flights, and will continue to be improved as new flights occur and data becomes available. The assumption of a beta distribution is convenient in order to construct a prior distribution for the first flight; however, the properties of the lower tail are not necessarily consistent with observed data. Other distributions are being investigated that could provide a better fit with observed data. References [1]. CSMA-09-001. Ares I-X Launch Area Risk Final Flight Data Package Scenario Probability Estimates. NASA JSC - NC, May 11, 2009 Robert Cross holds a Masters Degree and Bachelor s of Science in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Florida. He has 27 years of experience primarily in risk assessment in the nuclear power, oil and gas, and aerospace industries. He is currently employed by NASA as an analyst with the NASA Safety Center.