Network Revenue Management: O&D Control Dr. Peter Belobaba

Similar documents
New Developments in RM Forecasting and Optimization Dr. Peter Belobaba

MIT ICAT. MIT ICAT M I T I n t e r n a t i o n a l C e n t e r f o r A i r T r a n s p o r t a t i o n

Evolution of Airline Revenue Management Dr. Peter Belobaba

Overview of the Airline Planning Process Dr. Peter Belobaba Presented by Alex Heiter

FLIGHT TRANSPORTATION LABORATORY REPORT R98-3 INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITIVE IMPACTS OF ORIGIN-DESTINATION CONTROL USING PODS BY: ALEX YEN HUNG LEE

Overview of PODS Consortium Research

Airline Schedule Development Overview Dr. Peter Belobaba

Network Revenue Management

Evaluation of Alternative Aircraft Types Dr. Peter Belobaba

epods Airline Management Educational Game

Istanbul Technical University Air Transportation Management, M.Sc. Program Aviation Economics and Financial Analysis Module November 2014

Route Planning and Profit Evaluation Dr. Peter Belobaba

Aviation Economics & Finance

Demand, Load and Spill Analysis Dr. Peter Belobaba

MIT ICAT M I T I n t e r n a t i o n a l C e n t e r f o r A i r T r a n s p o r t a t i o n

SERVICE NETWORK DESIGN: APPLICATIONS IN TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS

Yield Management for Competitive Advantage in the Airline Industry

Pricing and Revenue Management

Chapter 16 Revenue Management

NETWORK DEVELOPMENT AND DETERMINATION OF ALLIANCE AND JOINT VENTURE BENEFITS

Pricing Challenges: epods and Reality

Overview of Boeing Planning Tools Alex Heiter

The effective management of group

Price-Setting Auctions for Airport Slot Allocation: a Multi-Airport Case Study

Fundamentals of Airline Markets and Demand Dr. Peter Belobaba

Decision aid methodologies in transportation

Airline Scheduling Optimization ( Chapter 7 I)

Assignment 2: Route Profitability Evalua8on Michael D. Wi?man

Congestion. Vikrant Vaze Prof. Cynthia Barnhart. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology

A MAGAZINE FOR AIRLINE EXECUTIVES 2011 Issue No. 1. T a k i n g y o u r a i r l i n e t o n e w h e i g h t s. America aviation

Airline Network Structures Dr. Peter Belobaba

Airplane Value Analysis Alex Philip

PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY. Damage stability of cruise passenger ships. Submitted by the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) SUMMARY

Fundamentals of QSI. Khalid Usman Jan 28, 2014 AVIATION, AEROSPACE & DEFENCE 2012 OLIVER WYMAN

Airline Sales and Yield Management

Dynamic Fare Adjustments and Dynamic Fare Generation. Presented by Tom Gregorson

Revenue Management in a Volatile Marketplace. Tom Bacon Revenue Optimization. Lessons from the field. (with a thank you to Himanshu Jain, ICFI)

Right-Sizing: The Right Move in the Airline Business

MIT ICAT M I T I n t e r n a t i o n a l C e n t e r f o r A i r T r a n s p o r t a t i o n

Operations Research By Ben Vinod Ascend Contributor

Dynamic and Flexible Airline Schedule Design

NOTES ON COST AND COST ESTIMATION by D. Gillen

Transportation Timetabling

QUALITY OF SERVICE INDEX Advanced

CRANE CREW MANAGEMENT

2011 Sabre Airline Solutions: Airline Industry Trends Survey

AIR TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT Universidade Lusofona January 2008

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ROUTE DEVELOPMENT UNDERSTANDING AIRLINES MODULE 3

Two Major Problems Problems Crew Pairing Problem (CPP) Find a set of legal pairin Find gs (each pairing

Air Connectivity and Competition

THIRTEENTH AIR NAVIGATION CONFERENCE

Entry of Low-Cost-Airlines in Germany - Some Lessons for the Economics of Railroads and Intermodal Competition -

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ROUTE DEVELOPMENT MARKETING TO AIRLINES AND THE PERFECT PRESENTATION MODULE 10

Airlines Demand Forecasting Leveraging Ancillary Service Revenues

A Duality Based Approach for Network Revenue Management in Airline Alliances

New Market Structure Realities

QUALITY OF SERVICE INDEX

UC Berkeley Working Papers

ICAO Air Connectivity and Competition. Sijia Chen Economic Development Air Transport Bureau, ICAO

Applying Integer Linear Programming to the Fleet Assignment Problem

Hybrid Forecasting for Airline Revenue Management in Semi- Restricted Fare Structures

Including Linear Holding in Air Traffic Flow Management for Flexible Delay Handling

Airline Operating Costs Dr. Peter Belobaba

The Value of a PNR Data Warehouse

Partnership Proposal. Phases & Timetable. easyjet. Thursday, December 2, 2004

Istanbul Technical University Air Transportation Management, M.Sc. Program Aviation Economics and Financial Analysis Module 2 18 November 2013

The Fall of Frequent Flier Mileage Values in the U.S. Market - Industry Analysis from IdeaWorks

From Planning to Operations Dr. Peter Belobaba

UNIT TITLE: CONSTRUCT AND TICKET DOMESTIC AIRFARES

CRUISE TABLE OF CONTENTS

Alliances, Open Skies And Antitrust Immunity

Jeppesen Pairing & Rostering

Introduction: Airline Industry Overview Dr. Peter Belobaba Presented by: Alex Heiter & Ali Hajiyev

Airline Overbooking Considering Passengers Willingness to Pay

A Conversation with... Brett Godfrey, CEO, Virgin Blue

Airline Scheduling: An Overview

Approximate Network Delays Model

Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Transportation Conference. June 16, 2010

2010 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING. May 4, 2010

Given the challenges, airlines would far prefer to have ample capacity and no slot constraints.

Measuring the Business of the NAS

SIMAIR: A STOCHASTIC MODEL OF AIRLINE OPERATIONS

2/11/2010 7:08 AM. Concur Travel Service Guide Southwest Direct Connect

MIT ICAT. Price Competition in the Top US Domestic Markets: Revenues and Yield Premium. Nikolas Pyrgiotis Dr P. Belobaba

Airline Performance and Capacity Strategies Dr. Peter Belobaba

Introduction to Fleet Planning Dr. Peter Belobaba and Ali Hajiyev

Vista Vista consultation workshop. 23 October 2017 Frequentis, Vienna

Directional Price Discrimination. in the U.S. Airline Industry

Schedule Compression by Fair Allocation Methods

Runway Length Analysis Prescott Municipal Airport

FAQs Optional Payment Charge (OPC)

Chapter 2 Selected Topics in Revenue Management

customer sales and service: the key to an airline s profitable future

Establishes a fare structure for Tacoma Link light rail, to be implemented in September 2014.

MIT ICAT. Fares and Competition in US Markets: Changes in Fares and Demand Since Peter Belobaba Celian Geslin Nikolaos Pyrgiotis

Airport Slot Capacity: you only get what you give

Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc.

Gerry Laderman SVP Finance, Procurement and Treasurer

Chapter 8.0 Implementation Plan

Citi Industrials Conference

Transcription:

Network Revenue Management: O&D Control Dr. Peter Belobaba Istanbul Technical University Air Transportation Management M.Sc. Program Network, Fleet and Schedule Strategic Planning Module 23 : 4 April 2015

Background: Fare Class Control Majority of world airlines still practice fare class control : High-yield ( full ) fare types in top booking classes Lower yield ( discount ) fares in lower classes Designed to maximize yields, not total revenues Seats for connecting itineraries must be available in same class across all flight legs: Airline cannot distinguish among itineraries Bottleneck legs can block long haul passengers 2

Yield-Based Fare Class Structure (Example) BOOKING CLASS Y B M Q V FARE PRODUCT TYPE Unrestricted "full" fares Discounted one-way fares 7-day advance purchase round-trip excursion fares 14-day advance purchase round-trip excursion fares 21-day advance purchase or special promotional fares 3

O-D Control Example: Hub Network JFK HKG LH300 FRA LH200 NCE LH100 4

Leg-Based Class Availability FLIGHT LEG INVENTORIES LH 100 NCE-FRA LH 200 FRA-HKG LH 300 FRA-JFK CLASS AVAILABLE CLASS AVAILABLE CLASS AVAILABLE Y 32 Y 142 Y 51 B 18 B 118 B 39 M 0 M 97 M 28 Q 0 Q 66 Q 17 V 0 V 32 V 0 ITINERARY/FARE AVAILABILITY NCE/FRA LH 100 Y B NCE/HKG LH 100 Y B LH 200 Y B M Q V NCE/JFK LH 100 Y B LH 300 Y B M Q 5

Leg Class Control Does Not Maximize Total Network Revenues (A) SEAT AVAILABILITY: SHORT HAUL BLOCKS LONG HAUL NCE/FRA NCE/HKG (via FRA) NCE/JFK (via FRA) CLASS FARE (OW) CLASS FARE (OW) CLASS FARE (OW) Y $450 Y $1415 Y $950 B $380 B $975 B $710 M $225 M $770 M $550 Q $165 Q $590 Q $425 V $135 V $499 V $325 (B) SEAT AVAILABILITY: LOCAL VS. CONNECTING PASSENGERS NCE/FRA FRA/JFK NCE/JFK (via FRA) CLASS FARE (OW) CLASS FARE (OW) CLASS FARE (OW) Y $450 Y $920 Y $950 B $380 B $670 B $710 M $225 M $515 M $550 Q $165 Q $385 Q $425 V $135 V $315 V $325 6

O-D Control Optimization Quiz QUESTION: With 1 seat available on each flight leg, which of these 4 O-D requests should we accept to maximize network revenue? JFK LH300 Discount B Fare NCE-JFK $710 Deep Discount V Fare FRA-JFK $315 FRA LH200 Discount Q Fare NCE-HKG $590 HKG Full Y Fare NCE-FRA $450 LH100 NCE 7

What is O-D Control? The capability to respond to different O-D requests with different seat availability. Can be implemented in a variety of ways: Revenue value buckets ( greedy approach ) EMSR heuristic bid price (HBP) Displacement adjusted virtual nesting (DAVN) Network probabilistic bid price control (ProBP) All of the above can increase revenues, but each one has implementation trade-offs. 8

Marginal Value of Last Seat on a Leg Marginal value concept is basis of leg RM: Accept booking in fare class if revenue value exceeds marginal value of last (lowest valued) remaining available seat on the flight leg In network RM, need to estimate marginal network value of last seat on each leg: Can be used as displacement cost of a connecting vs. local passenger Or, as a minimum acceptable bid price for the next booking on each leg 9

Marginal Network Value of Last Seat EMSR($) ODF #1 ODF #1,2 EMSRc ODF #1,2,3 0 Available Seats Seats 10

Displacement Adjusted Network Value Actual value of an ODIF to network revenue on a leg is less than or equal to its total fare: Connecting passengers can displace revenue on down-line (or up-line) legs Given estimated down-line displacement, ODFs are ranked based on network value on each leg: Network value on Leg 1 = Total fare minus sum of down-line leg displacement costs Under high demand, availability for connecting passengers is reduced, locals get more seats Network optimization mathematics needed to estimate displacement costs for each flight leg 11

O-D Optimization Concepts Conceptual steps in O+D optimization process ODIFs are ranked according to their network revenue value, regardless of fare restrictions Network revenue values account for displacement of passengers (and revenue) on connecting legs Bid price calculated for each flight leg in network, reflecting marginal value of remaining seat(s) Or, booking limits calculated to determine seat availability by revenue value virtual bucket In the following FRA hub example, we focus on the NCE-FRA leg to illustrate this process 12

Ranking by ODIF Revenue Value RANKING ODIFs ON NCE-FRA LEG RANK FARE ODIF DEMAND 1 $ 1,415 Y NCEHKG 2 $ 975 B NCEHKG 3 $ 950 Y NCEJFK 4 $ 770 M NCEHKG 5 $ 710 B NCEJFK 6 $ 590 Q NCEHKG 7 $ 550 M NCEJFK 8 $ 499 V NCEHKG 9 $ 450 Y NCEFRA 10 $ 425 Q NCEJFK 11 $ 380 B NCEFRA 12 $ 325 V NCE JFK 13 $ 225 M NCEFRA 14 $ 165 Q NCEFRA 15 $ 135 V NCEFRA 13

Ranking with Displacement Adjustment RANKING ODIFs ON NCE-FRA LEG ($500 DISPLACEMENT COST FRA-HKG) RANK FARE ODIF DEMAND 1 $ 950 Y NCEJFK 2 $ 915 Y NCEHKG 3 $ 710 B NCEJFK 4 $ 550 M NCEJFK 5 $ 475 B NCEHKG 6 $ 450 Y NCEFRA 7 $ 425 Q NCEJFK 8 $ 380 B NCEFRA 9 $ 325 V NCE JFK 10 $ 270 M NCEHKG 11 $ 225 M NCEFRA 12 $ 165 Q NCEFRA 13 $ 135 L NCEFRA 14 $ 90 Q NCEHKG 15 $ (1) V NCEHKG 14

Ranking with Displacement Adjustment RANKING ODIFs ON NCE-FRA LEG ($500 DISPLACEMENT COST FRA-HKG) ($300 DISPLACEMENT COST FRA-JFK) RANK FARE ODIF DEMAND 1 $ 915 Y NCEHKG 2 $ 650 Y NCEJFK 3 $ 475 B NCEHKG 4 $ 450 Y NCEFRA 5 $ 410 B NCEJFK 6 $ 380 B NCEFRA 7 $ 270 M NCEHKG 8 $ 250 M NCEJFK 9 $ 225 M NCEFRA 10 $ 165 Q NCEFRA 11 $ 135 L NCEFRA 12 $ 125 Q NCEJFK 13 $ 90 Q NCEHKG 14 $ 25 V NCE JFK 15 $ (1) V NCEHKG 15

Ranking with Displacement Adjustment NCE-FRA LEG BID PRICE = $200 RANKING ODIFs ON NCE-FRA LEG ($500 DISPLACEMENT COST FRA-HKG) ($300 DISPLACEMENT COST FRA-JFK) RANK FARE ODIF DEMAND 1 $ 915 Y NCEHKG 2 $ 650 Y NCEJFK 3 $ 475 B NCEHKG 4 $ 450 Y NCEFRA 5 $ 410 B NCEJFK 6 $ 380 B NCEFRA 7 $ 270 M NCEHKG 8 $ 250 M NCEJFK 9 $ 225 M NCEFRA 10 $ 165 Q NCEFRA 11 $ 135 L NCEFRA 12 $ 125 Q NCEJFK 13 $ 90 Q NCEHKG 14 $ 25 V NCE JFK 15 (1) $ V 16 NCEHKG ACCEPT REJECT 16

Virtual Class Mapping with Displacement FARE VALUES BY ITINERARY NCE/FRA NCE/HKG (via FRA) NCE/JFK (via FRA) CLASS FARE (OW) CLASS FARE (OW) CLASS FARE (OW) Y $450 Y $1415 Y $950 B $380 B $975 B $710 M $225 M $770 M $550 Q $165 Q $590 Q $425 V $135 V $499 V $325 MAPPING OF ODFs ON NCE/FRA LEG TO VIRTUAL VALUE CLASSES VIRTUAL REVENUE MAPPING OF CLASS RANGE O-D MARKETS/CLASSES 1 1200 + Y NCEHKG 2 900-1199 B NCEHKG Y NCEJFK 3 750-899 M NCEHKG 4 600-749 B NCEJFK 5 500-599 Q NCEHKG M NCEJFK 6 430-499 V NCEHKG Y NCEFRA 7 340-429 B NCEFRA Q NCEJFK 8 200-339 V NCEJFK M NCEFRA 9 150-199 Q NCEFRA 10 0-149 V NCEFRA Displacement Adjustment 17

Alternative Mechanism: Bid Price Under value bucket control, accept ODF if its network value falls into an available bucket: Network Value > Value of Last Seat on Leg; or Fare - Displacement > Value of Last Seat Same decision rule can be expressed as: Fare > Value of Last Seat + Displacement, or Fare > Minimum Acceptable Bid Price for ODF Much simpler inventory control mechanism than virtual buckets: Simply need to store bid price value for each leg Evaluate ODF fare vs. itinerary bid price at time of request Must revise bid prices frequently to prevent too many bookings of ODFs at current bid price 18

Example: Bid Price Control A-------B-------C-------D Given leg bid prices A-B: $35 B-C: $240 C-D: $160 Availability for O-D requests B-C: Bid Price = $240 Available? Y $440 Yes M $315 Yes B $223 No Q $177 No 19

Example: Bid Price Control A-B: $35 B-C: $240 C-D: $160 A-C Bid Price = $275 Available? Y $519 Yes M $374 Yes B $292 Yes Q $201 No A-D Bid Price = $435 Available? Y $582 Yes M $399 No B $322 No Q $249 No 20

Network Optimization Methods Network optimization mathematics needed for both bid price and value bucket controls. Several optimization methods to consider: Deterministic Linear Programming Nested Probabilistic Network Bid Price Dynamic Programming (applied to each leg after displacement adjustment) Simulated revenue gains are quite similar: ODF database, forecast accuracy and robustness under realistic conditions make a bigger difference 21

Network LP (Deterministic) Maximize Total Revenue = Sum [Fare * Seats] Summed over all ODFs on network Subject to following constraints: Seats for each ODF <= Mean Forecast Demand Sum[Seats on Each Leg] <= Leg Capacity Outputs of LP solution: Seats allocated to each ODF (not useful) Shadow price on each leg (reflects network revenue value of last seat on each flight leg) Used as estimates of displacement cost for all connecting ODFs, for virtual nesting controls 22

O-D Control System Components Much more than an optimization model: Database Requirements: Leg/bucket vs. ODF. Forecasting Models: Level of detail to match data; detruncation and estimation methods. Optimization Model: Leg-based or network tools; deterministic vs. probabilistic; dynamic programs Control Mechanism: Booking classes vs. value buckets vs. bid price control. Many effective combinations are possible: Revenue gain, not optimality, is the critical issue. 23

Overview of O-D System Alternatives Data & Forecasting Optimization Process Availability Control Flight Leg by Class/Bucket Leg EMSR Heuristic Bid Price Control Historical O-D Ticket Data Displacement Adjustment Leg Bucket Availability (LP) Leg DP PNR-based Forecasts by ODIF and date Network Optimization (LP, ProBP) (ProBP) Network Bid Price Control 24

Potential for O-D Control Simulations show potential O-D revenue gain: As much as 1-2% additional gain over leg/class control under ideal simulation conditions Network characteristics affect O-D benefits: Substantial connecting traffic required High demand factors on at least some feeder legs Greater benefits with greater demand variability CRS seamless availability links essential: Different responses to different ODF requests 25

Incremental Revenue Gains of 1-2% O-D Control vs. Leg/Class RM 2.50% 2.00% 1.50% 1.00% HBP DAVN PROBP 0.50% 0.00% 70% 78% 83% 87% Network Load Factor 26

Additional Benefits of O-D Control Simulation research and actual airline experience clearly demonstrate revenue gains of O-D control Return on investment huge; payback period short Even 1% in additional revenue goes directly to bottom line O-D control provides strategic and competitive benefits beyond network revenue gains Real possibility of revenue loss without O-D control Improved protection against low-fare competitors Enhanced capabilities for e-commerce and distribution Ability to better coordinate RM with alliance partners 27

Competitive Impacts of O-D Methods Implementation of O-D control can have negative revenue impacts on competitor: Continued use of basic FCYM by Airline B against O-D methods used by Airline A results in revenue losses for B Not strictly a zero-sum game, as revenue gains of Airline A exceed revenue losses of Airline B Other PODS simulation results show both airlines can benefit from using more sophisticated O-D control Failure to implement network RM (O-D control) can actually lead to revenue losses against competitor! 28

1.50% 1.25% 1.00% 0.75% 0.50% 0.25% 0.00% -0.25% -0.50% -0.75% -1.00% Competitive Impacts of O-D Control Network ALF=83%, Airline B with Basic YM HBP DAVN PROBP Airline A Airline B 29

Response to Low-Fare Competition Under basic leg/fare class RM, no control over different O-D markets booking in each class With low-fare competitor, matching fares requires assignment to specific fare class Fare class shared by all O-D itineraries using same flight leg and supply of seats With O-D control, bookings are limited by network revenue value, not fare type or restrictions Low matching fares will still be available on empty flights But will not displace higher revenue network passengers 30

Changing Distribution Channels O-D control also allows for improved control of bookings by distribution channel Differential valuation of origin-destination-fare requests from a growing variety of alternative distribution options Each new distribution channel represents an opportunity to increase revenues, but also a major risk of revenue dilution Different costs and net revenue values to the airline In e-commerce, RM fundamentals are unchanged Forecast and protect seats for high revenue ODF requests Use O-D control to accept bookings only from channels and points of sale that will increase total network revenues 31

Summary: Airline O-D RM Systems O-D control is the 4th generation of RM: Data collection, forecasting, optimization and control by origindestination-fare type as well as distribution channel Not just a revenue enhancement tool, a strategic and competitive necessity for airlines: Incremental network revenue gains of 1-2% over basic RM Essential to protect against revenue loss to competitors Increased control of valuable inventory in the face of pricing pressures, new distribution channels, and strategic alliances 32