Paul Clayton Air New Zealand

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Transcription:

Paul Clayton Air New Zealand

External Threats Expected Events and Risks Unexpected Events and Risks External Error Internal Threats Crew-Based Errors CRM Behaviors Threat Recognition and Error Avoidance Behaviors Error Detection and Response Behaviors Outcomes Safe Flight Recovery to Safe Flight Additional Error Incident Accident Courtesy - University of Texas

Error Types Intentional Noncompliance Procedural Communication Proficiency Operational Decision Error Responses Trap Exacerbate Fail to Respond Error Outcomes Inconsequential Undesired Aircraft State Additional Error Courtesy - University of Texas

Error Types Intentional Noncompliance Procedural Communication Proficiency Operational Decision Error Responses Trap Exacerbate Fail to Respond Error Outcomes Inconsequential Undesired Aircraft State Additional Error Undesired State Responses Mitigate Exacerbate Fail to Respond Recovery Undesired State Outcomes Incident/ Accident Additional Error Courtesy - University of Texas

System -- Organizational -- Professional Latent Systemic Threats External Threats External Threats Known Unexpected External Error Actions Error Action Threat Recognition and Error Avoidance Behaviors Intentional Noncompliance Procedural Communication Proficiency Operational Decision Trap- Exacerbate- Fail to Respond Outcomes Inconsequential Undesired Aircraft State Additional Error Actions Mitigate Exacerbate Fail to Respond Final Outcome Recovery Incident/ Accident Additional Error Courtesy - University of Texas

AIR NEW ZEALAND THREAT & ERROR MANAGEMENT (TEM)

The Rain of Threat and Error External Events External Errors System Defenses CRM Crew Threat Recognition and Error Avoidance Behaviors Flightcrew Errors CRM Crew Error Detection and Management Behaviors Incident / Accident Courtesy - University of Texas

The Concept of the PRISTINE Flight What is it? A flight where nothing goes wrong A flight goes entirely as planned good weather no delays no fatigue no passenger demands nothing out of the ordinary boring!! Does it ever happen??? Courtesy Continental Airlines

What is a threat? Anything that causes a variation to a Pristine Flight

WX Fatigue Cabin Crew Ground Crew Heavy Traffic Unfamiliar Airport Distractions Passenger Events THREATS Missed Approach ATC Terrain Personality Conflicts Similar Call-sign Time Pressure Under-performing Crew Member Flight Diversion External Human Error Automation Event Corporate Pressure System Malfunction

TEM Model THREATS Time/Options Strategies ERRORS Resist Resolve Decreasing CONSEQUENCE Courtesy: Continental Airlines

TEM Principles Recognition of threats Threat management strategies Verbalisation Prioritise flying, deal with threat Planning, briefing, SA reviews Error trapping SOPs, Vol 1 procedures adherence Checklists what am I checking? SA reviews Error Management Immediate actions & Error review Creating right environment Open communication & Encourage feedback Setting standards

17 Threat and Error Management THREATS: Baro VNAV - QNH setting Radar vectors: vertical mode? MCP altitude window? TOGA to LNAV

Route Guide example - SYD WARNING AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL * Air Navigation Regulations apply, which include the use of specific arrival and departure corridors refer Jeppesen for details. ADVERSE CONDITIONS * Visibility reduces in fog (autumn, winter, and spring), and with dust in North west winds. * Turbulence can be severe in South west winds, and strong North west winds, on hot days. CAUTION * Large flocks of birds in vicinity of aerodrome. * Stringent noise abatement procedures apply refer Jeppesen for details. * During arrivals, aircraft must fly within and not deviate from designated flight corridor, except when instructed or approved by ATC for safety reasons. * Extensive holding can occur during peak periods. When a delay of more than 5 minutes is expected, ATC will advise expected landing, delay, or onwards clearance time as appropriate. * ILS PRM Approaches: * Air NZ approved, provided the Captain and First Officer have successfully completed the Precision Runway Monitor training package. * Descent/Approach brief must include reference to Jeppesen Terminal Sydney ILS PRM USER INSTRUCTIONS page. * Ensure PRM ILS approach chart is used, as opposed to standard ILS chart. * Simultaneous Close Parallel RWY operations may be in force. Refer Jeppesen SYD pages for procedures and terminology. Aircraft up to and including B767/A300 size may be processed to land on either of the parallel RWYs 16L/R or 34L/R. * TCAS RA s may be experienced during parallel RWY operations. Consider using TA Only Mode. Refer to SOPs. * Aircraft which operationally require to use either 16R or 34L should notify ATC prior to TOD. * Go around procedures from a visual approach in VMC must follow the instrument procedure for the primary instrument approach for that RWY, or proceed as directed by ATC.

THREATS General *Obstacle. There is one significant obstacle in the vicinity of the airport. *B777 300. Ground restrictions may apply. Refer Jepp airport pages. Route Guide example - SYD Arrival Specific *ATC. During arrivals, aircraft must not deviate outside designated flight corridors, except when instructed or approved by ATC for safety reasons. *Navigation: ILS PRM approaches: *Air New Zealand approved, provided the captain and first officer have successfully completed the Precision Runway Monitor training package. *Descent/Approach brief must include reference to Jeppesen Terminal Sydney ILS PRM USER INSTRUCTIONS page. *Ensure PRM ILS approach chart is used, as opposed to standard ILS chart. *Parallel runway operations. Simultaneous close parallel runway operations may be in force. Refer Jeppesen SYD pages for procedures and terminology. Aircraft up to and including B767/A300 size may be processed to land on either of the parallel runways 16L/R or 34L/R. *Unstable ILS Indications Runway 16R. Aircraft taxiing in the vicinity of the GS antenna, located inside the main taxiway, may cause unexpected pitch downs and associated GS fail flag for aircraft on approach. *VMC go around. Go around procedures from a visual approach in VMC must follow the instrument procedure for the primary instrument approach for that runway, or proceed as directed by ATC. Departure Specific *Taxiway restrictions. Numerous TWY restrictions apply.

Other examples

Other examples

Other examples Realistic communication scenarios are to be introduced - this means that the Instructor may interrupt briefings or procedures at any stage to pass on instructions or information. This provides realism and highlights the need for Threat and Error management skills. B737 Flight Instructor Guide Inclusion of 15 minute Human Factors module focussing on TEM during 6 monthly recurrent simulator training. It is important we learn from our human factor based events, especially the identification of the types of errors and any conditions surrounding the error/s. KORUSAFE (AIR NEW ZEALAND FLIGHT SAFETY MAGAZINE) Foremost in the development of joint and focussed recurrent training during Emergency Procedures day.

06_SI_122

06_SI_122

Threat Management There were a number of threats the crew were faced with and had to manage, namely: 1. The work in progress at the end of 4L. 2. A different taxi route to the terminal when leaving runway 4R than the crew had previously been accustomed to. 3. Night time operation with the lack of signage and lighting on taxiway C on the southern side of runway 8L. 4. Jeppesen Ground Chart for HNL Airport. 06_SI_122

Recommendations 1. It is recommended that the Manager Human Factors uses this event along with the following points for discussion in future recurrent flight crew CRM training: Distraction management; while trying to look for the taxiway lights on the other side of runway 8L the crew allowed themselves to become distracted by the Aloha B737 aircraft on the runway. The use of ATC as a mitigation measure; if the ground controller had been queried about the status of the lights and the offset on the other side of 08L, the flight crew would have been given the information enabling a better management of the threat. Language; the ground controller gave the instruction to cross runway 8L very quickly (this is a common practice and is familiar to all crews that operate to the US). While the clearance was discussed among the crew and the correct route identified, part of the clearance was misinterpreted. 06_SI_122