Memphis International Airport 2013 Triennial Emergency Exercise After Action Report Part of this document has been redacted pursuant to 49 CFR 1520 Protection of Sensitive Security Information. Triennial Emergency Exercise Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority Submitted by Walter Mac Harper Operations Duty Manager & Exercise Coordinator
Introduction The Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority held its Full-Scale Triennial Emergency Exercise, as required by 14 CFR Part 139, on Monday, September 9 th, 2013. The date and approximate time were previously announced, however the exact location was less-widely known. The exercise was designed to test and evaluate the Airport Emergency Plan and to provide feedback and recommendations on the improvement of the emergency plan and ways to enhance the training for responding members. For the purpose of the Triennial, a simulated MD-88 was used since it is the most critical passenger aircraft serving Memphis International Airport that is indicative to ARFF Index C. Scenario Unlucky Airlines Flight #13, an MD-88 with 150 souls on board (6 crew members and 144 passengers) while on final approach to Runway 36C is struck by a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) causing the aircraft to loose directional control and crash. The aircraft came to rest on the Taxiway J Runup Pad and erupted into flames. Interjectors 1. Terrorists are in the vicinity of McKellar Park 2. One of the passengers onboard is a prisoner transport 3. The US Treasury Department is shipping a large sum of cash Priority I (Red) - 23 Priority II (Yellow) - 34 Priority III (Green) - 56 Priority IV (Black) - 37 Total 150 Casualties Source: FAA Advisory Circular 150/5200-31C, Airport Emergency Plan, Table 7-2. Estimated Casualties Exercise Objectives Primary areas of focus included: Mass casualty response, including: o Establishment of Unified Incident Command o Proper set-up of the scene and emergency equipment o Triage, treatment, & transport of victims in an effective, timely manner (Golden Hour).
Simulation Errors During the execution of the Triennial a number of Simulation Errors occurred the affected the response to the accident. Although they were not serious in nature they are provided here to address any concerns that one may have. Dispatching of the Alert III This occurred due to a miscommunication from the Triennial Exercise Coordinator and Airport Communication on how the Triennial Exercise would be dispatched. Due to the misunderstanding, airport authority were not dispatched by Airport Communications and instead self-dispatched to respond. ARFF Units were dispatched via the Crash Phone and were not impacted by this error. Victim Injury Cards looked similar to Triage Cards Every volunteer playing a victim was given an injury card describing their injury. Like the Triage Cards the fire fighters and paramedics would use, the Injury Cards had a silhouette of a body to identify where the injury was located. During the Triennial, some victims were not triaged due to the responders mistaking the Injury Card as being a Triage Card. Buses used as Ambulances Department of Treasury Money This was an interjector intended to be used to test how responders would handle finding a large sum of money being shipped by the Treasury Department. Due to not having actual money containers, an Ammo Can was painted black and labeled with US Department of Treasury and included fake money. The responders viewed it as a suspicious item and left it in place. No Gun for Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) that was transporting a prisoner This interjector was to test police response to a prisoner being transported on an aircraft and not needing to go to the hospital. The decision was made to not include a gun for the LEO to prevent any active shooter scenarios at the crash site. Responders could not find a gun on the LEO and attempted to search the wreckage for the gun that never existed.
Exercise Response
Initial Response Triennial started at 9:50 A.M. A1 arrived first on scene at 9:53 A.M. and discharged water then established the Incident Command Post approximately 300 feet to the West of the accident site. A2 & A3 were the second and third units to respond and arrived at 9:53 A.M. and remained North of the aircraft throughout the exercise. Initially the Emergency Trailer arrived and started to be setup approximately 300 feet to the East of the Accident Site. It was then decided to be moved to the North of the Accident Site where it remained. This placed it in the downwind position of the Accident Site. Incident Command The Director of Maintenance arrived at the Incident Command Post established by A1 and established himself as the Scene Manager. Initially the Mobile Command Post arrived at the Incident Command Site where a tent had been placed and then was moved to North of the Emergency Trailer where it remained. At 10:44 A.M. the Operations Duty Manager, Airport Police Sergeant, and interim Airfield Maintenance Manager relocated to the Mobile Incident Command Post North of the Crash Site. Both Incident Command Posts had green lights on indicating where the Incident Command Post was. At 11:22 A.M. the Operations Duty Manager, Airport Police Sergeant, and interim Airfield Maintenance Manager relocated back to the original Incident Command Post located on the West side of the Accident Site. Triage/Treatment/Transport Unit 19 responded and setup the treatment area North of the Accident Site. This placed Medical in the downwind position of the Accident Site. Triage began by responding firefighters and paramedics soon after the fire was extinguished. Treatment Area was established utilizing the Emergency Trailer with Red, Yellow, and Green Tarps for each category of injury. The Transport Trailer and Deer Carts were utilized to bring multiple patients from the Accident Site to the Treatment Area. Triage was completed by 10:50 A.M. and all patients were at the Treatment area. Several Ambulances and the Ambu-bus arrived to simulate the transport of patients to area hospitals and were staged North of the Emergency Trailer. Patients that were being transported to put on busses to get to the local hospitals
Evaluator Comments MFD Evaluator Note: We authorized removal of turnout coats and SCBA once fire was extinguished. Mostly well. Some confusion, such as possible bomb. Airport Ops left Unified Command and relocated on other side of incident. Airport Ops Evaluator A MX/Phil identified himself at IC for the airport. Relocated trailers (command & emerg) downwind due to no hazmat & fire out. Relocate to AP Command Trailer 1044 Bomb found as of 1110 no talk about evac area. Relocated back to IC at 1122 Airport Index considerations for closures Medical Evaluator Fire out in first 5 minutes. Aircraft cleared in 10 minutes. Triage started after aircraft cleared delayed while vests put on. Need to yell for walking wounded to walk to TX Area. Triage & TX no identified some FF s didn t know. AMR transported 1 st red at 40 min. Morgue setup while live patients still on field. Field cleared in 1 hr (1050). All patients at TX area. Contamination tags left on triage tags. Airport Police Evaluator MAPD provided escorts of emergency equipment to and from incident. Overall the Alert III exercise was very well planned operationally and the response times were good! The only concern that jumped out was the location of the Command Post. Mainly I could not identify where the command post was located later during the exercise there were two command posts in two different locations. Determining the proper location of the command center is very important element of the exercise.
Recommendations Establish an Airport Emergency Planning Committee to include Airport Operations, Airport Maintenance, Airport Police, Airport Communication, ARFF, Medical, and Airline Representatives; to plan and evaluate the Airport Emergency Plan and to coordinate training with the various responding groups on the Airport Emergency Plan, which should include Orientation Seminars and Functional Exercises. Ensure that new personnel that have a role in the Airport Emergency Plan are properly trained and signed off before assuming that role during an actual emergency. The neck-braces that are duct taped to the backboards came off many of the backboards and weren t used. By replacing the duct tape with Velcro that is epoxied to the backboards the neck braces would be more likely to remain intact and be easily removed. For further information, questions, or comments, please contact: