Tourism: Improving Economic Performance

A Tourism: Improving Economic Performance Mozambique s prospects as a high quality beach and tropical island destination supported by the attraction of exceptional marine ecology and Maputo s potential to position itself as an emerging regional MICE (meetings, incentives, conferences and events) destination are clear opportunities for economic growth. The GOM has identified this potential and set a target of four million tourists by 2020 (in 2006 tourist numbers were close to one million). However, tourism s current economic performance is well below what it could be and investments in the sector have been slow to mature (only 18% of approved tourism investments between 2005 and 2007 have actually materialized 1 ). Recent sector studies 2 and interviews with stakeholders confirm that three over-riding reasons are contributing to weak economic performance and slow-to-materialize investments: a) the absence of large international investments capable of driving high value markets, building local supply chains, building international awareness and PR for the destination; b) high input costs and low productivity in current tourism businesses; c) sub-optimal use of existing resources and attractions. This section explores the underlying causes for weak performance and suggests remedial strategies. 1. Current economic performance: well below potential On potential In the mid-1960s Mozambique annually welcomed over 400,000 tourists (surpassing the number for Kenya at the time) split roughly 50/50 between those originating in southern Africa and Portugal. Mozambique was an important cruise ship port-of-call and was considered one of the premier tourism destinations in Africa renowned for the world-class wildlife in Gorongosa National Park (then more well-known than Serengeti), its tropical beaches and the cosmopolitan cities of Beira and Lorenzo Marques (now Maputo). During a turbulent two decades between 1973 and 1992 tourist numbers declined, tourism infrastructure was destroyed and wildlife resources, especially large mammal species, were decimated by soldiers on both sides in the civil war. However, there are signs that improved management and wildlife protection in national parks through the World Bank/GEF Transfrontier Conservation Areas Project and partnerships with NGOs such as the Norman Carr Foundation, Peace Parks Foundation, African Wildlife Foundation and World Wildlife Fund are leading to a growth in mammal populations and hence the potential of these areas to attract tourists and investment. While terrestrial wildlife suffered, marine life was left alone and has thrived. The coral reef system off the coast of Mozambique, the quality, diversity of marine life and ease of access to it offer outstanding tourism resources. The beaches along the coastline and the island archipelagoes launching points for the access to the marine underworld are still pristine. Mozambique is recognized 3 as one of the top five diving and snorkeling destinations in the world: the only place where a marine big six can be seen; dugong, several dolphin species, whale shark, all four sea turtle species, the hump-backed whale, and five different species of rays including the giant manta rays whose wing spans can exceed five meters. These marine species are more or less permanent residents in the shallow reef waters off the coast and many are guaranteed sightings by average ocean safari goers. 1 Data from FUTUR. 2 2006 FIAS Tourism Value Chain Assessment (Volumes I & II) 3 August 2006: Conde Nast Traveller: The World s Top Ten Dive Destinations

Driven by the growing numbers of business visitors over the past decade, Maputo is also reviving its cosmopolitan city reputation and atmosphere. Whilst there have been developments a world class conference centre, casino complex, restaurants, bars, nightclubs, and shopping malls very few new international standard business hotels have been built in the past five years and there are only two investments in the pipeline (a proposed Sheraton and the expansion of the Holiday Inn). Despite its enormous potential, it must be recognized that Mozambique is a fledgling tourism destination that is yet to gain sufficient socio political capital and momentum to drive major government commitment and investments. On current economic performance In broad terms tourism s contribution to GDP in Mozambique is below average, particularly for coastal countries. Direct tourism revenue was recently calculated at 1.8% of GDP 4 (US$ 144 million in export earnings in 2006) putting Mozambique well below some high performing countries (e.g. Tanzania 9.7%, South Africa 7.6%, and Mauritius 32%) and less than half the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (3.9%). Other aggregate indicators such as average expenditure and average length of stay also show below average performance. a) Average expenditure per foreign tourist (US$) b) Average length of stay per foreign tourist (days) B Tanzania South Africa Mauritius Namibia Kenya Botswana Zambia Mozambique 1270 1180 1220 800 690 570 376 255 1790 Seychelles 10.5 Seychelles Tanzania South Africa Mauritius Namibia Kenya Botswana Zambia Mozambique 12 12.5 11 12 10.2 5.5 6 4.7 0 500 100 0 Source: World Economic Forum Tables 2007 (from immigration data, various years) 150 0 200 0 0 5 10 15 Overall tourism volumes were estimated at nearly half a million in 2004 and official statistics claim over a million tourists in 2006 5, but it should be mentioned that the number of ports of entry where data is collected doubled in 2005. Whilst it is difficult to assess growth rates due to this unreliable data, one million visitors are significant and it is critical to assess why the economic performance is relatively poor, or, as the data shows, why expenditure per tourist and length of stay per tourist are as low as they are. Despite the absence of recent immigration data 4 August 2007: The Economic Contribution of Tourism in Mozambique, Sam Jones and Hanifa Ibrahimo, Ministério de Planificação e Desenvolvimento, Mozambique. 5 No report has officially been published, this figure is mentioned in the budget speech and in the statistical abstract of 2006.

extensive tourist expenditure surveys were conducted in 2007 6 at eight main entry ports, including four international airports. With a total sample size of 3845, this data provides valuable demand-side insight. Based on research complied in 2004, 90% of Mozambique s visitors originated in other African countries with South Africans and Zimbabweans making up 80% of this figure. Europeans and Americans account for 8.3% of visitors. 87% of visitors arrive by car (or truck or bus) and only 6% of visitors fly into Mozambique. The trends from the sample survey data of 2007 show that the visitors from other African countries reduced to 75% and 70% arrived by car. Combining the 2004 data with the 2007 survey, Mozambique s current demand profile breaks down into four distinct categories; (i) high end foreign tourists going to the island resorts in the Bazaruto and Quirimbas archipelagoes and some coastal resorts in Pemba, Matutuine, Ponto d Ouro, and Vilanculos (est. 30,000), (ii) business tourists mainly utilizing hotels in Maputo, Beira, Nampula and Pemba (est. 200,000), (iii) low-end regional tourists mainly self-drive South African and Zimbabwean utilizing camp-sites, guesthouses and lower-priced hotels scattered along the coastline (est. 140,000), and (iv) regional visitors who are not tourists per se, but just crossing the border to transit through the country or visiting friends and relatives (est. 580,000). The three main tourist categories (augmented by resident expatriates and middle class citizens) drive the current supply-side response in terms of transportation, accommodation and other services offered to visitors. There are significant correlations between the demand profile and the supply response that inform the economic picture. Currently three broad types of accommodation are supplying demand in Mozambique; small high end resorts on the islands and some coastal locations (only approx. 400 rooms in total) attracting predominantly international long haul tourists and South Africans with an average rack rate 7 US$350-525 per person per night business hotels in the major cities (approx. 6,000 rooms) that are split into higher quality hotels (approx. 1,400 rooms) mainly in Maputo that command average rates of around US$150 per person per night and cheaper city hotels that are in the US$50 per person per night range camp sites, small guesthouses and low-priced hotels in coastal areas (approx 3-4,000 rooms), that attract mostly regional and domestic demand with rates of around US$20-75 per person per night. As yet Mozambique has no large scale tourist standard resort (3-5 stars) accommodation (such as exists in every established beach tourism destination) that can realistically be packaged and sold in volume by international tour operators and travel agencies. This segment of accommodation is almost non-existent and yet forms the bulk of accommodation offers in competing destinations like Kenya (12,000 rooms), Mauritius (16,000 rooms), South Africa (25,000 rooms) and Tanzania (6,000 rooms). C 6 A recent visitor expenditure survey (3845 respondents across eight entry ports 6 ) carried out by the Ministry of Tourism (MITUR) in collaboration with the National Statistics Office (INE) shows the different expenditure patterns by purpose of visit and country of origin. 7 Rack rates are the rates obtainable when you walk-in to a hotel without a prior booking. These rates are usually between 20-40% more expensive than contract rates which are negotiated with bigger supply intermediaries, such as tour operators who negotiate for a number of rooms throughout the year and on-sell the rooms as part of a package.

(i) Small high-end resorts; currently 14 properties make up the 300 or so rooms on the Bazaruto and Quirimbas archipelagoes. This offers an overall inventory of about 100,000 rooms (or 200,000 beds) available over the year. Occupancy rates are modest at between 50-70% accounting for about 30,000 tourists who stay an average of three nights, most commonly as couples. Since the majority of rooms are pre-sold as an exclusive and up-market (>$350 per person per day) product in basically only four source market countries South Africa, UK, Portugal and USA it is difficult to calculate (or track) the overall impact on the economy. These properties compete directly with more established (and internationally integrated) destinations like Zanzibar (1500 rooms), Mauritius (8,000 rooms), Seychelles (6,000 rooms), and Maldives (5,400 rooms) and are struggling for a sustained market share. A survey of 25 UK tour operators survey carried out in 2004 showed that Mozambique, in most cases, is simply offered as a beach extension to a high quality safari from South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania or Zambia and that most UK-based tour operators book their clients direct with the resorts and/or lodges in Mozambique, and the transfer from and back to the airport is organized by them as well (cutting out the opportunity for local tour operators to emerge). Interestingly several of these UK operators characterized Mozambique s beach product as like Mauritius 50 years ago 8. Whilst these properties are helping to put Mozambique on the touristic map (Conde Nast Traveler, National Geographic Traveler, New York Times and dozens of high profile magazines and newspapers have featured one or other of the small lodges on the islands), they are too small (all of the combined rooms of all the lodges amount to just one typical hotel in Mauritius, Zanzibar or any established destination in the Caribbean) to deliver any meaningful economic growth, or, more importantly, sustained market penetration. Also, the individual properties do not generate sufficient demand for support services and backward linkages to deepen the tourism value chain and are therefore only helpful to Mozambique s tourism sector in providing good public relations and international exposure. (ii) Business hotels: A handful of international standard hotels in Maputo (circa. 1,400 rooms) cater mainly to the donor community and corporate business clients. There has been little growth over the past five years in the quality hotel room market because Maputo is not establishing itself as a destination for anything other than doing business and the centre for development activities; other capitals have positioned themselves to cater to the meetings, incentives, conferences, and events (MICE) market. The 1,400 or so >4-star standard rooms average 60-70% occupancy and achieve room rates around US$120, but again this falls below the performance of other African capitals; Nairobi for instance offers over 5000 4-star+ rooms with year round occupancy rates close to 90% and average achieved room rates of US$160. Costs for operating a 4-star hotel in Maputo on average 30% higher than a similar business hotel in South Africa or Zambia 9. Outside Maputo, costs increase to over 50% higher than out of town lodges and hotels in South Africa. Similar premiums have to be paid for construction, with a majority of the materials having to be imported (see the construction section of the CEM). The 3 star and below hotels in Maputo are not performing well and are running at less than 30% occupancy rates. Outside Maputo, occupancies are in the 20% range. In addition, hotel managers observe low staff productivity as reflected by a staff of three employees per room 10, instead of D 8 2004 Tourism Intelligence Consulting, Mozambique Marketing Plan (pg. 15) 9 Pers. comm. Manager, Holiday Inn 10 2006 FIAS Tourism Value Chain Assessment (Volume I, pg. 52)

the industry average of between one and two. Managers also reported inefficiencies and a lack of suitable skills at the supervisory staff level, most of which are Mozambican. Airfares to Maputo are expensive. In particular, flights from Johannesburg to Maputo (the current main access route to Mozambique, especially for business travelers), are 163 percent more expensive than flights from Johannesburg to Durban (a similar distance). In general, international flights to Maputo are 40% more expensive per passenger kilometer than to a range of competing destinations; domestic air travel (more or less monopolized by LAM) is 50% more expensive per passenger kilometer than South Africa and Tanzania. 11. Finally telecom costs especially high speed internet connections (a must for business travelers), are also comparatively high e.g. $2,500 per month for a hotel in Maputo. (iii) Camp sites, small guesthouses and low-price beach hotels are the only fast growing segment of the accommodation market. Catering mainly to the self-drive South African, Zimbabwean, backpacker 12 and domestic market, in Vilanculos and Inhambane alone there have been over 1,200 rooms of this category added in the past five years 13. Occupancy rates are difficult to ascertain, but a survey carried out in 2007 in 34 such establishments in Inhambane (the premier dive and snorkeling tourism destination in Mozambique) estimated 50% occupancy and sited seasonality as a the main factor in the modest occupancy rates. However, as most of these enterprises are small with relatively low overheads, only 25-30% occupancy is usually required to break even. In terms of volume (an estimated 140,000 tourists in 2007 14 ) this segment is the most significant in driving tourism demand. However, several indicators and recent studies suggest that this supply demand dynamic may not offer the best bang for the buck for Mozambique. For instance, activities such as diving and snorkeling are sold (70% to South Africans) well below their potential market value. Swimming with whale sharks considered by most a once in lifetime wildlife experience is the marine equivalent of mountain gorillas in terms of rarity and value. E Swimming with whale shark in Tofo, Inhambane Province Product in Mozambique is undervalued. Swimming with whale sharks in Australia costs US$ 400 per person per trip and is only available for 2months of the year. In Mozambique whale sharks are a year-round occurrence and the cost in US$ 60 per person per trip. 11 2006 FIAS Tourism Value Chain Assessment (Volume I, pg. 75) 12 Typically young, low-budget travelers. 13 2007 SNV Inhambane Province Tourism Baseline Assessment 14 Based on the 2007 SNV Inhambane Tourism Baseline Assessment, USAID tourism reports on the northern provinces and the tourist surveys carried out in 2007

In other parts of the world where it is possible to do this it is a carefully controlled and monitored activity, with only limited daily permits available. In Mozambique this activity is not controlled at all (perhaps jeopardizing its longer term future) and is sold cheaply at up to 10 times below its value elsewhere. A recent economic impact study (2007, Jones et al 15 ) calculated the value addition of different segments of tourism as they pertain to local expenditure and backward linkages and confirmed that the self-drive segment of mainly South Africans is the least beneficial for the economy of Mozambique. (iv) The absence of large scale standard tourist resorts. The most significant factor in Mozambique s weak performance is the absence of large scale tourism investments capable of linking to global markets and catalyzing local supply chain linkages. This factor is affecting competitiveness along the whole value chain. The lack of volume is a poor incentive for tour operators and destination management companies (DMCs 16 ) to develop. In other destinations these intermediaries are innovators of new product and significant players in the promotion and distribution of tourism product (to all markets). The lack of tour operators and large accommodation facilities is stifling the development of backward linkages because the existing volume market is largely self-sufficient and low spending while the high value segment is very small and concentrated on the islands where the prospects for backward linkages are limited. This situation is stalling Mozambique s tourism development. 2. Reasons for underperformance The difficulty of securing prime land for tourism investments is the main reason for the sector operating at significantly below potential. Other important issues include a perception deficit and airline policies. a) Risks and costs are high in acquiring land for investment; The main reason for why only 2% 17 of approved tourism investments between 2005 and 2007 have actually materialized is the difficulty for investors to secure land for their investments. The land acquisition process is both risk and lengthy: The risks are high because, while a legal framework for assigning land use rights is in place (DUAT), there is weak regulation outside Maputo, leading for instance to multiple DUATs being issued for some prime coastal areas e.g. we were told by a business lawyer that one investor lost a $4 million investment in a tourism lodge as a result of double land registration and has not to date obtained compensation through the courts. Double registration happens as a result of poor registries and poor governance. There are also risks associated with larger pieces of land that may be required for bigger multiple use resort types of investment (golf courses, retail complexes, hotels, holiday homes etc.) because speculation is rife along the coastline and the available land is being broken up into smaller pieces owned (or maybe with multiple owners on one piece of land) by several entities, requiring extended negotiation for parties interested in larger tracts of land. F 15 August 2007: The Economic Contribution of Tourism in Mozambique, Sam Jones and Hanifa Ibrahimo, Ministério de Planificação e Desenvolvimento, Mozambique. 16 DMCs are large domestic tour operators that package products for on-selling to foreign markets. 17 FUTUR and MITUR data

The full legal process for obtaining a DUAT is lengthy; involving negotiations with communities around which there is little guidance for either the investor, who wants something for nothing, or communities who may not have all the facts concerning the investment and a range of local government stakeholders. This situation creates opportunity for speculation and rent seeking when there is perceived interest from a foreign investor, but it also leaves communities vulnerable to political or economic pressure. This environment is narrowing the scope for interesting much needed higher quality corporate investors who are answerable to shareholders, boards and banks for their investment decisions. The example of Praia da Rocha illustrates the costs and risks and lost opportunities: G Praia da Rocha Inhambane Province A proposed US$80 million tourism complex consisting of 450 high quality hotel rooms, extensive local infrastructure, full environmental safeguards, 1500 jobs, and a minimum of US$1 million in community benefits over the first 10 years of the project was set aside after long and costly negotiations in favor of a proposal for 46 luxury holiday homes creating perhaps 100 jobs and offering only short term compensation of less than US$50,000 to local communities and no environmental impact assessment A second example in Maputo Special Reserve, where a large investor pulled out after almost two years of negotiations with the government, demonstrates that even in areas specifically designated for tourism development (one of several Priority Areas for Tourism Investment PATI identified in the government-ratified Strategic Plan for Tourism Development) are vulnerable to inconsistent and unreliable governance. There is an added risk for tourism investors posed by the lack of clarity and coordination within government concerning other large scale industrial investments. There are plans for extensive oil and gas exploration along the coastline as well as the development of heavy industries such as oil refining and iron smelting that may impact tourism investments. There is no zoning occurring that would otherwise give investors a degree of comfort that their tourism investment would not be impacted at a later date by an adjacent heavy industry development. b) The perception for potential investors is that upfront investment costs are too high due to poor infrastructure, high corruption, unavailability of skilled labor, lengthy investment and startup procedures, and the still-weak image and awareness of Mozambique as a tourism destination 18. Given investment options elsewhere these are significant obstacle to overcome. In addition, reports such the World Economic Forum s Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index a cross-country comparative exercise on tourism competitiveness (WEF, 2007) places Mozambique in 119th out of 124 places, falling behind prospective peers such as Tanzania (80th), Mauritius (20 th ) and South Africa (22 nd ) and the World Bank s Doing Business Indicators that rank Mozambique s investment climate poorly, do influence investment decision makers, particularly in the absence of other information. 18 IFC Tourism Anchor Program staff reports based on multiple interviews with potential investors.

H One investor from Mauritius 19 who is considering investing in Madagascar and has visited Mozambique on a scoping mission cited the following reasons: a) we will have to build the market and invest a lot in driving business, no one knows about Mozambique; b) there is not enough scheduled air service from established European source markets for beach products UK, France, Germany, Italy; c) we don t want to be pioneers, we already did that in Mauritius and it was expensive; d) maybe we will look again in 5 years. Overall the start-up costs were considered too expensive and market linkages were too weak (required too much investment). Asked if land was an issue, the investor said they were offered prime sites by the government and that they didn t feel it was an issue (reality may prove otherwise as suggested by the experience of those who tried so far). New investors talk to existing investors in order to gauge the business environment. The perception of many current investors is that the business environment is hampered by excessive regulation and fining from the public sector and that the regulatory environment is not consistent. It was also found that there is poor public awareness of law changes. c) Poor airline policies. The high airfare costs are due to poor management of the state owned national airline (LAM) combined with the government policies preventing more open skies are not forthcoming. The following have not been found to be important constraints labor regulations, access to finance, taxes, health and security. 3. Recommendations for improving the economic performance of tourism The following recommendations address the issues presented above. a) Push through and publicize the current pipeline of large tourism investment prospects. In the near future, it is critical that there are successes to publicize among the Dubai World Africa project, the IFC Anchor Investments and various other proposals now before the government. Given the uncertain investment environment around tourism and the need for these large investments to access international markets and improve the overall performance along the value chain, demonstrations that it can happen will provide momentum not only for further investment in tourism, but also hopefully address the perception issues of Mozambique for investors, as well as tourists. This will also be the way to develop and implement better regulations, processes and institutions to facilitate and secure access to land (see below). b) Improve and shorten the process of land negotiations with communities. This would mean establishing transparent compensation guidelines that fully consider both the investors and the local community interests; including appropriate levels of compensation, community ownership, and standard procedures for negotiation and compensation with communities. The marketability and registration of DUATs will also have to be much improved (see the land market section of the CEM for more details). Perhaps FUTUR could take a lead here. 19 Pers. comm. with Business Development Manager, Moevenpick Resorts, Glattbrugg, Switzerland.

I c) Improve planning and zoning to build the pipeline of investment projects and upgrade the existing low value developments in prime areas. Building on the existing programs supporting the sector (in particular, IFC s Tourism Anchor Investment Program and the World Bank Transfrontier Conservation Areas and Tourism Development Project), there is a need to adopt a more developmental and inclusive approach at a provincial level that improves the tourism management and planning capacity of local government, improves local capacity and skills to participate in the resulting supply chain and direct employment opportunities, and addresses infrastructure requirements and other social services. Improved planning and zoning will create opportunities for clustering tourism services and gradually building greater depth of services and retail opportunities around the low value accommodation. The positive statements about tourism and local economic development in the PARPA indicate that this approach might have some political and social traction. It would be important that this process also builds on the existing government policies such as the creation of Priority Areas for Tourism Investment (PATIs). There is currently no focus or capacity within the provinces to follow up on the creation of PATIs with the implementation of processes (such as those followed by the IFC Anchor Investment Program) necessary to free up new sites for tourism development. The PATIs, as described in the policy, also require action on zoning for different land use options and this too needs follow up to allow for different investment options, infrastructure development and community participation. Lessons can also be learned from USAID s Northern Arc Tourism Program that is taking a holistic development approach in addition to targeting land for large investments. It is suggested that the pipeline Private Sector Competitiveness Project is used to pilot this expanded approach. The project has already suggested a focus on Inhambane Province which is perhaps the richest province in terms of tourism assets and potential, but ironically the poorest in terms of per capita GNP. d) Develop Maputo as a must see capital city driving the MICE tourism segment by: (i) Improving the performance of the Joaquim Chissano International Convention Centre ( JCICC ) in Maputo would be a significant contribution. This state-of-the-art facility is publicly owned and operated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The facility is currently utilized at only 5% of its potential capacity 20 and the current management does not have adequate resources to efficiently operate it. Options such as private management have been rejected by the management, despite the fact that this facility could drive an increased conference business to Maputo with the associated spin-offs in goods and service provision. Workable solutions to defrosting this state asset should be sought. (ii) Increasing the attractiveness of Maputo; Maputo needs an urban regeneration program that addresses drainage, sewerage and waste management, and improving the sidewalks and promenades along the ocean front. There is also a need to improve the attractiveness of the city for business visitors and an increasing number of cruise tourists by easing access to nearby leisure activities (e.g. improving access to Inhaca Island and Maputo Special Reserve) and improving the presentation of the city museum (once a key attraction) and other historic sites. The city needs a program of events and festivals focusing on culture, food, and sports. 20 Pers. comm. with management and scoping report from IFC consultant.

J e) Improve international air access and the domestic services by: (i) Continuing to implement 5 th freedom rights for neighboring countries (allowing for instance British Airways, KLM and Air France to fly from other African cities to destination(s) in Mozambique) in line with SADC protocol agreements; (ii) Entering into code share agreements with large airlines on key routes to Europe. (iii) Approaching LAM with a proposal to break off its domestic service and either reinvest and recapitalize or privatize management; (iv) Bring other players into the domestic market to increase supply and competition. f) Other reforms which will help tourism in Mozambique: i) Improving the clarity and awareness of the laws and regulations governing tourism enterprises; ii) Reforms in the construction and retail sectors which are key pillars of the tourism industry (see separate sections of the CEM on construction and retail); iii) Reforms in the telecom sector to increase competition and reduce the price of internet services; iv) More emphasis on acquiring English at school. ***

K Sources of information Interviews: In Maputo Public Sector: Tim Borne - USAID FUTUR MITUR Private Sector: Arturo Esposito Pestana Hotels Rui Montero Rani Hotels Bruce Chapman Holiday Inn John Elliot LONRHO, Cardoso Hotel Nathalie Da Silva - Dana Tours Adrian Frey - MOZLEGAL In Inhambane / Vilanculos Public Sector: Martinho Muatxiwa, Director Inhambane Tourism Directorate Vilanculos Municipal Tourism Directorate Vilanculos Airport Administration SNV Binoy Sharma, Senior Advisor Private Sector: Inhambane Hotel and Tourism Association (AHTI) National Diving Association (AMAR) Association for cleaning the environment (ACMA) Management of 12 hotels and lodges in Vilanculos and Inhambane Deep Blue tour operator in Vilanculos Renate Bleeken, Consultant in tourism and hospitality Reports: 1) 2004 MITUR Strategic Plan for Development of Tourism: Government Strategy for Tourism Development in Mozambique 2) 2007 GoM Tourism policy and Implementation Strategy: National policy governing the development of Tourism in Mozambique 3) 2007 WEF Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index: Mozambique s competitiveness report

L 4) 2004 Development Bank of SA: Preparation of a Private Investment Strategy for Tourism 5) 2006 FIAS The Tourism Sector in Mozambique: A Value Chain Analysis (Vols.1+2) 6) 2006 Mintel Mozambique: Travel and Tourism Intelligence: Report on the tourism market 7) 2005 and 2008 Tourism Statistics 2004 and 2007: Instituto Nacional de Estatística 8) 2004 Nathan Associates/ DTIS report: Tourism Sector Mozambique 9) 2005 IFC Smart Lessons learned SEATIP: Salvaging value from aborted SEATIP program 10) 2007 Ministry of Planning and Development and DANIDA: The Economic Contribution of Tourism in Mozambique 11) 2007 Ministry of Planning and Development, and DANIDA: The Tourism Economy in Mozambique: Size, Impacts and Implications 12) 2003 Provincial Government: Inhambane Tourism Development Plan 13) 2004 Tourism Intelligence International: Tourism Marketing Plan: Mozambique Promotion Plan 14) 2005 MITUR: TFCAs; Economic Potential of Tourism in Mozambique; Final Report, Exec Summary and Appendices