E U R O C O N T R O L SRC POSITION PAPER Safety Assessment of Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions Utilising Landing Clearance Delivery Position and/or Landing Clearance Line Concept, Edition1.5, 1 st December 2010 Edition 1.0 06 March 2011 Released Issue
Position Paper and Advice to States Safety Assessment of Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions utilising Landing Clearance delivery position and/or Landing Clearance Line Concept, Edition1.5, 1 st December 2010. This Position Paper presents the outcome of the review of the document presenting the Safety Assessment of the Optimised Operations In Low Visibility Conditions Utilising Landing Clearance Delivery Position And/Or Landing Clearance Line Concept conducted by representatives of NSA/Member States in the SRC Coordination Group (United Kingdom and Slovakia) upon a mandate given by the SRC at the 35th meeting of the Safety Regulation Commission held on 10/11 June 2009. The comments and positions contained in this Position Paper are for information purposes only. They do not constitute formal approval, acceptance or certification or other legal commitment, which remain the responsibility of the authorities and entities concerned, and shall not be interpreted, or inferred as being such. This Position Paper is provided without any warranty of any kind, either express or implied. EUROCONTROL shall not be held liable for any direct or indirect loss resulting from the use of the review. SRC Position The safety assessment for Optimised Operations In Low Visibility Conditions Utilising Landing Clearance Delivery Position and/or Landing Clearance Line Concept presents a credible argumentation for the safe provision of Air Traffic Services, including the use of different navigation (e.g. MLS) and surveillance (i.e. A-SMGCS) technologies, which can help optimise the runway throughput under low visibility conditions. The above referred safety assessment assesses the safety of a concept that could improve the landing rate under low visibility conditions. The concept is based on the following changes to current low visibility operations, taking into account the end-to-end aviation approach, including airborne and ground people, equipment and procedures. The following changes to current operations will help to deliver the expected capacity benefit: The determination of the landing clearance line instead of holding points for aircraft/vehicles vacating the runway. ATC delivery of a landing clearance based on ensuring that both conditions are met: Aircraft/vehicles are clear of the runway by use of A-SMGCS only, The landing clearance is given to the approaching aircraft before reaching 0.6 NM from the threshold using surveillance means. ANSPs choosing to deploy the Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions utilising landing clearance delivery position and/or Landing Clearance Line Concept will need to develop their own local safety assessment and cannot rely on the reviewed safety assessment document alone. The safety assessment document provides the assumptions, safety requirements and safety justification to support the development of a local safety assessment for Optimised Low Visibility Operations.
Where attention to the key issues identified and attached to this Position Paper have been made, the SRC considers the safety assessment document as valuable information for ANSPs to use as a starting point for their local safety assessment of Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions Landing Clearance Delivery Position and/or Landing Clearance Line Concept. Implementation issues and all possible environmental configurations have not been addressed by the safety assessment document. Therefore, it was not possible to demonstrate that this concept is safe in all possible environments of operations. In that regard, the role of the local safety assessment (or local safety case), that will be an acceptable safety assessment to the NSA prior the introduction into service, is to supplement the generic safety assessment and to demonstrate the anticipated achievement of a satisfactory level of safety in local implementation. However, the practicability of the assumptions, design requirements and safety requirements has been assessed to facilitate the transition to the local implementation. SRC Advice The SRC reminds States that the operational context for the application of Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions Utilising Landing Clearance Delivery Position and/or Landing Clearance Line Concept is in areas where the use of different navigation (e.g. MLS or GBAS) and surveillance (i.e. A-SMGCS) technologies can help optimise the runway throughput under low visibility conditions. The safety assessment document sets out a generic argumentation to support the local safety assessment of the concept of operation. However, ANSPs choosing to deploy Low Visibility Conditions Utilising Landing Clearance Delivery Position and/or Landing Clearance Line Concept are responsible for developing their own Local Safety Case (or local safety assessment) and cannot rely on the referred safety assessment to identify the issues that need to be specifically addressed at local level. Several key assumptions are made in the safety assessment document. It will be necessary for each implementer to validate the applicability of these assumptions in their own operational environment, and if not valid, to address them in their local safety case (or local safety assessment). States will need to consider the implications on the aircraft and aircraft crews at a local level and assess the impact upon: Aircraft which shall be fitted with eligible certified equipment for Cat II/III operations; Aircraft operators which shall be authorised and crews qualified to carry out eligible Cat II/III operations; Eligible landing ground equipment which shall be certified for Cat II/III operations; Eligible CAT II/III approaches which shall be designed according to PANS OPS criteria and which shall have been flight checked as appropriate; Operational procedures for missed approaches shall be designed and flown as in current operations. Any safety assessment of variations to the existing procedures shall specifically address the impact on, or as a result of, the implementation of Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions:
The existing definition of OFZ which shall remain valid (ICAO Annex 14; ICAO Doc 013) and shall protect landing aircraft from aircraft/vehicle holding at holding positions; All ICAO markings signage and lighting must accord with ICAO SARPs appropriate to the operations to be supported; ICAO PANS ATM wake vortex criteria which shall apply; The safety assessment Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions and/or Landing Clearance Line Concept does not cover mixed mode (take-off and landing) operations; Operational procedures for Pilot/ATC communication shall be designed and used in accordance to PANS ATM and communication systems as in current operations. Any safety assessment of variations to the existing procedures shall specifically address the impact on, or as a result of, the implementation of Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions; The Landing Clearance Line 1 shall be established in accordance with the safety requirements dealing with the minimum landing clearance line position from runway centreline that meets acceptable level of safety. The benefits of the Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions and/or Landing Clearance Line Concept are dependent upon appropriate equipage - meaning that aircraft will need to be certified at the appropriate level. The safety benefits of the Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions and/or Landing Clearance Line Concept are dependent upon appropriate coordination with airport operations and authorities - meaning that airport equipments and procedures will need to be implemented and supervised at the appropriate level in accordance with existing regulations. The SRC urges States to consider that new technologies and procedures may create as yet unidentified hazards. The SRC recommends that States and implementers avail themselves of monitoring data repositories regarding the Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions and/or Landing Clearance Line Concept and related facilities to support any transition to these operations, and to fulfill their safety oversight responsibilities. States should be aware of their responsibilities regarding the need for appropriate training for air traffic controllers and other affected individuals prior to the introduction of Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions and the subsequent need to ensure ongoing competence, specifically to focus on the appropriate training with regard the impact of the use of this procedure on operations. (Space Left Intentionally Blank) 1 The EUROCONTROL document Landing Clearance Line Determination edition 1.3, October 2010 establishes the minimum safe distance from runway centreline for an aircraft vacating the runway (landing or crossing the runway) after which landing clearance can be given to a landing aircraft.
Applicable Documents: EUROCONTROL Landing Clearance Line Determination edition 1.3, October 2010. Applicable Regulations Applicable Regulations and Standards for Optimised Operations in Low Visibility Conditions and/or Landing Clearance Line Concept: At the highest level of regulation, all surveillance equipment and systems in the European Union are legally obliged to comply with the Single European Sky and the Interoperability Regulation which includes Essential Requirements (ER) for surveillance. Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2096/2005, the common requirements, contains General and Specific Requirements for providers of ANS, they also include requirements for Operations Manuals and for the implementation of SMS by ATS and CNS service providers. EUROCONTROL Operational Concept and Requirements for A-SMGCS Implementation Level 1" (Edition 2-12/12/2006). EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement 4 (ESARR 4), Risk Assessment and Mitigation in ATM. EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement 3 (ESARR 3), Use of Safety Management Systems by ATM Service Providers. EUROCONTROL, Generic safety case Report & final Report on A-SMGCS HMI to confirm runway vacated February 2010. ECAC/CEAC document 17, European Guidance Material On Aerodrome Operations Under Limited Visibility Conditions, European Air Navigation Planning Group, 3 rd ed., June 2008. ICAO Document 9365 AWO Manual. ICAO Doc 7030 amendment 2 25/8/09. EUROCONTROL System Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM). Edition 2.0. At the time of this assessment, no gaps in legislation were identified by the SRC. ( *** )
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