Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) Faculty of Science Institute for Environmental Management and Land-use Planning (IGEAT) Ex post analysis of the new air procedures implemented on 6 February 2014 in the Brussels metropolitan area Study for the FPS Mobility and Transport Final Report 7 May 2014 1
Sponsor: FPS Mobility and Transport Version of this report: Final (07/05/2014) This study was produced by: Frédéric Dobruszkes, Doctor in Geographical Science, researcher and senior lecturer at ULB-IGEAT and Visiting Research Associate in the Transport Studies Unit of the University of Oxford. Jean-Michel Decroly, Doctor in Geographical Science, Professor of Human Geography, Demography and Tourism at Brussels Free University (Université Libre de Bruxelles ULB), head of the "Applied Geography and Geo-marketing" research unit of IGEAT. Alix Sotiaux, agricultural engineer, researcher in remote sensing and geographic information systems within the ANAGEO research unit of IGEAT. Contact: Frédéric Dobruszkes Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) Faculty of Science Institute for Environmental Management and Land-use Planning (IGEAT) Avenue Franklin D. Roosevelt 50, CP 130/03 1050 Brussels frederic.dobruszkes@ulb.ac.be 2
Executive summary The ULB-IGEAT was tasked by the Belgian government s Federal Public Service (FPS) for Mobility and Transport with providing an objective standpoint on developments since the implementation of the new air procedures introduced at Brussels Airport on 6 February 2014. This study complements a Noise Model study currently being produced by the Laboratory of Acoustics and Thermal Physics (Laboratorium voor Akoestiek en Thermische Fysica) at the University of Leuven (KUL). Based on Belgocontrol radar traces (before and after these new procedures were implemented), demographic data, tax statistics and written evidence, our conclusions are as follows: 1. Consequences of the plan The new air procedures have caused two major changes: a) A decrease in the overflying of the fringes of the Brussels-Capital Region (BCR) and the Brussels Periphery: primarily the eastern fringes and the Oostrand, where the percentage of take-offs has fallen from 49.9% to 13.3%; secondarily the Noordrand and the Western Ring, where the percentage of take-offs has dipped from 42.8% to 41.1%. b) The displacement of air traffic towards densely (or very densely) populated areas of the BCR, essentially along two routes: the Canal route, the use of which has been greatly intensified; the new route over Evere Schaerbeek Etterbeek Auderghem Watermael Boitsfort (known in flight jargon as Sopok Rousy Pites), which also affects the western parts of both Woluwe Saint Lambert and Woluwe Saint Pierre. As a result of the aggregate traffic on these two routes, 45.6% of aircraft now follow a take-off route over densely (or very densely) populated areas of Brussels, compared to 7.3% before 6 February 2014. In population terms, the number of people affected by low-flying aircraft as far as 20 km from the airport can be estimated as follows: - 405 700 inhabitants along the Evere Schaerbeek Etterbeek Auderghem Watermael Boitsfort route; - 392 300 inhabitants along the Canal route; - 142 700 inhabitants along the route towards the Noordrand Western Ring; 3
- 130 500 inhabitants along the former left-turn route towards the Oostrand. Our calculation methods, which take into account the higher population densities in the areas newly affected by low-flying aircraft, indicate that the number of residents exposed to aircraft noise has been multiplied by: a factor of 3.1 along the new route passing over Evere Schaerbeek Etterbeek Auderghem Watermael Boitsfort when compared to the traditional left-turn towards the Oostrand; a factor of 3.0 along the Canal route when compared to the traditional left-turn towards the Oostrand; a factor of 2.7 along the Canal route when compared to the Noordrand/Western Ring Road route. Moreover, the Canal route constitutes almost as bad a solution as the Chabert route which it replaced in 2012. In social terms, the study also shows that the displacement of aircraft pollution, as illustrated by the figures above, has resulted in an improved quality of life in high-income areas (which now have fewer planes flying over them), but a deterioration in low-/middle-income parts of Brussels. Finally, in terms of public safety, the upshot of aircraft overflying densely populated urban areas is that any accident would be far more dramatic in its severity. 2. Decision-making and implementation processes We also sought to form an understanding of the extent to which the current plan complies with the Belgian Government s own agreements. This analysis reveals two anomalies: - The Council of Ministers (i.e. the Belgian Government s ministerial cabinet), at its meeting of 26 February 2010, actually decided to proceed with modifications to flight procedures, but in accordance with the procedure laid down in the draft legislation on the operating framework for Brussels-National Airport. The version of the draft legislation presented at that time to the Council of Ministers stipulated a detailed study of the environmental impact (particularly in terms of noise and health) and consultation/public-information procedures over a 60-day period (with publication of the relevant dates in Belgium s official journal). Clearly, this procedure has not been respected, even though the Government agreement of 1 December 2011 stipulated that the decisions at the Council of Ministers meetings of 19 December 2008 and 26 February 2010 within the framework of the management of noise pollution from Brussels-National Airport shall be implemented in full. - The discussions on air procedures for example, at meetings between ministerial officials ( intercabinets ) held in 2012 were conducted on the basis of Belgocontrol charts which inaccurately mapped the reality on the ground. This may have misled the parties involved, particularly since these documents were distributed at the meetings in order to enable [participants] to form opinions. 4
3. Short- and medium-term perspectives 1. Short term: with the advent of summer, the only likelihood is that the situation will worsen on account of three factors: an increase in the number of flights; the fact that, in hot weather, aircraft gain height more slowly; summer means outdoor activities and open windows. 2. Medium term: allowing flights over densely populated areas appears to us to be an open door to aircraft overflying any densely-populated urban area, creating a potential safety hazard for all neighbourhoods: if a flight route can be created over Evere Schaerbeek Etterbeek Auderghem without ringing any alarm bells, there would be nothing to stop an Evere Uccle route, or a route over Neder Over Heembeek Koekelberg Molenbeek Anderlecht. If the objective is to limit flights over densely populated zones, our only options are to: 1. Divide the flights between the fringes and the northern and eastern peripheries of Brussels, which equates to: in the short term, abolishing the Canal routes, but without simply then reinstating the route Chabert ; reinstating the old Sopok Rousy Pites flight path to Huldenberg from main runway 25R, with a relatively tight left-turn, as implemented between the early 1970s and February 2014. Based on the distribution of fights in January 2014, this would result in a virtually even distribution of the number of flights between North and East. 2. Keep an open mind while studying new air procedures, but this time in compliance with the criteria of minimising the overflying of densely populated areas. Annex 2 outlines one of several potential examples. 3. Develop a real airport strategy at national level. Message following the events of 6 May 2014 Our figures seem to corroborate those recently calculated by the Bruxelles Environnement agency, presented on 6 May 2014 by the Brussels Minister of the Environment, even though the methods and the areas covered differ. In particular, Bruxelles Environnement calculates the population affected in the BCR, whereas our study extends beyond Brussels administrative boundaries. Our understanding at this stage is that the measures presented on 6 May 2014 by the Secretary of State for Mobility appear to do no more than tinker around the edges and do not properly reconsider the measures implemented on 6 February. They therefore do nothing to alter the findings we present here. 5