Accident Data for Simulator Training Scenarios to meet the March 2019 FAR Requirement. Dennis A. Crider Chief Technical Advisor Vehicle Simulation

Accident Data for Simulator Training Scenarios to meet the March 2019 FAR Requirement Dennis A. Crider Chief Technical Advisor Vehicle Simulation 1

Presentation Outline Historical Background/Intro 2019 Training Requirement Accident data for Training Scenarios Stall & Stick Pusher Icing Bounced Landing Recovery Gusty Crosswind Takeoffs 2

Presentation Outline Historical Background/Intro 2019 Training Requirement Accident data for Training Scenarios Stall & Stick Pusher Icing Bounced Landing Recovery Gusty Crosswind Takeoffs 3

Feedback from Accidents Accidents data can: identify training needs. Provide external drivers/conditions for scenarios Winds & Vorticies Icing aerodynamic decrements 4

Windshear Accidents Eastern Flight 66, Boeing 727 New York; June 24, 1975; 113 fatalities Pan Am Flight 759, Boeing 727 New Orleans; July 9, 1982; 153 fatalities Delta Flight 191, Lockheed L1011 Dallas Fort Worth; August 2, 1985; 134 fatalities Continental Flight 426, Boeing 727 Denver ; August 7, 1975; no fatalities Allegheny Flight 121, DC-9-31 Philadelphia, June 23, 1976; no fatalities US Air Flight 183, DC-9-31 Detroit; June 13, 1984; no fatalities United Flight 663, Boeing 727 Denver; May 31,1984; no fatalities 5

Windshear Accidents Eastern Flight 66, Boeing 727 New York; June 24, 1975; 113 fatalities Pan Am Flight 759, Boeing 727 New Orleans; July 9, 1982; 153 fatalities Delta Flight 191, Lockheed L1011 Dallas Fort Worth; August 2, 1985; 134 fatalities Continental Flight 426, Boeing 727 Denver ; August 7, 1975; no fatalities Allegheny Flight 121, DC-9-31 Philadelphia, June 23, 1976; no fatalities US Air Flight 183, DC-9-31 Detroit; June 13, 1984; no fatalities United Flight 663, Boeing 727 Denver; May 31,1984; no fatalities 6

Pan Am Flight 759 Crashed after takeoff from New Orleans Foil Medium FDR Five parameters T Fujita Modeled mircroburst using FDR and meteorological data 17 kt headwind that switched to a 31 kt tailwind with a 7 fps down flow 7

Pan Am Flight 759 (cont.) The NTSB recommends that the federal aviation administration: Recommend to air carriers that they modify pilot training on simulators capable of reproducing wind shear models so as to include microburst penetration demonstrations during takeoff, approach, and other critical phases of flight (A-83-25) 8

Delta Flight 191 Crashed on Approach to DFW Digital Tape FDR 15+ parameters Higher resolution horizontal windshear of at least 73 kts and a maximum updraft of 14.8 kts with a maximum downdraft of 29 kts. 9

Presentation Outline Historical Background/Intro 2019 Training Requirement Accident data for Training Scenarios Stall & Stick Pusher Icing Bounced Landing Recovery Gusty Crosswind Takeoffs 10

2019 Training Requirements Full stall recovery (FAR 121.423) Stick pusher (FAR 121.423) Bounced landing recovery (FAR 121.423) Gusty crosswind takeoffs (FAR 121 Appendix E & F) Icing (14 CFR Part 60, SAFO 10006) 11

Support & Guidance Part 60 Revised to support new training AC 120-111 Guidance for upset prevention and recovery training AC 120-109A Guidance for stall prevention and recovery training 12

Public Law 11-216 (sec 208) The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall conduct a rulemaking proceeding to require part 121 air carriers to provide flight crewmembers with ground training and flight training or flight simulator training (a)(1)(a) To recognize and avoid a stall upset of an aircraft or, if not avoided, to recover from the stall; (b)(1).. increase the familiarity of flight crewmembers with, and improve the response of flight crewmembers to, stick pusher systems, icing conditions, and microburst and windshear weather events

NTSB Stall & Stick Pusher Recommendations Recommendation A-10-022: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, 135, and 91K operators and 14 CFR Part 142 training centers to develop and conduct training that incorporates stalls that are fully developed; are unexpected; involve autopilot disengagement; and include airplane-specific features, such as a reference speeds switch. Recommendation A-10-023: Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators of stick pusher-equipped aircraft to provide their pilots with pusher familiarization simulator training. Recommendation A-10-024 Define and codify minimum simulator model fidelity requirements to support an expanded set of stall recovery training requirements, including recovery from stalls that are fully developed. These simulator fidelity requirements should address areas such as required angle-of-attack and sideslip angle ranges, motion cueing, proof-of-match with post-stall flight test data, and warnings to indicate when the simulator flight envelope has been exceeded. 14

NTSB Icing Training Recommendations Recommendation A-11-46 Define and codify minimum simulator model fidelity requirements for aerodynamic degradations resulting from airframe ice accumulation. These requirements should be consistent with performance degradations that the National Transportation Safety Board and other agencies have extracted during the investigations of icing accidents and incidents. Recommendation A-11-47 Once the simulator model fidelity requirements requested in Safety Recommendation A-11-46 are implemented, require that flight crews of all aircraft certificated for flight in icing conditions be trained in flight training simulators that meet these fidelity requirements. Such simulation training should emphasize the following: (1) cues for recognizing changes in the aircraft s flight characteristics as airframe icing develops; (2) procedures for monitoring and maintaining appropriate airspeeds in icing conditions, including the use of icing airspeed reference indices; and (3) procedures for responding to decaying airspeed situations, stall protection system activation, and early stalls that can occur without stall protection system activation. 15

Presentation Outline Historical Background/Intro 2019 Training Requirement Accident data for Training Scenarios Stall & Stick Pusher Icing Bounced Landing Recovery Gusty Crosswind Takeoffs 16

17 LOC by Event Factors

Stall Mitigation Strategy 1. Avoid 2. If not avoided recognize the stall 3. Recover 18

Stall Mitigation Strategy 1. Avoid 2. If not avoided recognize the stall 3. Recover 19

PSA 2386 February 7, 2013 Bowman, GA CRJ-200 One minor injury Minor damage Lost an engine 20

Column 10 5 0-5 PSA Flight 2386 Stick Shaker (L) Stick Pusher (L) Column (L) Off On -2 Shaker/Pusher Discreet -1 0 1-10 2 15:40:30 15:40:45 15:41:00 15:41:15 GMT (hr:min:sec) 21

15 10 PSA Flight 2386 AOA Pitch Pitch and AOA (deg) 5 0-5 -10-15 15:40:30 15:40:45 15:41:00 15:41:15 GMT (hr:min:sec) 22

20 PSA Flight 2386 30 15 20 Roll (deg) 10 5 0-5 -10 10 0-10 Wheel (deg) -15-20 -30 15:40:30 15:40:45 15:41:00 15:41:15 15:41:30 GMT (hr:min:sec) Roll Left Wheel Right Wheel -20 23

Colgan Air Flight 3407 February 12, 2009 Clarence Center, New York Bombardier DHC-8-400 No significant ice degradation 24

Control Column (deg) 15 10 5 0 Left Column Right Column Left Angle of Attack Right Angle of Attack Upset 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 Angle of Attack (deg) -5 0 95520 95530 95540 95550 95560 95570 FDR Time (sec) 25

Roll (deg) Buffalo Colgan DHC-8-400 110 100 Right Right 100 80 90 Captain's Wheel 80 Roll 60 70 60 40 50 40 20 30 0 20 10-20 0-40 -10-20 -60-30 -80-40 Left Left -50-100 95520 95530 95540 95550 95560 95570 Upset FDR Time (sec) Wheel (deg) 26

Buffalo Colgan DHC-8-400 Pitch Angle (deg) 50 40 30 20 10 0-10 -20-30 -40 Pitch Left Angle of Attack Right Angle of Attack Upset 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 Angle of Attack (deg) -50 0 95520 95530 95540 95550 95560 95570 FDR Time (sec) 27

Stall Upsets (no icing) Accident Shaker Pusher Break Airborne Express DC-8-63 Dec 22, 1996 IO IO NR China Airlines 676, A300-622, February 16, 1998 UK UK UK Thai Airways Flight 261, Airbus A310-300, December 11, 1998 UK UK UK Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701 Bombardier CL-600-2B19, October 14, 2004 NR NR NR United Express Flight 6291 Jetstream 4101, January 7, 1994 NR NR UK Pulkova Flight 612, TU-154M, Aug 22, 2006 UK UK UK West Caribbean airlines MD-82 near Machiques, Venezuela, August 16, 2005 Continental Connection Flight 3407 Bombardier DHC-8-400, February 12, 2009 NR UK NR NR NR NR IO = Inoperative UK = Unknown NR = Not responded to

Stall Recognition Cue Summary Stall Cue` Historically Trained? Comment Buffet Stick Shaker Reduced Roll Stability/ Uncommanded Roll Initial Stick Pusher Yes, but records show often ignored Yes, but records show often ignored No No May be masked by turbulence Roll often unstable post stall Stick Pusher Dynamics No Pitch, roll and load factor oscillations coupled with column movement. Pitch Break Reduced Control Effectiveness No No 29

Presentation Outline Historical Background/Intro 2019 Training Requirement Accident data for Training Scenarios Stall & Stick Pusher Icing Bounced Landing Recovery Gusty Crosswind Takeoffs 30

Upsets from Stalls due to Icing Saab 340: Eildon Weir, Australia November 1998 2300-foot altitude loss Saab 340: Albury, Australia June 2004 40-foot altitude loss Saab 340: San Luis Obispo, CA, USA January 2006 5000-foot altitude loss Saab 340: Los Menucos Argentina May 2011 Ground Impact, 22 fatalities

Saab 340 Icing Event Comparison Lift Coefficient - C L No ice lift curve Albury Eildon Weir American Eagle 3008 Los Menucos 0 5 10 15 20 Body Angle of Attack - (deg) 32

CRJ Icing Event Comparison Fredericton no ice (sim sweep) Baotou no ice (sim sweep) Fredericton Baotou Fredericton Baotou C L 0 5 10 15 20 25 Angle of attack 33

Stall Upsets (icing) Accident/Incident Shaker Pusher Break Saab 340A, VH-LPI, Eilden Weir, Victoria, Nov 11, 1998 ES ES NR Saab 340A, VH-KEQ, Albury, New South Wales Australia, June 18, 2004 Saab 340B, VH-OLM, Bathurst, New South Wales Australia, June 28 2002 ES ES PR ES ES NR American Eagle 3008, Saab 340B+, San Luis Obispo, January 2, 2006 ES ES NR Air Canada Flight 646, Canadair CL-600-2B219, December 16, 1997 -- -- -- Cessna Citation 560, Pueblo, Colorado, February 16, 2005 UK UK UK Comair Flight 3272, Embraer EMB-120RT, January 9, 1997 ES -- NR Skywest 3855, Bombardier CL-600-2B19, January 17, 2004 -- -- -- ComAir 5054, EMB-120, March 19, 2001 NR NR NR Empire Airlines 8284, ATR-42, Lubbock TX, Jan 27, 2009 NR ES NR IO = Inoperative UK = Unknown PR = Proper response NR = Not responded to ES = Early stall

Stall Recognition Cue in Icing Stall Cue` Historically Trained? Comment Buffet Stick Shaker Reduced Roll Stability/ Uncommanded Roll Yes, but records show often ignored Yes, but records show often ignored No May be masked by turbulence May not happen before stall in ice Roll often unstable post stall Initial Stick Pusher No May not happen before stall in ice Stick Pusher Dynamics No May not happen before stall in ice Pitch Break No Reduced Control Effectiveness No 35

Icing Aerodynamics Increased drag Decreased lift -0.01-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Decreased stall angle-of-attack Time (sec) Extracted accident aerodynamic degradation Need recorder data Drag Coefficient difference ( C D ) 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 Saab 340 Icing Event Comparison Albury American Eagle 3008 Eildon Weir 36

Presentation Outline Historical Background/Intro 2019 Training Requirement Accident data for Training Scenarios Stall & Stick Pusher Icing Bounced Landing Recovery Gusty Crosswind Takeoffs 37

Qualification, Service, and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers Requires bounced landing recovery training in simulators Part 60 requirements Cites NTSB rec A-05-30 American Eagle 5401 38

American Eagle 5401 May 9, 2004 San Juan, Puerto Rico ATR 72 One serious injury 19 minor injuries Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cht1ukcdlbo 39

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A-05-30 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 air carriers to incorporate bounced landing recovery techniques in their flight manuals and to teach these techniques during initial and recurrent training. 41

FedEx Flight 14 Newark, NJ July 31, 1997 Boeing MD11 Aircraft destroyed 5 minor injuries 42

A-00-93 Convene a joint government-industry task force composed, at a minimum, of representatives of manufacturers, operators, pilot labor organizations, and the FAA to develop, within 1 year, a pilot training tool to do the following: provide a syllabus for simulator training on the execution of stabilized approaches to the landing flare, the identification of unstabilized landing flares, and recovery from these situations, including proper high sink rate recovery techniques during flare to landing, techniques for avoiding and recovering from overcontrol in pitch before touchdown, and techniques for avoiding overcontrol and premature derotation during a bounced landing. 43

Federal Express 80 Narita (Tokyo) Japan March 23, 2009 Boeing MD-11F destroyed Two fatalities 44

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Bounced Landings Accidents (1982 to 2014) 33 US Part 121 bounced landing accidents 15 resulted in tail strikes 4 sited windshear or turbulence 5 followed unstabilized approaches 3 had power too high for spoiler deployment 46

A Success Story Boeing MD11 Training (2012) Adopted by all US operators Bounced landings decreased 2010: 1 in 40 2014: 1 in 1200 Training has been effective 47

Presentation Outline Historical Background/Intro 2019 Training Requirement Accident data for Training Scenarios Stall & Stick Pusher Icing Bounced Landing Recovery Gusty Crosswind Takeoffs 48

Continental Airlines Flight 1404 Boeing 737-500 Denver, Colorado December 20, 2008 Six people serious injuries 41 people minor injuries

Attempted Takeoff Intended takeoff direction Wind

51 Area of high winds reaches surface

Pilot Reactions Time (hr:min:sec) 330 335 340 345 350 18:18:20 18:18:15 18:18:10 Heading (deg) Off Runway FDR rudder Wind speed FDR Heading 18:18:05 18:18:00-5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0 Rudder (deg) and Wind Speed (knots)

Recommendation A-10-110 Gather data on surface winds at a sample of major U.S. airports (including Denver International Airport) when high wind conditions and significant gust are present and use these data to develop realistic, gusty crosswind profiles for use in pilot simulator training programs.

Recommendation A-10-111 Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135 and 91K operators to incorporate the realistic, gusty crosswind profiles developed as a result of Safety Recommendation A-10-110 into their pilot simulator training programs.

Gusty Crosswind Training Surprised pilot Pilot felt rudder wasn t working Abandoned rudder Training Goal Pilot familiar with effects of strong crosswind gust. Proper control inputs 55

Summary By March 12, 2019 the FARs require airline transport pilots to be trained to: recognize and recover from stalls and stick pusher activation recover from bounced landings handle gusty crosswind takeoffs Accident history identifies specific skill shortcomings that should be used in developing simulator training scenarios to meet these requirements. 56

Reserves

Recommendation A-97-47 The NTSB recommends that the FAA evaluate the data available on the stall characteristics of airplanes used in air carrier service and, if appropriate, require the manufacturers and operators of flight simulators used in air carrier pilot training to improve the fidelity of these simulators in reproducing the stall characteristics of the airplanes they represent to the maximum extent that is practical; then add training in recovery from stalls with pitch attitudes at or below the horizon to the special events training programs of air carriers. National Transportation Safety Board

Recommendation A-10-22 Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135 and 91K operators and 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 142 training centers to develop and conduct training that incorporates stalls that are fully developed; are unexpected; involve autopilot disengagement; and include airplanespecific features such as a reference speeds switch

Recommendation A-10-23 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators of stick pusher-equipped aircraft to provide their pilots with pusher familiarization simulator training.

Recommendation A-10-24 Define and codify minimum simulator model fidelity requirements to support an expanded set of stall recovery training requirements, including recovery from stalls that are fully developed. These simulator fidelity requirements should address areas such as required angle-of-attack and sideslip angle ranges, motion cueing, proof-of-match with post-stall flight test data, and warnings to indicate when the simulator flight envelope has been exceeded.

Recommendation A-11-46 Define and codify minimum simulator model fidelity requirements for aerodynamic degradations resulting from airframe ice accumulation. These requirements should be consistent with performance degradations that the National Transportation Safety Board and other agencies have extracted during the investigations of icing accidents and incidents.

Recommendation A-11-47 Once the simulator model fidelity requirements requested in Safety Recommendation A-11-46 are implemented, require that flight crews of all aircraft certificated for flight in icing conditions be trained in flight training simulators that meet these fidelity requirements. Such simulation training should emphasize the following: (1) cues for recognizing changes in the aircraft s flight characteristics as airframe icing develops; (2) procedures for monitoring and maintaining appropriate airspeeds in icing conditions, including the use of icing airspeed reference indices; and (3) procedures for responding to decaying airspeed situations, stall protection system activation, and early stalls that can occur without stall protection system activation.

Buffet & Stick Shaker Reduced Roll Stability Stick Pusher Un-commanded Roll Pitch break Reduced control effectiveness The Stall Upset Recognition Funnel Accident