REPORT Bulk Carrier POLO M -C6OL1- Grounding on 23 November 2004 2005-02-14
REPORT BULK CARRIER POLO M -C6OL1- GROUNDING ON 23 NOVEMBER 2004 Our reference: 080202-04-17548 Maritime Casualty Björn Molin, +46 (0)11 19 13 27 Investigation Divison The report can also be www.sjofartsverket.se read in Swedish on Sjöfartsinspektion Olyckor & tillbud Haverirapporter our web-site Photo Ove Eriksson, Swedish Maritime Safety Administration Reprint permitted provided stating of source SWEDISH MARITIME SAFETY INSPECTORATE 2005-02-14 SE-601 78 NORRKÖPING Phone: +46 (0)11 19 10 00 Fax: +46 (0)11 23 99 34
List of Contents Summary... 1 Account of facts... 2 The ship... 2 Port state controls... 3 The crew... 3 The weather... 4 According to entries in the ship s log... 4 The weather situation according to SMHI (Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute)... 4 Gale warnings...5 Miscellaneous... 6 Collection of facts... 6 Course of events...7 According to the ship s log... 7 According to the master, 2nd officer and 3rd officer... 7 According to SUNNANVIK s master and the shipbroker... 9 According to the AIS... 10 The course of events after the grounding... 10 Analysis... 11 Cause... 13 Observations...13 Recommendations... 13 Damages... 14 Results of the investigation... 14 Encl. 1: Beaufort wind scale. 15 Encl. 2: Chart extract 16 Encl. 3: Print-outs from AIS 17
Summary The ship POLO M, flying Bahama flag, was riding at anchor in the road off Slite, Gotland, Sweden, on 19 November 2004 at 1950. The ship was anchored by the port side anchor with 7 shackles (192 m) of chain in the sea. In the evening loading of cement from the ship SUNNANVIK started. Up till 22 November at 1700 SUNNANVIK had made three trips between Slite and POLO M. The loading was then suspended due to the strong wind. On 23 November between 0600 and 0730 POLO M was dragging on two occasions, which was noted neither by the master nor the 3 rd officer who are both said to have been on the bridge. After that the ship was on the whole lying still until 0800 when the anchor started to drag again. POLO M grounded on 23 November at abt. 0835 in position approx. 58º38.4 N, 018º48.6 E. Page 1
Account of facts The ship Name: POLO M IMO No.: 7637840 Call sign: Port of registry: Shipowner: Operator: C6OL1 Nassau, Bahamas Louis Maritime Corporation A.M. Nomikos Transworld Maritime Agencies S.A. Athens, Greece Gross: 21630 Length over all: Breadth: Draught: Classification society: 176.56 m 27.49 m 11.5 m DNV Year built: 1980 Construction material: Propulsion power: Steel 8827 kw Crew: 28 POLO M was built in 1980 in Paryskiej shipyard, Gdynia, Poland and was given the name BAUCHI. The ship has earlier flown Norwegian and Liberian flag. Page 2
In 1996 POLO M was entered in the ship s register of the Bahamas. She was of conventional type with deck-house, bridge and accommodation aft. There below was the engine room. Ahead of the engine room was the cargo area, divided into 7 cargo holds. Under the cargo area was the double bottom, divided into tanks for ballast and fuel. POLO M was of double hull construction. The bridge was of conventional type with open wings. The most interesting equipment on the bridge related to the accident was two radar units of make Racal-Decca Bridge Master and Kelvin Hughes nucleus 2 500R. Both were in operation and set at 3 M (one nautical mile =1852 metres). The gyro compass and autopilot were of make Anschütz. There were also two GPS receivers of make Furuno and Shipmate RS 5500 on board. The propulsion machinery comprised one six cylinder two-stroke crosshead motor of make Cegielski-Sulzer 6RND76, which made 8827 kw and was connected to a fixed-blade propeller. At full speed the ship made abt. 15 knots. All equipment on the bridge and in the engine room was said to have been in good working condition. Port state controls POLO M has been subject to port state controls in Spain on 7 October 2002, in Canada on 9 January 2003, in Norway on 6 February 2004 and on 19 20 October 2004. At the controls in Spain and Norway (19 20 October), deficiencies were noted but not serious so as to result in detention. The crew The crew comprised the master, 3 deck officers, chief engineer, 3 engineers, 7 deck crew, 11 engine crew and 2 other ratings. 26 of the crew were Polish nationals and 2 were Bulgarian. Page 3
During common voyages the officers had regular four-on/eight-off watches. During the loading period in the road off Slite the chief officer had the day duty watch, the 2 nd officer had the 00 06 watch and the 3 rd officer had the 06 12 watch. POLO M was properly manned at the accident. The weather According to entries in the ship s log On 19 November at 1600 the wind was northerly force 7 B (Beaufort, see Enclosure 1). For 20 and 21 November no entries were made as regards the weather. On 22 November at 2400 the wind was southeasterly force 9 10 B. On 23 November at 0600 the wind was easterly 10 11 B. At 0800 the wind was northeasterly 11 B. The weather situation according to SMHI (Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute) From SMHI the Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate has obtained information on the weather situation in the waters at eastern Gotland during the period in question. In the period from 22 to the afternoon of 23 November an intense low, 983 hpa (hektopascal), moved from Skagerrak to Kaliningrad, passing Gotland the night before 23 November. Ahead of the low a south-easterly gale was blowing in the waters off northern Gotland, and occasionally westerly 10 15 m/sec. in the waters off southern Gotland. Behind the low the wind force very rapidly increased to strong gale from northeast to north and around 0900 am temporarily storm 24 m/sec. During the afternoon slowly decreasing. Page 4
The strong gale caused very heavy sea on the eastern side of Gotland, reaching its climax at noon on the 23rd. At the time the sea was 4 5, max. 7 metres high and then started gradually to decrease. Gale warnings The following storm and gale warnings were broadcast from SMHI between 20 th and 23 rd November for the waters of central Baltic: Saturday 20/11 0445 and 1120: NW the following night abt. 15 m/sec. 20/11 1500: NW from tonight 15 m/sec. 20/11 1830: from tonight NW 15 m/sec., between Gotland and the coast of the Baltic temporarily 18 m/sec. Sunday 21/11 0500: NW 15 m/sec., between Gotland and the coast of the Baltic temporarily 18 m/sec., late afternoon decreasing. 21/11 1200: NW 15 m/sec, Monday noon S 15 m/sec. 21/11 1500: Monday noon S 15 m/sec. 21/11 1900: late Monday S 14 18 m/sec. Monday 22/11 0515: in the afternoon SW 14 18 m/sec, the following night S 15 20 m/sec. east of Gotland. 22/11 0700: in the afternoon SW 14 18 m/sec, the following night S 15 20 m/sec. east of Gotland. 22/11 1100: SW 14 18 m/sec. tomorrow N 18 22 m/sec. 22/11 1400: S 15 20 m/sec. during Tuesday increasing to 20 to storm 25 m/sec., most intense wind towards the afternoon in the western waters. 22/11 1845 and 2115: abt. S 15 20 m/sec. during Tuesday N and increasing to 20 to storm 25 m/sec., in the afternoon most intense wind in the western waters. Page 5
Tuesday 23/11 0010 and 0320: at first westerly, locally up to 15 m/sec., from Tuesday morning turning to N 20 to storm 25 m/sec., during the coming night slowly decreasing. 23/11 0500 and 0645: starting at the central Baltic N 20 to storm 25 m/sec., from this afternoon in the whole area, during the coming night slowly decreasing. 23/11 0945: N 20 to storm 25 m/sec., from afternoon in the whole area, during the coming night slowly decreasing. 23/11 1215 and 1435: N 20 to storm 25 m/sec., during the coming night slowly decreasing. 23/11 1900 and 2100: N 16 22 m/sec., slowly decreasing. Wednesday 24/11 0445: N 15 m/sec., decreasing. Miscellaneous Times stated in this report is Swedish standard time (UTC + 1 hour). Collection of facts Facts have been collected by means of interviews of the crew on board POLO M. Also the crew of SUNNANVIK and a shipbroker at Slite, Gotland, were interviewed. Information from the ship s log. Records from the Coast Guard s interrogation of the crew of POLO M. Information has been collected from the AIS (Automatic Identification System). Weather forecast has been obtained from the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI). The log of MRCC. Page 6
Course of events According to the ship s log POLO M anchored off Slite by the port side anchor with 7 shackles (192 m) of chain in the sea in position 57º38'.6 N, 018º50'.5 E on 19 November 2004 at 1950. In the evening loading of cement started from the ship SUNNANVIK. The loading continued on 20 November, and entries made show that the anchoring position was checked at 0600 and 1600. On 21 November the loading continued and the anchoring position was checked at 0600, 1200, 1800 and 2400. At 1700 on 22 November the loading had to be suspended due to inclement weather. The anchoring position was checked at 0600, 1200, 1800 and 2400. At 0600 the position was 57º38'.7 N, 018º49'.7 E. At 0830 it was observed that the ship was dragging. At 0840 the engine was running and the crew started to heave the anchor; the ship continued to drag. At 0845 the POLO M grounded in position 57 o 38'.4 N, 018 o 48'.4 E. According to the master, 2nd officer and 3rd officer POLO M anchored off Slite in the evening of 19 November. The anchorage had been assigned by the pilot, who said it was a safe place for anchoring. In the master s opinion it was too close to shore, which he mentioned to the pilot, who however maintained that the site was safe and the best place for loading. At the time of arrival the wind was westerly but turned to the south and to northeast till 22 November. Between 19 and 22 November 23,050 tons of cement was loaded, which was transported by the ship SUNNANVIK from Slite to POLO M in three voyages. On 22 November at 1700 the loading was suspended due to inclement weather and SUNNANVIK returned to berth at Slite. Page 7
The 2 nd officer was on watch between 0000 and 0600 on 23 November. He checked the ship s position at even intervals but did not notice anything unusual. The position was checked by means of variable rings and bearing rulers placed on Ajstudden and Gothemhammar (see extract from chart). A GPS was also set to sound in case the ship should deviate more than 2.5 cable lengths (463 metres) from her position. When the 2 nd officer went on duty the wind was southeasterly, 10 B, and snow showers. During his duty the wind veered to the east. He did not observe any change in the ship s position during the night. At watch change he remained on the bridge until 0615. The master was on the bridge 3 4 times during the night. From 0600 he continuously was on the bridge with the exception of abt. 15 minutes when he was in the accommodation area, but he could not remember at what time. Since the winds were strong the master had ordered stand-by in the engine room and that the engines should be prepared to be started within a 10- minutes period. At 0600 the 3 rd officer relieved the 2 nd officer; in the morning hours he was most of the time sitting in a chair in front of the radar screen. On the screen variable rings and bearing rulers were placed at Ajstudden and Gothemhammar. According to the 3 rd officer a GPS receiver was set to sound if the ship s deviation should exceed 2 cable lengths (370 metres) from her position. He also checked the ship s position more or less continuously, which also the master did. The master stated at an inquiry that no alarm was set to sound in the GPS in case the ship should deviate from her position. When the 3 rd officer went on his duty the wind was easterly, 10 11 B, with snow showers. The master was on the bridge when the 3 rd officer went on his duty. The 3 rd officer thought that the position was alright but noticed minor changes and informed the master accordingly. The master indicated that these changes were due to normal movements when lying at anchor. According to the 3 rd officer the master went down for breakfast at about 0745 and was gone for approximately 15 minutes. Page 8
The master stated that strong winds and bad weather were prevailing during the night but that before 0830 there had been no problems whatsoever. At 0830 the officers observed changes in the distances on the radar screen and realized that POLO M was dragging. On one occasion the 3 rd officer looked at the GPS and noted that the ship then was dragging at a speed of 2.5 knots. The master immediately called the engine room and ordered start of the engine. The 3 rd officer called the chief officer and asked him to go together with the bosun to the forecastle to try to heave the anchor chain. Shortly afterwards he called the 2 nd officer and asked him to relieve the chief officer on the forecastle. At 0840 the engine was running; attempts were made to heave the anchor at the same time as the engine was running full speed ahead. The anchor chain was very tight and one managed to heave up to seven shackles on the windlass, but due to the strong wind the ship continued to drag. The attempts to keep the ship by means of the engine and heaving the anchor chain were fruitless and POLO M grounded at 0845. According to SUNNANVIK s master and the shipbroker SUNNANVIK suspended loading due to inclement weather on 22 November at 1700 and returned to berth at Slite. At midnight the wind was southeasterly and the ship s anemometer stopped at 31.5 m/sec. In the moring of 23 November the wind veered to the northeast and the wind-force was abt. 20 m/sec. at 0800. At abt. 0810 the shipbroker called the master of POLO M to inquire about the situation on board. The master informed that the weather was rough but as to the rest no problems. At abt. 0830 SUNNANVIK s master noted that POLO M had moved from her position and was getting near to ground. He then informed the shipbroker by phone about the situation. The shipbroker immediately called POLO M on VHF and forwarded the information he had got. The master of POLO M then said that he was in big trouble, that he was running full speed ahead but the ship did not move forward and the anchor chain was stretched. Shortly after he got the information that POLO M had run aground. Page 9
According to readings on the AIS From the AIS-information can be read that POLO M anchored abt. 1950 on 19 November 2004. During the first days the ship had the normal movements of a ship lying at anchor. On 22 November between 1210 and 1230 she dragged abt. 130 metres to north. On 23 November between 0600 and 0700 POLO M dragged almost 2 ship s lengths and between 0700 and 0730 yet another ship s length westward. From 0730 until just before 0800 she was on the whole still, then she dragged again and at 0800 she was dragging westward at a speed of 0.7 knots. At 0810 the speed was 1.1 knots and POLO M then continued to drag to the west and southwest at varying speed until she run aground at abt. 0835. Between 0600 and 0835 on 23 November the ship dragged totally abt. 1400 metres. The course of events after the grounding Soundings showed that the ship took in water in double bottom tanks 2, 3 and 6. No leakage of oil was observed. The master informed the Greek operator of the ship and the local agent about the grounding. At 0849 the accident was reported to MRCC. At abt. 1330 ten of the crew members were evacuated. At abt. 1500 it was noted that a thin layer of oil was surrounding the ship. An extensive salvage work started and after lightening of oil and cargo the ship was afloat on 30 November at 1204. Six coast guard vessels and two tug-boats were engaged in the salvage work. In total 9 divings were carried out at POLO M on 24, 27, 30 November and 1 December. After she was afloat POLO M was anchored to be checked for damages, and then left for Fredericia, Denmark, to discharge the cargo. Thereafter she went to a shipyard in Hamburg, Germany, for repair. Page 10
Analysis After POLO M was anchored on 19 November she had in the first days the normal movements of a ship lying at anchor. From the AIS information appears that the winds were northerly, westerly, southwesterly and at noon on 22 November southerly. The anchoring position was checked at 1200 when loading was still going on. Between 1210 and 1230 on 22 November the ship had dragged abt. 130 metres northward. The position was checked by means of variable rings and bearing rulers on two landmarks. The reason why the 130 metres dragging was not observed on board may be that the movement was too small to be observed on the radar screen. Regardless of the fact that the movement probably was too small to be noted on the screen the ship was equipped with two GPS receivers and the officers could have got information there. Those data would have given the officers information on changes in position which clearly showed that the ship was dragging. Then the wind veered and according to the ship s log on 22 November at 2400 it was southeasterly with a force of 9 10 B (21 28 m/sec.). At the same time, according to the anemometer on board SUNNANVIK, which lay at berth at Slite, the wind was southeasterly and the meter stopped at 31.5 m/sec. Since there was no anemometer on board POLO M the navigators had to estimate the direction and force of the wind. Indications show that the wind-force was correctly estimated on board POLO M, and in any case it was not under-estimated. According to the ship s log the wind was easterly at 0600 on 23 November and northeasterly at 0800. Between 0600 and 0700 POLO M dragged a little less than two ship s lengths and between 0700 and 0730 another ship s length. The 3 rd officer thought that the ship was in position but could observe minor changes. He informed the master about his observations but the master s opinion was that these were normal movements of a ship at anchor. The changes observed by the 3 rd officer were most likely due to the fact that the ship was dragging at the time. Should the master have taken notice of the officer s observations and checked the ship s position closer he would then most probably have noted that POLO M was dragging. According to the ship s 2 nd officer one GPS was set to sound in case the ship should deviate more than 2.5 cable lengths from her position. According to the 3 rd officer the alarm was set at 2 cable lengths and Page 11
according to the master no anchor alarm was set on the GPS at all. It has not been possible to establish if or how the alarm was set. Provided that the alarm had been set at 2 or 2.5 cable lengths it should have sounded at abt. 0730 when the ship had dragged approx. 3 ship s lengths. Between 0730 and just before 0800 the ship was on the whole still, and then the anchor started to drag again and at 0800 the ship dragged at a speed of 0.7 knots. At 0810 the speed was 1.1 knot and POLO M then continued to drag at varying speed until she grounded at 0835. Between 0600 and 0835 the ship dragged abt. 1400 metres, a fact that seems not to have been observed by the officers on the bridge until just before the grounding. According to the master the engine room was in stand-by position and the engine could be ready for operation in 10 minutes. It has not been possible to settle how the officers acted on the bridge as from the moment POLO M started to drag at 0600. In any case, the course of events cannot have been as described by the master and the 3 rd officer. Should the officers have checked the ship s position, they would also have noted that the ship was dragging abt. 3 ship s lengths between 0600 and 0730. That would have given time to start the engine and to head the wind. In the morning the master left the bridge for breakfast and was gone for abt. 15 minutes. According to the 3 rd officer the time was then abt. 0745. When the master had returned to the bridge, abt. 0800, the anchor started to drag again. The ship then dragged until she run aground at 0835. Also at this time the officers would have had the opportunity to notice that she was dragging and given the order to start the engine, which is said to have been ready for use within 10 minutes. The ship s echo sounder seems not to have been in use at the event. Considering the configuration of the bottom in the area the echo sounder would also not have indicated that the ship was on her way to ground. In any case the information would have come too late to take measures to avoid the grounding. The information given by the officers at inquiries on board POLO M in several respects significantly deviates from what is obtained from the AIS. The master and the 3 rd officer claim to have noticed at 0830 that the ship was dragging and that the engine then was started and was run full speed ahead at 0840. They also state that POLO M run aground at 0845. The AIS Page 12
information clearly states that the course of events was far more extended in time. An AIS print-out showing the ship s movements during the morning was shown to the master, but still he stack to his version of what had happened. This indicates that the master was not familiar with the function of the AIS transponder technique. Cause The reason why the ship was dragging was the strong wind that was prevailing at the time. The reason for the grounding was that the ship s position was not adequately checked on board POLO M. Observations Notes in the log on weather conditions and checking of the ship s position have not been continuous. The information given by the officers at inquiries on board POLO M in several aspects strikingly deviates from information obtained from the AIS. The 3 rd officer informed the master about minor changes in position without the master observing or checking the details. The officers did not make use of the possibility to obtain information from the ship s GPS receivers. Recommendations It is of great importance always to note all relevant details in the ship s log continuously. It is also important by all means always to closely check the ship s position. At the event in question all equipment available on the bridge was not used and the officers did not observe until it was too late that the ship was dragging. Page 13
Damages No personal injuries are known to have come about. The ship got large bottom damage with cracks in ballast and oil tanks. Between 10 and 30 tons of heavy fuel oil leaked. Abt. 5 tons of oil was collected by Coast Guard ships, but oil also polluted beaches on Gotland. Results of the investigation The ship was duly manned. The equipments on the bridge and in the engine room are said to have been functioning properly. At the occasion the loading had been suspended due to strong wind. The course of events related by the officers differ significantly from the information obtained from the AIS. Records have not been satisfactorily entered in the ship s log. The ship s master and 3 rd officer observed too late that the ship was dragging. Page 14
Encl. 1 BEAUFORT WIND SCALE 00 0,0 0,2 m/sec. Calm 01 0.3 1.5 m/sec. Light air 02 1.6 3.3 m/sec. Light breeze 03 3.4 5.4 m/sec. Gentle breeze 04 5.5 7.9 m/sec. Moderate breeze 05 8.0 10.7 m/sec. Fresh breeze 06 10.8 13.8 m/sec. Strong breeze 07 13.9 17.1 m/sec. Near gale 08 17.2 20.7 m/sec. Gale 09 20.8 24.4 m/sec. Strong gale 10 24.5 28.4 m/sec. Storm 11 28.5 32.6 m/sec. Violent storm 12 > 32.7 m/sec. Hurricane Page 15
Encl. 2 Page 16
Encl. 3 Page 17
Encl. 3 Page 18
Encl. 3 Page 19
Encl. 3 Page 20
Encl. 3 Page 21
Encl. 3 Page 22
Encl. 3 Page 23