Key Issues for the Critical Path Approach, Landing and Go-Arounds Moderator John Allen Vice-President, Chief Safety Officer, JetBlue Airways Panelists Atholl Buchan Head, Flight Operations Regulatory Affairs, SFO, IATA Rob Eagles Director, Infrastructure, SFO, IATA Rudy Quevedo Director, Safety, SFO, IATA Martin Rolfe Managing Director Operations, NATS UK Ken Speir Director, Line Operations, Delta Air Lines
Martin Rolfe Managing Director Operations, NATS UK 3
XMAN Arrival Management Setting up a good Approach Collaboration with Airlines and Adjacent ANSPs 90% more efficient than existing holding Focus on arrival punctuality Next steps Extended horizon using datalink Shared operating plan Since April 2014, XMAN has saved airlines around 1.25m in fuel and 5,000 tones of CO 2
Time and Distance Based Separation Optimised and Resilient Landing Rates Heathrow Arrival ATFM Delay Headwinds cause 160 180,000 minutes ATFM delay per annum Affecting 55-65 days per annum Winds 44% LVPs 26% Snow LVPs Winds T/Storm Capacity Other
Time and Distance Based Separation Optimised and Resilient Landing Rates Assured Operations improved resilience and safety High Performance ATC consistent delivery of approach spacing Maximising runway throughput
Time and Distance Based Separation Optimised and Resilient Landing Rates Unique use of real-time downlinked Wind Data Proven accuracy Core part of TBS concept of operations TBS uses Mode-S downlinked data to create real-time wind profile for approach (could also use ADS-B)
Time and Distance Based Separation Optimised and Resilient Landing Rates Live operation started 24 th March 2015 Benefits: Delays reduced by 50% Reduced airborne holding No cancellations Reduced wake risk in light winds Live operation replay 29 th March 2015, headwind at 3000ft 55kts.
Performance Based Navigation (PBN) Today s Airspace Highly dependent on Radar vectors High ATC and crew workload Few aircraft fly published routes clearly there is a need for greater systemisation
Performance Based Navigation (PBN) - Results Systemised Airspace PBN systemisation Optimised use of airspace Reduced workload Enhanced safety Enabling redesign of London TMA Validated by airlines through Lead Operator Group in the UK Following successful trials, reduced UK PBN route separation standards to be published May 15
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) Independent Parallel Approaches Building on advanced RNP established concept developed in USA Use of RNP-AR can increase runway capacity You have to be AR equipped to use the extra capacity NATS solution differs from USA as it will use Automated Conformance Monitoring RNP-AR containment Seattle Greener Skies Potential 15% tactical arrival capacity gain CDA compliance
So PBN is all Good News? PBN Challenge Public and political support Airspace re-design will define traffic patterns for a generation New routes, new noise Old routes, more noise Throw in an extra runway in London to make it even more contentious
Abnormal Indicated Airspeed Monitor (AIM) Speed Monitor Prevents aircraft catch-up on final approach Has significantly reduced under-separated pairs Look out for that speed camera Nigel
Barometric Pressure Setting Advisory Tool (BAT) Level Busts Incorrect aircraft pressure setting causes risk of level bust and is critical for APV approach Down-linked cockpit pressure setting is automatically cross checked to alert controllers Since BAT introduction level busts due to pressure setting down from 5 to 0
Cleared and Selected Flight Level CFL/SFL Level Bust and Read-back Incorrect selected level Causes level bust risk Risk in go-around CFL and down-linked SFL automatically cross checked and controllers alerted Has significantly improved safety in current Area and Terminal operations En-route example
Remotely Piloted Aerial Systems (RPAS) Emerging Threat and Opportunity Issues to be considered Safety Equity Impact of efficiency Security NATS is actively engaged in trials with RPAS operators Need for greater collaboration worldwide
Conclusions It s all about collaboration between people and technology At NATS, we re committed to keeping the skies safe and delivering the best possible customer experience For safe & successful implementation of change it s all about collaboration Collaboration between all Stakeholders - Industry & Community Collaboration between Ground, Airborne & Space-based technology Perhaps the biggest challenge for today is: Are we doing enough, together..?
Rob Eagles Director, Infrastructure, SFO, IATA 23
Ken Speir Line Operations, Delta Air Lines 24
Key Issues for the Critical Path An airline view of the issues IATA Ops Conference Los Angeles, CA April 2015 Captain Ken Speir Chair, IATA Flight Ops Group
The Big Picture Overview Threats / Errors Proactive Solution Sets The Operational Front Lines
Conventional The Big Picture NowGen
Big Picture analogy
Threats / Errors Legacy FMC Inventory PBN FMS Programming ATC management Mutual Situational Awareness Fewer Inputs more Constraints
Threats / Errors Automation Evolution 99.99% incident free Good enough? Vertical > Lateral New SMS Challenges Risk Level Risk Description (IF ) C-4 If STARS Fusion FMA automation platform is not installed/implemented on the published schedule date.. E-5 If STAR and Established on RNP procedures are not accepted by other carriers. E-5 If no mixed equipage solution / TF solution. Impact (THEN ) Then ATC will not have the ability to monitor aircraft on the turn. ( keyhole effect ) Then new routes will not be utilized. Plus, the safety analysis will be conducted on incorrect designs. Then Established on RNP will be too difficult for ATC to use and ATL will not use the procedure. Mitigation Strategy 1. Meet with STARS PM, and link dependencies of STARS and Established on RNP programs. (STARS PM needs to understand on our critical path ) Move Atlanta STARS implementation to the left. 2. Monitoring CSPO project activities including conducting independent operations for runway separation below 4200 feet and the need for a highupdate radar. 3. Future waiver(s) may be needed to conduct Established-on-RNP in Atlanta 1. Lead carrier working with others to achieve agreement on procedure. Disagreement b/w DAL and SWA. 2. DAL documenting disconnect (disco) of STAR and approach in white paper. Will pass to FAA to drive from top down. 1. Explore TF turns in safety analyses, (risk is safety case for TF turn next to ILS ) Needs additional funding. 2. Explore ELSA. Needs additional funding. 3. Explore BEBS scenarios. 4. Delta Fleet plans RNP capability in the future (trying to acquire date). Get RJs and other airlines to RNP equip.
Proactive Solution Sets FMC Design and Pilot Skill Sets Understanding automation Using automation in NowGen Train Flying and Monitoring skills Formal Education and Reference materials
Operational Front Lines Pilots and Controllers Audits Line Checks Training Procedure Policy
KEY ISSUES FOR THE CRITICAL PATH Approach, Landing, and Go-Arounds Atholl Buchan Head Flight Operations Regulatory Affairs, FOPS Rudy Quevedo Director of Safety
Accidents per Phase of Flight 2010-2014 IATA 2014 Safety Report
Breakdown by Accident Category 2010-2014 IATA 2014 Safety Report
Accident Frequency/Survivability 2010-2014 IATA 2014 Safety Report
A Success Story 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Stable Unstable 4% unstable - Airbus study 3.4 % unstable - LOSA study very good can we do better?
A Not so much Success Story 83% of all ALAs preventable with a go around [Jim Burin, IASS 2011] No other single decision can have such an impact on the industry accident rate [Curtis 2007] 3% compliance - Airbus study 4% (13%) compliance LOSA
Go Around Policies
Pilots that continue unstable approaches to land perceive far less risk than pilots that go around Interesting Facts The top four reasons why UA pilots stated they continued the approach were all associated with their ability as a crew to compensate. These included their experience and the presence of a high-functioning crew. They also admitted to the moderate influence of peer pressure to land and a personal resistance to managing the demands of a GA. (Ref: ASW Magazine, FSF 2013) How operators manage the go around policy affects the not only the GA rate, but also the UA rate
Be Careful What You Wish For What risk could be generated by compliance with GA policies? GA s can generate risk Can the system manage the results? Is Stabilized Approach criteria the same as Go-Around criteria?
Stable approach criteria Approximately 3% of approaches do not meet the stabilized approach criteria, yet only 3% of those result in G/As Why? Overruns Do we need a better G/As criteria? Usually result of high energy approach, an outcome from a long touchdown or poor braking action Go-around Do crews fully understand touchdown markings Over-reliance on crew report / autobrake What governs the crew decision Company policy / Other company policy Peer pressure Define criteria and review the potential risk
Thank you