Flight in volcanic ash in Indonesia on Jetstar 114 (JQ114) from Perth (PER) to Jakarta (CGK)

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Transcription:

DLR.de Chart 1 Flight in volcanic ash in Indonesia on 13.02.2014 Jetstar 114 (JQ114) from Perth (PER) to Jakarta (CGK) * Compiled from public sources. Information and discussion might be inaccurate.

DLR.de Chart 2 Press announcement (1)

DLR.de Chart 3 Take off and landing time Scheduled: 13.02.2014 STD 18:25z 13.02.2014 STA 22:50z Or 13.02.2014 STD 02:25 wst (Perth) 14.02.2014 STA 05:50 wit (Jakarta) Actual: 13.02.2014 ATD 19:04z 13.02.2014 ATA 23:18z Or 13.02.2014 ATD 03:04 wst (Perth) 14.02.2014 ATA 06:18 wit (Jakarta) The flight was delayed for about 40min WHY??? Did the crew received the VAA and was considering cancelation or it was a routine delay?

DLR.de Chart 4 1 ST VAAC Darwin VAA* No info on OBS or FCST VA area NOTE that it was approximately one hour before STD of Jetstar 114 so the crew should have received this VAA *ftp://ftp.bom.gov.au/anon/gen/vaac/2014/idd41295.201402131721.txt

DLR.de Chart 5 2 nd VAAC Darwin VAA* WITH info on OBS and FCST VA area NOTE that it was approximately half an hour before STD of Jetstar 114 so the crew should have received this VAA, too *ftp://ftp.bom.gov.au/anon/gen/vaac/2014/idd41295.201402131752.txt

DLR.de Chart 6 3 rd, 4 th, 5 th, 6 th and 7 th VAAC Darwin VAA were issued duration the Jetstar 114 flight* WITH info on OBS and FCST VA area NOTE that 6 th VAA at 22:29z showed ash extended to FL550 *ftp://ftp.bom.gov.au/anon/gen/vaac/2014/idd41295.201402132048.txt *ftp://ftp.bom.gov.au/anon/gen/vaac/2014/idd41295.201402132052.txt *ftp://ftp.bom.gov.au/anon/gen/vaac/2014/idd41295.201402132136.txt *ftp://ftp.bom.gov.au/anon/gen/vaac/2014/idd41295.201402132229.txt *ftp://ftp.bom.gov.au/anon/gen/vaac/2014/idd41295.201402132300.txt

DLR.de Chart 7 1 st SIGMET to be found on the Internet* ***** Received at 23:24, 13/02/14 ***** YBBB SIGMET I01 VALID 132320/140520 YPDM - YBBB BRISBANE FIR VA ERUPTION MT KELUT PSN S0756 E11219 VA CLD OBS AT 132245Z SFC/FL550 S0720 E11250 - S0940 E11300 - S0945 E10605 - S0650 E10615 - S0720 E11250 MOV SW 60KT FCST 140445 SFC/FL550 S0605 E11235 - S1020 E11305 - S1115 E10110 - S0645 E10040 - S0605 E11235= NOTE that it was issued approximately six hours after the first VAA *https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/giajumbojet/conversations/topics

DLR.de Chart 8 Additional eruption info http://vast.nilu.no/eruptions/volcano_1/ http://sacs.aeronomie.be/airsalert/2014/02/alertsairs_20140213_18h11_310. php?alert=20140213_201015_310 http://sacs.aeronomie.be/airsalert/2014/02/alertsairs_20140214_06h28_310. php?alert=20140214_075440_310 http://sacs.aeronomie.be/iasi_notifash/2014/02/notifash_iasi_20140214_02h 54_310.php?alert=20140214_045119_310 http://sacs.aeronomie.be/iasi_notifash/2014/02/notifash_iasi_20140215_02h 33_309.php?alert=20140215_043223_309

DLR.de Chart 9 Perth - Jakarta route Picture of 18:11z 13.02.2014 Received by mail 20:10z 13.02.2014

DLR.de Chart 10 Weather FCST on 13.02.2014 Strong wind from east at approx. 250mb = FL350 Wind FCST valid on 14.02.2014 at 00:00z Temperature, dew point and wind over Jakarta on 13.02.204 at 23:00z (NOAA) NOTE that wind will blow VA into flight path of Jetstar 114

DLR.de Chart 11 Flightradar24 (1) To approx. 20:50z - at FL340 From 20:50z to 22:25z - can t be seen From 22:25z to 22:41z - at FL360 From 22:41z to 22:50z - can t be seen From 22:50z to 23:00z - at FL220 From 23:00z - approach/landing The pilot changed cruising level at some point WHY??? Did the crew received the VAA or advice from the dispatcher and was considering overflying of the ash cloud?

DLR.de Chart 12 Flightradar24 (2) Aircraft turns SW at 22:21z NOTE that it looks like they wanted to a avoid the ash cloud. Downwind, WHY???

DLR.de Chart 13 Flightradar24 (3)

DLR.de Chart 14 Flightradar24 (4)

DLR.de Chart 15 Discussion (1) There is probability that they were actually flying in ash for some time, probably about 10min (if we take the last speed of 486kt), before they realized that something was going on and decided to try to avoid it. BURNING QUESTION Did they lost engine/s in that point and restarted it/them later after descending?? WHAT happened in that 08S/108E point???

DLR.de Chart 16 Discussion (2) Closeup-view of flighttrack, with estimated SO2-Cloud position in light blue. Distance SAPDA-IPKON = 300 nm. Aircraft was approx. 100 nm in SO2-aerosol- cloud towards IPKON, plus maybe the same thereafter. Total could be approx. 200nm = approx. 25 minutes. Ashconcentration in the area is UNKNOWN. WHAT happened in that 08S/108E point???

DLR.de Chart 17 Press announcement (2)

DLR.de Chart 18 Press announcement (addition)

DLR.de Chart 19 Pilot statements They came from the SE, and my guess is, that they didn t have any chance to turn and come around the long way, upwind. One word: fuel. Another thought: knowledge. That they flew the route at all shows they didn t know about the ash-cloud. When they got some info, it was probably in co-ordinates, and probably, very, very late...like when they were already seeing it.. speculation. It will be interesting to see the report. $20 Mio...that s the price of one lucky VA encounter quoted in the newspapers... 250.000 $ was the annual (!) budget of the VAAC Buenos Aires I once saw in an ICAO paper. Someone has to figure it all out, someone with more financial understanding. It seems that they descended earlier than necessary for approach, maybe in an attempt to evade the ash, or per procedure: engines idle. Big problem that the crew obviously didn t get the info - still larger problem that Aussie ATC and Indonesian ATC didn t warn them...or at least I think so until proven otherwise. Nobody would have gotten me to continue on the route downwind of a fresh + very high eruption nobody!!! My thoughts: The Crew didn t know, and was not warned. The year: 2014!!!

DLR.de Chart 20 Dispatcher statements It looks like they did not receive any information about the eruption prior to departure. This is a BIG problem! As a Dispatcher under US regulations I would have been required to send that info. I would have sent them the original VAA, then closely monitored the eruption prior to departure for direction of movement of the ash. Some of the things I would be considering would be impact on the current route, do I need to file a new routing NE of the eruption? How much fuel would it require? Prior to departure I would also be evaluating the impact on, and availability of, alternate airports. I might delay the flight until there was a good picture of what the ash could was doing. If necessary, I would just cancel the flight and live to fight another day. The best time to make these evaluations is before the flight leaves the gate! It doesn t look like this was done. Once en-route, the options become more limited the closer the flight gets to the destination (and the ash cloud). At some point I would have looked at rerouting the flight to the NE of the eruption. I am not very familiar with the airports in that part of the world. But, it looks like, if needed, a fuel stop could have been made in Denpasar, Bali (WADD). If prior to the mid-point of the flight, I would have certainly considered a return to Perth. I don t know what the regulations are that govern Jetstar, but the information provided to the crew was either woefully inadequate, or completely ignored.

DLR.de Chart 21 We hope that answers on all these questions will be available through the final official report. The only fact we know for sure now is: Passengers and crew of Jetstar 114 were extremely lucky!

DLR.de Chart 22 Appendix A Highlighting an importance of SACS!!!

DLR.de Chart 23 Appendix B Cloudsat: water-cloud radar

DLR.de Chart 24 Appendix C There were more encounters with the ash cloud!!! Report from the 8 th meeting of the IAVWOPSG in Melbourne, 17-20 Feb 2014 ICCAIA* representative at the meeting was: Mr Rory Clarkson (Project Engineer, Rolls-Royce, PO Box 31, Derby DE24 8BJ, UK +44(0)1332 246027, rory.clarkson@rolls-royce.com *ICCAIA International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations