Aviation Security: TSA Successes and Ongoing Challenges Post- 9/11 Jennifer Grover, Director Chris Ferencik, Assistant Director Homeland Security and Justice Airports Council International North America October 18, 2017, Arlington, Virginia For more information, contact Jennifer Grover, (202) 512-7141 or GroverJ@gao.gov Page 1
Agenda Background Examples of TSA successes highlighted in previous GAO work Examples of ongoing TSA challenges highlighted in previous GAO work Ongoing work Questions and GAO Contact Page 2
Background GAO is the independent, nonpartisan research and investigative arm of the U.S. Congress GAO s mission is to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government Source: GAO Page 3
Background TSA is responsible for screening passengers and baggage at nearly 440 airports across the country Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, TSA has spent billions of dollars on aviation security programs Over the past five fiscal years funding ranged from a high of nearly $7.7 billion in 2012 to a low of nearly $7.0 billion in 2013 Figures presented on this slide are from a September 2016 report Number of Airports in Each TSA Security Risk Category Page 4
TSA Success: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections Aviation Security: TSA's Efforts to Assess Foreign Airports and Inspect Air Carriers (GAO-17-808T) TSA has taken steps to enhance foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections since 2011 Aligning resources based on risk, resolving airport access issues, making evaluations more comprehensive, and creating operational efficiencies TSA addresses deficiencies with capacity and development, such as training and on-the-spot counseling Our preliminary analysis showed that TSA s database for tracking deficiencies does not have comprehensive information Our draft report includes two recommendations to strengthen TSA s data management Page 5
TSA Success: Access Controls at Airports Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress Implementing Requirements in the Aviation Security Act of 2016 (GAO-17-662) TSA has generally made progress addressing the applicable requirements within the Aviation Security Act of 2016 As of June 2017, TSA had implemented most of the requirements, had not taken action on 3 requirements, and had taken initial action on the remaining requirements Key examples of TSA s progress in implementing the requirements in the act: Updated airport employee credential guidance Developed a tool for unescorted access security to ensure those individuals are randomly screened for prohibited items Page 6
TSA Success: Steps to Secure Perimeter and Access Control Aviation Security: Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security Would Benefit from Risk Assessment and Strategy Updates (GAO-16-632) TSA has made progress in assessing risk to the airport perimeter and access controls, including developing a risk assessment in May 2013 but has not updated the assessment to reflect changes in the airport risk environment or comprehensively assessed vulnerability TSA has taken steps to oversee and facilitate airport security by developing strategic goals and evaluating risks; however it has not updated its strategy accordingly We made 6 recommendations to TSA related to risk assessment, which remain open Page 7
TSA Success: Steps to Secure Perimeter and Access Control A variety of technologyand nontechnologybased approaches have been implemented to strengthen perimeter and access control security Airports encountered challenges related to cost and effectiveness Example of Airport Perimeter Fence Page 8
TSA Challenge: Countermeasures Aviation Security: Actions Needed to Systematically Evaluate Cost and Effectiveness Across Security Countermeasures (GAO- 17-794) TSA has data on the effectiveness of some of its passenger aviation security countermeasures passenger screening, checkpoint and checked baggage, and explosive detection canines but not the Behavior Detection Analysis Program and the U.S. Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS) We recommended that TSA explore and pursue methods to assess the deterrent effect of TSA s passenger aviation security countermeasures, with FAMS as a top priority Page 9
TSA Challenge: Countermeasures TSA compares the security effectiveness of some aviation security countermeasures, but does not evaluate cost and effectiveness tradeoffs across all countermeasures Without such an analysis, TSA is not well positioned to strike an appropriate balance of costs, effectiveness, and risk We recommended that TSA systematically evaluate the potential cost and effectiveness tradeoffs across aviation security countermeasures A TSA Canine Team Searches an Airport Terminal Page 10
TSA Challenge: Behavior Detection Aviation Security: TSA Does Not Have Valid Evidence Supporting Most of the Revised Behavioral Indicators Used in Its Behavior Detection Activities (GAO-17-608R) We assessed the extent to which TSA has valid evidence demonstrating that the specific indicators in its revised list can be used to identify passengers who pose a threat to aviation security We reviewed and categorized 178 sources and found that 98 percent (175 of 178) did not provide valid evidence Sources Cited by TSA in Support of Its Revised List of Behavioral Indicators by Category Note: News or opinion sources and reviews of studies sources do not meet generally accepted research standards. Page 11
TSA Challenge: TSO Training Aviation Security: TSA Should Ensure Testing Data Are Complete and Fully Used to Improve Screener Training and Operations (GAO-16-704) TSA measures TSO performance annual proficiency reviews, assessments of x-ray machine operators, and covert testing programs, among other things TSA uses annual proficiency review data to enhance TSO training but its use of other testing data is constrained by incomplete and unreliable data We recommended TSA: Collect complete data on assessments of X-ray machine operators Analyze these data nationally for opportunities to enhance TSO performance Track the implementation of covert testing recommendations TSA has implemented our recommendations Page 12
TSA Challenge: FAMS Risk Federal Air Marshal Service: Actions Needed to Better Incorporate Risk in Deployment Strategy (GAO-16-582) Among other things, we identified three ways FAMS could better incorporate risk into its deployment decisions Consider risk when dividing resources between domestic and international flights Conduct a risk assessment to document certain domestic deployment decisions Document the rationale for selection of international deployment destinations In the summer of 2016 FAMS began documenting the decisions on a monthly and quarterly basis. This has been useful for external parties with authorized oversight responsibilities Page 13
Ongoing TSA-related engagements TSA Resource Allocation Plan Air Cargo Security TSA Covert Testing Cuba Airport Security Behavior Detection Analysis protections against profiling Page 14
QUESTIONS? Page 15
GAO Contact Jennifer Grover, Director Homeland Security and Justice (202) 512-7141 GroverJ@gao.gov Source: GAO Page 16
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