Sjöfartsverkets rapportserie B

Sjöfartsverkets rapportserie B 2006-7 The Swedish roro passenger ship FINNSAILOR - SBHY - in collision with the Maltese bulk carrier GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI - 9HZU6, 13 November, 2005

REPORT The Swedish roro passenger ship FINNSAILOR - SBHY - in collision with the Maltese bulk carrier GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI - 9HZU6 13 November, 2005

on the investigation of the collision between Swedish roro vessel FINNSAILOR and Maltese bulk carrier GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI South Baltic Sea 13 November 2005 Marine Accident and Incident Investigation Merchant Shipping Department Merchant Shipping Directorate Malta Maritime Authority Malta Swedish Maritime Administration S-601 78 NORRKÖPING Sweden SE-601 78 NORRKÖPING, Sweden Phone +46 (0)11-19 10 00 Fax +46 (0)11-23 99 34

The following is a joint investigation report with the Malta Maritime Authority, the German Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation and Swedish Maritime Administration in which the Swedish Maritime Administration has taken the lead role pursuant to the IMO Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents (Resolution A849 (20)). The sole objective of the investigation is to prevent future accidents and malfunctions. The investigation does not serve to ascertain fault, liability or claims. A German version of the investigation report does not exist. Date: 2006-03-20 Our reference: 080201-05-17234/080202-05-17235 Maritime Casualty Investigation Division Sten Anderson Direct phone: +46 (0)11-191269 The report is also www.sjofartsverket.se Sjöfartsinspektion available on our website Olyckor och tillbud Haverirapporter Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

List of Contents 1 Summary... 1 2 Account of facts...2 2.1 The ships... 2 2.1.1 FINNSAILOR... 2 2.1.2 Equipment on the bridge... 4 2.1.3 Turning radius... 5 2.1.4 Engine... 6 2.1.5 Crew... 6 2.1.6 ECS (Electronic Chart System)... 7 2.1.7 VDR (Voyage Data Recorder)... 7 2.1.8 Sound recording from the VDR... 8 2.2.1 GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI... 9 2.2.2 Bridge equipment... 11 2.2.3 Engines... 12 2.2.4 The crew... 12 2.3 The weather situation... 12 2.4 The fairway...12 2.5 Ships involved... 13 2.6 AIS (Automatic Identification System)... 14 2.7 The convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea (COLREG)...15 2.8 STCW (Seafarers Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Code)... 16 2.9 Account of facts... 17 3 Course of Events... 17 3.1 According to FINNSAILOR... 17 3.2 According to GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI... 22 4 Analysis... 26 4.1 The actions of FINNSAILOR... 26 4.1.1 Evasive action... 26 4.1.2 Engine manoeuvre... 27 4.2 The actions of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI... 27 4.3 Fatigue... 29 5 Violation of the convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea (COLREG)... 29 5.1 FINNSAILOR... 29 5.2 GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI... 30 5.3 PROTECTOR and DANA 1... 30 6 Causes... 30 7 Factors... 31

8 Observations... 32 9 Recommendations... 32 10 General recommendation... 32 11 Damage...33 11.1 Material damage of FINNSAILOR... 33 11.2 Material damage of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI... 34 12 Result of the investigation... 35 13 Submission... 36

1 Summary The roro passenger ship FINNSAILOR, en route from Travemünde, Germany, to Malmö, Sweden, was approaching the traffic separation scheme rounding the Gedser Reef (see chart extract in item 2.4). In good time before entering the separation scheme the OOW on the bridge of FINNSAILOR observed, visually and on the radar, three ships on a parallel course heading east in the separation scheme. The OOW steered aft of the three ships and laid FINNSAILOR on a parallel course between the northernmost ship and the one in the middle. In his mind all three ships would continue in the direction of the separation lane and turn where the direction changes from approx. east-west to approx. northeast-southwest. The southernmost of the four ships, the Malta registered bulk carrier GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI began to turn to port in order to continue along the new running of the separation lane. The new course pointed in front of the stem of the second southernmost ship, DANA 1, which was forced to turn, also to port. Since the attention of the OOW of FINNSAILOR was completely focused on the northernmost ship, PROTECTOR, he did not notice until late that GENERAL ROT-ROWECKI had turned to port with her course in front of his stem. When FINNSAILOR realized that a hazardous close-quarters situation was a fact, the OOW tried to turn away by hard a port rudder. The manoeuvre failed and the starboard quarter of FINNSAILOR hit the port side of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI at hatch No. 6. The collision took place on 13 November 2005 at 0445 in position 54º24'52 N, 012º11'12E. The hulls of the two ships were seriously damaged and both had to go to a shipyard for repairs. Page 1

2 Account of facts 2.1 The ships 2.1.1 FINNSAILOR Name FINNSAILOR IMO No. 8401444 Call sign Port of registry Shipowner SBHY Malmö Rederi AB Nordö Link Gross tonnage 20783 Length over all Breadth 158.40 metres 25.70 metres Page 2

Draught Classification society 7 metres Det Norske Veritas Year built 1987 Construction material Engine power Steel 15360 kw Crew 23 Passengers 48 FINNSAILOR was built at shipyard Stocznia Gdanska im. Lenina in Gdansk in 1987 for Finnlines Oy, Finland, and was flying Finnish flag. The ship s name has been the same since delivery. In 1996 she was modernized and converted from a cargo ship to a ropax ship. In the period September 2000 till the end of the year 2001 she was chartered by Nordölink. On 1 January 2004 FINNSAILOR was transferred to fly Swedish flag and was routing Malmö Travemünde, a route that the shipowner has operated since 1982. FINNSAILOR was equipped with a wide ramp at the stern and another ramp forward to starboard for loading and unloading. The cargo capacity was 1400 metres of lanes for trailers and trucks, and also space for another 230 private cars. On this particular voyage there were 48 passengers in addition to the trailers and trucks. The passenger capacity was 119 persons in 45 cabins. Cargo was carried on decks 1, 2 and 3. Deck 4 was weather deck and was also the lowest deck of the deckhouse. Decks 5 7 were in the deckhouse and contained crew areas and passenger areas. The bridge was on deck 8. Page 3

2.1.2 Equipment on the bridge The design of the bridge on deck 8 was such that it was possible to see practically all around the horizon. The normal position of the OOW was in his chair a few metres to starboard from the centreline with an Atlas 9600 Arpa radar straight in front of the seat, an Adveto Ecdis 1200 electronic chart diagonally to the right and a conning display just to the left of the radar. Immediately to the left of the OOW was the control panel with i.a. the engine controls, automatic steering Atlas 9600, override of the steering, bow-thruster controls and VHF telephones. On the other side of the manoeuvre panel was another radar, and behind it was the seat where the master normally sat when he was involved in operating the ship. To port of the centreline was a third radar, normally operated by the lookout. On each of the covered bridge wings was a control panel for manoeuvring to and from berth. All equipment on board was in good working order. Conning display ARPA radar ECS Override Picture: The seat of the OOW on the bridge of FINNSAILOR. Page 4

2.1.3 Turning radius When going the speed that FINNSAILOR did on the occasion, approx. 18 knots, a 90º change of course will be reached abt. 1.3 minutes after hard a port is steered, according to the turning radius. After another 1.3 minutes (approx.) the ship will be on reverse course. The lateral movement at a full turn (360º) is 0.367 M (nautical mile = 1852 metres). The speed reduction at a course change of 90º is abt. 5 knots. From the original course the aft of the ship is pressed out to starboard abt. 50 metres at a turn to port. Picture: The turning radius of FINNSAILOR. Page 5

2.1.4 Engine The propulsion engine of FINNSAILOR consisted of two 12 cylinder main engines of type Wärtsilä-Sulzer 12ZAV4O, which developed 15,360 kw in total and which were connected to two controllable pitch propellers, giving the ship a maximum speed of 19 knots. FINNSAILOR was also equipped with two spade rudders, one aft of each propeller. This gave the ship an excellent steering and manoeuvring ability. Far forward was a bowthruster. 2.1.5 Crew On this voyage 23 crew members were on board: master, chief officer, 2 second officers, boatswain, 4 able bodied seamen (AB), chief engineer, 1 first and 2 second engineer officers, repairman, motorman, purser, 2 cooks and 5 catering assistants, all of Swedish nationality. The duty schedule of the officers was drawn in such a way that 2 weeks duty was followed by 2 weeks off, and then 2 weeks duty and 4 weeks off. The OOW at the time of the accident, one of the second officers, was 34 years old. He had passed his examination as a master and had got his certificate as deck officer Class V some six months earlier. He signed on as a second officer for the first time on 15 June, 2005. The current period of duty started on 6 November. The working hours of the second officer was 10.5 hours Tuesday through Friday and 9 hours on Saturday. On this Sunday his watch was from midnight and was supposed to last until 0500. The collision occurred 15 minutes before the relief. FINNSAILOR made six return trips per week between Malmö and Travemünde. During the five months that he had been on duty on board, the OOW had made slightly more than 100 passages in the Kadett channel. The AB on watch was 32 years old and had been employed at Nordö Link for 2.5 years. He too had passed his examination as a master but had not sufficient time-at-sea to get his certificate as a deck officer Class V. Page 6

The working time of the AB was 11 hours in 24 hours Monday through Friday and 9.5 hours on Saturday. This night his watch started at midnight and he would be a lookout until 0600. The master s standing order was that he should be informed if the visibility was less than 2 M, if a close-quarters situation should occur or if the traffic was dense. 2.1.6 ECS (Electronic Chart System) Diagonally in front of the OOW s seat was the electronic chart (ECS) of make Adveto, type Adveto Ecdis 1200. On the ECS screen the AIS (Automatic Identification System) displayed other ships equipped with AIS. The Adveto navigation programme can record and save navigation data from the own ship and from AIS data received. By this recording function a chosen course of events can be displayed later on. According to the OOW the ECS was more useful than the radar. 2.1.7 VDR (Voyage Data Recorder) At the time of the accident a VDR was compulsory for passenger ships and new cargo ships with a gross tonnage above 3000. FINNSAILOR was equipped with a VDR of make Concilium. The VDR colloquially is called the black box and is an integrated system, where e.g. information concerning the safe operation of the ship is collected. All information in the VDR can be played back later. At any moment a recording function can be activated to save information for a minimum of 12 hours, following international requirements. Most suppliers, one of which is Concilium, have longer storage time set in their plants. If no saving function is activated, the information is erased successively as the preset time is exceeded. The most interesting data concerning the accident was the radar data with the various echoes, course- and speed-vectors, date and time, position and Page 7

course and speed. The data of the last-mentioned functions were collected from one of the ship s GPS (Global Positioning System). Set out in various places on the bridge were also 6 microphones connected to the VDR. Five were meant to record conversation on the bridge and the sixth was for the VHF traffic. 2.1.8 Sound recording from the VDR Out of the VDR sound recording the following might be of interest as regards the reactions on the bridge of FINNSAILOR the minutes before the collision. At 04.41.18 the AB commented (on DANA 1): One of them is turning now. At 04.42.10 the AB said: Does that damned fool mean to go straight ahead? and the OOW answered: No, I think he won t. The ship in question was PROTECTOR. At 04.43.49 the AB said: It will be quite tight with the one to starboard. At 04.44.16 the OOW of FINNSAILOR tried to contact GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI by VHF, without success. Page 8

2.2.1 GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI Name GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI IMO No. 8417754 Call sign Port of registry Shipowner Operator 9HZU6 Valletta Cepheus Shipping Limited Polish Steamship Co. Gross tonnage 23409 Dead weight Length over all Breadth Draught, summer Class 38498 tonnes 198.29 metres 27.78 metres 11.14 metres Polish Register of Shipping Page 9

Year built 1985 Construction material Engine power Steel 7943 kw Crew 21 GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI was built in 1985 at shipyard Georgi Dimitrov, Varna, Bulgaria, for Polish buyers and was under Polish flag. Her present name was given at delivery, and it has been kept ever since. In the year 2001 she was transferred from Polish to Maltese flag. The ship was a genuine bulk carrier with 7 cargo holds ahead of the deckhouse, which comprised crew areas and the bridge. The engine room was aft, beneath the deckhouse. Both cargo holds which were affected by the collision measured 19.55 x 27.6 metres. All 7 holds were covered with hatches of steel. No rig or other equipment on the foredeck was blocking the view from the bridge. Under the cargo holds along the whole cargo space were double bottom tanks. At a distance of 3.4 metres from the shell plating the tank top plating rose on both sides and met the shell plating 5.6 metres above the ship s bottom (see figure). Double bottom tanks 3 and 4 to port, which were both ballast tanks, were affected by the collision. Page 10

Top wing tank Figure: Cross section of cargo hold 5 of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI. Top wing tanks under the weather deck ran along both sides. The bottom of the tanks stretched from the height of the coaming and met the shell plating at 4.25 m from the weather deck (see figure). No. 2 and 3 port top wing tanks, both ballast tanks, were affected by the collision. They could hold 1130 and 780 m 3 respectively. 2.2.2 Bridge equipment The bridge of the ship, located 5 decks above weather deck, was of conventional type with open wings. The most important pieces of apparatus in this connection were two 3 cm radars of type K/H NUCLEUS 6000 A and K/H HR 3000T, AIS of type KDU 1905 SAILOR and one C. PLATH gyro compass. One of the radars was a fully ARPA radar. All equipment on board was in good working order. Page 11

2.2.3 Engines The ship was equipped with one Sulzer main engine of 7943 kw, connected to a fixed blades propeller. The rudder was of conventional type. 2.2.4 The crew On board on this voyage were 21 crew members: master, chief officer, second and third officer, chief engineer, first, second and third engineer, electrician, boatswain, 3 AB, 2 OS, repairman, oiler, cook, catering assistant and 2 cadets, all of Polish nationality. The chief officer and one of the ABs were on watch from 0400. A system of four-on/eight-off watches was applied on board, i.e. the watch was on duty for 4 hours and then 8 hours off in a rolling schedule. The chief officer was 52 years old, the AB 45 years. As of 1 November through 12 November, the day before the accident, the chief officer had been working 150 hours and the AB 155 hours. 2.3 The weather situation At the time of the accident the weather was good with southsouthwesterly wind force 4B (6 8 m/sec), overcast with good visibility and 0.5 metre sea from southsouthwest. It was dark. 2.4 The fairway The collision took place southeast of Gedser, Denmark, in the Kadett channel in German territorial waters. Between Denmark and Germany, off Gedser, a traffic separation scheme has been introduced in order to separate the dense ship traffic. Heading east, the separation scheme first stretches west-east, and southeast of the Gedser Reef caisson lighthouse it changes its main direction to southwestnortheast. The breadth of the traffic lane heading east was about 1.8 M. After approx. another 4 M the separation scheme bends at racon buoy 71 to run southsouthwest northnortheast, where a deep-water separation is arranged between the other two traffic lanes. There is no coastal zone in this traffic separation scheme. Page 12

The collision took place in the middle stretch, very close to the eastern limit of the separation scheme. The fairway is supervised by means of radar and VHF by the VTS (Vessel Traffic Service) at Warnemünde, Germany. A recording of the course of events has been placed at the disposal of the investigators. X Collision 2.5 Ships involved Besides the colliding ships, FINNSAILOR and GENERAL GROT- ROWECKI, two other ships had an influence on the course of events. Page 13

One was the bulk carrier PROTECTOR, with call sign HPPD, IMO No. 8307349, year built 1984, registered in Panama. PROTECTOR was 189.5 metres long with a breadth of 30 metres and had a maximum draught of 15.73 metres. She had a gross tonnage of 24942 and on the occasion her speed was 14.2 knots. PROTECTOR, en route from Rotterdam to St. Petersburg, intended to continue her course steered and hence leave the separation scheme. The second one was the dry cargo ship DANA 1, call sign V3IB, IMO No. 7310973, year built 1973, registered in Belize. DANA 1 was 81 metres long with a breadth of 11.8 metres and she had a maximum draught of 4 metres. Her gross tonnage was 1494 and at the time of the accident her speed was 9.4 knots. DANA 1 was en route from Brunsbüttel, Germany, to Szczecin, Poland. She did not intend either to turn to port to continue in the separation scheme. All four ships were going in the same direction, close to parallel courses. 2.6 AIS (Automatic Identification System) The four ships involved were all equipped with AIS. This system is meant to supply information about ships to other AIS-equipped ships and landbased stations concerned, such as identity, category, position, course over ground, direction of the current, speed over ground and other safety-related details. The AIS-information which is recorded on land is generally stored for later display, if needed. This is the case as regards this accident. A ship may have its AIS-equipment connected to an integrated navigation system where its own navigation data as well as AIS-data from other ships can be stored. Having the AIS connected to a navigation system is not compulsory. However, on board FINNSAILOR this was possible via the navigation programme available in the electronic chart of the ship. Details as regards position, course and speed are collected from one of the GPS-units of the ship equipped with AIS. The AIS-details are transmitted and received on the VHF-channel. Page 14

2.7 The convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea (COLREG) The COLREG regulations are elaborated to improve safe navigation by providing rules as regards the acting of ships under way by specifying sound and light signals and describing how avoiding actions shall be performed when there is a risk of collision. Part B, Steering and Sailing Rules, states measures to be taken in order to avoid collision, and it is divided into three sections. Section I shall be applied in any condition of visibility, Section II when vessels are in sight of one another and Section III describes the conduct of vessels in restricted visibility. Below is an excerpt from the rules which are applicable in this specific case. The four ships operated in a traffic separation scheme. Rule 10 (a) says that this Rule applies to traffic separation schemes adopted by the Organization * and does not relieve any vessel of her obligation under any other rule. This means, according to Rule 13 a, that any vessel overtaking any other shall keep out of the way of the vessel being overtaken. Rule 13 (d) elucidates: Any subsequent alteration of the bearing between the two vessels shall not make the overtaking vessel a crossing vessel within the meaning of these Rules or relieve her of the duty of keeping clear of the overtaken vessel until she is finally past and clear. Rule 17 (a) (i) states that where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course and speed. Rule 17 (b) states: When, from any cause, the vessel required to keep her course and speed finds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by the action of the give-way vessel alone, she shall take such action as will best aid to avoid collision. * Organization means the UN body International Maritime Organization (IMO) in London. Page 15

Rule 5 states that every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. Rule 6 deals with safe speed. Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions. In determining a safe speed the following factors shall be among those taken into account: (a) By all vessels: (ii) the traffic density including concentrations of fishing vessels or any other vessels. Rule 10 (b) (iii) states that A vessel using a traffic separation scheme shall normally join or leave a traffic lane at the termination of the lane, but when joining or leaving from either side shall do so at as small an angle to the general direction of traffic flow as practicable. Rule 34(d) states that when vessels in sight of one another are approaching each other and from any cause either vessel fails to understand the intentions or actions of the other, or is in doubt whether sufficient action is being taken by the other to avoid collision, the vessel in doubt shall immediately indicate such doubt by giving at least five short and rapid blasts on the whistle. Such signal may be supplemented by a light signal of at least five short and rapid flashes. 2.8 STCW (Seafarers Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Code) 1. According to the STCW Code, Chapter VIII section A-VIII/1, all persons who are assigned duty as officer in charge of a watch or seafarer on watch shall be provided with a minimum of 10 hours rest in any 24- hour period. 2. The hours of rest may be divided into no more than two periods, one of which shall be at least six hours in length. Page 16

2.9 Account of facts This investigation is based upon information collected i.a. from the following sources: AIS, VDR and ECS of FINNSAILOR. Interrogation of the crew of FINNSAILOR. Statements from GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI. Radar recordings from Warnemünde VTS. 3 Course of Events 3.1 According to FINNSAILOR FINNSAILOR left Travemünde, Germany, at 0130 on Sunday 13 November, 2005. When the ship had left the port area the second officer took over the watch with an AB as lookout. The automatic steering was connected and the ship was mainly navigated by means of the electronic chart in which the AIS information was registered, but also by means of radar, where electronic navigation lines were set manually. Since the time of arrival in Malmö was scheduled the OOW reduced the speed at around 0300 and set the steering controls so that the scavenging air pressure was 1.0 bar. At full speed the scavenging air pressure was 1.5 bar. After reduction the speed was about 18 knots. When FINNSAILOR got closer to the traffic separation scheme in the Kadett channel, the OOW saw three ships side by side heading east in the separation scheme. Facing a close-quarters situation he turned to port in order to enter the separation scheme aft of these ships. At about 0437 FINNSAILOR s position was right between buoys 69A and 70, in parallel with the northernmost ship, PROTECTOR, which was about 25º on the port bow at a distance of 0.88 M, and the ship in the middle, DANA 1, which was about 23º on starboard bow at a distance of 0.92 M. South of DANA 1 was GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI at a distance of 1.06 M from FINNSAILOR. Page 17

FINNSAILOR s course was 083º and her speed 17.9 knots, which made her the overtaking ship to all three ships going the same direction. The OOW very closely monitored PROTECTOR, whom he presumed would turn to port and continue in the direction of the traffic lane, but there was no turning. He himself dared not turn to port to pass aft, since he estimated that this might result in a close-quarters situation or even a collision. On FINNSAILOR s bridge, where the attention was focused on PROTECTOR, it was not observed at first that GENERAL GROT- ROWECKI at about 0439 had commenced a turn to port to course 047º. This was realized at about 0442 and at the same time one noted that a dangerous close-quarters situation was a fact. In order to avoid a collision also DANA 1 had been forced to turn to port, but she was no threat to FINNSAILOR, since she was already abaft the beam. At 0444 FINNSAILOR tried to establish contact with GENERAL GROT- ROWECKI, but without success. The situation was getting really critical since the distance between the ships had been reduced to 4 cables only. At 04.44.46 FINNSAILOR started an evasion action by helm hard a port by means of the override. The distance between the ships was then less than 1 cable. At 04.45.33 FINNSAILOR and GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI collided in position 54º24',52N, 012º 11',12E. FINNSAILOR was under a heavy turn to port and starboard quarter hit the other ship s port side at hatch 6. Due to the heavy turn the speed of FINNSAILOR had been reduced to 16.5 knots whereas GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI on the whole had maintained course and speed, according to the AIS and VDR of FINN- SAILOR and according to radar pictures from VTS Warnemünde. At the time of the collision FINNSAILOR had managed to turn about 40º. PROTECTOR and DANA 1 both continued their way out of the separation scheme maintaining more or less their original courses. Page 18

The master was awaken by the impact and arrived at the bridge some minute after the collision. At 0448 he reduced the speed to 7 8 knots and continued going north in order not to interfere with other ship traffic. The master handled the radio and the other second officer attended to the navigation. A damage control was made and contact was established with the other ship and with the German police. At 0525 the police urged FINNSAILOR to return to the scene of the accident for interrogation and alcohol test. Police boarded the ship at 0700, and at 1130 the ship was allowed to continue her voyage after checks had been carried out of bridge equipment, certificates and competences, and facts had been collected. The police had also made clear that the men on watch were not under the influence of alcohol. At 1625 FINNSAILOR moored in Malmö and after unloading she sailed to Landskrona shipyard for repair. Picture: The situation 9 minutes before the collision Page 19

Picture: The situation 6 minutes before the collision. GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI has commenced her turn to port. Picture: The situation 2 minutes before the collision. DANA 1 has turned to port. Page 20

Picture: The situation 1 minute 15 seconds before the collision. Picture: 30 seconds before the collision. FINNSAILOR turns to port. No turn visible by GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI. Page 21

Picture: The collision. 3.2 According to GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI After unloading her cargo GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI left Rouen, France, at 2200 on 9 November heading for Ventspils, Latvia, via Great Belt. After having passed Fehmarnbelt the master left the bridge at 0230 on 13 November, since he considered that they had passed the most difficult passage. At 0400 the chief officer and one AB went on watch duty. The ship was on automatic steering at course 090º, making a speed of 12.8 knots. The navigation was run visually and by means of radar. When taking over the watch the chief officer saw a ship on the same course, 10º on the port bow at a distance of 1.5 M, which was rapidly reduced. He also clearly saw buoy E 69 on the starboard bow at a distance of 3.3 M. Moreover he saw two ships on his starboard side, one of which was on crossing course heading for buoy E 70. Page 22

At 0420 the OOW steered course 095º in order to give space to the ship on his port bow, which he was overtaking. When passing buoy E 69 at 0425 the OOW changed to manual steering since the distance to the ship being overtaken was growing smaller and was now only 0,5 M. At 0444 the ship being overtaken was abeam to port. That ship started a change of course to port, so he ordered the helmsman to change course, at first to 070º, then to 060º and 050º to set his own ship on course 044º. After having made the changes of course the OOW went to starboard bridge wing and then to port bridge wing in order to overview the situation after the changes of course and also to check the position of the ship being overtaken. He found that the starboard side was clear and that the other ship was abeam to port at a distance of 0.5 M. Suddenly he saw, 50º abaft the beam on port side at an estimated distance of 0.7 M, an illuminated ship coming at high speed holding a course between his own ship and the one being overtaken. He considered that there was too little space and tried to call the other ship s attention by flashing the aldis lamp. He first thought that the incoming ship would turn to port, but she suddenly started turning to starboard, steering straight at his own ship. The OOW then realized that a collision was inevitable and gave the helmsman order to steer 20º to starboard and soon afterwards hard to starboard. He also saw that the other ship tried to turn hard to port, but realized that it was too late. The other ship s aft hit the port side of GENERAL GROT- ROWECKI at hatches 5 and 6 and she immediately got a list to starboard. The OOW immediately alarmed the crew and simultaneously called the colliding ship. A few minutes after the collision the master came to the bridge. He found the situation threatening due to the list and planned to take GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI to shallow waters in case the damage would be great so as to risk the ship to go down. Page 23

The OOW went to get a general view of the damage and to sound the bottom tanks. By pumping ballast he tried to reduce the list. He found that the top wing tanks were leaking into the cargo holds and also that the ship had no ingress of water. The cargo holds were pumped dry, which reduced the list. A stability calculation of damaged condition was made, which showed that the stability of the ship was satisfactory. At about 0500 the German coast guard arrived and carried out interrogations. Contact was established with FINNSAILOR. About 0745 the master got permission to go to the roads of Swinoujscie. The ship was repaired at Szczecin shipyard in Poland. Picture: Sketch made by the chief officer. Page 24

Picture: Sketch made by the chief officer. Picture: Sketch made by the chief officer. Page 25

4 Analysis 4.1 The actions of FINNSAILOR 4.1.1 Evasive action When entering the traffic separation scheme the OOW of FINNSAILOR chose to place his ship between the northernmost (PROTECTOR) and the second to north (DANA 1) of the three ships on the same course. He considered it to be too narrow on the northern side of PROTECTOR, even though it was about 7 cables between that ship and the fairway border. Had the OOW chosen to place FINNSAILOR north of PROTECTOR his port side would have been free to follow the regular track, which was close to buoy 70; this could have been done without interference from the other ships. At 04.39.33, six minutes before the collision, FINNSAILOR had PROTECTOR at about 30º on port bow at a distance just above 7 cables. The OOW s attention was on PROTECTOR, whom he expected to turn to port and hence follow the separation lane, which he would also do himself. To turn to port and go aft of PROTECTOR seemed hazardous to the OOW, even though FINNSAILOR was easily manoeuvred and her turning radius only half the distance to PROTECTOR. The focus of both the OOW and the AB on FINNSAILOR s bridge was on the optical observation of PROTECTOR, which is why they did not notice GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI s turn to port, although the turn showed in the ECS and on the radar already 6 minutes before the actual collision. When the turn to port finally commenced the port side angle to PRO- TECTOR was about 45º and the distance just above 4 cables. The minimum distance to PROTECTOR during the turn was about 3 cables. Page 26

4.1.2 Engine manoeuvre To be on the timetable the speed was slowed down earlier in the night so that the scavenging air pressure would be about 1.0 bar, a minimum figure for that pressure not to cause unnecessary decarbonization of the engines. In case lower speed was wanted for a longer period it was practice on board to stop one engine and run the other one at full speed. Neither orders nor hindrances prevented the use of the engines in different ways to avoid hazardous close-quarters situations. Conversations with the OOW however indicated a reluctance to let the scavenging air pressure go below 1.0 bar. 4.2 The actions of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI was the southernmost of the four ships in the fairway and had, when approaching the eastern limit of the separation scheme, DANA 1 just abaft her beam on her port side at a distance of about 4 cables. GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI was the overtaking ship. It seems as if the OOW of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI did not realize or could not even imagine that the other three ships would do anything but turn to port and continue in the direction of the separation scheme. OOWs need to know what they are doing at all times and anticipate the consequences of their actions. This does not mean that the OOW should be aware of everything in order to use prescribed rules. This brings to mind situation awareness. OOW needs to determine what requires priority. This is important in order to understand the possible development of the situation. Otherwise he would most likely not have turned to port in front of the stem of the other ships, at which one a slow ship on the same course had to turn hard to port to avoid a collision and the other one, a fairly fast overtaking ship, became involved in the collision. It would have been possible for GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI to slow down to let the ships on the port side pass and then follow the traffic flow, without interfering with the other ships. Page 27

Finnsailor Protector Dana 1 General Grot- Rowecki Radar picture from Warnemünde VTS. GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI on her new course after the turn to port. Finnsailor Protector Dana 1 General Grot- Rowecki Radar picture from Warneünde VTS after the collision, which shows that PROTECTOR and DANA 1 did not intend to go in the separation scheme. Page 28

4.3 Fatigue Since the working hours of the crew of FINNSAILOR was on a rolling schedule the rest hour regulations had not been violated. There is no reason to believe that fatigue had had any influence on the bridge of FINN- SAILOR. Between 0800 on 6 November and 0800 on 7 November, and between 0800 on 9 November and 0800 on 10 November the OOW of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI had not had the rest hours prescribed in the STCW Code, Chapter VIII Section A-VIII/1. Neither had the watchkeeping AB had the prescribed rest hours in the 24 hour period 7 to 8 November. Fatigue has probably not had any impact upon the course of events, in spite of the fact that the OOW and the AB of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI a few days earlier had not get the rest fixed by law. 5 Violation of the convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea (COLREG) The four ships were sailing in a traffic separation scheme. Rule 10 (a) stipulates that this rule applies to traffic separation schemes adopted by the Organization and does not relieve any vessel of her obligation under any other rule. Neither the FINNSAILOR nor the GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI gave blasts on the whistle nor light signals in accordance with Rule 34(d). 5.1 FINNSAILOR Rule 5 stipulates that every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out. On the bridge of FINNSAILOR the focus was on PROTECTOR to such an extent that the turn to port and new course of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI was not observed until too late. Rule 6 deals with safe speed. FINNSAILOR sailed into a close-quarters situation with three other Page 29

ships at a speed of nearly 18 knots. A speed reduction in order to find out the development of the situation would have been appropriate. 5.2 GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI Rule 13 (a) stipulates that any vessel overtaking any other shall keep out of the way of the vessel being overtaken. GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI was the overtaking vessel as regards DANA 1. A turn to port ahead of the stem of the vessel to be overtaken was made so that the latter had to take a hard avoiding action. Rule 17 (a) (i) stipulates that where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course and speed. GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI turned to port and then laid her new course in front of the stem of the overtaking vessel, which was FINNSAILOR. The OOW and the AB claim that FINNSAILOR was not noticed until the distance was 0.7 M. This indicates that look-out has not been in accordance with rule 5. GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI should have adjusted her speed according to rule 6 instead of turning to port with the same speed and laying her new course in front of the stems of the three ships on the same course: DANA 1, FINNSAILOR and PROTECTOR. 5.3 PROTECTOR and DANA 1 These ships have not left the traffic lane according to rule 10 (b) (iii) at as small an angle to the general direction of traffic flow as practicable. 6 Causes The main cause for the collision was the turn to port of GENERAL GROT- ROWECKI ahead of a ship going in the same direction, which was being overtaken and which had to take an evasive action. The turn to port made the ship cause a collision with another ship going in the same direction, the speed of which was higher than that of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI. Page 30

A contributing cause was the deficient look-out on the bridge of FINN- SAILOR, to some extent also on board GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI. 7 Factors Inadequate understanding that the regulations for preventing collisions at sea are fully applicable also in a traffic separation scheme. The manner in which PROTECTOR and DANA 1 left the traffic lane. The inability of the OOWs on FINNSAILOR and GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI to imagine that not all four ships would continue in the scheme. The high speed of FINNSAILOR and her reluctance to slow down, due to the scavenging air pressure. The nearly total concentration that FINNSAILOR s OOW optically gave PROTECTOR. The inadequate attention of the OOW of GENERAL GROT- ROWECKI causing that, according to his statement, he did not notice FINNSAILOR until the distance was 0.7 M. Insufficient knowledge of the OOW of FINNSAILOR as regards the turning capacity of the ship. The OOW and the AB of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI have violated the rest hour requirements of the STCW Code. Page 31

8 Observations GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI made a turn to port against the regulations in spite of the fact that she had three ships going the same direction on her port side, at least two of which were seriously affected by the manoeuvre. At a speed of 18 knots FINNSAILOR sailed into a hazardous closequarters situation without due cause. Insufficient knowledge on the bridge of the two ships as regards the regulations to be followed in a traffic separation scheme. Lack of imagination on the bridge of the two ships involved as regards the development of the traffic situation. Imagination is a key step in risk assessment and management. The watch-keepers on board GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI have violated the rest hour requirements of the STCW Code. 9 Recommendations The owners of both ships are recommended to see to it that officers of the watch have knowledge of COLREG and, considering the accident in question, especially rule 10. 10 General recommendation On various occasions the uncertainty and ignorance of rule 10 of COLREG has been exposed in the shipping business. A prevalent opinion on board seems to be that ships in a traffic separation scheme are the stand-on vessels. Shipping companies, education institutions and ships management need to stress the importance of the fact that rule 10 does not relieve any vessel of her obligation under any other rule. Page 32

It is important that ships crews shall be provided with a minimum of the rest hours stated in the STCW code. 11 Damage Personal injuries and damage to the environment are not known to have occurred. The material damage has been mentioned only in general terms in the investigation report. 11.1 Material damage of FINNSAILOR The shell plating and reinforcements within the starboard corner of the stern, from the ramp, around the corner and up to about 2 metres ahead were severely damaged. Also the deck plates in the area from poopdeck (deck 3) and down were damaged, as also the tank under deck 2. There was no water ingress. FINNSAILOR was taken to Landskrona shipyard in Sweden for repair. Picture: Damaged area of FINNSAILOR. Page 33

11.2 Material damage of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI There were indentations on the steel plates on port side at the aft part of cargo hold No. 5 and the fore part of cargo hold No. 6. Top wing tanks 2 and 3 on the port side were damaged and cracked, which caused ballast water from the tanks to flow into cargo holds 5 and 6. Double bottom tanks 3 and 4 to port were damaged. The piping to the tanks in question was damaged. The ship did not spring a leak. GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI was taken to Szczecin shipyard in Poland for repair. Picture: The damaged area of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI Page 34

12 Result of the investigation Four ships, GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI, DANA 1, FINN- SAILOR and PROTECTOR, were sailing in a traffic separation scheme almost on parallel courses. In the area in question the traffic separation scheme changed its course from west-easterly to southwest-northeasterly direction. The southernmost ship, GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI, turned to port when getting closer to the limitation of the separation scheme without checking the intentions of the other ships. The turning ship, GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI, was both an overtaking and an overtaken ship. The OOW of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI had obviously no knowledge of rule 10 (a) of COLREG. FINNSAILOR, which was overtaking the other three ships, sailed into a hazardous close-quarters situation. FINNSAILOR was not aware of the change of course of GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI until very late. The attention of the OOW of FINNSAILOR was on the northernmost ship, PROTECTOR. DANA 1 and PROTECTOR were leaving the separation scheme to continue on their original courses, against the rule 10 b) (iii). The other two ships did not realize that this might be the case. The weather was fine with good visibility. It was dark at the time of the accident. Page 35

13 Submission The final draft of the report was sent to: The owners of the GENERAL GROT-ROWECKI, Polish Steamship Company. The owners of the FINNSAILOR, Rederi AB Nordö Link. Comments were received from the Swedish company. A submission was received from the Polish company. Please find enclosed the summary of the submission: Page 36

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