F A S T Update Early warning program Kosovo Semi-annual Risk Assessment May to October 2005 F T A S
Kosovo May to October 2005 Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) 3 All Domestic Conflictive and Cooperative Events 5 All International Conflictive and Cooperative Events 7 Appendix: Description of indicators used 9 The FAST International Early Warning Program 10 Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp Contact FAST International: Phone: +41 31 330 10 71 Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:fast@swisspeace.ch www.swisspeace.org/fast Country Expert: Dr. Florian Bieber
Kosovo May to October 2005 Page 3 Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 68 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: Over the past six months, the level of overall stability remained relatively high, whereas conflictive events continued at a stabile, yet high level. While there has been a reduced degree of volatility in the stability index as opposed to the previous reporting period, stability remains highly fragile. The past six months have seen the most important decision since the end of the conflict in 1999, i.e. the beginning of discussions for the final status of Kosovo, endorsed by the UN Security Council on 24 October. The relative calm in Kosovo in the run up to the decision of the Security Council can be viewed as an encouraging sign. The foreseeable impasse in the status talks, however, bears considerable risks in terms of a radicalization in Serbia and Kosovo. The talks, lead by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, who as been appointed by the UN, includes representatives from the EU, Russia and the United States, as well as the two main parties, the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro and the government of Kosovo. The weakness of the Kosovo Albanian political leadership has emerged as another source of instability. Although Ramush Haradinaj was released from the trial pending at the Hague Tribunal and was allowed to resume political activities, his ability to shape Kosovo politics remains constrained by the pending case for war crimes. The Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi has not been able to continue the energetic leadership of Haradinaj and was weakened by corruption allegations. The fact that Ibrahim Rugova, president and de-facto leader of the largest party, has been diagnosed with cancer and is in deteriorating health raised the risk of weakening the Kosovo Albanian negotiation team and might usher in a period of political instability. In particular, the dominant party, the Democratic League of Kosovo, risks splitting during the status talks in case Rugova would no longer lead the party. In a step to overcome internal divisions among the main political parties, president Rugova nominated a negotiation team for the status talks including all main parties, namely himself, Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi; the President of the Assembly Nexhat Daci; as well as the President of the Democratic Party of Kosova, Hashim Thaci and the President of ORA, Veton Surroi, and the publisher of the newspaper Zeri, Blerim Shala.
Kosovo May to October 2005 Page 4 Kosovo is entering a possibly protracted period of great uncertainty with significant potential for instability. The diametrically opposed goals for the status talks of the Kosovo Albanian political elite and the Serbian political elite leave no room for a mutually acceptable compromise. The Albanian side has made it clear that anything less than independence would be unacceptable, whereas the Serbian political elites appear willing to consider any solution except independence for Kosovo. As a result, an externally imposed solution appears the mostly likely scenario. On both sides, the risk of extreme spoilers, ranging from the Serb Radical Party in Serbia to the opposition in Kosovo or some more radical groups is very high in case of even small compromises. Even if a solution is imposed, spoilers can derail the implementation of the solution and/or endanger the democratic transformation in either Serbia or Kosovo.
Kosovo May to October 2005 Page 5 All Domestic Conflictive and Cooperative Events Average number of reported events per month: 68 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: Over the past six months, the number of Domestic Conflictive Events exceeded the Domestic Cooperative Events. Although not a new trend, recent months mark a widening of the gap between the two. The conflictive climate is shaped by the lack of participation of Kosovo Serbs in political life in Kosovo and tensions associated with the run-up to the status talks. Political relations among the main Albanian political parties remain tense with the Democratic Party of Kosovo continuing its role as an effective opposition party. The party formed a shadow government headed by party president Hashim Thaci and called on the prime minister to resign over a scandal involving the prime minister using a private jet of a Kosovo businessman to return from a holiday trip. A key government initiative during the past six months has been the launch of five pilot projects for the decentralization of Kosovo. The project established new municipal units: Gracanica, within the municipality of Prishtina, and Partes, previously part of Gjilan/Gnjilane both predominantly Serb; the predominantly Turkish unit Mamusa within the Prizren municipality; and two predominantly Albanian units Djeneral Jankovic and Junik within the municipalities of Decan/Decane and Kacanik. The pilot projects are intended to lead to a broader decentralization in Kosovo, which would balance Serb demands for Serb self-governance in existing enclaves and Albanian fears of consolidating lines of division that could facilitate a break-up of Kosovo. The decentralization project thus targets both Serb and other minority territories, as well as Albanian-inhabited regions. The launch of the initiative in July, a key advance in the long contested field of decentralization, was marred by the boycott of the process by the main parliament party of Kosovo Serbs, the Serbian List for Kosovo of Oliver Ivanovic and the outright rejection by most Kosovo Serb and Serbian politicians. Throughout the reporting period, there have been continued instances of violence. In addition to the murder of two Serbs, who were shot from a car in August and the wounding of a Serb member of the Kosovo Police Service, the Kosovo Independence Army, a shadowy group, has emerged in Western Kosovo. Although the motivation behind the crimes could not be determined, the Serbian authorities
Kosovo May to October 2005 Page 6 quickly qualified them as being ethnically motivated. The Kosovo Independence Army has issued a series of threats and called on immediate independence for Kosovo. In addition, a series of other armed groups, both Albanian and Serb, have claimed to be active in Kosovo. In most cases, the existence of these groups beyond issuing declarations remains doubtful. The increased number of statements by such groups indicates the threat potential in the coming months, if they are able to secure some broader support. Most groups have their bases among organized crime structures and political extremists, which enjoy marginal popular support. A conflict climate also exists among the political leadership of the Kosovo Serbs. The headquarters of the small Serb Democratic Party (housed in the ministry for returns headed by the party president), which is participating in the Kosovo institutions and has been accused of betrayal by more extreme Kosovo Serb parties and groups, was targeted in a bomb attack in July. The party president Slavisa Petkovic later accused other Kosovo Serb parties for being involved in the attack. Although this accusation has not been confirmed, it is indicative of existing tensions. Domestic tensions are likely to continue to simmer in light of the status talks. In particular the role of Kosovo Serbs in the talks remains unclear, as Kosovo Serb politicians refused to join the Kosovo delegation. Representation with the Serb delegation remains unconfirmed and there is a risk that the community might be marginalized in the status discussions by both Serbia and Kosovo.
Kosovo May to October 2005 Page 7 All International Conflictive and Cooperative Events Average number of reported events per month: 68 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: Overall, the number of International Cooperative Events exceeded the number of conflictive ones during the past six months. The international events related largely to the preparation of the status talks and the activities of the special UN envoy Kai Eide, who prepared a key report which, despite its sharp criticism over the lack of fulfilment of the standards for Kosovo, recommended the beginning of Status talks as further postponements would not lead to an improvement in the fulfilment of standards. Tensions, however, remain high between Serbia and Kosovo and the international presence remains under pressure in Kosovo itself. With the impending status talks, there has been an increase in divergent opinions among members of the international community in regard to the outcome of the status talks. Statements in favour of independence by the president of Slovenia and government representatives in Switzerland are indicative of this trend. On the other hand, Serbia has sought increased international support for its negotiation platform of offering Kosovo less than independence and more than autonomy. The status talks have worsened relations between Kosovo and Serbia, which have been particularly tense since the March 2004 events, i.e. the riots in Kosovo, which targeted mostly Kosovo Serbs and representatives of the International Community. This has negatively impacted Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo itself. Encouraging in this context has been a series of meetings between Kosovo and Serbian ministers in the framework of the technical talks, such a cultural heritage and decentralization (earlier talks focused also on missing persons, etc.), in Vienna and Belgrade. The meeting of the ministers of culture in Belgrade is particular significant, as for the first time a Kosovo minister officially visited the Serbian capital. While tense and not yielding any concrete results, the meetings were a confidence building exercise and a key test of the willingness of both parties to engage in direct talks for the more significant and contentious process of negotiating the status of Kosovo. Suggestions for high-ranking direct talks between the presidents and prime ministers of Kosovo and Serbia have in the meantime come to naught. In addition to meetings with Serbia, there have been technical talks with Montenegro on the issue of refugee return.
Kosovo May to October 2005 Page 8 Furthermore, status talks have increased fears of impending independence for Kosovo in Serbia itself. The largest political party, the Serb Radical Party, threatened mayhem on the streets in case Kosovo would gain independence. Both the party and the Serb Orthodox Church suggested that Kosovo should be declared to be unlawfully occupied by the international peacekeeping forces with the goal that Serbia would thus be able to reassert control at some undefined point in the future. While not part of the government, the Radical Party is likely to further constrain the negotiating options of the Serb delegation, which is in a weak position after the government and the president have opposed status talks for months and lack a clear negotiation platform. In September, the head of the Serbian Coordination Centre for Kosovo, Nebojsa Covic, was replaced by Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, due to a conflict between the government and the Social Democratic Party headed by Covic. Although unrelated to Kosovo, the change marks the departure of a key person in Serbia s policies towards Kosovo since 2001. As much of the Kosovo policies (or the lack thereof) in the past year have been shaped by Prime Minister Kostunica, the change did not usher in a significant policy change. The international presence in Kosovo has come under pressure from the Kosovo Action Network (KAN), headed by Albin Kurti, a leader of the 1997/8 student protests in Kosovo, spokesperson of the KLA and later political prisoner in Serbia, which has been campaigning for "No Negotiations, Self Determination, i.e. opposing any talks over the final status. While not resorting to violence, the movement s activities have radicalized both the political space within Kosovo and relations with international actors present in Kosovo. In addition to criticism by KAN, the international presence has come under attack in a series of bomb attacks in July. The bombs targeted UNMIK and the OSCE, as well as the government of Kosovo. In recent months also a number of vehicles of international organizations have been destroyed by explosions. This continues a series of low-level attacks against the international presence in Kosovo over recent years. In a key cooperative development of the transfer of international responsibilities to domestic authorities, UNMIK launched an action plan in July to transfer control over the police and judiciary to Kosovo institutions. By the end of 2005, the relevant institutions will be established, which will receive some test competences. If successful, the ministries will receive control over most aspects of policing and the judiciary. Murky terrorist and criminal groups pose a threat to the international presence in Kosovo, in particular if status talks appear to be stagnating or delaying the Kosovo Albanian goal of independence. Divergent and conflictual positions regarding the possibility of independence, however qualified, in the international community are likely to become more apparent in the coming months, which is likely to impact both the status talks and the international relations of Kosovo. In particular Russia has become more active in recent months to assert a greater role in the resolution of the status of Kosovo than its engagement in the region to date. In addition, the United States has also reengaged with the beginning of Status talks. While the lead organization is the EU and its members, the key will be establishing a coherent platform together with Russia and the United States. The announcement of Montenegro to pursue a referendum on independence in the Spring of 2006 is likely to complicate status discussions and has raised concerns in the EU of possibly heightening tensions in Serbia.
Appendix: Description of indicators used Page 9 Country Stability Conflictive Events (Relative) All Conflictive Domestic Events All Cooperative Domestic Events All Conflictive International Events All Cooperative International Events The Country Stability index reflects three independent factors: (i) challenges by non-government actors to the state's monopoly of force; (ii) state repression; and (iii) violence entailing physical force against persons or property. The index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflictcooperation scale* divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflictcooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country. The Indicator has a range between 0 and. Number of Events (i) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflictcooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country. The Indicator has a range between 0 and. Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflictcooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country. The Indicator has a range between 0 and. Number of Events (i) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflictcooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country. The Indicator has a range between 0 and. *The IDEA cooperation-conflict scale is a general weighting scale that attaches a weight to every event. The scale has a range from 13 to +8. Event types that are regarded as cooperative have positive values, conflictive event types have negative values.
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