A Summary of Major Industrial Accidents

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A Summary of Major Industrial Accidents Presented by Dr. Bob Baron The Aviation Consulting Group www.tacgworldwide.com

CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR PLANT

What? Nuclear meltdown Where? Ukraine When? 1986 Critical human factors Culture Violations of operating rules and regulations (NOPs and SOPs) Lack of knowledge Lack of experience Lack of training CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR PLANT

Plant Design combination of events impossible: Probabilistic risk assessment (low) Intentional disabling of emergency protection equipment plus the violation of operating procedures could never happen Rule infringement CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR PLANT Operational routine allowed by the power station staff

UNION CARBIDE CHEMICAL PLANT

What? Gas Leak Where? Bhopal, India When? 1984 Critical human factors: Poor safety culture Under-maintained and decaying facilities Weak attitude towards safety Lack of/inadequate training Lack of properly working safeguards UNION CARBIDE CHEMICAL PLANT

NASA CHALLENGER SPACE SHUTTLE

What? Explosion Where? Cape Canaveral, Florida When? 1986 Critical human factors: Poor safety culture Groupthink Faulty design of O-rings Low temperature tolerance NASA CHALLENGER SPACE SHUTTLE

EXXON VALDEZ OIL TANKER

What? Oil Spill Where? Prince William Sound, Alaska When? 1989 Critical human factors: Fatigue: the 1989 tanker crew was half the size of the 1977 crew, worked 12-14 hour shifts, plus overtime. The crew was rushing to leave Valdez with a load of oil Third mate was at controls Captain was sleeping off a bender Inoperative RAYCAS (radar) EXXON VALDEZ OIL TANKER

Latent Threats EXXON VALDEZ OIL TANKER Ships were not informed that the previous practice of the Coast Guard tracking ships out to Bligh Reef has ceased The oil industry promised, but never installed, stateof-the-art iceberg monitoring equipment Exxon Valdez was sailing outside the normal sea lane to avoid small icebergs thought to be in the area Coast Guard vessel inspections in Valdez were not done, and the number of staff was reduced

COSTA CONCORDIA CRUISE SHIP

What? Capsized Where? Off Isola del Giglio, Tuscany, Italy When? 2012 COSTA CONCORDIA CRUISE SHIP Critical human factors: The ship was sailing too close to the coastline, in a poorly lit shore area, under the Master s command who had planned to pass at an unsafe distance at night time and at high speed (15.5 kts) Distractions, errors and violations can be established as the elements which characterized the human factors as root causes

COSTA CONCORDIA BRM (Bridge Resource Management) training not mandatory at time. None of the crew had BRM training Optimizing violation by Captain (showing off) CRUISE SHIP Decision error by Captain (perceived risk/reward) Complacency by Bridge Team (reduced vigilance regarding proximity to rocks)

ALVIA TRAIN DERAILMENT

What? Derailment Where? Northwest Spain When? 2013 Critical human errors? A year earlier, the driver bragged on Facebook about train s speed capabilities Train was travelling at high speed (111-118 mph) as it approached the curve Speed limit in area was 50 mph ALVIA TRAIN DERAILMENT

Driver said that he suffered a lapse of concentration as he approached the curve Driver was on cell phone just before curve ALVIA TRAIN DERAILMENT The high-speed track has ERTMS-compliant signaling which is designed to slow or stop a train whose driver is ignoring signals or the speed limits. But. The new high-speed line joins a conventional track shared with low-speed trains, at the curve where the accident happened. The conventional track only had the older ASFA signaling system, which will warn drivers if they are exceeding speed limits, but will not automatically slow or stop a speeding train.

What? Runway collision Where? Tenerife, Spain When? 1977 Critical human factors: Airport congestion due to bomb threat (re-routes) Pan Am aircraft had not exited the runway C-3 taxiway KLM Captain took off without proper clearance: Duty-time regulations Fatigue Deteriorating weather (fog) PAN AM AND KLM 747 COLLISION

Non-standard phrases by the KLM co-pilot ( We re at take off ) and the Tenerife control tower ( OK ) Lack of assertiveness by KLM co-pilot Fatigue? Stress? Pressure? Situational violations? PAM AM AND KLM 747 COLLISION

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