M I T I n t e r n a t i o n a l C e n t e r f o r A i r T r a n s p o r t a t i o n WHAT S WRONG WITH (SOME) US AIRLINES? Recent Airline Industry Challenges Dr. Peter P. Belobaba Program Manager Global Airline Industry Program January 2005
Recent Airline Industry Challenges US Airline Industry Since 2000 9/11 Attacks and Subsequent Events Impacts on Capacity, Traffic and Profits Pricing and Revenue Challenges Lower Total Industry Revenues Growth of Low-fare Carriers Fare Simplification Cost and Productivity Challenges Unit Cost Comparisons Stage Length and Aircraft Utilization Shifts in Operating Cost Categories Key Questions for the Future 2
US Airline Industry Before 9/11 Current industry crisis began before 9/11: Dot.com bubble burst, stock market slide, and softening economy led to unprecedented decreases in yields and business traffic by mid-2001 Industry losses forecast for 2001 even before 9/11 attacks Other airline industry concerns at the time: Air transportation system capacity constraints led to record flight delays in 2000 Consumer perceptions of poor service and airline indifference, exacerbated by delays Dominance of large network airlines, accusations of anticompetitive actions vs. new entrants Difficult labor/management relations, with labor demanding a share of 1990s airline profits 3
Impacts of 9/11 Attacks and More Most airlines reduced operations almost immediately after 9/11: 80,000 layoffs by US airlines alone, many more since then US airline capacity (ASMs) cut by 25%, hundreds of aircraft retired/parked US airline traffic (RPMs) initially dropped by 45% due to passenger fears, security hassles Post-9/11 setbacks haven t helped: Invasion of Afghanistan (October 01) Iraq War (March 02) SARS epidemic (March 03) Airline fuel prices increased 60% in 2004 US Terror Alerts keep security concerns in passengers minds 4
3 Years Later, Traffic Has Recovered US airline RPMs returned to 2001 levels in mid-2004 But August 2004 US airline capacity 7% lower than August 2001 Average load factors in 2004 are now above pre-9/11 levels 83.5% ALF in July 2004 is highest month on record Almost no expectation of US industry profits in 2005: Revenue mix of traffic is extremely weak, despite recovery of traffic and load factors Average fare (yield) is still running about 14% lower than in 2000 US airline bankruptcies United, Hawaiian in Chapter 11 American threatens, but achieves cost reductions US Airways emerges, but files for 2 nd time Delta on the brink 5
US Airline Capacity Still Down 7% from 2001 Billions 85 80 2001 2002 2003 2004 CAPACITY: Available Seat Miles 75 70 65 60 55 January February March April May June July August September October November December Source: ATA data Source: ATA Monthly Passenger Traffic Report 6
Domestic Traffic Now Back to 2001 Levels Billions 70 65 2001 2002 2003 2004 TRAFFIC: Revenue Passenger Miles 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 January February March April May June July August September October November December Source: ATA data Source: ATA Monthly Passenger Traffic Report 7
Load Factors are at Historical Record Levels 90% 85% 2001 2002 2003 2004 LOAD FACTOR: Percent of Capacity Utilized* 80% 75% 70% 65% 60% 55% January February March April May June July August September October November December Source: ATA data Source: ATA Monthly Passenger Traffic Report 8
US Industry Losses Over $30 Billion Since 2000 US Airlines Operating and Net Profit 15,000 10,000 Profit ($ millions) 5,000 0 (5,000) Operating Net Profit (10,000) (15,000) 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Year 9
Pricing and Revenue Challenges Industry profits in late 1990s driven by improved revenue generation through pricing and distribution: Multiple price levels, restrictions and effective revenue management of low fares led to higher load factors and unit revenues ($/ASM) Revenue power of legacy airlines has virtually disintegrated, with little relation to 9/11: Business passengers no longer willing to pay 5 to 8 times the lowest available fare Internet distribution channels give more passengers more information about air travel options Cutbacks have reduced service quality differences between network and low-cost carriers 10
US Airline Industry Revenues $140 $130 $120 US $ Billions $110 $100 $90 $80 $70 $60 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 Source: Air Transport Association Total industry revenues dropped by almost 20% and are still 12% lower than in 2000 11
10.50 10.00 9.50 9.00 8.50 8.00 Domestic Unit Revenues Are Down 15% R A S M -- M a in lin e D o m e s tic 12 M onths Ended Source: ATA data 12 Jan-96 Jul Jan-97 Jul Jan-98 Jul Jan-99 Jul Jan-00 Jul Jan-01 Jul Jan-02 Jul Jan-03 Jul Jan-04 Jul
Growth of Low Fare Carriers in US Recent conditions favorable for low-fare airlines: Less business travel overall, reduced willingness to pay for premium services More stable demand for price-sensitive leisure travel Leisure travel demand less affected by post 9/11 hassle factor Low-fare carriers threaten the viability of Majors: Share of domestic passengers flown by low-fare carriers increased to almost 25% in 2004, from 16% in 2000 and only 5.5% in 1990 Largest low-fare carriers continue to increase both capacity and traffic, in sharp contrast to most Majors Major airlines are looking for new business models to respond to changed environment and to compete with low-fare airlines 13
LEGACY AIRLINES AA American Airlines UA United Air Lines DL Delta Air Lines Legacy and Low Fare Airlines LOWFARE AIRLINES WN Southwest Airlines HP America West Airlines AS Alaska Airlines NW Northwest Airlines CO Continental Airlines US US Airways Legacy group carried 73% of US passenger RPMs in 2003. TZ American Trans Air (ATA) B6 JetBlue Airways FL AirTran Airways These airlines carried another 18% of US traffic. 14
Changes in Market Share by Carrier Change in % Market Share from 1st Qtr 99 to 3rd Qtr 03 1.00% 0.50% 0.00% -0.50% -1.00% -1.50% -2.00% -2.50% -3.00% -3.50% -4.00% 2.50% 2.00% AA UA DL NW CO US Change in % Market Share from 1st Qtr 99 to 3rd Qtr 03 While 4 out of 6 network carriers have lost market share since 1999, all low-fare airlines gained market share during this period, led by Southwest and Jetblue 1.50% 1.00% 0.50% 0.00% WN AS HP TZ B6 FL F9 NK 15
US Airline Yields (Revenue/RPM) $0.1400 $0.1350 $0.1300 $0.1250 $0.1200 $0.1150 Top 6 Majors Low-Fare Majors $0.1100 $0.1050 $0.1000 $0.0950 $0.0900 1999 1 1999 2 1999 3 1999 4 2000 1 2000 2 2000 3 2000 4 2001 1 2001 2 2001 3 Yields began decreasing prior to 9/11 and have shown little sign of recovery 2001 4 2002 1 2002 2 2002 3 2002 4 2003 1 2003 2 2003 3 2003 4 16
All Legacy carriers have lost revenues; UA and US revenues have dropped by over 30% Change in Passesnger Revenues -- Legacy Carriers 2003 vs 2000 60 50 40 30 20 % 10 0-10 AA CO DL NW UA US -20-30 -40 17
Lowfare group maintained or increased revenues biggest % gains at JetBlue, AirTran Change in Passenger Revenues -- Lowfare Carriers 2003 vs 2000 60 50 845% 40 30 20 % 10 0-10 AS HP TZ WN B6 FL -20-30 -40 18
Differential Pricing Theory (circa 2000) Market segments with different willingness to pay for air travel Different fare products offered to business versus leisure travelers Prevent diversion by setting restrictions on lower fare products and limiting seats available Increased revenues and higher load factors than any single fare strategy 19
Differential Pricing and Airline Fare Structures Differential pricing was embraced by all airlines: Charge more for flexibility and highest-demand flights while selling off excess seats at lower but more restricted fares Even low-fare carriers offer differentiated price levels and practice some form of revenue management/seat inventory control Difference with traditional airlines is that their differentiated prices are both less restricted and closer in ratio of fare levels Example of a traditional fare structure shown on following slide for Boston-Seattle market (2001): Highest unrestricted economy fare (Y) is 5 times that of lowest discount fare with restrictions All fares with any meaningful discount from the unrestricted fare require advance purchase and a Saturday night stay 20
BOS-SEA Fare Structure American Airlines, October 1, 2001 Roundtrip Cls Advance Minimum Change Comment Fare ($) Purchase Stay Fee? 458 N 21 days Sat. Night Yes Tue/Wed/Sat 707 M 21 days Sat. Night Yes Tue/Wed 760 M 21 days Sat. Night Yes Thu-Mon 927 H 14 days Sat. Night Yes Tue/Wed 1001 H 14 days Sat. Night Yes Thu-Mon 2083 B 3 days none No 2 X OW Fare 2262 Y none none No 2 X OW Fare 2783 F none none No First Class 21
Fare Simplification: Less Restricted and Lower Fares Recent trend toward simplified fares compressed fare structures with fewer restrictions Initiated by some LFAs and America West, followed by Alaska Most recently, implemented in all US domestic markets by Delta, matched selectively by legacy competitors Simplified fare structures characterized by: No Saturday night stay restrictions, but advance purchase and non-refundable/change fees Revenue management systems still control number of seats sold at each fare level PODS simulations of impacts show traffic mix and revenue impacts of simplified fares: Revenue impacts of simplified fare structures 22
BOS-SEA Simplified Fare Structure Alaska Airlines and American, May 1, 2004 Roundtrip Fare ($) Cls Advance Purchase Minimum Stay Change Fee? Comment 374 V 21 days 1 day Yes Non-refundable 456 L 14 days 1 day Yes Non-refundable 559 Q 14 days 1 day Yes Non-refundable 683 H 7 days 1 day Yes Non-refundable 827 B 3 days none No 2 X OW Fare 929 Y none none No 2 X OW Fare 1135 F none none No First Class 23
PODS Simulation Results: Traditional Restricted Fare Structure 5:1 fare ratio; all fare classes below full fare have Sat. night stay and 7/14/21 day AP restrictions 74.6% load factor; total flight revenue $64,716 5% revenue gains from use of RM booking limit controls 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 Loads by Fare Class 41.3 20.2 9.2 3.8 $625 $405 $240 $125 Fare Class 24
PODS Simulation Results: Simplified Fare Structure Fare ratio compressed to 3.5:1; Sat. night stay restriction removed from all but lowest fare class; advance purchase restrictions retained Load factor increases to 77.8%; but total revenues drop by 15% to $55,221 % Revenue impact of RM controls increases to over 8% 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 Loads by Fare Class 33.0 16.6 9.2 8.4 6.6 4.0 $450 $375 $240 $180 $155 $125 Fare Class 25
Impacts on Differential Pricing Model Drop in business demand and willingness to pay highest fares Greater willingness to accept restrictions on lower fares Reduction in lowest fares to stimulate traffic and respond to LCCs Result is lower total revenue and unit RASM despite stable load factors 26
Summary: Revenue Challenges Pricing actions by traditional airlines have increased unit revenues, but not to previous levels: Price cuts to stimulate leisure demand and reduce restrictions on business fares returned load factors to 75%, but did not improve revenue quality Recent experiments to decrease unrestricted fares have likely succeeded in re-attracting some business passengers But, fare simplification still leaves unit revenues 10-15% below levels of 2000 Conclusion: Pricing actions alone cannot return the network airlines to profitability 27
Cost and Productivity Challenges Post 9/11 operating costs increased substantially: Lower aircraft utilization due to schedule cuts affected productivity and increased unit costs Added security requirements and associated delays Security fees and higher insurance costs Fuel prices in Q1 2004 were 50%+ higher than in 2001 Given 15% shortfall in unit revenues, legacy airlines must cut costs and increase productivity: Low-cost carriers often used as benchmark for unit costs Changing work rules, reducing workforce and cutting wage rates are all options for reducing labor unit costs ($ per ASM) But, unit cost differences are also due to aircraft productivity, as determined by configuration and pattern of operations 28
US Airline Unit Costs (per ASM) Cost per Available Seat Mile (CASM) 13 12 11 Cents per ASM 10 9 8 7 6 99 1 99 2 99 3 99 4 00 1 00 2 00 3 00 4 01 1 01 2 01 3 01 4 02 1 02 2 02 3 02 4 03 1 03 2 03 3 Netw ork Carriers Unit Costs differences between network carriers and LCCs have continued to increase despite cost-cutting efforts LCCs 29
4.00 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 Airline Operating Cost Components UNIT COST BY CATEGORY Cents per ASM 30 Labor Fuel Ownership Professional Services Landing Fees Food & Beverage Maintenance Material Passenger Commissions Insurance Ad & Promotion Utils & Office Supplies Other Source: ATA data
120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 Fuel Prices Up 90% Since Q1 2002 FUEL COSTS Cents per Gallon 31 1Q90 1Q91 1Q92 1Q93 1Q94 1Q95 1Q96 1Q97 1Q98 1Q99 1Q00 1Q01 1Q02 1Q03 1Q04 Source: ATA data
Travel Agency Commissions All But Eliminated Down 85% Since 1994 PASSENGER COMMISSION COSTS Cents per RPM 2.00 1.60 1.20 0.80 0.40 0.00 1Q90 1Q91 1Q92 1Q93 1Q94 1Q95 1Q96 1Q97 1Q98 1Q99 1Q00 1Q01 1Q02 1Q03 1Q04 Source: ATA data 32
Food and Beverage Costs Cut in Half FOOD & BEVERAGE COSTS Cents per RPM 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 1Q90 1Q91 1Q92 1Q93 1Q94 1Q95 1Q96 1Q97 1Q98 1Q99 1Q00 1Q01 1Q02 1Q03 1Q04 Source: ATA data 33
Unit revenues dropped below unit costs in 2001 for legacy carriers Unit Costs and Unit Revenues Legacy $0.12 $0.11 $0.10 $0.09 CASM RASM $0.08 $0.07 $0.06 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 34
AA and UA have made biggest unit cost cuts, DL unit costs surged in 2003 Unit Costs / Legacy Carriers 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 AA CO DL NW UA US 0.09 0.08 0.07 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 35
Lowfare carriers RASM also down, but lower CASM continues to decrease Unit Costs and Unit Revenues Lowfare Carriers $0.12 $0.11 $0.10 $0.09 CASM RASM $0.08 $0.07 $0.06 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 36
Lowfare carriers have lowest CASM across all average stage lengths CASM vs. Stage Length 2003 $0.15 $0.14 US $0.13 DL CASM $0.12 $0.11 $0.10 $0.09 NW AS AA UA CO $0.08 $0.07 FL WN HP TZ $0.06 B6 $0.05 0 500 1000 1500 Stage Length (miles) 37
Aircraft Utilization and Productivity Aircraft utilization measured in block-hours/day: Southwest historically achieved system-wide utilization rates 5-10% higher than other Majors, despite flying shorter stage lengths Post-9/11 cutbacks reduced aircraft utilization at Top 3 Majors more dramatically than at Southwest Aircraft productivity measured in ASMs generated per aircraft per day: = (# departures) X (average stage length) X (# seats) Example: B737-500 aircraft operated by CO, UA, WN: Each WN aircraft generates 37% - 51% more ASMs per day, with more seats per aircraft, more departures, and more block-hours 38
Daily Aircraft Utilization by Legacy Carriers Plunged After 9/11 (not for Southwest) 12 11.5 11 Block Hours/Day 10.5 10 9.5 AA UA DL WN 9 8.5 8 98-1 98-2 98-3 98-4 99-1 99-2 99-3 99-4 00-1 00-2 00-3 00-4 01-1 01-2 01-3 01-4 02-1 02-2 39
Boeing 737-500 Productivity (2 nd Quarter 2002) Airline Daily Block Hours Flights per Day Avg. Stage Length Seats ASMs per Day Continental 8.3 3.9 719 104 291,626 United 7.5 4.3 564 109 264,347 Southwest 10.2 8.2 400 122 400,160 40
Lowfare carriers lead in aircraft utilization at all average stage lengths Aircraft U tilization 2003 BHs/ aircraft day 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 B6 FL WN AS TZ HP US AA CO DL UA NW 0 500 1000 1500 Stage Length (miles) 41
Labor Costs: A Big Part of the Problem Labor costs account for 1/3 of airline expenses Real unit labor costs 21% lower today than 1980 But RASM are 32% lower than 1982 costs exceed revenues Unit labor costs of low cost airlines about 50% below top carriers Wage movements out of synch with revenue movements Past labor cost reductions provided short term relief but not long term improvements in operational performance (productivity or service) 42
Legacy carrier employment down by 25% since 2000, a loss of over 100,000 jobs Airline Employment 1997-2003 450000 400000 350000 300000 250000 200000 Legacy Low-fare 150000 100000 50000 0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 43
Lowfare carrier salaries/benefits per employee 25% lower than legacy carriers Salaries and Benefits per Employee $90,000 $80,000 $70,000 CPI Adjusted to 2000 $60,000 $50,000 $40,000 $30,000 Legacy Lowfare $20,000 $10,000 $0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 44
Growth in Pilot Wage Rates vs. Growth in Revenue per Employee: 1993-1997 vs. 1997-2001 30% Pilot Wage Rate Changes Averaged Across Four Aircraft Types at 21 Airlines Pilot Wages 25% Revenue per Employee 24% 20% 18% 15% 10% 5% 4% 0% -5% -10% -8% % Change 1993-1997 % Change 1997-2001 Source: Department of Transportation Form 41 (from Database Products, Inc.) and Airline Industrial Relations Conference 45
Summary: Cost and Productivity Challenges Unit cost differences not entirely due to labor costs: Differences in aircraft productivity can account for up to one half of difference in aircraft operating expenses per ASM Translates into about 25% of total unit cost difference between traditional carriers and LCCs Network carriers are exploring alternatives for increasing aircraft productivity to reduce unit costs: Continuous connecting banks to reduce ground times at hubs Higher density seating options (e.g. removal of First Class) More point-to-point flying to increase aircraft utilization Successful new business models will depend on reducing both aircraft and labor unit costs In addition to fine-tuning fare structures to maximize unit revenues 46
US Airline Performance Since 2000 US airline industry is in the midst of its greatest transition in history Fundamental shifts in airline business models More efficient new entrants with much lower costs Changes envisioned by architects of deregulation more than 25 years ago 9/11 was not the primary cause of this crisis It did lead to increased operating costs Other unfortunate events have not helped But new competition is transforming the industry 47
Key Questions for the Future What industry structure will emerge from this crisis? Will (most) network carriers be able to adapt and survive? Or, will several network carriers have to cease operations, leaving LCCs as domestic carriers, and only a few international hub airlines? What are the new revenue/operating paradigms for network carriers? Are LCC pricing and operating models broadly applicable? Can network carriers reduce operating costs to competitive levels? What will be the impact on small markets? Most domestic O-D pairs can only be served with a hub network Should the government intervene? Stability and sustainability of air transportation system; vs. Disruption of re-structuring process spurred by market forces 48