Eyjafjallajökull - What have we learnt? Aviation Crisis Management Workshop Brussels, 22-23 May 2012 Joe Sultana Chief Operating Officer Directorate Network Management The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
Before the Volcano With establishment of CFMU, EUROCONTOL established a Crisis Management Group (CMG) ad-hoc structure (national ATC and AOs reps) Balkan war Airspace over ex Yugoslavia/Adriatic closed, neighbouring airspaces significantly impacted; Movement of large numbers of mil a/c Managed at operational level between CFMU and NATO Sept 11th US airspace closed with immediate effect a/c turned back mid-atlantic Rest of US-bound flights grounded within 4 minutes Managed at operational level CFMU/FAA Command centre In both cases CMG was not activated
Crisis Management in Europe 2001/10 Move towards a more operationally focused approach at senior Operations level Directors of Operations to meet regularly to assess any looming network disruption and prepare ops response plan No crisis/major disruption requiring strategic and political coordination No network Crisis Management structure/procedures in place in April 2010
Icelandic Volcanic Eruption April 2010 Initial response Addressed at ATM level based on approximate ash dispersion prediction charts Based on ICAO guidance material Limited expertise on impact and danger to a/c in flight Safety first approach, but no airworthiness authorities involvement CFMU managed the progressive closure of airspace EC pushed for options on how to re-open airspace
De-facto Crisis Management EC, Eurocontrol, representatives of airlines, airports; Combined political and operational response Options presented to DGs and Ministers of Transport Safety Information guidance eventually issued by EASA Better prepared for following eruptions
Key lessons learnt/1 Different solutions adopted by States on conditions to allow operations Communications and media impact of H24 and social media; Link between ad-hoc crisis management cell and national decision making processes Dynamic airspace network situation information sharing channels overloaded
Key lessons learnt/2 No intermodal transport considerations Need for updated ICAO Volcanic Ash Contingency plans Role of regulatory/airworthiness authorities and coordination of local decisions Close link between operational, regulatory and political bodies for safe, pragmatic and coordinated decisions
What has changed Two level management of major disruptions and crisis EACCC established as part of SES Network Management functions regulation EASA role in coordinating airworthiness/regulatory positions Improved information sharing/communication means
What still needs to be done Integration of national focal points in the European crisis management process Strengthening operational and strategic coordination with adjacent regions Russia, MidEast, N America More work on probability, risk and impact of threats to European airspace and airports Prepare for prolonged shutdown initiatives using other modes of transport
Conclusion Next crisis could affect your airspace directly, will effect your airspace indirectly Workshop today supporting process to Be better prepared mitigate its effects and recover as quickly as possible to normal operations