RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE

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Security Policy Research Center Qendra Kërkimore për Politika të Sigurisë Centar za istraživanje bezbednosnih politika www.sprc-ks.org, info@sprc-ks.org, Ulpiana, D9, H-6, No:6, 10000 Prishtina Russian influence in the Balkans: a raising concern for Kosovo (Policy Brief) Published by: Security Policy Research Center - SPRC (Qendra Kërkimore për Politika të Sigurisë) 2 Author: Burim Ramadani Contributer: Eris Hana Prishtina, July 2017 The original Report is written in Albanian language All Rights Reserved by Security Policy Research Center. Intellectual property rights are protected by Law no. 04.L-065 on Copyright and related rights and Law no.05/ L-047 on amending and supplementing the Law no. 04 / L-065 on copyrights and related rights. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electoral, mechanical or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

POLICY BRIEF Russian influence in the Balkans: a raising concern for Kosovo Content: 1. Introduction... 4 2. Soft Power - an integral part of Russia's influence in the Balkans... 5 3. Humanitarian Center in Serbia - "Access to Russian satellites"... 8 4. Russian propaganda: "Kosovo a criminal enclave"... 11 5. Conclusions and Recommendations... 14 3 Notes... 15

1. Introduction The role and influence of Russian Federation in Western Balkans countries and Kosovo has been seen manifested either in terms of disrupting some of the Western Balkan countries stability, or EU or Euro-Atlantic paths 1. This argument is even more credible, given the Concept of Russian Foreign Policy, point C, which states that Russian s foreign policy activities shall be aimed at accomplishing the following main objectives: c. to consolidate the Russian Federation s position as a centre of influence in today s world 2. However, Russia's influence in the region and especially in Kosovo has not been adequately researched and analyzed. Therefore, this policy brief aims to contribute to raising institutional and social awareness of the necessity for better understanding, identification, analysis of tools, methods, mechanisms and level of influence of the Russian Federation in Kosovo. Despite the fact that most of Kosovo's population, as well as Kosovo's institutions are clearly pro-west oriented, Kosovo's institutions and activists in Kosovo must measure and determine the influence of the Russian Federation in general in Kosovo, but also focused especially in communities, civil society, media and economy / business. Such an approach is indispensable to assist Kosovo's institutions in the decision-making process and in its efforts to remain steadfast and secure on its path to Euro-Atlantic integrations. 4 The analysis is based on research on Russia's objectives in Kosovo and the Western Balkans. Also in analysis related to Russia's level of Information War and propaganda in relation to Kosovo, including the official response of the Moscow authorities in relation to developments in Kosovo, and which could have an impact on the economy/business, civil society, Media and non-state actors in Kosovo. 1 http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ecfr_163_return_to_instability.pdf, p.6 2 http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/cptickb6bz29/content/id/2542248

2. Soft Power - an integral part of Russia's influence in the Balkans Different methods, including the modern technology methods are the tools being used by Russian authorities to achieve the objectives. In its Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation - approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016 it is very clearly emphasized the that the soft power mechanisms show the new efforts and methods for achieving Russian objectives. Alongside military might, other important factors allowing States to influence international politics are taking centre stage, including economic, legal, technological and IT capabilities 3, and In addition to traditional methods of diplomacy, "soft power" has become an integral part of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives. This primarily includes the tools offered by civil society, as well as various methods and technologies from information and communication, to humanitarian and other types 4. The authorities of the Russian Federation through propaganda interpretations about developments in Kosovo seem to have a clear intention to increase confusion over the state of Kosovo's stability. It is commonly noticed that Russian authorities represent Kosovo's statehood as something completely temporary and that Kosovo's status will be a new issue in relations in the Balkans and beyond. Moreover, it is noticed that in the last two years Russian authorities have increased intensively the commenting of developments in Balkans in general and in Kosovo, in particular. Information campaigns are nothing new for Russia, which is leading them in the Balkans for at least the last eight years, as Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. Its strategy is to 5 3 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016, Chapter II: Modern World and Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, point 8, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/- /asset_publisher/cptickb6bz29/content/id/2542248 4 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016, Chapter II: Modern World and Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, point 9, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/- /asset_publisher/cptickb6bz29/content/id/2542248

create a perception of Russia as a powerful ally, with little substance behind it, in investments or donations to countries in the region 5. Through the news agency, Sputnik 6, which produces multimedia content in more than 30 languages around the world and has started work in November 2014, the Russian information war has received a special dimension in relation to the Balkans and Kosovo. In a large number of articles, including opinions and blog posts, Kosovo is portrayed as a territory occupied by the US and NATO. The title and illustrative photo of the quoted article, where in the 'background' section the propaganda war in relation to the truth in Kosovo is clearly evident. 6 In an article titled Second Kosovo?..., Sputnik in a part of the commentary as the background to the article, aims to compare the situation of Kosovo with that of Syria, propagating the artificial ignition of ethnic tensions in the Balkans. "As for Kosovo, US military strategists had to legitimize their military presence in the region. First, the US fueled ethnic tensions and clashed and then NATO invaded Kosovo with the declared goal to stabilize the situation. Finally, the region was declared a sovereign state, with NATO and US military structures deployed there" 7. 5 For more, see: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/19/heres-how-russias-trying-tosway-opinion-in-serbia-and-the-balkans/?utm_term=.38294c29c5ca 6 For more detailed information, see: https://sputniknews.com/docs/about/index.html 7 For more, see: https://sputniknews.com/politics/201706181054739824-us-plan-syria/, published on 18 june 2017

At the same time, Russia has repeatedly encouraged conflicting agendas and attitudes towards NATO and the EU in various countries in the Balkans. Russia is strengthening its ties with nationalists in Serbia, encouraging Bosnian Serbs in their struggle for more independence - or entirely - in Bosnia and has encouraged Kosovo Serbs to insist on the same outcome in front of Kosovo. Also, "through its support for the opposition in Montenegro, has kept it under tension 8. The Russian propaganda campaign is very focused, targeting in general Serbian Slavic communities in the Balkans. Russia's main policy tools are the television network, the internet portal RT (formerly Russia Today) and the Sputnik Srbija news and broadcasting service. "Since the beginning of 2015, both have had, and have combined, a relatively small staff of about 30 people" 9. Russia s policy towards the Western Balkans, in the present circumstances of confrontation and assertiveness towards the West, constitutes an immediate challenge to the EU s objectives of transformation. It seems that, Russia is back, though its presence varies across different countries, and in an unpredictable manner 10. Creating the balance of forces in the Western Balkans is a substantial part of Russian foreign policy. We have close ties in the field of military and technical cooperation. We are ready to consider constructively any request that our Serbian friends can formulate to ensure the credible protection of their country and certainly in the context of the overall balance of forces in the region 11. 7 8 For more, see: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russia-never-went-away-from-the-balkans-01-18-2017 9 For more, see: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/19/heres-how-russias-trying-tosway-opinion-in-serbia-and-the-balkans/?utm_term=.38294c29c5ca 10 For more, see: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ecfr_163_return_to_instability.pdf, p. 4 11 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking and answering media questions at the joint conference after meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Ivica Dacic, Belgrade, 12 december 2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/- /asset_publisher/xk1bhb2bujd3/content/id/2559907

3. Humanitarian Center in Serbia - "Access to Russian satellites" Russia's intentions and efforts to influence and play a role in the Western Balkans are obvious. High profile government officials of the Russian Federation have publicly mentioned Russia's national interest and specific objectives in the Western Balkans. Here, indispensably, two extremely important events are involved, one of which continues to be a 'quarrel evidence' in the Balkans and the other that was prevented. More specifically, the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis of Serbia, which was founded in 2012, and is constantly seen in the dimension of a Russian espionage center and attempted-coup in Montenegro in 2016. In the case of Montenegro, the angry reaction of the Russian Federation with regard to the path followed for NATO membership has been commented to have followed with actions that aimed a coup. As published in The Economist: "When NATO invited Montenegro to become the 29th member of the military alliance on 2 December 2016, Russia reacted with anger. It was a controversial open move, the foreign ministry said in a statement, and Russia will "respond accordingly." "Russia is still making its most vulnerable presence in the Balkans. The government-funded Sputnik Agency broadcasts radio and television news in Serbian language, in competition with Western countries" 12. 8 According to official judicial proceedings in Montenegro, on October 16, 2016, a plot was organized, which failed to reach its objective. Montenegrin authorities have accused the Russian Federation of planning to enter parliament and bring pro-russian power. Montenegro's special prosecutor, Milivoje Katnic, said that "nationalists from Russia were behind an attempt to kill the prime minister and make a coup" 13. 12 For more, see: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21683967-montenegros-accession-fills-one-fewremaining-gaps-western-alliance 13 For more, see: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37890683

Meanwhile, as before, Russia has been paying considerable attention to Belgrade for a considerable period of time. Also, traditionally Belgrade had confirmed ties with Moscow. During 2016, Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic flirted with Putin while at the same time trying to bring Serbia closer to the EU. In 2013, during a visit to Putin's summer residence in Sochi, Nikolic signed a statement on the strategic partnership between Belgrade and Moscow. Later that year, Serbia signed a military co-operation agreement with Russia. And in October 2014, much to Berlin s chagrin, Serbia rolled out the red carpet for Putin, with Nikolić awarding him the country s highest order Moscow is focusing increasingly on the Western Balkans because it does not want the region to become part of the West 14. Russia and Serbia have jointly established the "Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center" in the city of Nis in Serbia. On April 25, 2012, the agreement on the establishment of this center was signed by Russia's Minister of Emergency Situations, Vladimir Puchkov and Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs, Ivica Dacic. But the official goal of this agreement does not only include Serbia. The Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center was founded in order to provide humanitarian emergency response in Serbia and other Balkan states 15. 9 Although this Center is officially devoted to emergency situations and humanitarian response, it has not avoided its involvement in social life in Serbia. This, of course, is also related to the purposes of 'soft power' as defined in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept. Fulfilling its mission of humanitarian organization the Center is an active participant in the social life of Serbia. It cooperates with the non-governmental, religious and veterans organizations, schools and media 16. Moreover, according to the initial agreement, Serbia has pledged to grant the diplomatic status of the employees in this Center, which has two co-directors 17 : Bojan Glamoclija from the Serbian side and Viacheslav Vlasenko, acting director from the Russian side. 14 For more, see: http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/57301 15 For more, see: http://en.ihc.rs/about 16 For more, see: http://en.ihc.rs/about 17 For more, see: http://en.ihc.rs/org

The Russian- Serbian Humanitarian Center (RSHC) intends to have access to Russia's Spatial Satellites. Hence, Russia insists on a special status for the Center and immunity and diplomatic protection for its employees. The American response to this center has included Washington's concern not so much for what it is now, but what it might become if it receives what Russia has been asking from Serbia, which is some kind of special status, a protected diplomatic status or immunity 18. If it allows Russia to create some kind of a special center for espionage or other nefarious activities, it will lose control over part of its territory, said Yee 19. 10 Although the leaders of this center have tried to explain their activities as related to civil emergency issues, the intent of accessing Russian satellites has never been concealed. Through the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center, we have the opportunity to get information from the National Center for Emergency Management in Russia about the dangers threatening our country, 20. 18 See Senate Statements by US State Deputy Assistant, Hoyt Brian Yee, on 15 june 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-sees-russia-humanitarian-center-serbia-spy-outpost/3902402.html 19 Ibid. 20 See Glamoclija's interview, on 28 june 2017, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=06&dd=28&nav_id=101665

4. Russian propaganda: "Kosovo a criminal enclave" An illustrative case for the Russian Federation's propaganda interpretation for Kosovo is the commenting through the official communication of the Russian Foreign Ministry on the results of the 11 June elections in Kosovo, presenting these results as a "political radicalization of the authorities in Pristina, such as the result of a silent agreement between the US and the EU" 21. In general, regarding Kosovo, the Russian Federation is challenging to recognize Kosovo's statehood, while President Putin has stressed his contradictions against Western countries on several occasions. We keep hearing from the United States and Western Europe that Kosovo is some special case. What makes it so special in the eyes of our colleagues? It turns out that it is the fact that the conflict in Kosovo resulted in so many human casualties. Is this a legal argument? The ruling of the International Court says nothing about this. This is not even double standards; this is amazing, primitive, blunt cynicism. One should not try so crudely to make everything suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and black tomorrow. According to this logic, we have to make sure every conflict leads to human losses. 22. 11 Moreover, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov mentions UNSC Resolution 1244 as the only legal basis for Kosovo. We support all the actions that are being undertaken to resolve the Kosovo problem in strict compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244. We stand in solidarity with our Serbian friends and will resist attempts to unilaterally rewrite this resolution. Any solution can only be subject to a general consensus between Belgrade and Pristina 23. 21 For more, see the special press release from the Ministry of External Affairs of the Russian Federation for the election results to 11 June 2017, published on June 14, 2017: http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/2783567?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instan CE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB 22 Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, in front of the deputies of the State Duma, members of the Federal Council, leaders of Russian regions and representatives of civil society in the Kremlin, March 18, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 23 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking and answering media questions at the joint conference after meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Ivica Dacic, Belgrade, December 12, 2016,http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/- /asset_publisher/xk1bhb2bujd3/content/id/2559907

Moreover, it seems that different methods - including the information war - were used to create the perception of Kosovo as a "criminal enclave". This territory has become a criminal enclave and a hideout for bandits and terrorists (let s call things by their real names), rather than a prosperous state, as had been promised by the Western community 24. The meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of Serbia (now President), Aleksandar Vucic, on March 27, 2017 in Moscow (Kremlin's official web site). 12 Finally, during the meeting Putin - Vucic in Moscow (March 27, 2017), the Russian President itself spoke about the security situation in the Western Balkans region....of course, we very much want to discuss with you the situation in the region today, because various outside signs suggest that a degree of escalation is taking place 25. In addition to Security, Putin was also talking about economic projects in bilateral relations with Serbia. 24 Press conference of the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Maria Zakharova, Moscow, March 16, 2017, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/2687802 President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, during a meeting with Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic, Moscow, March 27, 2017, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54109

We saw a slight increase of around 2 percent in bilateral trade last year. Your Government s efforts meant that this increase was mostly thanks to growing exports from Serbia to Russia. Some sectors were leaders in this, agriculture, for example, with an increase of around 40 percent. We have good joint projects that are developing actively, especially in the energy sector. I am sure we will discuss all of this today 26. For regional security and economic ties, the Prime Minister of Serbia was cituar as follows: I want to say that we need to thank you personally and the Russian Federation for supporting the Republic of Serbia s territorial integrity and sovereignty. As you said, I hope and am sure that we will have plenty of opportunities to increase our bilateral trade and economic ties.... It is very important that, as you know, we remain committed to our national independence, freedom and military neutrality. We will discuss together all of this and examine the steps we need to take for the future 27. 13 26 Ibid. 27 Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, 27 March 2017, Moscow, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54109

5. Conclusions and Recommendations Given the context of the abovementioned developments, the concrete actions interconnected particularly with the "Humanitarian Center in Nis", the attempted-coup in Montenegro, the information propaganda war on Kosovo and the truth of Kosovo, it can be clearly concluded that the Russian Federation intends to spread global confusion around Kosovo. This can also be clarified by analyzing the main objectives of the Russia's Foreign Policy Concept, which specifies the dimension of 'soft power' as a strategy for achieving goals in the Western Balkans and in this context, as well as in relation to Kosovo. The main elements of the Russian Federation's propaganda war in relation to Kosovo seem to be summarized in at least as following: - Distortion of Kosovo's truth from abroad and in relation to other states, - Presentation of Kosovo as "territory occupied by the US and NATO", - Strengthening the mechanisms, beside others, also Satellite in neighborhood (in Serbia), - Confusion about the sustainability of the state of Kosovo and the "necessity" of finding another legal status of Kosovo, - The aim to portray Kosovo as "criminal enclave", as well - The persistent and aggressive accusations of the "US-EU hidden agreement on the political radicalization of Kosovo's authorities". 14 Therefore, a comprehensive institutional and Kosovar society approach to confront Russia's propaganda war against Kosovo is indispensable and requires strategic clarification. Also, full research is important to enlighten on Russian influence in the region and in Kosovo.

Notes http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ecfr_163_return_to_instability.pdf, p.6 http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/- /asset_publisher/cptickb6bz29/content/id/2542248 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016, Chapter II: Modern World and Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/- /asset_publisher/cptickb6bz29/content/id/2542248 https://sputniknews.com/docs/about/index.html https://sputniknews.com/politics/201706181054739824-us-plan-syria/, publikuar më 18 qershor 2017 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russia-never-went-away-from-the-balkans-01-18-2017 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/19/heres-how-russias-tryingto-sway-opinion-in-serbia-and-the-balkans/?utm_term=.38294c29c5ca http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ecfr_163_return_to_instability.pdf, p. 4 http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/- /asset_publisher/xk1bhb2bujd3/content/id/2559907 http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21683967-montenegros-accession-fills-one-fewremaining-gaps-western-alliance http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37890683 http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/57301 http://en.ihc.rs/about http://en.ihc.rs/about http://en.ihc.rs/org https://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-sees-russia-humanitarian-center-serbia-spyoutpost/3902402.html http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=06&dd=28&nav_id=101665 http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/2783567?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02b w&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/- /asset_publisher/xk1bhb2bujd3/content/id/2559907 http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/- /asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/2687802 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54109 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54109 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54109 15

Cataloging in Publication (CIP) National Library of Kosovo Pjetër Bogdani 327(47:497)(091) 16 327(47:(496.51)(091) Ramadani, Burim Russian influence in the Balkans: a raising conern for Kosovo : (Policy Brief) / Burim Ramadani. Pristina : Security Policy Research Center, 2017. 17 f. ; 21 cm. ISBN 978-9951-8949-1-3

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