Lumes 999-000 Sustainable Land Use Project : Water scarcity and potential conflict in the Nile River Basin By Thor Aasø, Stanley Worgu Marisa Espinosa ABSTRACT This report analyses the problems surrounding water use of the Nile River by Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, using a systems approach. Scenarios are developed to explore the current water conflict situation and to develop future conditions under a range of solutions. While water conflict over the use of the Nile can be prevented over the next 50 years, the solutions to do this are somewhat questionable. The most important aspect in solving water conflict in the Nile is to develop a portfolio of solutions involving international cooperation, water efficiency projects and population control. However, under predicted climate change, these solutions must be amended to prevent conflict, resulting in several unrealistic goals to be formed. This report highlights the complexities involved in the use of the Nile and the somewhat pragmatic future for Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. There needs to be a rapid development in international cooperation between these three countries in order to effectively implement changes and hopefully solve the pending crisis. Lund University April 00
Table of contents INTRODUCTION... OBJECTIVES... THE NILE RIVER: LOCATION AND HYDROLOGY... HYDROPOLITICS OF THE NILE... PROBLEM DEFINITION... THEORY... CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM... LIMITATIONS AND SYSTEM BOUNDARIES...5 METHOD...5 SCENARIO : PROJECTED TRENDS UNDER CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION...5 SCENARIO : PROJECTED TRENDS UNDER PROPOSED WATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS...6 SCENARIO : PROPOSED SOLUTIONS...6 SCENARIO : CLIMATE CHANGE WITH PROPOSED SOLUTIONS...7 SCENARIO 5: PREVENTING CONFLICT UNDER A CHANGING CLIMATE...7 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION...7 SCENARIO : EXTENDED CURRENT SITUATION...7 SCENARIO : PROPOSED WATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS...8 SCENARIO : PROPOSED SOLUTIONS...9 SCENARIO : THE EFFECT OF CLIMATE CHANGE...0 SCENARIO 5: PREVENTING CONFLICT UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE... CONCLUSIONS... REFERENCES...ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
Introduction Globally water is a critical resource for the survival of the human species, plants and animals. While its distribution may seem very uneven over the globe, its scarcity is significantly glaring in some regions of the world, particularly in the semi-arid and arid countries. This tragic situation has put many of these countries at the verge of crises as conflict looms on the short and long run in their desperation to secure long-term access to this vital resource. Many arid nations are already facing a water crisis that has caused political tensions with neighboring countries over the use of shared water bodies. Such is the case of the Nile River Basin. The situation is likely to deteriorate due to the rapid increase in population, which requires more water for domestic and industrial use, as well as for agricultural production and hydropower generation. It is clear then that efficient water management is crucial for the sustainable development of these nations (Biswas, 99). Objectives The objective of this study is to analyse the problems surrounding water use of the Nile River using a systems approach. The study focuses on Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, as these are the major players in the fate of the Nile waters. Scenarios will also be developed to assess the future of the Nile and the people dependent on it up until 050. Lastly, suggestions on how to solve the Nile River conflicts will be discussed. The Nile River: location and hydrology Figure : Geography of the Nile River Catchment. Source: ICE (000). The Nile River has a catchment covering.9m km, which spans ten countries (Mageed, 99). The majority of the river is located in semi-arid to arid landscapes within northern Africa. The Nile Catchment covers three main bioregions, the Ethiopian plateau, equatorial lakes and the Bah el Gahazal basin. Annual average rainfall entering the catchment totals 00 km of which 6.5% falls on the Ethiopian plateau (Mageed, 99). However little of this rainfall ever enters the Nile River proper due to evaporative losses. Figure details the location of the Nile River (Elhance, 999). Three main tributaries as shown in Table form the Nile. The Blue Nile originates within the Ethiopian plateau, with it s principle source from Lake Tana (Elhance, 999). The White Nile rises from its source in Burundi, passes through Lake Victoria, and flows into southern Sudan, where the flow is dramatically slowed down by a massive natural swamp system (8000 km ) called the Sudd (Elhance, 999). Near the capital city of Khartoum, the White Nile meets up with the Blue Nile, which has its source in the Ethiopian highlands, near Lake Tana (Elhance, 999). The two flow together to just north of Khartoum, where the waters of the Atbara, whose source is also located in the Ethiopian highlands, join them. The river then flows north through Lake Nasser, the second largest man-made lake in the world and the Aswan Dam before splitting into two major distributaries just north of Cairo. Eighty five percent of waters entering the Nile proper originates in Ethiopia (Elhance, 999)
Table : River Nile sources. Source Average annual flow (km ) Average contribution Blue Nile* 9.56 59% Atbara River* 0.9 % White Nile.5 8% Total (Nile at Aswan) 8 - * Headwaters are located within the Ethiopian Catchment. Due to evaporative losses occurring in Aswan Dam, which is estimated to be 0 % of the stored water, the average annual volume of water available for Egypt is ~ 75km (ICE, 000). Variations in rainfall over the years can cause quite considerable variations in discharges as shown in Table. This seems to be more explicitly the case for the White Nile River system. For this reason, average discharge figures might vary greatly depending on the period under consideration. However this report only uses the average annual flows of the three main tributaries. Hydropolitics of the Nile The hydropolitics of the Nile is rather complex as 0 countries share this huge river basin. The agreements set to establish water rights among these countries were highly influenced by the interests of the United Kingdom, at a time when most of the basin countries were under the British rule (Allan, 999). The terms of these agreements favoured Egypt, which is the most dependent on the Nile waters and has historically claimed rights over and above those of the remaining riparian nations (T Kur Abay, 000; Mageed, 99). The water needs of Egypt have increased with its growing population (Clarke, 99). In the 950 s, the fully independent Egyptian government addressed the issue of water security by initiating the Aswan High Dam project to collect and control the flow of the Nile (Allan, 999). In order to go on with the Aswan Dam project, Egypt negotiated an agreement with Sudan. With this agreement, signed in 959, Egypt would achieve total control of the Ethiopian flood, by creating storage at its southern border with Sudan of about three times the annual flow at that point. The two countries agreed to share the water in a proportion of 75% (55.5 billion cubic meters of water) to 5% (8.5 billion cubic meters), favouring Egypt (Allan, 999). Problem definition Since its inauguration in 97, the Aswan High dam has allowed Egypt to control the river s annual flood and to create over-year storage to mitigate against drought periods (Mageed, 99). However, it has not relieved the water scarcity problem and has also exacerbated the conflict over water allocation in the region (Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman, 997, Samson and Charrier, 997). Indeed, the water supply can not cope with the needs of the growing population and therefore the Egyptian government has undertaken massive irrigation projects at the expense of the development needs of other riparian nations (Clarke, 99; Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman, 997; Samson and Charrier, 997). The water scarcity problem has been intensified by the use of inefficient irrigation methods; the cultivation of cash crops, which demand large volumes of water; and the high evaporation rates that arise from the large water surface exposed at the High Aswan Dam (Samson and Charrier, 997; ICE 000). Until recently, the upstream riparians, in this case Sudan and specially Ethiopia, have lacked the economic, technical, institutional means to develop water securing projects in the Nile tributaries (Allan, 999). However, these nations, which are among the poorest in the world, begin to harness the Nile s waters to provide economic prosperity for their growing population. The Ethiopian government has overseen the construction of more than 00 small dams that will use nearly 500
million cubic meters of the Nile s flow annually. Additional dams are being planned to increase the country s irrigation and hydropower capacity (Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman, 997). In the case of Sudan, the government is planning to build its own dam on the Nile in order to meet its growing irrigation and development needs, and like Egypt, is turning to Ethiopia to answer its water needs (Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman, 997; Clarke, 99). Egypt is the most powerful nation, economically and militarily, of the countries under study (Elhance, 999). It has recognised upstream water storage projects as a potential national security threat and has stated its willingness to go to war to retain its access to the annual 55.5 billion cubic meters of water, negotiated with Sudan in 959 (Allan, 999; Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman, 997; ICE 000). Theory Causal Loop Diagram The CLD attached as figure is based on an aggregate statistic for major variable factors such as population, economic development, water need, water use, etc., for three riparian nations namely Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. The CLD has been used to plot the systemic relationship and interaction of several factors that defines the use of the Nile and the conflict thereof. From the CLD therefore, an increase in population leads to an increase in economic development, which will trigger a corresponding increase in population. This is a reinforcing loop. However, as population increases the need for water will grow. A growing water need will demand more water security projects, as countries will become more eager to initiate and implement projects that guarantee them long-term unhindered access to the Nile water resources. An increase in water security projects will cause three effects. Firstly, water right claims will increase due to an increase in competition for access to water. Conflict is likely to escalate as each country claims more water rights. But as conflict escalates, water right claims will increase, which will Econ. Dev. & Growth R Population - - Food Scarcity - B B Water Efficiency Total Water Use Water Need Water Sec. Projects Evaporation Water Scarcity Resource Scarcity Food Import CONFLICT Water Rights cultivation of water demanding cash crops, and low water reuse. - B B R reinforce the problem. Secondly, water security projects will increase the effect of evaporation because most of the projects may involve the construction of large dams and canals, which in arid areas, are affected by high evaporation rates. Thirdly, the total water use will be much higher. Total water use is further increased by relatively low water efficiency due to inefficient irrigation methods, Figure : CLD of the Nile river conflict. A higher population not only affects the quantity of water available for human consumption but also its quality. An increase in population will intensify water scarcity, which will also be accentuated by evaporation. But more people will lead to heighten food scarcity, which together with water
scarcity will lead to resource scarcity. As this happens, population will be negatively affected because people will not have enough water and food to survive. Of course, resource scarcity means a rise in tensions and conflict, which will cause a decline in population if the situation degenerates to war. Limitations and system boundaries In order to ensure that the set objectives are addressed and communicated effectively, we have set the limits of this paper as follows. The scenarios and analysis are based in a fifty-year period (000 to 050). The presumed conflict is limited to an interstate conflict involving the principal parties. Although we look at all the major tributaries of the Nile, the focus is on the Blue Nile, and therefore on the resulting tension that shrouds the use and access to the Nile River for its major players, ie. Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. Emphasize is on the tension resulting from the use of the Nile water resources. Other forms of land use issues and problems such as salinisation, human health, etc., are not within the scope of this paper. Seasonal variations in water volume are not considered. Method Four scenarios have been created to explore the dynamics of population, water use and hydropolitics within the lower Nile Catchment. Each scenario has many assumptions, which are outlined below. Scenario : Projected trends under current political situation. Under the current situation, Egypt is controlling the water allocations for Sudan and Ethiopia (Biswas, 99). Egypt has done this through the 959 agreement on the full utilisation of the Nile waters, forcing Sudan to only extract 7.8 km of water p.a. out of the Nile (Elhance, 999). Furthermore, Egypt has stated that it will go to war if Ethiopia disturbs the Nile flow though their proposed water developments (Samson and Charrier, 997). The data used in this scenario is as follows. The Nile water flows are based on figures given in (Biswas, 99; FAO, 000a, b, c, d; Elhance, 999). Aswan Dam has 6 km of reservoir capacity (ILEC, 000). Average evaporation of the Aswan Dam is 8 km p.a. (Waterbury, 979). The Sudd marshes result in ~50% of the White Nile water to evaporate before reaching the Blue Nile confluence (Samson and Charrier, 997). 6 km of water is evaporated from the Blue Nile before it reaches the Aswan Dam (Biswas, 99). Ethiopia draws out. km of water p.a. from the Nile (FAO, 000b, d). Sudan draws out 7.8 km of water based on the 959 agreement enforced by Egypt. (FAO, 000d). Egypt draws out 66.9 km of water from the Nile (FAO, 000d, Hvidt, 995). Egypt s population will reach 0.7 million by 050, with the growth rate decreasing from.8% to 0.9% (FAO, 000a). Ethiopia s population will reach 8.68 million by 050, with the growth rate decreasing from.% to.% (FAO, 000b). Sudan s population will reach 58 million by 050, with a decreasing growth rate from.% to.% (FAO, 000c). Water shortage is determined to occur at 000 m /yr/capita, which corresponds to level in the STELLA model (Elhance, 999). 5
Water stress is determined to occur 750 m /yr/ capita, which corresponds to level (Elhance, 999). Severe water stress is determined to occur below 500 m /yr/capita, which corresponds to level (Elhance, 999). Scenario : Projected trends under proposed water development projects Assumptions used in this scenario follow the previous scenario. Additional information used is as follows. Several Water development projects have been proposed or are in construction for the three countries. These projects are intended for agricultural, industrial and domestic use. The Jongeli Canal is a major undertaking to reduce the amount of water evaporated within the Sudd marshes, located on the lower catchment of the White Nile (Samson and Charrier, 997). The Jongeli Canal will be fully operational in 05, diverting 8 km of water direct into the Blue Nile (FAO, 000d). Under current agreements km will be utilised by Sudan and the other km by Egypt (Elhance, 999). Egypt will declare war against Sudan and or Ethiopia if its Nile river supply at Aswan is reduced (Elhance, 999). This report interprets that any reduction of the Egypt s current water right (55.5 km p.a. entering Aswan dam) will cause Egypt to declare war. Sudan s total water consumption increases by % p.a. (FAO, 000d). Egypt s agriculture growth rate increases by.8% p.a. This study considers that this increase will cause the same rate of increase in water use (FAO, 000d). Egypt uses 57. km of water p.a. Egypt s industrial and residential water use is 9.5 km p.a. (FAO, 000d). The rate of industry and residential use is.5%. Scenario : Proposed solutions A holistic approach to solving the conflict and water stress between these three nations is used. Several measures are suggested to gradually manipulate the water situation of the Nile over a 50- year period. The Most important measure is to develop an international agreement over the water resources of these three countries and to implement a restructured water allocation scheme. International Agreement includes: Net reductions of Egypt s water extraction from the Nile by developing groundwater reserves. Elhance (999) suggests that Egypt has a total of 65 km of groundwater, of which up to 0 km can be sustainable used under current recharge rates and economic conditions. The use of groundwater reserves is gradually developed from 05, with a maximal 0 km p.a. extraction rate by 050. The development of the Lake Tana in the Ethiopian plateau as a large storage reservoir to help prevent floods and create additional flow downstream in times of drought within Sudan and Egypt (Elhance, 999). By developing the Lake Tana, it can serve the same hydrological and hydroelectric services as the Aswan dam of which can be shared among the three countries. The advantage of Lake Tana is that it would have 60% less evaporation than Aswan dam due to the different climatic conditions (Elhance, 999). However to develop such a scheme would need huge capital and international agreement between countries, which this report presumes will be accomplished. The water saved from the reduction of the Aswan dam and the subsequent development of Lake Tana use will be divided up between the three countries as surplus Nile water. Population decreases by 050 for Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan is 7%, % and 6% respectively. In the STELLA model, Ethiopia s rate of water need will decrease from % to.% by 050. Sudan will have 5% reduction in water need for irrigation, which is achieved through drip irrigation and crop change. Sudan s rate of agriculture will decrease due to the decrease in the population growth rate (from % to 0.7% p.a.). By 050, Sudan will reuse.87 km of water from all water demands per year. Under an international agreement, the Jongeli Canal development allows Sudan to increase its water rights to.5 km. With the same agreement, Ethiopia gets a maximum of km of water. Egypt gets 8 km of water. Egypt s agricultural and industry will decrease with population decrease (from.8% to 0.9% p.a.). Egypt s water need for crop irrigation will decrease by 5% by 050, through implementation of drip irrigation and crop change. 6
Egypt s water reuse will increase to 7.7 km p.a. by 050. Water efficiency measures are carried out through a gradual implementation of efficient irrigation (drip irrigation), reuse of treated agricultural wastewater, and the change from water thirsty cash crops to food crops. This is focused on Egypt and Sudan as they use 85.5% and 9.% of their water for irrigation use, for mainly cash crops such as cotton and sugar cane and sorghum (FAO, 000a, c). Furthermore, In Egypt only.% of this irrigation is done using drip technology (micro irrigation) (FAO, 000a). These landuse changes are represented in a drop in water extraction for Egypt from 66.9 km p.a to 6 km. This is a moderate reduction considering up to 0% of water can be saved from drip irrigation compared to conventional fallow methods (Postel, 999). Drainage water-reuse for Egypt will be increased from the current 0. km to 7.7 km p.a. by 050 (FAO, 000a). For Sudan, there will be a net increase in water use from the Nile in order to reduce the current and future severe water stress experienced in the country. Sudan s water use is gradually increased from 7.8 km to. km p.a. by 050. Scenario : Climate change with proposed solutions There is some evidence that desertification and global warming with alter the distribution and seasonality of rainfall patterns across Northern Africa (Elhance, 999). Elhance (999) suggests that this could result in a 5% reduction in mean annual flow of the Nile River and its tributaries. This report assumes gradual decrease in river flows (White Nile, Blue Nile and the Atbara Rivers) over a 50-year period. By 050 each river will have a 0% reduction in flow. Furthermore, Elhance (999) indicates that under the current IPCC sea level rise predictions, all of Egypt s coastal groundwater supplies with be salinised making them useless for human use and consumption. Thus under this climate change scenario, Egypt s 0 km p.a. groundwater extraction is unavailable. Scenario 5: Preventing conflict under a changing climate Because of climate change, the only way to attempt to solve the problem is to reduce the water need. For both Sudan and Egypt the water need for agriculture is reduced to.% by 050. This is achieved by increasing the amount of drip irrigation. Sudan s water reuse has to be.6 km by 050. Egypt has to reuse 5. km by 050. Results and discussion Scenario : Extended current situation In this scenario water rights remain unchanged. Figure shows the trends in water per capita for Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. As population increases in all countries, the level of water stress becomes more pronounced. Figure : Water per capita when water rights remain unchanged : : : : : : : : : : egypts water per capita : ethiopia water per capita : sudans water per captia 850.00 075.00 00.00 0.00.50 5.00 7.50 50.00 Graph (Untitled) Time :55 PM tor, apr 06, 000 In Egypt, the water per capita falls from 995 m /yr/capita to 65 m /yr/capita in 50 years, which indicates that the country goes from a water shortage to a water stress level. Egypt s domination prevents Sudan from using more water from the Nile and therefore Sudan s water per capita drops from 56 m /yr/capita (water stress) to 06 m /yr/capita (severe water stress). The most dramatic decrease in water per capita happens in Ethiopia, where it goes from 89 m /yr/capita to 6 m /yr/capita, 7
equivalent to a situation where there is relatively no water shortage to one where there is water stress. Ethiopia is not bound by any agreement for water rights; therefore, it is likely to use as much water from the Blue Nile as it needs. However, the growth in population is so pronounced that soon there will be not enough water to satisfy the growing needs. However, for Sudan and Egypt, it is unlikely that in reality this scenario will occur like it is described here. It is probably that Sudan will react to the increasing water stress and that it will start using more water from the Nile, in spite of the 959 agreement with Egypt. In such a case, water stress in Egypt will occur sooner and it will be even more striking, thus, the probability for armed conflict will be much higher. Scenario : Proposed water development projects In this scenario, Ethiopia and Sudan increase their water use (Figure ). Since the population in these two countries increases rapidly, there is more water needed, especially for irrigation. This is particularly true for Ethiopia, whose population increases from 6.5 million to 8.7 million in 50 years. : : : : 5: : : : : 5: : : : : 5: : egypts total use : ethiopias nile use: sudans total use: lower nile 5: war 05.00 6.00 55.00 85.00.00 75.00.00 5.00 65.00 0.50 5.00.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 5 5 5 0.00.50 5.00 7.50 50.00 Figure : Water use for all three countries. As these countries start to use more and more water, the water left for Egypt s uptake decreases. Despite this fact Egypt continues to increase its water use, which results in a drying of Lake Nasser by the year 07 (not shown in graph). From then on, Egypt can not longer extract water as before and its water use shows a sharp decline. As the other riparians keep extracting water, Egypt s water use slowly goes down. According to our model, Egypt declares war to Sudan and/or Ethiopia around 0, when the water flow into Lake Nasser drops below 55.5 million m of water. However, it is likely that in reality Egypt will not wait until the water flow drops to this level. Without any kind of cooperation between the three countries, armed conflict may occur around 00 when Lake Nasser dries up. If war is to occur, its implications for population will be tremendous. However, we do not known the exact extent to which it would affect population in all countries involved. Therefore, the effects of war are not accounted for in our model. Figure 5: Water per capita. (Untitled) Time :8 PM tor, apr 06, 000 5 : : : : : : : : : : egypts water per capita : ethiopia water per capita : sudans water per captia 50.00 500.00 900.00 850.00 500.00 700.00 50.00 500.00 500.00 0.00.50 5.00 7.50 50.00 water and war (Untitled) Time : PM tor, apr 06, 000 Figure 5 shows the water per capita for the three countries. Sudan s exhibits an increase, as its population benefits from the water development projects. Even if the country is still water stressed, the water per capita increases from 56 m /yr/capita to 80 m /yr/capita. In the case of Ethiopia, the population increase is still so high that the water security projects can not cope with, 8
resulting in a decrease of water per capita 856 m /yr/capita to 66 m /yr/capita. As in the previous scenario, this corresponds to going from a situation where there is relatively no water shortage to one where there is a water stress. Egypt s water per capita decreases because this country can not longer obtain sufficient water due to upstream water development. The values fall from 995 m /yr/capita (water shortage) to 65 m /yr/capita (severe water stress), which is a major drop compared to the results obtained in scenario. Scenario : Proposed solutions Figure 6: Water use under proposed solutions : sudans total use : egypts total use : ethiopias nile use : lower nile Figure 6 indicates a stabilisation of water : 90.00 : : use amongst the three riparian countries : over the 50-year period. An evaluation of the result indicates the following. The : total water use for Sudan will increase : 6.00 very mildly from 7.8 km : - 9. In Egypt : the increase is not too significant, rising from 66.7 km - 8. 8 km. Ethiopia will : see a modest increase in water use from : :. km -.8 km :.00. Within the same time 0.00.50 5.00 7.50 50.00 water and war (Untitled) Time : PM tor, apr 06, 000 period, the water flow in the Lower Nile is stabilised around 8.0 km, that is well above the agreed 55.5 km level. Under the scenario there will be no conflict. Figure 7: Water per capita under proposed solutions : : : : : : : egypts water per capita : ethiopia water per capita : sudans water per captia 850.00 075.00 Figure 7 shows that Sudan and Egypt have stable water per capita levels over the 50 year period. However, for Sudan this merely means a stable situation of severe water stress as water per capita is below 500m per capita. Ethiopia's water per capita decreases from 850m to about 00m by 050. : The most pressing question is are these : : 00.00 0.00.50 5.00 7.50 50.00 solutions realistic?. The development of water per capita (Untitled) Time : PM tor, apr 06, 000 Egypt ground water reserves can be done sustainably, however with increasing upstream water extraction, the recharge rate and quality of this aquifer could be severely reduced in the future. The development of Lake Tana as an alternative to Lake Nasser would require a huge capital investment and a successful international cooperation. Currently these two criteria s are unforeseeable. The reduction of the proposed population for Ethiopia and Sudan is drastic, which are probably not realistic. That would require an immediate growth rate reduction. A water management plan involving the proposed re-use of water and drip irrigation measures is realistic and as small scale measures are been taken currently. However drip irrigation would require large capital 9
Scenario : The effect of climate change Under this scenario, the proposed population and water consumption measures for the three countries do little to prevent conflict. This is due to the gradual but significant decreases in river flow for the major tributaries of the Nile. Figure 8 details the gradual decline in the Atbara, the Blue and White Nile Rivers. : : : : 5: : : : : 5: : Atbara river : upper Blue nile : upper white nile : ASWAN 5: war.00 80.00 60.00 00.00.00 9.50 70.00 50.00 00.00 0.50 5 : : : : : : : egypts total use : sudans total use : ethiopias nile use 90.00.50.00 70.00 0.00.00 : : : : 5: 8.00 60.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5 5 5 0.00.50 5.00 7.50 50.00 water levels and war (Untitled) Time :9 PM Mon, 0 Apr 000 : : : 50.00 7.50.00 0.00.50 5.00 7.50 50.00 water use (Untitled) Time :0 PM Mon, 0 Apr 000 Figure 8: Water flows and War under a changed climate Figure 9: Water Use under a changed climate With the slow but continue growth in water consumption by the three countries, the water flow for the Lower Nile is significantly reduced. By ~0, the flow into the Aswan dam is less than the water extracted for Egypt s use, and thus the Aswan dam starts to be reduced. By around 00 Lake Nasser is completely empty, resulting in Egypt s water use to be attenuated. By 00, the water entering the Aswan is less than the agreed upon 55.5 km p.a, and thus Egypt declares war in the upper riparian countries. Due to the downstream position of Egypt, it is the first country to experience significant water-use reduction at around 00, as shown in Figure 9. A rapid reduction in water use occurs due to the loss of the Aswan dam reservoir coupled with the continual reduction in Nile River flow to the dam. Sudan also experiences significant water-use reduction at around 00, with Ethiopia experiencing slight water-use reduction just before 050. Figure 0: Water per Capita under a changed climate : : : : : : : : : : egypts water per capita : ethiopia water per capita : sudans water per captia 850.00 075.00 00.00 0.00.50 5.00 7.50 50.00 water per capita (Untitled) Time :9 PM Mon, 0 Apr 000 While the reductions in water flow for these three rivers occur gradually over 50 years, the exact figure of a 0% reduction is debateable. There is little known on the exact changes to climate on a large scale let alone on a small scale such as Northern Africa (Elhance, 999). However, considering that currently there is little other information detailing the exact effects of a changed climate for the Nile Catchment, this report is bound in using these estimations. Figure 0 details the water per capita decline as a result of declining Nile water flow under climate change. Declining water per capita is both a function of population growth and water supply decline, especially the later, with consideration of downstream users such as Egypt. Thus Ethiopia s water per capita falls, but due to abundant water resources other than the Nile, the impact from a 0% reduction of Blue Nile flow has no effect. However for Sudan, dependent on the Blue Nile, a decreased water capita occurs over time due to the reduction in water flow from climate change. 0
This impact on climate change is more evident with Egypt, where water per capita is significantly reduced when the Aswan dam dries up at around 00. Scenario 5: Preventing conflict under climate change Under a 0% reduction of Nile River and its tributaries, several drastic measures are needed to preserve peace along the Nile up to 050. Figure shows the water extraction for all countries can remain reduced but fairly stable for 50 years, allowing Egypt to have at least 55 km of water p.a and thus preventing war. However the Graph indicates that from 00 onwards, Egypt s water extraction is more than the water entering the Aswan dam, resulting in the progressive lowering of the dam. Thus by approximately 060 (outside our time perspective) Egypt will declare war as the water entering the Aswan dam will eventually fall below the agreed upon 55.5 km per year allocation. : sudans total use : ethiopias nile use : egypts total use : ASWAN : : : : 76.00 70.00 : : : : egypts water per capita : ethiopia water per capita : sudans water per captia 850.00 : : : : 8.00 5.00 : : : 075.00 : : : : 0.00 0.00 0.00.50 5.00 7.50 50.00 water use (Untitled) Time :7 PM Mon, 0 Apr 000 : : : 00.00 0.00.50 5.00 7.50 50.00 water per capita (Untitled) Time :0 PM Mon, 0 Apr 000 Figure : Water use of the Nile Figure : water per capita within the Nile Figure details that by 050, water per capita for the three countries stabilises, with only Ethiopia having reduced water per capita over the next 50 years. This reduced water per capita is due to the massive population growth even under population control measures as explained in Scenario. To prevent conflict under a changed climate requires drastic measures. The most extreme measure is the amount of drip irrigation needed to reduce the water need for Agriculture for both Sudan and Ethiopia. A.% reduction in water demand in irrigation for both countries equates to ~70% of all irrigation to be using this drip irrigation technology. Currently drip irrigation only accounts for 0.05% and.% of the total irrigation use in Sudan and Egypt respectively (FAO, 000a, c). Thus it seems unlikely that by 050 Sudan and Egypt can reach these drip irrigation goals, unless there is massive national and international capital injected. Currently Sudan and Egypt recycle a mere 0.0 km and 0. km of all water used (FAO, 000a,c). Considering the technology for water recycling is cheap and is currently being used on a small scale (Elhance, 999), the assumption that Sudan and Egypt recycle.87 km and 7.7 km respectively is not unrealistic. To achieve sustainability and peace among these three riparian countries beyond 050 will need even further drastic measures in water use and population control. Conclusions Under these Scenarios water conflict seems to be at best merely prolonged under a package of somewhat unrealistic measures. Such solutions as population decrease and water efficiency
measures involves complex socio-political barriers and massive capital input. However while these measures appear unattainable, it is the only way of preventing water conflict as if left unsolved, these factors are the main driving forces behind war over water. The most important aspect in solving water conflict in the Nile is to develop a portfolio of solutions involving international cooperation, water efficiency projects and population control. Thus sound development may actually be a tool to move towards sustainability, rather than a threat. Under current conditions the low levels of development in agriculture and water storage technology is causing significant inefficiencies in water use. By developing drip irrigation, water-resistant crops, and sound water storage projects, the water efficiency of the Nile could be dramatically improved. Moreover the current use of this water is in serious question. Egypt and Sudan use the majority of their water for irrigation of cash crops in order to generate a national economy buy food and foreign exchange. By growing water thirsty cash crops in order to generate income to buy food is a highly inefficient and unsustainable way to feed a nation. This system is also susceptible to international market fluctuations and merely increases foreign debt. Thus the Nile is currently being used as an inefficient source of income, instead as a source of water. By reverting to food production rather than cash cropping, water efficiency could be further increased. Government priorities are also of major concern. Currently Governments are focused on developing a commodity export culture, within a war stricken system. Thus the fundamental needs of the population such a s food and water and its fair distribution are lacking. In the case for Ethiopia, the report indicates relatively high water per capita throughout the each scenario. However currently Ethiopia and Sudan are faced with famines due to inequitable distribution of water and food resources under drought conditions. In conclusion this report highlights the complexities involved in the use of the Nile and the somewhat pragmatic future for Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. There needs to be a rapid development in international cooperation between these three countries in order effectively implement changes and hopefully solve the pending crisis.
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