Dealing with Unexpected Events. ICAO LOC-I Symposium June 2015, Nairobi Sunjoo Advani - President, IDT

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Dealing with Unexpected Events ICAO LOC-I Symposium 22-24 June 2015, Nairobi Sunjoo Advani - President, IDT 1

2

What is the most common human factor in LOC-I incidents? 3

Startle 1

What is Surprise in Aviation? Pilot s Mental Model Mismatch Actual A/C behaviour Created by Sudden abnormal aircraft behavior wake vortex encounters control surface hard-overs asymmetric thrust Or a gradual deviation of the pilot s mental model (e.g., misinform the pilot via erroneous display information) 3

Surprise During Training Surprise Startle Unexpected Stall Distract pilots by keeping them busy Create expectations in scenario Distract pilot with workload in line with expectations Aircraft upset is then unexpected icing pilot briefing WX ATC FMS startle! actual events wake V 1 cut Realistic environment, realistic (high) workload, realistic distraction, realistic upset scenario è Immersion pilot s expecta-ons stall

AF-447 (from BEA Report) 7

Note - video can be found on YouTube as AF 447 animation 8

Summary of AF 447 The accident resulted from the following succession of events: Temporary inconsistency between the measured airspeeds led to autopilot disconnection and a reconfiguration to alternate law, Inappropriate control inputs that destabilized the flight path, Crew disconnect between the loss of indicated airspeeds and the appropriate procedure, The PM s late identification of the deviation in the flight path and insufficient correction by the PF, The crew not identifying the approach to stall, the lack of an immediate reaction on its part and exit from the flight envelope, The crew s failure to diagnose the stall situation and, consequently, the lack of any actions that would have made recovery possible. 9

Pilot Mis-perceptions of Overspeed Pilots consider in-flight overspeeds a serious risk. Origins: Flight theory training dangers of shock stall = low-speed stall onset flutter or Mach tuck >>> Only on older aircraft VMO/MMO corresponds to a critical limit; excursions not demonstrated during training VMO/MMO excursions are severe, requiring maintenance inspection Certification criteria state that overspeeds should be indicated by a red ECAM MSG, with alarm 10

Realities of Overspeed Modern supercritical airfoils have improved high-speed performance position of aerodynamic centre is virtually stable drag increase is so great that it s extremely unlikely (impossible) to fly faster and enter flutter FBW and load-factor limitations prevent structural damage 11

Risk of Low Speed Loss of control Aerodynamic stall However, not all aircraft demonstrate the same characteristics, even from day-to-day 12

BEA Recommendations (AF 447) specific and regular exercises dedicated to manual aircraft handling of approach to stall and stall recovery, including at high altitude. to make sure, through practical exercises, that the theoretical knowledge, particularly on flight mechanics, is well understood. define criteria for selection and recurrent training among instructors that would allow a high and standardized level of instruction to be reached. training scenarios of the effects of surprise in order to train pilots to face these phenomena. 13

Subtle Unexpected Events 14

Automa'on Dependency Ensuring Robust Performance in Unexpected Situa8ons Sunjoo Advani, IDT

Man4Gen GOAL: to iden8fy the causality behind incidents and accidents which required manual opera8ons. Recommend short- term changes to procedures, training, flight- deck technology in order to reaffirm proper manual opera8ons. Achieved through: Analysis of relevant accidents and incidents related to manual skills Analysis of unexpected and challenging situa8ons Understanding breakdown of situa8on awareness Developing and performing experiments related to unexpected events Analyzing system monitoring, decision- making and manual control Development of recommenda8ons for training, procedures and system design 8 Experiment Valida8on and Concept Procedure Friday, April 17, 2015

Man4Gen European FP7 2012 Aeronau8cs and Air Transport programme. Man4Gen consor8um partners: NLR (coordinator, the Netherlands) DLR (Germany) IDT (the Netherlands) Linköping University (Sweden) Boeing R&T (Spain) University of Vienna (Austria) Medical University of Vienna (Austria) Global Training Avia8on (Spain) Airbus and Airbus Opera8ons (France) The project started in 2012 and will run un8l the end of 2015 7 Experiment Valida8on and Concept Procedure Friday, April 17, 2015

Flying is Safe Air travel is the safest mode of transporta8on Accident rates have subsided to the lowest level Ascend, Airbus 2011 2 Experiment Valida8on and Concept Procedure Friday, April 17, 2015

Experiment IntenBon: to study decision making and risk assessment in response to unexpected and challenging situa8ons Experiment scenario elements: reversion to manual control, unexpected and challenging ac8ve and authorita8ve decision making Crews were observed for ac8ons, communica8ons and behaviour using the Desirable Flight Crew Performance (DFCP) method and the Airbus Assessment and Grading System. B747-400 research flight simulator at NLR in Amsterdam, and A320 research simulator at DLR in Braunschweig. 9 Experiment Valida8on and Concept Procedure Friday, April 17, 2015

Scenario 11 Experiment Valida8on and Concept Procedure Friday, April 17, 2015

Observa'ons Crews indeed experienced the events in the scenario as unexpected events. Crews appeared to have more difficulty than expected with the scenario. Some cases leading to unstable approaches and very short final line up distances. The decision to land as quickly as possible led to abbreviated procedures and checklists, if run at all. Crews failed to perform complete threat assessment and made decisions without considering the impact of these decisions. 15 Experiment Valida8on and Concept Procedure Friday, April 17, 2015