REPORT General Cargo Vessel MEG - UBFH - Grounding on October 15th, 2002 2003-01-15
REPORT General Cargo Vessel MEG - UBFH - Grounding on October 15th, 2002 Our reference: 080202-02-17572 Maritime Casualty Investigation Division: Björn Molin Reprint permitted provided stating of source SJÖFARTSVERKET 2003-01-15 SE-601 78 NORRKÖPING Sweden Phone: +46 (0)11-19 10 00 Fax: +46 (0)11-10 19 49
Table of Contents Summary... 1 Account of facts... 1 The vessel... 1 The crew and the watch system onboard... 2 The grounding site...3 The weather... 3 Miscellaneous... 4 Course of events...4 Course of events after the grounding... 5 Analysis... 6 Cause... 7 Remarks... 7 Recommendations... 7 Damages... 8 Conclusions... 8 Enclosures: Excerpt from nautical charts Excerpt from chapter VIII, section 3-1 of the STCW-convention
Summary The general cargo vessel Meg was on its way from Boston, UK, to St. Petersburg in Russia under ballast conditions. Approximately 1 hour after change of course the chief officer fell asleep on duty and the ship grounded on October 15, 2002, at 0555 hours (local time) at a speed of approximately 9 knots south of the lighthouse Faludden in position N 56 59,5 E 018 24. Account of facts The vessel Name: MEG IMO No.: 9066057 Call sign: Port of registry: UBFH St. Petersburg Gross tonnage: 1596 Length over all: Breadth: Draught: Classification society: 81.44 meters 11.46 meters 4.22 meters Russian Maritime Register of Shipping Year built: 1993 Construction material: Propulsion power: Steel 1000 kw Crew: 9 Page 1
The vessel was built in 1993 at Arminius Werke GmbH, Bodenwerder, Germany, and got its present name on delivery. The Meg was a conventional vessel with deckhouse, bridge and crew areas at the very aft. Under the deck house was the engine room. The Meg was built with double bottom and double sides. The cargo space consisted of just one big cargo hold which was covered by a hatch of steel. The bridge was of conventional design with open bridge wings. All navigation equipment was located at the front edge of the bridge. A comfortable armchair, so called reclining chair, was placed in the centre line. Considering the event, the most interesting equipment at the bridge was a radar unit of make Furuno. It was located on the starboard side, was in operation and set at 6 M (nautical miles) when the grounding occurred. On the port side was also a river radar of make Kelvin Hughes. Gyro compass and automatic steering gear was of make Anschütz. Onboard there was also a satellite navigator of make Magnavox Mx 200. The ship was run by means of the automatic steering. The propulsion machinery consisted of a main engine of make MAK, which generated 1000 kw and was connected to a fixed propeller. At full speed the ship did about 10 knots. On the occasion the Meg was ballasted. The crew and the watch system onboard The crew consisted of the master, 2 deck officers, the chief engineer, one electrical engineer, 3 able seamen and one cook. The chief officer had the 4-8 watch, the master had the 8-12 watch and the second officer had the 12-4 watch. Onboard the ship Moscow time was applied, which differs 2 hours from local time. Thus the chief officer was on watch between 0200 and 0600 hours local time. Page 2
The times mentioned in the following in this report refer to local time. The chief officer was 36 years old and had worked onboard the Meg since 1994. He then started as second officer and was promoted to chief officer in 1999. Earlier the crew had been on duty for 6 months, followed by 2 months time off. In the last working period the relieving system had been changed to 4 months on duty followed by 4 months time off. On the present occasion the chief officer had been on duty for about 4 months and would therefore go on 4 months leave upon arrival in St. Petersburg. The chief officer normally was working about 24 hours overtime per month. In the week prior to the accident he had about 8 hours overtime. On the day in question he turned in at about 2100 hours and slept well until he was called at 0140 hours. He arrived at the bridge at 0150 hours. The chief officer stated that he usually slept between 8 and 10 hours in 24 hours. He did not feel particularly tired during watch on the night in question. The chief officer was well familiar with the waters in question. The grounding site The Meg run aground just south of the lighthouse Faludden, which is built upon a point on the southeast part of the island of Gotland. The building is a 11.3 meters high lighthouse. The lighthouse has got the characteristics Oc(3) 15s, which means groups of 3 obscurations in rapid succession every 15 th second. The nominal range of visibility of the lighthouse is 17 M. The nominal range of visibility corresponds to the greatest distance from the lighthouse, at which the lighthouse light can be seen at a visibility corresponding to a daylight visibility of 10 M. The weather The wind was easterly, about 10 m/sec. and the wave height approximately 5 meters according to the master of the Meg. It was dark and the visibility was between 6 and 7 M. Page 3
Miscellaneous From going on the watch in question until falling asleep the chief officer did not see any disturbing traffic in the area. Course of events The vessel left Boston, UK, on October 8, 2002, at 2015 hours with destination St. Petersburg in Russia. The Meg passed the Kiel Canal and sat course for the western side of Bornholm, where the ship was anchored on October 13 at 0650 hours because of bad weather. On October 14 at 0818 hours the ship weighed anchor and the voyage was continued in the traffic separation scheme that led south of Gotland. On October 15 at 0200 hours the Meg was about 24 M southwest of the southern point of Gotland and the second officer was relieved by the chief officer. The relief of the watch lasted between 10 and 15 minutes under standard procedure. At 0220 hours the chief officer changed the course approximately 20 to starboard in order to reduce the ship's movements so as to avoid slamming in the easterly wind and sea (see chart enclosure). At 0412 hours the course was changed approx. 35 to port, and at 0425 hours the course was set at approx. 350. The chief officer intended to steer for and then follow the shore of Gotland towards Östergarn and further towards the Gulf of Finland. At about 0500 hours the look-out left the bridge for cleaning work in the engine room. The chief officer did not remember anything after that until the grounding took place. The master woke up when noticing that the ship's speed was reduced. He immediately went to the bridge, and when he arrived there the Meg was grounded. The chief officer was then standing up, shocked and apathetic. Page 4
The master immediately stopped the engine of the ship. He then tried to go astern to get the ship off the ground but without success. After that attempts were made to get the ship off by pumping ballast but also these attempts failed. The master then contacted the shipowner to inform about the grounding. Course of events after the grounding The officer on watch at the Coast Guard in Stockholm got the call about the accident at 0737 hours. The MRCC (Maritime Co-ordination Center) was called by the Coast Guard at 0748 hours. At 0759 hours the MRCC got contact via VHF with the ship, which confirmed that it had grounded but that the crew was in no danger. At 0826 hours the Swedish Sea Rescue Society was called, which sent a boat to the site where she arrived at 0935 hours. The Coast Guard vessel KBV 181 got the call about the accident at 0755 hours and left Slite (Gotland) for Faludden. She arrived at the grounding site at 1230 hours. Absorbing limitation devices were laid along the sides of the disabled vessel. Goose-necks of the Meg were cut off and about 42 tons of gas-oil were pumped via the goose-necks into a container. The rescue service then pumped the oil to sludge trucks ashore. On October 16 at about 0800 hours the tug boat S:t Olof of the Röda Bolaget arrived on site. At 1200 hours an attempt was made to pull the vessel off the ground. The attempt failed and had to be interrupted at 1400 hours. After further unloading of the disabled vessel another attempt was started and at 1755 hours the vessel was afloat. The Meg was anchored to be checked for damages whereupon the tug boat S:t Olof took the disabled vessel in tow to Slite, which was reached on October 17 at 0130 hours. Page 5
Analysis At the time of the occurrence the bridge was manned by the chief officer. The look-out had left the bridge at about 0500 hours to carry out cleaning work in the engine room. At this point of time it was still dark. In Chapter VIII, section 3-1 of the STCW convention, basic principles are stated, which should be observed as regards watch duty on the bridge. From the convention it appears that the officer of the watch on the bridge may be the sole look-out in daylight on certain occasions (see enclosure).in the dark the officer of the watch is obliged to have a look-out. The visibility at the occurrence was between 6 and 7 M, which was also the distance at which the lighthouse Faludden could be seen. According to notes made in the chart the speed over ground was approx. 12 knots the last hours before the grounding. The lighthouse has then been visible for at least 30 minutes. Should look-out have been maintained on the bridge, he would no doubt have noticed that the Meg was going towards the lighthouse and that the chief officer had fallen asleep. He could then have awakened the officer and thereby prevented the grounding. From the time when the Meg weighed anchor the chief officer was on watch between 1400 and 1800 hours on October 14. Thereafter he was also awake from 1800 until about 2100 hours, when he turned in. The chief officer slept about 4.5 hours before going on the watch in question. He also stated that he generally slept between 8 and 10 hours per 24 hours. An important contribution to fatigue is the shortened or disturbed rest (fatigue) that often occurs in connection with irregular working-hours. Getting ones sleeping periods in the wrong phase of the day and short periods of rest are crucial for the ability to stay awake. Also vibrations, noise, high sea and monotony are without doubt contributing to the sense of drowsiness. It is also verified that one does not necessarily feel tired even though the level of wakefulness is lowered. The chief officer had been onboard for about 4 months and would go on 4 months leave at the end of this very voyage. The fact that the chief officer was in the end of his working period has probably contributed to the fatigue that is natural under these circum- Page 6
stances. The movements of the ship has probably also had a drowsy effect and contributed to the falling asleep of the chief officer. When the master arrived at the bridge he tried to back the ship off the ground by its own engines. The attempts were made in a sensitive area without the master's affirmation that a backing off by its own engines could be made without worsening the ship's damages or causing discharge of oil. The master has stated that the attempts to back off were taken since the Meg was bumping heavily to the ground in the rough sea. He also feared that the ship would break. While the ship lay bumping the aft top mast broke, which indicates that the master's worries were well-founded. The Meg run aground at 0555 hours and the MRCC was informed about the accident at 0748 hours. The MRCC should have been informed by the ship immediately after the grounding. Cause The cause of the accident was that the chief officer fell asleep when on watch. A contributing cause was that no look-out was stationed on the bridge. Remarks The Meg had no look-out. The chief officer fell asleep when on watch. The vessel did not report the grounding to the MRCC. Recommendations The great peril of reduced wakefulness on various occasions and under various circumstances makes it important to stress the risk when sinking into a comfortable chair at times when the difficulty to stay awake is well documented. Page 7
It is of great importance that look-out is stationed on the bridge in accordance with existing regulations. It is also important that the ship as soon as possible contacts the MRCC, where the staff is well trained to make a quick judgement of the situation in order to decide when and what efforts may be needed. The alarm procedure at the occurrence in question made the MRCC receive the call about two hours after the grounding. Damages To our knowledge no damages to personnel or environment have occurred. The vessel got indentations all along the bottom. Conclusions The grounding took place in darkness and good visibility. Rough easterly sea was prevailing. The waters in question were familiar to the chief officer. The Meg was ballasted at the accident. The vessel was on automatic steering at the time of the accident. The bridge was manned by the chief officer. The chief officer fell asleep on watch. There was no look-out on the bridge. Page 8