GREEN CROSS / Sep/Oct 2005 Incident In a fatal accident caused by improper use of a portable enginedriven water pump on a lighter one repairer and one security guard were killed. In the tragedy, one repair worker died of depletion of oxygen and inhalation of carbon monoxide in a poorly ventilated tank in which portable engine-driven water pump was used to empty the bilge water. A security guard who rushed down to the tank in an attempt to rescue the unconscious worker without first assessing the potential risk became the second victim. Circumstances In a sultry and rainy summer day, four dumb steel lighters under detention were being moored in abreast in the harbour, each being guarded by a security guard from the Bailiff Office. Persistent heavy rain in the last few days poured the aft peak compartment of the lighters with a large amount of rainwater. As the lighters under detention were left without any crew, a repair company was appointed to clean up the bilge water in the flooded compartments of the lighters. A worker carried with an enginedriven water pump and accessory hoses was sent by the repair company to carry out the bilge cleaning job. The worker rigged the engine-driven pump to a wooden plank inside the aft peak compartment of the lighter at a height of about one metre above the bilge water one day before the accident, and left it there until the next day. Next day, the worker boarded the lighter and started the engine of the pump for pumping bilge water out from the compartment. He had entered the compartment several times for checking bilge water level and to refuel the engine of the pump. In the evening when a duty Security Guard A patrolled the lighter, he spotted no water coming out from the discharge hose of the pump. He went to the entrance of the peak compartment for an answer and saw the worker lying unconsciously inside the compartment. Security Guard A shouted to the worker from the entrance, but there was no response. He immediately summoned his colleagues who were on duty at the nearby lighters for help. Three security guards rushed to the scene. Security Guard B went down to the aft peak compartment to rescue the worker at once. Meanwhile, Security Guard A went ashore with an inflatable raft to report the incident to the company. The other two security guards stood by at the entrance of the compartment. When Security Guard B reached the bottom of the compartment and grasped the worker, he collapsed as well. As there was no communication equipment on board, the security guards remained on board had to wait until the return of Security Guard A. Knowing two men lying unconscious in the compartment, Security Guard A hastened ashore with the inflatable raft again, to report the incident to the Police. At last, fire brigades arrived at the scene. Two victims were rescued from the compartment. However, the victims were certified dead on arrival at the hospital. Findings and Observations The bilge pump was driven by a petrol engine. During pumping operation, the water pump was placed in ship's compartment that was poorly ventilated. Petrol engine consumed large amount of oxygen during running. Internal combustion engine when operated in poorly ventilated space would consume large amount of oxygen, and emit carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide. Carbon monoxide is a toxic gas. The fact that repairer had safely entered the compartment several times before does not mean it was safe to enter, because the oxygen inside the compartment would have been depleted and replaced by carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide being produced. Recommendations Coroner inquest was held for the accident and a verdict was returned with the following safety recommendations for prevention of occurrence of similar accident:- (1) Engine driven pump should not be used inside a confined space or tank that is poorly ventilated. (2) Direct means of communication should be avai1able on board. (3) Notice should be served to all crew-members on board to warn people not to use internal combustion engine inside any poorly ventilated compartment as that would lead to poisoning by carbon monoxide gas. Applicable Legal Requirements (1) Section 9(1) of the Shipping and Port Control (Cargo Handling) Regulations, Cap 313 B states that effective and suitable provision shall be made for the adequate ventilation of every workplace on a vessel to which persons employed are required to have access, in the course of their employment. (2) Section 9(2) of the Shipping and Port Control (Cargo Handling) Regulations, Cap 313 B states that where in any place referred to in the above paragraph (1) (a) the proportion of oxygen in the air is liable to have been substantially reduced below the normal proportion; or (b) there is likely to exist any fume, gas, vapour, dust or other impurity in the air that may be injurious to health. (3) The proposed Merchant Shipping (Local Vessels) (Works) Regulation requires that whenever a vessel is undergoing repair in the waters of Hong Kong, the person in charge of works should be assisted by at least one Works Supervisor to supervise the safety at each workplace onboard the vessel. The Works Supervisor who should have reached the age of 18 years and have at least 2 years practical experience must have received the mandatory safety training (shiprepairing and ship-breaking) course.