HERRMANN LAW GROUP AVIATION DISASTER ATTORNEYS EST FORMER SENATOR & INSURANCE COMMISSIONER Karl Herrmann ( ) Founder

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AVIATION DISASTER ATTORNEYS EST. 1950 FORMER SENATOR & INSURANCE COMMISSIONER Karl Herrmann (1915-1997) Founder Re: LION AIR FLIGHT JT610 DISASTER To Victim Families and Loved Ones: November 26, 2018 Our hearts go out to victims of the horrific crash of Lion Air Flight JT610. Decades representing air disaster victims have taught us the depth of your sorrow. Mere words are insufficient, but please accept our sincere condolences. We provide you with this information to help you confront legal challenges you will face seeking justice from those responsible for the loss of your loved ones. GENERAL ADVICE Lawyers representing Boeing and Lion Air are already at work preparing their clients cases opposing you and your family. You should seek legal counsel as soon as you are able. MOST IMPORTANT. immediately: The following are four (4) points you need to know 1. First, do not discuss your case with representatives of Boeing, Lion Air, government agencies, insurers or anyone else other than your family, your doctors, or your lawyers. People working for Boeing, Lion Air, and other potential defendants may seem sympathetic and helpful, but their goal is to protect their employers and to help settle your claim as cheaply as possible; 2. Start a diary/journal in which you record all your suffering both physical and emotional daily. Preserve all financial records including income, taxes, business/corporate records, bank account, and budgets. Further, keep records of all medical treatment and all expenses; 3. Seek out psychological/grief counseling. Not only can it be vital for your mental health, but it will also document your suffering, which will help prove the extent of your damages when the time comes; and, 4. All victims need legal advice from lawyers not only skilled in these complicated aviation disaster cases, but also experienced in representing Asians in USA courts. They must be aware of the cultural differences to be effective. The sooner your lawyers start work on your behalf, the more successful they will be.

INVESTIGATION It is too early in the investigation to reach firm conclusions on fault in this accident. However, it does appear this new Boeing airplane experienced mechanical problems and that the flight crew was uninformed on how to correct the problem. This plane was exhibiting serious mechanical problems on its previous four flights, including a flight the night before this crash. While Lion Air says that it performed repairs and maintenance prior to the doomed flight, even replacing an angle of attack (AOA) sensor the previous day, just two flights prior to the ill-fated flight, problems persisted. In 68 years of representing victims of accidents, we have seen that safety measures can be expensive. Frequently, they re sacrificed in manufacturing and maintenance of equipment as well as training of the crews. All too often management policies are more concerned with profit margins than with safety. Usually air disasters involve a chain of mistakes. Some combination of faulty design, a manufacturing error, poor maintenance, inadequate training, insufficient operating and safety manuals, and a poor cockpit crew response leads to these disasters. One thing is clear; it was neither the fault of the passengers nor the cabin crew. They were entirely innocent. Here s what has been reported so far. The plane involved was a brand-new Boeing 737 Max 8 that Lion Air had just taken possession of in August 2018. The aircraft, a more fuel-efficient update of Boeing s best-selling airliner in history, the 737, was touted as one of Boeing s newest and most advanced jets ever built and has been in commercial operation since only May 2017. According to Indonesia s National Transport Safety Committee (NTSC), this specific plane had logged a mere 800 hours in the sky prior to its final, ill-fated flight. This airplane experienced severe problems on the previous four flights, including the day prior to the doomed flight. One of those flights reported no data from one of the air sensors. Pilots on board the plane's previous flight from Denpasar to Jakarta reported technical problems and that the plane was displaying "unreliable airspeed," according to the deputy chief of Indonesia's National Transport Safety Committee, Haryo Satmiko. Alon Soetanto, a passenger aboard the Lion Air flight from Denpasar to Jakarta, told reporters About three to eight minutes after it took off, I felt like the plane was losing power and unable to rise. That happened several times during the flight. We felt like in a roller coaster. Some passengers began to panic and vomit. Further, Conchita Caroline said that as the airplane was preparing for take-off, the engine died several times. When the plane did finally take-off, the floor felt hot to the touch and she could see the right engine shaking out of her window. Nonetheless, Lion Air Chief Executive, 2

Edward Sirait, told local media that engineers had checked and repaired the issue and that they gave the plane clearance to fly the very next day. At approximately 6:20 a.m. on Monday, October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight JT610 departed Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, Tangerang, Indonesia, on its way to Depati Amir Airport in Pangkalpinang, Bangka Island, Indonesia. The flight was carrying 189 people in total, including 178 adult passengers, 3 child passengers, 6 cabin crew members and 2 pilots, Captain Bhavye Suneja and co-pilot Harvino. Shortly after take-off, the plane displayed abnormal changes in speed, altitude and direction. While a plane would normally be ascending in the first few minutes of a flight, Lion Air JT-610 experienced a 726-foot drop over 21 seconds. Data initially suggested that the plane was not in automatic flight profile, as it would normally be for a takeoff in such an advanced aircraft. Instead, it was believed to be in an unstable vertical flight profile an increase in speed with a decrease in altitude - suggesting some loss of control of the aircraft. Approximately 12 nautical miles after taking off, the pilots made a request to air traffic control to return to the airport. However, the plane did not turn around and the pilots did not declare a formal emergency. Air traffic control lost contact with the aircraft soon after. An estimated 13 minutes after takeoff, Lion Air Flight JT-610 crashed into the Java Sea killing all 189 passengers and crew members aboard. Experts now speculate that there was a problem with the aircrafts instruments, specifically an angle of attack (AOA) sensor, that was part of the pitot-static system that calculates airspeed, altitude, and the plane s nose direction, that contributed to the crash. An AOA sensor is an instrument, like a small wind vane, that sits outside the plane just below the cockpit and sends information to its computers about the angle of the plane's nose relative to the oncoming air. The sensor helps to determine whether the plane is about to stall and dive. To protect against a possible stall on the Boeing 737 MAX 8, Boeing made a change to the flight-control system, called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), so that it automatically pushes the nose of the aircraft down when a sensor indicates that the nose is pitched up and putting the plane in danger of a stall. Safety experts involved in the investigation said the new automated stallprevention system on the Boeing 737 MAX 8 and MAX 9 models, intended to help cockpit crews avoid mistakenly raising a plane's nose dangerously high, under unusual conditions can push it down unexpectedly and so strongly that flight crews can't pull it back up. 3

It is being reported that Boeing told airlines that such a situation can result in a steep dive or crash, even if pilots are manually flying the jetliner and don't expect flight-control computers to kick in. The description of MCAS provided by Boeing states that the system is designed to activate only during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall and that it is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other airplane systems. The investigation will determine whether the jet s new MCAS flight-control software was working properly or whether the pilots were simply uninformed about the new flight control system altogether and had no knowledge of the procedure to cut off the automatic system and manually control the plane. It is believed that this sensor, the Angle of Attack (AOA) sensor, was feeding bad data to the jet s flight computer, activating the new system and repeatedly pushing the nose of the plane down when in fact there was no danger of a stall. Boeing allegedly withheld information about the potential hazards of new flight-control features on this model of plane and had not informed the airlines of the change to the flight control system. In fact, pilots flying Boeing s 737 MAX for American Airlines and Southwest Airlines were not informed during training about this key change to the automatic flight control system. The fact that U.S. pilots were not informed about the MCAS means that Lion Air pilots may have been unaware of it as well, especially since the cockpit displays and systems seemed identical. This is the first description you, as 737 pilots, have seen, the message from the pilots association at American Airlines reads. It is not in the American Airlines 737 Flight Manual nor is there a description in the Boeing FCOM (Flight Crew Operations Manual). It will be soon. It was not until after the fatal crash Boeing released an operational bulletin, warning all airlines about how to address any erroneous readings related to the AOA sensor. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) later issued its own directive that advised pilots about how to respond to similar problems. Boeing subsequently sent out a warning bulletin to all airlines operating the plane worldwide, informing pilots how to cut off the new automated system if it malfunctions. Because the data suggests problems with the air speed and altimeter, the flight control system will be investigated thoroughly. Problems with the pitotstatic system have been involved in previous incidents: disappearance of Air France Flight 447 in 2009 and the return of a Malaysia Airlines flight to Brisbane, Australia after take-off in July 2018. The new MCAS system will be 4

investigated to confirm it was operating properly. All Boeing operating manuals, training and instructions provided to the airlines and pilots on the new MCAS system will be investigated to see if they had proper notice of the changes to the flight control system or proper training and sufficient information in the manual to correct any problem and turn the automatic system off. The aircraft s flight data recorder has been recovered, but it will take months to analyze the data it recorded. The cockpit voice recorder has not been found yet. While the investigation may point to several causes for the crash, such as faulty sensors, insufficient information, instruction and notice of the MCAS in the operating manuals issued by Boeing, errors by the Lion Air flight crew in following the operating manual during the flight once they realized there was a serious problem with the data they were receiving from the air sensors, or improper repairs by Lion Air s mechanical and safety engineers that checked and replaced the faulty sensor, it remains too early to jump to firm conclusions. P.T. Lion Mentari Airlines, operating as Lion Air, is a privately-owned company that was formed in 1999 by two brothers, Rusdi and Kusnan Kirana, both Indonesian nationals. Its parent company is Lion Air Group with headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia. It markets itself as Indonesia s low-cost airline and, consequently, it has seen rapid growth in the company s short existence, tapping into the growing middle class in Asia. In fact, Lion Air is Indonesia s largest airline, as well as Southeast Asia s second largest low-cost airline, after Air Asia. According to the airlines own website, aggressive business expansion was a top priority for Lion Air and its parent company. Unfortunately, it seems to have been of the utmost priority for the airline, as its safety record in the company s nearly two decades of service is anything but safe. Of note, past incidents include Lion Air Flight 386 which crashed after take-off on January 14, 2002, causing a total loss of the plane but no fatalities. On November 30, 2004, Lion Air Flight 538 crashed in Surakarta, killing 25 people. On March 4, 2006, Lion Air Flight 8987 skidded on the runway during landing and caused a total loss of the plane. Again, on April 13, 2013, Lion Air Flight 907 overshot the runway and crashed into the water near Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia. The poor safety record of Indonesian airline carriers led the United States and the European Union to ban Indonesian carriers from their skies in 2007. The Federal Aviation Administration only recently lifted that ban in August 2016. The European Union followed suit and lifted the ban in June 2018. Aviation experts are questioning whether Lion Air pilots receive adequate training in flying planes during emergency conditions or in handling new technology like that in the Boeing 737 Max 8. Pilots who have worked for both 5

Lion Air and its competitors have also stated that training for flight and ground crews sometimes did not keep up with latest developments. The catastrophic crash of Lion Air Flight JT610 will certainly renew concerns about the safety and priorities of Indonesian airlines and, specifically, Lion Air, once more. Safety has clearly been an issue with Lion Air and with the Indonesian aviation industry in general for a long time. We are here to help find out why. However, while Lion Air will likely be found at least partially liable for the crash, the investigation seems to point to Boeing as being the majority at fault for this deadly, and avoidable, crash. While the angle of attack (AOA) sensor had malfunctioned on the previous four flights, even being replaced the day before the crash, problems persisted. It also seems that Boeing did not properly inform pilots or airlines about the changes to the flight control system and the MCAS, and that the operating manual issued by Boeing may have been deficient on the MCAS, leaving the pilots helpless as the plane s nose began to automatically turn downward. All these issues will be thoroughly investigated, though the investigation may take as long as several months to a year to complete. All the evidence is being collected and will be preserved. Rest assured that all causes will be determined once the investigation is completed and those responsible will be held to account. AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION. COMPENSATION Issues of the amount of compensation are unique to each individual victim. The death of a loved one is immeasurable. The loss of love and affection, companionship, support and all other financial losses can amount to substantial sums of money depending upon family relationships, age of the victim, and actual and potential earnings. Many various factors go into calculating the just amount for each victim. We fully prepare every aspect of a case, utilizing experts when necessary, to maximize your just award. In previous cases we ve recovered compensation frequently for as much as several millions of dollars in wrongful death claims. You may want to look at our record as to specific amounts we have been able to recover for victims of disaster accidents. See our Firm Record and Our Legal Team that follow this letter. However, we want to be clear that past results do not guarantee any amount for future recoveries for different victims in other accidents. Each case is determined on its own merits. Because Boeing will be held at least partially liable for the crash, victims families can sue in the United States, where juries award the most money and where compensation will be higher than any other country in the world, including Indonesia. You need an American law firm that is experienced in aviation law and willing to fight for your rights. Based in Seattle, Washington, 6

the city where this Boeing 737 Max 8 was built, the Herrmann Law Group has been successfully representing clients in aviation disasters for decades. The most updated information on Lion Air flight JT610 and the investigation can be found on our website at:. We invite all to contact us for a free, personal, and private consultation with no commitments required. Feel free to contact any of the following: Charles Herrmann at cell: 206.488.5911 / charles@hlg.lawyer Lara Herrmann at cell: 253.380.5272 / lara@hlg.lawyer Or any of our 6 attorneys at either of our two offices. Seattle Office: 206.625.9104 Tacoma Office: 253.627.8142 Respectfully, HERRMANN LAW GROUP Charles Herrmann Attorney at Law Direct: 206.488.5911 Email: charles@hlg.lawyer Website: www.hlg.lawyer 7