BOBASIO/7. Preliminary RVSM Airspace Safety Assessment

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BOBASIO/7 Preliminary RVSM Airspace Safety Assessment

Outline Background Data used in the analysis BOBASIO RVSM Airspace Risk Hotspot in Mumbai FIR TCPs along Kolkata-Chennai FIR and Yangon-Kuala Lumpur FIR 2

1. Background 3

Risk Risk : risk is expected number of accident per flight hour Risk of 5 x 10-9 means that there are 5 accidents in a thousand million flight hours. The x 10-9 means in a thousand million flight hours To bring a thousand million flight hours into perspective. Let s compare it with 2016 annual BOB flight hours which is approximately 2.87 million hours. Risk of 5x 10-9 means that there are approximately 5 accidents in a thousand million flight hours (not taking into account the effect of TCAS). This means in BOB there are roughly 5 accidents in 350 years. Target Level of Safety (TLS) - acceptable risk level. TLS is 5 x 10-9 4

Risk Technical Risk Normal Case Risk : risk when there is no operational error (all agreement, procedures, separation, are followed correctly) Factors influencing technical risk : traffic pattern in a given airspace structure (FLAS/FLOS) etc. Operational Risk Failure Case Risk : risk when there is an error (LHDs) Ex. ATC forgets to transfer A/C, transfer with wrong level Factor influencing operational risk : duration of LHD (main driver), traffic pattern in a given airspace structure (FLAS/FLOS) etc. 5

LHD Categories LHD Category A Flight crew fails to climb or descend the aircraft as cleared B Flight crew climbing or descending without ATC clearance C Incorrect operation or interpretation of airborne equipment D ATC system loop error E ATC transfer of control coordination errors due to human factors F ATC transfer of control coordination errors due to technical issues 6

LHD Categories LHD Category G Aircraft contingency leading to sudden inability to maintain level H Airborne equipment failure and unintentional or undetected level change I Turbulence or other weather related cause J TCAS resolution advisory and flight crew correctly responds K TCAS resolution advisory and flight crew incorrectly responds L Non-approved aircraft is provided with RVSM separation M Other 7

LHDs Not all LHDs creates risk (based on the current assumptions and application of the Collision Risk Model). Risk-bearing LHD - LHD whose risk is not zero Non risk-bearing LHD - LHD whose risk is zero For each report submitted to the MAAR, The MAAR analyzes to see if the LHD is risk-bearing. The MAAR removes duplicate reports, if any. Unless specified otherwise, the number of LHDs in this presentation refers to number of risk-bearing LHDs. 8

2. Data used in the analysis 9

Data used in the analysis Scope - This analysis covers the first 6 months of 2017 (Jan-June 2017) Traffic sample data (TSD) 2016 TSD was used to approximate 2017 TSD. In the analysis, TSD was used to derive many parameters including occupancy, average aircraft dimension, annual flight hours etc. Typically, these parameters, except annual flight hours, do not change significantly over years. Large Height Deviation (LHD) Reports LHDs occurring during Jan-June 2017 LHD data is a major driver of operational and total risk 10

Data used in the analysis Typically, annual risk is calculated at the end of the year by using LHD data collected over the period of 12 months and annual flight hours. In this interim analysis, we used LHDs data collected over the period of 6 months and annual flight hours. In this analysis, there are comparisons in term of number of LHD reports between LHDs data in Jan-Jun 2016 and Jan-Jun 2017. Please note that since the introduction of the online LHD reporting system in Oct 2016, the MAAR has observed an increasing trend of number of reports received in both BOBASIO region and other regions. This is a factor to keep in mind when comparing number of reports from the two periods. 11

3. BOBASIO Airspace Risk 12

Risk BOBASIO (Jan - Jun 2017) Source of Risk 2016 (Jan- Jun) 2017 Annual Target Level of (Jan - Jun) Safety (TLS) Technical Risk* 0.87x 10-9 0.87x 10-9 Operational Risk 9.94x 10-9 14.73x 10-9 Total Risk 10.81x 10-9 15.60x 10-9 *Use 2016 TSD to approximate 2017 TSD. 2.5x 10-9 5x 10-9 13

By month 14

Risk Total and operational risks in the first 6 months of 2017 exceed the annual target levels of safety. Both total and operational risks increased 50% from the risks of the same period last year 98% of risk was caused by cat E LHD (breakdown in ATC-ATC transfer of control due to human factors) 15

Risk of each LHD The chart depicts operational risk. Each block represents each LHD event and the height of each block represents risk associated with each event. There are 448 LHDs but only 121 LHDs caused risk.total operational risk is 14.73 x 10-9 Risk in BOBASIO in the first 6 months of 2017 was dominated by a few long duration occurrences. There were 5 LHDs whose duration exceeded 30 mins and 6 LHDs whose duration was between 20 to 30 mins. 16

Risk location 17

3. Hotspot Western Boundary of Mumbai 18

Risk location 19

Risk Western Boundary of Mumbai (Jan - Jun 2017) Source of Risk 2016 (Jan- Jun) 2017 Annual Target Level of (Jan - Jun) Safety (TLS) Technical Risk* 0.87x 10-9 0.87x 10-9 Operational Risk 4.96x 10-9 11.62x 10-9 Total Risk 5.83x 10-9 12.49x 10-9 *Use 2016 TSD to approximate 2017 TSD. 2.5x 10-9 5x 10-9 20

Hotspot : Western boundary of Mumbai FIR 79% of operational risk in the first 6 months of 2017 rose from LHDs along western boundary of Mumbai FIR. Most LHDs in this region are category E LHDs All risk presented in this section is accident per [BOBASIO] flight hours 21

Mumbai Boundary : Operational Risk The chart depicts operational risk. Each block represents each LHD occurrence and the height of each block represents risk associated with each occurrence. There are 48 LHDs which result in the operational risk of 11.60x 10-9 Out of 48 LHDs, there were 4 LHDs whose duration exceeds 30 mins, and these 4 LHD accounts for the risk of 4.29x 10-9 or 36.98% of total operation risk in Mumbai FIR 22

Analysis of 4 Long Duration LHDs (>30 mins) 4 Cat E LHDs LHD Category ATS Unit originating the error 3 Muscat 2 Negative Transfer 1 Sana 1 Incorrect FL Nature of LHDs 1 Incorrect Route 23

Breakdown of Risk by Interface 24

Breakdown of LHDs by Interfaces Interface 2016* 2017* Muscat - Mumbai Number of reports received : 9 Number of risk-bearing LHD : 4 Risk : 2.33 x 10-9 *Number of reports received : 76 Number of risk-bearing LHD : 36 Risk : 8.85 x 10-9 Sana - Mumbai Number of reports received : 7 Number of risk-bearing LHD : 1 Risk : 1.03 x 10-9 Number of reports received : 7 Number of risk-bearing LHD : 3 Risk : 1.38 x 10-9 Mogadishu -Mumbai Number of reports received : 8 Number of risk-bearing LHD : 3 Risk : 1.68 x 10-9 Number of reports received : 16 Number of risk-bearing LHD : 8 Risk : 1.16 x 10-9 *The first 6 months of 2016 and 2017 ** Regarding the increase in number of reports along Mumbai-Muscat boundary, the MAAR has observed the increasing trend since Aug of 2016 25

LHDs along Muscat-Mumbai Interface *Only Jan-Jun of that year 26

LHDs along Sana-Mumbai Interface *Only Jan-Jun of that year 27

LHDs along Mogadishu-Mumbai Interface *Only Jan-Jun of that year 28

Contributing Factors Poor surveillance Poor communication 29

Recent Developments A meeting between Oman and Mumbai held in June 2017 to address LHD problems Install direct lines between the two units for communication Plan to install and connect OLDI and AIDC to facilitate transfer of control and reduce error Consider sharing surveillance data between Muscat and Mumbai Monthly coordination meeting 30

4. TCPs along Kolkata-Chennai FIR and Yangon-Kuala Lumpur FIR 31

Risk TCPs along Kolkata-Chennai FIR and Yangon-Kuala Lumpur FIR Source of Risk 2016 (Jan- Jun) 2017 Annual Target Level of (Jan - Jun) Safety (TLS) Technical Risk* 0.87x 10-9 0.87x 10-9 Operational Risk 2.23x 10-9 0.73x 10-9 Total Risk 3.10x 10-9 1.60x 10-9 *Use 2016 TSD to approximate 2017 TSD. 2.5x 10-9 5x 10-9 32

LHDs Higher risk in 2016 was the result of three moderate duration LHDs in the first 6 months of 2016 (10 mins, 10 mins, 26 mins). *Only Jan-Jun of that year 33

Corner near Yangon, Dhaka, Kolkata Waypoints - APAGO, AVLED, CHILA, ANSOS, TEBOV Year 2016 2017 Number of LHD reported 26 52 Total LHD duration 14 mins 27.5 mins 34

Recent Developments BIMT/4 - August 2016 India, Myanmar and Bangladesh agreed on coordination procedures designed to reduce coordination error India, Myanmar and Bangladesh agreed to initiate the process for surveillance data sharing and report the progress to BIMT/5 Regarding LHD coordination between States, Bangladesh, India and Myanmar agreed to initiate contact within 3 days from the date of occurrence, and the contracted unit to respond within 7 days 35

Recent Developments BIMT/4 - August 2016 (cont d) Bangladesh, India and Myanmar also agreed to hold periodic teleconference to discuss LHD occurrences and mitigation issues. According to information obtained from States, it was proposed that, in the first phase, bilateral teleconferences between Kolkata ACC and Dhaka ACC should be conducted ATS Interfacility Data Communication (AIDC) between Kolkata ACC and Yangon ACC will be implemented in the fourth quarter of 2017 36

Recent Developments AIDC between Yangon ACC and Chennai ACC will be implemented in the fourth quarter of 2017 [Info updated in June 2017 ] - Standard operating procedures for AIDC messages exchange between the Chennai ACC and Kuala Lumpur ACC was effective in May 2017, and the phased AIDC implementation would follow. Coordination would be carried out by voice at least until August 2017, when the exchange of CDN message via AIDC on a trial basis would be reviewed 37

Contact Us Monitoring Agency for Asia Region (MAAR) Website : http://www.aerothai.co.th/maar/ Phone : 66-2-287-8154 Email : maar@aerothai.co.th 38