Submission to Infrastructure Victoria s Draft 30-Year Infrastructure Strategy 1. Introduction This submission is a response to Infrastructure Victoria s assessment of the need to construct a heavy rail link from the city to Doncaster, in the draft report, 30-Year Infrastructure Strategy, October 2016. The draft report concludes that a rail connection to Doncaster cannot be justified as: it provides only a low contribution to meeting the growing demand for access to economic activity in central Melbourne ; it has a prohibitively high cost ; for many people in the Doncaster area it actually provides a worse journey than they currently have with the Doncaster Area Rapid Transit (DART) buses because of the need to start interchanging between bus and rail. ; and thus it has a very poor preliminary benefit-cost result. The draft report states also that the proposal has strong community support but it was not recommended by the citizen jury. 2. Comment on the Draft Report s reasons for non-recommendation There are many reasons that proponents of the Doncaster railway have used for its construction. However, that it would make a contribution to the economic activity in central Melbourne, has never been one of them. Therefore, while its economic contribution may be considered as low, it is unreasonable to consider this as a significant reason for rejection unless this is the only or one of the main two or three criteria used for consideration of the value of infrastructure projects. The draft report suggest that the cost of the proposal would be in the order of $3 billion to $5 billion. While this is a high cost, it compares favourably with the recently abandoned East-West road link eastern section ($11 billion) and Melbourne Metro rail ($11 billion). It should be noted that the proposal also includes redirecting the South Morang line to the city via a tunnel through the inner northern suburbs. A report on the feasibility of building the Doncaster rail, Doncaster Rail: What are its prospects? by Professor Peter Newman, September 2012, provides a costing of about $850 million for the section from Doncaster to Victoria Park, and a further $300 million for an extension from Victoria Park to the Melbourne Metro at Parkville via a tunnel. While these costings are on the low side, they suggest that $3 billion is not an unreasonable estimate for the proposal. It should be noted that the route of the tunnel to Parkville in the Draft Report proposal, based on Public Transport Victoria s Network Development Plan Metropolitan Rail,
December 2012 differs slightly from the one in the Newman assessment, but this should not lead to a significant cost difference. The assertion that a journey from Doncaster to the city via train would be worse for many people than the existing DART bus services because of the need to transfer between modes is presented without any evidence. The use of the phrase for many people is at best meaningless. It replaces what one would normally expect, a number or proportion of existing bus commuters who would be inconvenienced by having to change from a feeder bus to the train at Doncaster station. But it is also misleading in that it implies that a significantly large number of commuters would be inconvenienced by the change of mode. There is also the issue of what is so inconvenient about a change of mode. Public transport users are used to it and accept it as part of the public transport network. One of the problems facing commuters in the outer suburbs of Melbourne using stations such as Williams Landing and Craigieburn is that there is insufficient station car parking and inadequate and overcrowded feeder bus services to and from the station. Commuters in these areas (as evidenced by reports in local papers) want more of both and are quite happy to make a mode change from either private car or bus to the train, rather than drive their cars to their workplaces. The construction of the Doncaster railway would not necessarily lead to the removal of all, or any, DART services. Any future realignment of bus services would be expected to occur following a review when the railway commenced operations. However, the introduction of feeder buses to Doncaster and other stations on the line would be expected to happen, especially at Doncaster station where car parking would be limited. The draft report states that this proposal was supported during the consultative phase, and has general community support. No evidence is shown that supporters of the project would not be concerned with a bus - train mode connection at Doncaster station. The need for changes of this nature is a common feature of a public transport network. The draft report provides a benefit cost ratio for the project (including wider economic benefits) is 0.1 to 0.2. This figure seems inordinately low, especially when compared with that given to the Eastern Freeway to CityLink connection (previously known as the East West Link, Eastern Section), ranging from 0.7 0.9, or 1.1 1.4 with wider economic benefits. However the additional note in the draft report on this assessment is instructive: It should be noted that these results cannot be directly compared to other economic analyses of this option, due to a wide range of differences in the analysis.. The same can also be applied to the benefit cost analysis for the Doncaster railway. Furthermore, the submission to the draft report from Russell Crawford suggests that there is a flaw in the way that benefit cost ratios of public transport projects have been assessed by the 2
draft report. His methodology applied to the benefit cost ration of the Doncaster would provide a figure much greater than 0.2. 3. Additional comments on the Draft Report s Analysis This project has been assessed without reference to Melbourne s public transport network as a whole, except where comparisons have been made with current and possible future bus services between Doncaster and the city. The draft report states that the replacement of the existing DART buses (which spread out across the Doncaster region, providing four routes with direct access to central Melbourne) with feeder buses to a new rail line would require passengers who currently have access to the city without interchange to start changing services. However there is a certain inefficiency in the use of bus resources here. A rail line would allow the same number of buses operating currently between Doncaster and the city centre to operate at high frequencies on feeder routes from the greater Doncaster area to the station, and allow for the development of new routes beyond what might be considered the current catchment area. That this would be less desirable for many users is not a reason not to add public transport infrastructure, and has to be weighed against the advantages of doing so. The Newman study notes that at Murdoch station,59% of passenger boardings are from bus to train transfers. Apparently passengers in Perth are not dissuaded from public transport by having to make bus - train transfers. The draft report states that the Doncaster rail would be dependent on additional capacity between Clifton Hill and the city. However Public Transport Victoria (PTV) has already factored this into its planning and considers that a tunnel between Clifton Hill and the city may be necessary even without the Doncaster railway, because the line between Clifton Hill and the city via Jolimont will be unable to cope with the future demand on the South Morang and Hurstbridge lines. Having a second route from Clifton Hill to the city would provide sufficient capacity for the Doncaster trains to utilise the existing Jolimont route along with Hurstbridge trains, with South Morang trains travelling via the tunnel. This is the preferred PTV plan as outlined in its Network Development Plan. The draft report, quoting from the Doncaster Rail Study: Phase One Recommendations Report (February 2014), states that delivery of Doncaster heavy rail would primarily attract current public transport users (50 per cent DART users and the 48 per cent who currently travel on other rail services), with an anticipated two per cent of passengers who currently travel by private vehicle, which would equal 1,120 passengers per day in 2031, which if true would mean there would be very little impact on traffic congestion on the Eastern Freeway. The figures refer only to a railway constructed from the Doncaster Park and Ride to the city along the Eastern Freeway to Victoria Park. For a rail operating from Doncaster Hill (or beyond) this figure may well be greater. 3
The rail study indicates that travel time from the Doncaster Park and Ride would be 25 minutes, 10 minutes faster than the current equivalent DART bus service. A train service operating from Doncaster Hill (or beyond) would increase the time difference between the two modes. In any case a saving of 10 minutes per journey (a 30% time saving) is significant, and, coupled with traffic congestion, stress, cost of running and parking a private car may well produce a greater number of drivers switch their transfer mode to a future Doncaster rail. The Newman study provides a different view of patronage estimates based on that of the Southern Railway in Perth, a line passing through suburbs not dissimilar to those along the Doncaster corridor. The report points out that with a higher speed, the catchment area for the Southern Railway is greater than that for Melbourne trains, and the travel times (even where passengers make bus - train transfers) are much less than those for car. This suggests that if the Doncaster train could operate at a speed closer to that of Southern Railway, the potential patronage would be greater than the rail study estimate. The Newman study states that Southern Rail, after four years in operation, carries 20 million passengers per year, roughly 60,000 per typical week day, similar to the estimate of 56,000 stated in the rail study report, which provides a very low estimate of drivers forsaking their car for public transport. Also there was 25% growth in passenger boardings at that station between March 2010 and March 2010, which suggests that drivers are moving from their cars to public transport. 4. In support of Doncaster Heavy Rail One of the problems with Melbourne's public transport network is that there is a backlog of projects that should have been built 40 or more years ago. In addition, there are now, with the recent rapid expansion of suburban Melbourne, projects which should have been started 10 years ago. For example, the Doncaster and Rowville lines should have been built 50 years ago as the surrounding suburbs were becoming populated. Also the rail link to Melbourne Airport should have been completed in 1970, in time for the airport s opening. PTV recognised the backlog and has incorporated these projects into its network development, stating that."over the next 20 years, 200 kilometres of new track will be added to the existing 837 kilometres of metropolitan network. Nearly 130 kilometres of new track will be built to extend the network to bring service to some 300,000 people in areas like Doncaster and Rowville that do not currently have a rail service. (Network Development Plan p. 5). In rejecting the need for projects like the Doncaster and Rowville rail lines, does Infrastructure Victoria have insight into Melbourne needs that PTV lacks? Implicit in the PTV plan is the recognition of the importance of equity and access as an issue in provision of public transport. The Doncaster railway will provide a fast train service to residents in a fairly large catchment area (the Manningham Council municipality is the only one in Melbourne which does not have any heavy rail within its borders) to the city centre and other 4
destinations served by railway, trams and buses. Trains also provide access for many people with physical disabilities who have difficulty, or cannot, use trams and buses. The question of whether the Doncaster railway could attract people, city commuters in particular, to abandon their cars and take the train is open to debate, but a train journey of 35 minutes against a car commute of up to an hour along the Eastern Freeway may well encourage a sufficient number of people to do so, and in numbers sufficient to reduce the current peak hour congestion on the freeway, Hoddle Street and other arterial roads. At least the railway provides an option for car commuters, and provides a quality of journey that buses cannot. And a reduction of congestion on the Eastern Freeway, where the peak hour congestion comes mainly from the number of cars accessing the city centre rather than those crossing to the western suburbs, would reduce the pressure to build the East West Link in the future. It should be noted that the cost of building a heavy rail from Doncaster Hill to the city would be a lot less than the estimate of $9 billion for the East West Link, and not create the many problems resulting from the latter s construction. These include loss of parkland and vegetation, loss of housing, and induction of additional motor vehicle traffic with the resultant air pollution and greenhouses gases. Apart from the public support for the Doncaster rail project, recognized by Infrastructure Victoria, it is also supported by the Councils of Manningham and Yarra, the Metropolitan Transport Forum (which also supports the line to Rowville), and public interest groups such as the Public Transport Users Association. The arguments in this submission can also be applied to the Rowville Heavy Rail project. The rise in public transport patronage in Melbourne from 2006 has a number of causes resulted from population increase, road congestion, relative cost of road versus rail transport, young people rejecting car ownership in favour of public transport, and the desire of people to minimise their personal impact on greenhouse gas emissions. In cities across the world there is a movement to public transport. Many governments and transport authorities have responded by building new public transport networks and rehabilitating existing ones as a matter of priority. It is a pity that the draft report has not shown the same urgency for the construction of Doncaster and other rail projects, some of which were needed decades ago, others which are needed now or will be in the very near future. Denis Watson. 5
References Draft 30-Year Infrastructure Strategy, Draft Options Book, Version 2, Infrastructure Victoria October 2016. Doncaster Rail: What are its prospects?, Professor Peter Newman, September 2012. Network Development Plan Metropolitan Rail, Public Transport Victoria, December 2012. Doncaster Rail Study: Phase One Recommendations Report, February 2014. Submission to the Draft 30-Year Infrastructure Strategy, Russell Crawford, October 2016 Transport for Suburbia: Beyond the automobile age, Paul Mees, Earthscan, 2010. 6