1960 New York Air Disaster. On December 16, 1960, in rain and sleet, two civilian airliners collided 5000 feet above Miller

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1 1960 New York Air Disaster On December 16, 1960, in rain and sleet, two civilian airliners collided 5000 feet above Miller Field, Staten Island, New York [1, 2]. In the worst aviation accident of the time, 128 passengers and crew members aboard the two planes were killed; six people on the ground were also killed [2] when the wreck of one of the planes fell in the populated area of Park Slope, Brooklyn [1]. Trans World Airlines 1049A Constellation, N 6907C, Flight 266 was destined for LaGuardia Airport, Queens, New York, but collided with United Airlines DC-8, N 8013U, Flight 826 at 10:33 AM as it was making its way to Idlewild New York International Airport (now John F. Kennedy Airport). In the investigation that followed, information was gleaned from the recovered wreckage and automatically recorded conversations between the pilots and air traffic controllers [3]. Also, for the first time in American history, precise data from the flight recorder installed in UA 826, which automatically recorded flight data like altitude, speed, distance, and time, was used in the investigation; in earlier cases, only crude or incomplete data could be obtained [2]. The investigation determined that the primary cause of the accident was pilot error on the part of the crew of UA 826 [3]. Some witnesses on the ground reported that TWA 266 exploded just before the crash [1], but no other evidence was found that might support that event [3]. The US Civil Aeronautics Board, in their June 1962 aircraft accident report, determined that the collision occurred because UA 826 had proceeded outside of its clearance limit and the confines of the airspace allocated to it by Air Traffic Control. At the time of the collision, UA 826 was flying at 301 knots, or over 340 miles per hour, much faster than it should have been. The two planes, as

2 they approached their respective destinations, were both at an altitude of about 5000 feet [3], but their allocated airspaces would have kept them separated by at least three miles [4]. Before the collision, the flight of TWA 266 was fairly normal, with no major changes in route or equipment difficulties [5]. This was not so for UA 826. At 10:12, UA 826 contacted New York ARTCC (Air Route Traffic Control Center) and was shortly cleared to proceed, as normal, to the Robbinsville, New Jersey omni-directional radio range station (VOR), and then to Preston Intersection by way of Victor Airway 123. At 10:21, UA 826 advised their company through Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) that the No.2 receiver accessory unit was nonfunctional. Air Traffic Control, however, was not notified of this malfunction. At 10:25, New York ARTCC issued a clearance for a new, shorter route to Preston Intersection that reduced the distance UA 826 needed to travel by about 11 miles. After UA 826 reported passing through 6000 feet the New York ARTCC advised that radar service was terminated and instructed the flight to contact Idlewild Approach Control. At 10:33:28, UAL 826 called Idlewild Approach Control and stated United 826 approaching Preston at At 10:33:33 a sound like that of an open microphone was heard, and subsequent attempts to contact UA 826 were unsuccessful. The same sound was heard simultaneously in the recordings for TWA 266 [3]. The coincidence of the failure of one of the radio receiver units and the change in route most likely led to the pilot error that resulted in the collision of UA 826 with TWA 266. Normally, a fix of location was established by the intersection of two radials from two different radio range stations, and while it was possible to get a fix by switching a single receiver unit between two stations, the method is not as accurate and consumes a larger amount of time and thought than

3 simultaneously using two units. While a shortcut might have been appreciated under normal circumstances, it gave the crew of UA 826 less time to retune their sole receiver between the Colt s Neck and Solberg VOR stations in their attempt to navigate to the Preston Intersection that the stations helped define. If the crew did not try to retune the receiver, cross-bearings on the Scotland Low Frequency Radiobeacon could be taken using the Aircraft Direction Finding (ADF) equipment; however, doing so under the circumstances would require rapid mental calculation in interpreting an easily misread display [3]. Such a misinterpretation was most likely the reason why, as determined by analysis of communication tapes and data from the flight recorder, UA 826 had sped by Preston at over 500 miles per hour. When it transmitted United 826 approaching Preston at 5000 to Idlewild Approach Control, it had passed the Intersection several seconds before and was several miles past the point at which it should have turned into a holding pattern. The new clearance required a rapid descent (UA 826 dropped 8000 feet in two minutes) and maneuvering in order to position the flight at 5000 feet over Preston. In the rush, the flight crew seemed to have made no notation of the shortened time and distance to Preston Intersection; the original time and distance was perhaps so well engrained in the crew s mind after having flown the route so often that they believed, time-wise, that they had not yet reached Preston. In addition, because of the nonfunctional VOR accessory unit, the captain was probably transitioning to the ADF as an alternative for determining the location of Preston. In the move, he may have pictorially associated it with the VOR RMI and erroneously tried to fly until the instrument indicated 166 degrees; when the collision occurred, the instrument would have only indicated 153 degrees [3].

4 Because UA 826 did not enter a holding pattern at Preston, but instead proceeded on airway Victor 123, there was a question of the reliability and integrity of the VOR signals from the Robbinsville, Colt s Neck, and Solberg stations which defined the Intersection. Possible sources of abnormalities, such as co-channel interference, harmonics, industrial radio noise, vertical polarization, and transmitter malfunction were deemed unlikely based on flight checks of the stations, the limited amount of snow of the transmitters, a lack of abnormalities in the transmitted signals in the time period of interest, a lack of reports of what would have been noticeable interference, and a lack of any malfunctions found after extensive investigation of the stations logs and transmitting equipment [3]. Although primary responsibility for the accident perhaps belonged to the crew of UA 826, for New York ARTCC would probably not have cleared a new route had it known about an equipment malfunction, other factors may have prevented the accident from being successfully averted. Although TWA 266 was advised twice of traffic in the vicinity, the surveillance radar at the time could not provide information about aircraft altitude, so the traffic information was not relayed as possibly conflicting traffic. Also, New York ARTCC changed the route for UA 826 in order to increase the distance between it and succeeding aircraft which were cleared to Preston at greater altitudes; however, Idlewild Approach Control was not notified of this change, which would have had the flight approach from the southwest instead of the southeast. Also, the two controllers did not practice radar handoff with UA 826; in radar handoff, New York ARTCC and Idlewild Approach Control would simultaneously observe the aircraft and New York ARTCC would not relinquish control until the receiving facility had positively identified the aircraft. Radar vectors are not commenced until radar contact has been made with the positively

5 identified aircraft. Radar handoff was not mandatory, and it was assumed that both of the flight s receivers were working and so UA 826 could provide its own navigation, since Air Traffic Control was not told otherwise and no request for radar assistance was made. However, had it been carried out, the erroneous path of UA 826 might have been detected and evasive action taken. Also, LaGuardia Approach Control would have been aware that the traffic on Victor 123 was not destined for their airport, and while identifying the aircraft and its destination by consulting with New York ARTCC would have taken too long, there was enough time to assume that the unidentified traffic was conflicting and provide evasive radar vectors to TWA 266 [3]. As a result of the accident, several changes were made by the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA). Special regulation 445 was issued, requiring pilots operating under Instrument Flight Rules to report any in-flight malfunctions of navigational or communication equipment. All turbinepowered aircraft were to be equipped with distance-measuring equipment by January 1, 1963, as were all aircraft of over 12,500 pounds maximum takeoff weight a year later. Radar handoff service was increased to a great extent nationwide. Controllers were also instructed to advise all arriving jets to slow to holding pattern airspeed at least three minutes before arriving at a holding fix. A speed rule was also issued prohibiting aircraft from exceeding 250 knots and 10,000 feet when within 34 miles of a destination airport, except where the safety requirements of tactical military jets required otherwise [3]. The 1960 New York Air Disaster, like the Grand Canyon collision in 1956 that led to the creation of the FAA [5], was a jolting reminder of the importance of air traffic control and communication in general; it is better to err on the side of what may seem like being overly cautious than to assume that changes and errors will resolve themselves.

6 Bibliography [1] Bigart, Homer. (1960, December 17). Disaster in Fog. New York Times. Retrieved from on March 24, [2] Witkin, Richard. (1961, January 10). High Speed Laid to Jet in Crash. New York Times. Retrieved from on March 24, [3] US Civil Aeronautics Board. (1962). Aircraft Accident Report: December 16, Retrieved from on March 24, [4] Porter, Russell. (1960, December 17). A Pilot Off Route, US Officials Hint. New York Times. Retrieved from on March 24, [5] (2000). Notable Collisions. Retrieved from on April 10, Instructor s Comments The paper is well-written and contains all required elements excellent work

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