STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX Tel: MEXICO: A Security and Business-Risk Assessment

Transcription

1 STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX Tel: MEXICO: A Security and Business-Risk Assessment Jan. 21,

2 MEXICO: A Security and Business-Risk Assessment Executive Summary (Updated Jan. 21, 2011) Johnson Controls asked STRATFOR to provide an update to its April 26, 2010, security and businessrisk assessment focusing on the threats in Mexico posed by the country s drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), the cartel war, political instability and crimes not necessarily related to drug trafficking. As the original report did, this update focuses specifically on the cities of Reynosa, Ciudad Juarez and Monterrey. In addition, STRATFOR was asked to include in the update an assessment of the threat environment in the city of Matamoros, which is included in this report. (Additional information incorporated in the body of this report is indicated by bulleted text throughout, while the Matamoros updates are included as their own sections beginning on pages 5 and 10.) The security situation in Mexico continues to worsen at an alarming rate. The Mexican government has continued its offensive against the country s numerous drug trafficking organizations and, while it has made great progress in terms of arresting and killing high-value cartel targets, the violence continues to increase exponentially. Despite the rising death toll, the Mexican government has decided to stay the course and has, in fact, increased the tempo of its operations against these organizations throughout the country by launching new offensives in Tamaulipas and Michoacan states. With the federal government s main focus still squarely on combating the drug cartels, general crime levels still remain at all-time highs throughout the country. In many cases, this crime wave can be directly linked to drug cartel activity and individuals linked to the drug trade. However, as Mexican security forces continue to put pressure on the cartels drug transportation networks and revenues, the cartels are turning toward other sources of revenue by expanding their criminal portfolio to include kidnapping and extortion and to include in their target set foreign businessmen and other individuals not associated with the Mexican drug trade. Furthermore, as the bandwidth of the Mexican security forces is consumed by the government offensive against the cartels, smaller criminal groups have been able to flourish in the chaos. As a result, carjacking, mugging, robbery and assault still remain the greatest threat to business operations and their employees in Mexico. Overall violence has continued to increase annually over the past four years, with 2010 being the deadliest year yet of Mexican President Felipe Calderon s term in office. Last year, more than 15,000 deaths in Mexico were associated with organized crime, according the Mexican government. As the national 2012 elections approach, it appears that Calderon is determined to continue his offensive against the cartels until the end of his term. As STRAFOR mentioned in the forecasting component of the original April 26, 2010, Mexico report, one cartel may prevail over the next two or three years and become the dominant DTO. The Sinaloa Federation seems to be the most likely candidate for the top spot, which we will discuss further in this report. If this trend continues throughout Mexico and a dominant cartel does emerge, one result will likely be a more predictable operating environment for multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in the country. In the meantime, as the Mexican government and the drug cartels battle for supremacy, the drug trafficking business in Mexico will remain extremely volatile, with the security threat environment at critical levels and drug-related crime and violence a part of everyday life. Therefore, STRATFOR continues to assert that MNCs must plan their operations accordingly and maintain a healthy and robust security apparatus in the country to ensure the productivity and safety of their assets before the violence can begin to subside. 2

3 Executive Summary (April 26, 2010) Johnson Controls asked STRATFOR to provide a security and business-risk assessment focusing on threats the company is likely to face doing business in Mexico, specifically in the cities of Reynosa, Ciudad Juarez and Monterrey. The Mexican government currently is facing the most severe security challenge it has experienced in nearly a century. At the heart of this challenge are three basic battles: one between the government and the drug cartels, one among the various cartels themselves and the violence being inflicted by organized-crime groups against the country s civilian population. The mission President Felipe Calderon launched against the cartels in December 2006 has steadily escalated over the last four years, and while there is no denying the government is making progress fracturing the largest and most powerful cartels, one result has been a steadily deteriorating security situation nationwide. The general crime threat in Mexico also is at a critical level and getting worse. Mexican authorities have their hands full fighting the cartels and have not had the resources to focus on other criminal activity, and this has allowed criminal groups unrelated to the drug trade to thrive. Such an environment presents a range of security implications to Western multinational corporations (MNCs) doing business in Mexico. As organized-crime groups expand their targeting, it seems all but inevitable that MNC personnel and facilities will become part of that growing target set. The violence in Mexico actually is reaching a saturation point, politically and socially. Innocent civilians caught in the crossfire are growing increasingly angry and vocal, and protests have been staged in Monterrey, Juarez and Mexico City that have drawn tens of thousands of people. With the 2012 presidential election approaching, Calderon and his National Action Party are trying to find a way to reduce the level of violence and restore the balance of governmental and cartel power in the country s most embattled regions. Eventually, over the next two or thee years, companies looking to expand operations in Mexico could find themselves operating in a less volatile security environment. At present, however, the security situation in Mexico has never been worse, and it is likely to deteriorate even further before the violence begins to subside. This will force all business operations in Mexico, foreign and domestic alike, to continue to invest large portions of their budgets in security measures to protect their personnel and other corporate assets. Security Situation Mexico-Wide The escalating cartel war in Mexico, which has created the most severe security crisis that the country has seen in nearly a century, consists of three fronts: the government s battle against the drug cartels, the battles among the various cartels themselves and the violence being inflicted by the cartels and other criminal groups against the civilian population. The campaign that President Felipe Calderon launched against the cartels in December 2006 has steadily escalated over the last four years, and while there is no denying that the government is making progress in fracturing the largest and most powerful cartels, one result has been a steadily deteriorating security situation nationwide. One measure of this growing insecurity is Mexico s homicide rate related to organized crime. In 2009, the number of organized crime-related killings was approximately 8,200, making 2009 the country s deadliest year yet since Calderon launched his campaign. Today, three and a half months into 2010, the death toll has already surpassed 2,900, putting the country on pace to see many more than 9,000 organized crime-related deaths for the year, suggesting the brutal drug violence has yet to reach its peak. Of course, the violence cannot continue to increase indefinitely, but there is little reason to believe it will taper off within the next two or three years. 3

4 According to the Mexican Public Security Secretariat, there were a total of 15,273 organized crime related deaths in The death toll for 2011 is already 18 percent higher than the same period in 2010, with over 507 deaths at the time this update was written. One reason for this grim outlook involves the ongoing turf battles among rival criminal groups, battles that have only intensified over the past several years. Territorial disputes among drug cartels have long been the norm in Mexico, but Calderon s offensive against the country s most powerful cartels has severely disrupted the criminal balance of power, leaving power vacuums other criminal groups seek to fill. This conflict is especially visible in border cities such as Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana and Nuevo Laredo, which the cartels use as drug-smuggling corridors into the United States. But the conflict also affects other parts of Mexico that fall along the drug supply chain, such as ports in southern Mexico and areas along the Guatemalan border. (The map below has been updated for this report.) This cartel power struggle is far from over, and until a lasting balance of power has been solidified, the bloody warfare will continue and perhaps even intensify. It is this situation that confronts foreign businesses, which are forced to conduct daily operations in an increasingly volatile environment. This threatens not only the personal safety of their employees but also the profitability of their business operations. The threat of violence has forced some companies to close their doors and others, including several maquiladoras in Reynosa, to develop exit strategies should the violence become too intense. Another reason the violence is escalating is the increasing friction between the Mexican government and the cartels. One indication of how badly Mexican government policies have disrupted drug- 4

5 trafficking operations is the violent response that the cartels have directed at law enforcement and other high-ranking government officials. Several have been assassinated in retaliation for government counternarcotics operations, including Edgar Millan Gomez, the acting chief of the Federal Police, who was killed in May Charged with leading federal law enforcement counternarcotics operations, Millan had been involved in a high-speed pursuit during a Federal Police operation to capture former Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO) kingpin Arturo El Jefe De Jefes Beltran Leyva (who escaped). Later that night, as Millan returned home, he was ambushed by a group of assassins hired by the BLO, who shot Millan multiple times before he died. More recently, several high-ranking local and regional law enforcement and elected officials have been executed throughout the country, apparently an effort by the cartels to show that no government official is immune from cartel violence. In February, the mayor of Guadalupe y Cavo, in Chihuahua state, was executed by unknown gunmen in Chihuahua city, and in March the local police chief of Zacapu, Michoacan, was gunned down by armed men in ski masks. Since April 2010, numerous mayors throughout Mexico have been victims of organized crime. On Jan. 10, 2011, unidentified gunmen shot and killed the mayor of Temoac, Morelos state, as he drove his car near Amilcingo. The mayor s son was killed in the resulting crash, and his wife and two bodyguards were injured. On Oct. 13, 2010, the mayor of Cruillas, Tamaulipas, was kidnapped by unidentified attackers. Earlier that same month, unidentified gunmen killed the mayor of Martires de Tacubaya, Oaxaca state. Then in September 2010, unknown gunmen shot and killed Prisciliano Rodriguez Salinas, the mayor of Doctor Gonzalez, Nuevo Leon state, and another city employee in an ambush near the entrance of Rodriguez s ranch outside the city. Doctor Gonzalez is a small agricultural community about 56 kilometers (35 miles) east of Monterrey and is located in a region rife with conflict between Los Zetas and the New Federation that has also seen numerous Mexican military operations. Matamoros (Jan. 21, 2011) Matamoros, located in the state of Tamaulipas, sits due south across the Rio Grande River from Brownsville, Texas, and has been home to one of the most prolific Mexican drug trafficking organizations since the 1990s -- the Gulf cartel. With its long history of organized criminal activity, Matamoros has grown accustomed to periodic bouts of violence, but the sustained high levels of violence experienced in 2010 are a new and unwelcomed phenomenon. Farther away from Mexico s interior transportation infrastructure, Matamoros does not have the level of cross-border traffic seen in the nearby border cities of Reynosa and Nuevo Laredo (also located in Tamaulipas). Most of the U.S.- Mexico cross-border traffic in Matamoros stems from either the maquiladora industry or tourism. Still, Matamoros modern infrastructure and key location as a port of entry into the United States make the city a prime venue for enterprising cartels and lower-level criminal groups. Even after the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas began fighting in the Tamaulipas border region in early 2010 (originally explained in the Reynosa section below), Matamoros remained a stronghold for the Gulf cartel and its new associates in the New Federation at the time -- the Sinaloa Federation and La Familia Michoacana (LFM). As the fighting intensified throughout the summer of 2010, Matamoros became a favored target for Los Zetas to carry out raids against the Gulf cartel, and running firefights in the streets of Matamoros became almost a weekly -- and sometimes daily -- occurrence. However, during this same period, the Mexican government zeroed in on Gulf cartel leader Antonio Tony Tormenta Cardenas Guillen (the brother of former Gulf cartel head Osiel Cardenas Guillen) and his network of enforcers. Cardenas and several of his bodyguards were killed in November 2010 in a Mexican military raid. Several of Cardenas top operatives were also either killed or arrested during this time. The prospect of more violence in the wake of Tony Tormenta s death led the Mexican government to deploy more Federal Police and military assets to the Tamaulipas border region in late November The effective dismantlement of Tony Tormenta s faction of the Gulf cartel left the organization in a weakened state, and reports of infighting among other senior members of the cartel began to surface. It appears now that the operational leader of the Gulf cartel, Eduardo El Coss Costilla Sanchez, has taken over the cartel s operations in the region. Although STRATFOR sources say Mario El Gordo Cardenas Guillen, another Cardenas Guillen brother, has taken Tony Tormenta s place, he has yet to 5

6 gain the respect of much of the organization. The Gulf cartel s weakened state of affairs has put the Matamoros region in a prime position for another onslaught of assaults by Los Zetas, which are aiming to solidify their control over the Tamaulipas-Texas border region. STRATFOR sources had indicated that Los Zetas were staging assets in the region for a possible assault on the city during the first week of January While no assault has been mounted to date, it appears to be inevitable, an assessment reaffirmed by STRATFOR sources. Reynosa The border between Texas and Tamaulipas state handles the largest volume of legitimate trade between the United States and Mexico, which is the United States third largest trading partner. This particular border region, which provides easy access to the U.S. Interstate 35 and Interstate 10 smuggling corridors, is also the point of entry for the largest amount of drugs going into the United States, making it extremely valuable territory that is highly sought after by enterprising criminal organizations. Reynosa, the Tamaulipas border city just across the Rio Grande River from McAllen, Texas, is certainly no stranger to violence. The Reynosa area was previously under the control of the Gulf cartel and its enforcement arm, Los Zetas. Between 2004 and 2007, the Sinaloa Federation attempted to take control of the Tamaulipas border region, including Reynosa. The ensuing conflict brought running gun battles to the streets of Reynosa and the surrounding areas before the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas were able to push the Sinaloa cartel back. Today, the Tamaulipas border region is the front line of a conflict between the New Federation, a newly formed alliance of the Gulf, Sinaloa and La Familia Michoacana cartels, and Los Zetas, the Gulf cartel s former partners. Reynosa is caught right in the middle. The U.S. State Department went so far as to restrict the travel of U.S. diplomatic personnel to the Reynosa area for three days in March due to the rapid degradation of the security environment in the area caused by the feuding criminal groups. In addition to the running gun battles, skirmishes between the Mexican military and the cartels have paralyzed the city for hours at a time. The competing criminal groups have been known to deploy their own checkpoints in the area in an effort to catch rival cartel members. Another tactic seen more recently has been setting up roadblocks to impede the response of Mexican soldiers and police to cartel activities. On March 30, members of the New Federation hijacked tractor-trailers, taxis and other vehicles and disabled them along a busy street in Reynosa while the group conducted operations against Los Zetas and the Mexican military. Despite a new deployment of federal security forces in Coordinated Operation Northeast to the region in November 2010, Reynosa continues to see firefights and grenade attack throughout the city on a regular basis. Reynosa remains a contested area, but media reports have suggested that a breakaway group from the Gulf cartel, led by Samuel Metro 3 Flores Borrego, currently controls the urban areas of Reynosa while Los Zetas have a limited degree of influence in the surrounding rural areas. Recent open-source reports also suggest that Flores Borrego has arranged a non-aggression pact with Los Zetas, though firefights and grenade attacks are still being reported with some regularity by STRATFOR sources in the region. These incidents could stem from conflict between cartel elements and Mexican security forces. Ciudad Juarez Farther upriver, just across the border from El Paso, Texas, the Juarez Valley in the state of Chihuahua is a strategic point of entry for both legitimate commerce and illicit goods. Ciudad Juarez is the only major Mexican metropolitan area on the border with quick access to the U.S. interstate system within several hundred miles in either direction, making this area also extremely valuable to Mexican cartels. U.S. Interstate 10 runs directly through El Paso, where it also intersects with U.S. Interstate 25. This makes it easy to traffic drugs and other illicit goods east, west and north from Juarez. With the highest concentration of murders per 100,000 inhabitants due to a raging turf fight between the Sinaloa and Juarez cartels, the Juarez Valley is now considered the most violent region in the world (outside of active war zones) by the Citizen s Council for Public Security. This region also happens to be where the 6

7 Mexican government is most active in employing its new counter-cartel strategies and where it has deployed the largest concentration of security forces in the country. Juarez remained atop the list of Mexico s deadliest cities in 2010, with estimates of 2,990 to 3,100 people killed in drug-related violence. Chihuahua state continues to be the most violent state, with 96 deaths already recorded in 2011 at the time this update was written. The conflict in Juarez has evolved into three different layers of violence. The first layer is the streetlevel violence between local Juarez-based street and prison gangs backed by both the Juarez and Sinaloa cartels. The second layer is the more traditional conflict between the enforcement wings of the Sinaloa and Juarez cartels, Nueva Gente and La Linea, respectively. The third is the Mexican security forces battling gangs and cartel enforcers. The first two layers are the primary reasons for the high levels of violence in the Juarez area. Members of La Linea have burned down several nightclubs and bars that refused to pay their extortion demands, while members of Nueva Gente have demonstrated superior tactical skills in targeting members of the Juarez cartel-aligned street gang Los Aztecas. These three layers of violence often overlap, and combined they have produced unprecedented levels of violence throughout the region. Recently, however, according to a U.S. intelligence report, the Sinaloa Federation has gained control of the majority of the Juarez Valley. This may help stabilize the region eventually, but the remnants of the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization (VCF) are not expected to quietly fade away, and the violence likely will continue for some time. On April 9, 2010 the Mexican Federal Police officially assumed all law enforcement and security operations in the city of Juarez from the Mexican military, which will take up positions outside of the Juarez metropolitan area, in the more rural areas of the region, where military skills are better suited. This changing of the guard does not mean much in terms of immediate security improvements in the city. The main difference is that the Federal Police are legally allowed to investigate civilian crimes (which include all cartel-related activities), whereas the military is constitutionally prohibited from conducting such investigations. The Federal Police are empowered to detain serious cartel and drug offenders in the city, but their conviction and incarceration will depend on the evidence gathered and skill demonstrated by the prosecutor s office (arrested suspects often are released without punishment due to discrepancies in evidence collection and detainee handling). The effects of the Federal Police takeover have yet to play themselves out, but the move likely will have little effect on the security environment in Juarez. Since April 2010, Federal Police forces have been able to establish the first fully secure zone in recent memory in the Americas neighborhood of Juarez, located just south of the Bridge of the Americas international crossing. This is part of a new strategy to slowly build out concentric rings of secure areas and make it nearly impossible for cartel and criminal elements to do business without encountering Mexican security forces in the various neighborhoods of Juarez. It will likely take a few more years for this strategy to be fully implemented and for any meaningful results to be measured. Monterrey The greater Monterrey metropolitan area, in Nuevo Leon state, is the third largest population center in Mexico and the country s industrial and manufacturing hub. In addition to being a commercial powerhouse, Monterrey is a well-known stronghold for the Los Zetas organization. Strategically situated about 150 miles south of the Texas-Nuevo Leon border, the Monterrey metro area is a key transshipment point for legitimate commerce and illicit goods headed to northern Mexico and South Texas, largely because of the highway infrastructure that connects it to the important Reynosa and Nuevo Laredo border crossings. The current conflict between Los Zetas and the New Federation has spread westward into the Monterrey area, which also is seeing running gun battles in the streets, though the level of violence has not been nearly as intense as the conflict to the east along the South Texas-Mexico border. On March 7, Mexican marines arrested four alleged members of Los Zetas after they reportedly ambushed the marine patrol on the outskirts of Monterrey. And on April 18, Los Zetas engaged members of the New Federation in a running firefight that lasted some 20 minutes in the streets of Monterrey. 7

8 Members of the New Federation have once again started targeting the Los Zetas support network in and around Monterrey in a new regional offensive that began in the final weeks of Police officers and journalists who are known to be affiliated with Los Zetas have been threatened, targeted for kidnapping or killed in a move to slowly undercut the Los Zetas organization in Monterrey. At least nine police officers in the Monterrey metropolitan area have been executed since the beginning of 2011, including a Nuevo Leon state police agent executed on the night of Jan. 12 as he was conducting a patrol near the Roma area, a Monterrey suburb. This new offensive by the New Federation will likely lead to a degradation of the security environment in the Monterrey region in the coming weeks and months. In Monterrey, Los Zetas have employed tactics similar to those seen in Reynosa. The groups will hijack and disable large tractor-trailers and other vehicles to block major thoroughfares throughout the city, stalling traffic for hours. Los Zetas typically use this tactic while conducting operations against rivals or moving large quantities of drugs through a particular part of town in order to hinder a response by Mexican security forces. Due to the economic importance and size of Monterrey there have long been significant numbers of troops and Federal Police agents in the city, and there have yet to be significant federal deployments to augment these forces. They are currently positioned throughout the Monterrey area at checkpoints and as quick-reaction forces to thwart possible cartel activities or operations. Should anyone associated with Johnson Controls encounter a military or law enforcement checkpoint, the person should stop and follow the directions of security personnel. Failure to do so could result in security forces firing upon the vehicle. Several innocent civilians have lost their lives when they have tried to avoid these checkpoints or disobey directions. Criminal Threat Mexico-Wide The general crime threat in Mexico is at a critical level and has been for more than a decade. Changes in the security landscape over the last couple of years, however, have led to an expansion of criminal threats in the country. Three recent developments in particular illustrate this growing problem. First, Mexico's rampant corruption and general breakdown in law and order have created an environment in which other criminal organizations, unrelated to the drug trade, can operate with impunity. Mexican authorities have their hands full with the cartels and have not had the resources to focus on other criminal activity. While Mexican police have always had a reputation for corruption, the extent of the problem is not fully understood. Over the past two years, several high-ranking officials have been arrested on charges of cooperating with organized crime. By far the most noteworthy was the country's drug czar, Noe Ramirez Mandujano, who allegedly disclosed classified information to the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) for monthly payments of $450,000. In October 2008, Calderon launched a massive reform effort with the goal of uniting the two primary law enforcement agencies at the national level the Federal Investigative Agency and the Federal Preventive Police into one Federal Police organization. The reform process also was aimed at making the national police force a more professional organization. Agents were subjected to a thorough vetting process and their salaries were increased, along with their educational requirements. Many agents already in the federal ranks failed this vetting process. Those who did pass muster, along with newly minted agents, were deployed throughout Mexico beginning in January, but it remains to be seen if these agents can withstand the corruptive temptations of the cartels, which are known to bribe or kill police officers and government officials (more on the concept of plata o plomo further in this report). In June 2010, Calderon proposed a unified state police command for each of the 31 Mexican states similar to the reform plan for the Federal Police. Under state-police plan, all state and 8

9 local law enforcement would fall under the control of a single state-police commander who would be responsible for coordinating the state s law enforcement strategy with that of the federal government. Additionally, all current state and local law enforcement personnel would be subjected to a vigorous vetting process to weed out corrupt elements and would receive a pay increase to help mitigate cartel bribery. The plan is still being reviewed by the Mexican Congress, although some states have already volunteered to adopt such a strategy. Despite the proposed reform, corruption remains a rampant problem in the country and is not expected to be entirely eliminated with the creation and associated employment perks of a unified police command. Second, many drug-trafficking organizations have begun to turn to other criminal activities to supplement their incomes. Previously, drug traffickers generally focused their attention solely on the lucrative drug trade. This meant drug traffickers rarely crossed paths with civilians not associated with the drug trade. However, due to the government offensive against the cartels and U.S. efforts to interdict drug shipments from South America over the past two years, cartel turf battles have intensified, as have feuds within the organizations. As a result, many drug traffickers are becoming increasingly involved in crimes such as extortion and kidnapping for ransom (KFR). It is important to note that accurate statistics regarding the kidnapping and extortion threats in Mexico do not exist, since the vast majority of kidnappings are not reported to authorities. However, one inquiry by a Mexican legislative committee estimated there are some 4,500 kidnappings per year in Mexico, only one-third of which are reported to police because families fear reprisals from the kidnappers and because the police often are involved in such crimes. Nevertheless, Statistics available from the Mexican Public Security Secretariat show reported cases of kidnappings in Mexico rose by 40 percent from 2008 to 2009, increasing from 838 to 1,181 incidents. While these reports should not be considered comprehensive, they do provide a useful baseline. According to anecdotal reports from U.S. State Department, there has been a continual increase in the number kidnappings since April 2010, especially in the Monterrey metro region (more on this below). Several KFR groups operate throughout Mexico with varying degrees of sophistication. The more professional groups employ several teams with members assigned to specialized roles such as surveillance, countersurveillance, snatch and ransom negotiation. On the other end of the spectrum, so-called express kidnapping gangs flourish in major metropolitan areas. These gangs snatch people off the street and take them on a tour of banks and ATMs where the victims are forced to withdraw cash from their bank accounts. Due to the nature of express kidnappings, these gangs do not have to be tactically skilled. Another kidnapping trend in Mexico is the phenomenon known as the virtual kidnapping. In one such scheme, the kidnappers position themselves at a mall or other youth hangout claiming to offer young people a chance to enter a contest for prizes such as ipods or Xboxes. The youths then fill out entry blanks, unwittingly offering up personal information such as addresses, home phone numbers and the names of parents. Afterward, the kidnappers follow the potential target until he or she enters a place where cell phones cannot be immediately answered, such as a school or movie theater. This provides the kidnappers with a window of opportunity to call the target s parents, claim that they have abducted their child, describe details of authenticity such as what the person is wearing or where he was going, and demand that a ransom be paid immediately. While we are not aware any cases of kidnapping or extortion reported by U.S. manufacturers operating in the auto industry in Mexico, the exposure of companies such as Ford and GM in Monterrey and Mexico City, means they likely have had to deal with these issues, at least in terms of taking preventive security measures. Third, with Mexican security forces tied down in the cartel battle, common criminals not involved in the drug trade have flourished. Car thefts, robberies, muggings and pick-pocketing have long been staples in the Mexican crime scene, and such crimes have increased throughout the country in recent years. Indeed, these more common crimes are much more likely to affect Johnson Controls operations and personnel in Mexico than the cartel-related violence dominating the headlines. 9

10 The obvious risk associated with these developments is that, while the government continues to make it difficult to traffic drugs, very capable drug-trafficking organizations and other criminal groups will continue to target businesses and citizens throughout Mexico for abduction and extortion. These trends can be expected to persist at least for the next two or three years, until the country s security situation stabilizes. Matamoros (Jan. 21, 2011) Matamoros has a unique criminal operating environment. Virtually every criminal activity that takes place in and around the city is somehow tied to a larger drug cartel. With a population of a little more than 420,000 people, the city has geographic and criminal landscapes that are somewhat easier to monitor than larger metropolitan areas like Monterrey or Ciudad Juarez. Most of the crime that takes place in Matamoros occurs on the orders or with the complicity of either Los Zetas or the Gulf cartel. The fighting between the two organizations has increased over the past year, and as the Gulf cartel has appeared to be suffering from some internal turmoil, it and Los Zetas have both had to expand their criminal enterprises from simply trafficking drugs and people to a wider range of activities to help fund their efforts to control the Matamoros region. Auto theft increased dramatically throughout 2010 in the Matamoros area, specifically the theft of SUVs, heavy-duty trucks and four-wheel-drive vehicles. This can be directly related to the cartel need for these vehicles to transport drugs and people. Armored cars have proved to be a particularly sought-after commodity, used by criminal groups as ersatz armored personnel carriers. Many MNC plant managers have requested these types of vehicles as the security situation has deteriorated inside the city. While armored vehicles are an option, STRATFOR advises against the use of highly visible and heavily armored luxury-style vehicles because they raise the targeting profile of corporate users who often lack sufficient training to handle the vehicles. In many cases, the handling and mobility problems caused by the heavy armor have actually hindered the ability of drivers to escape threatening situations. Instead, low-profile and less heavily armored vehicles are recommended if armored transportation is preferred. A tactic favored by both the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas is to hijack large tractor-trailers and personal vehicles to block key intersections when they are conducting operations or when high-ranking members of their organizations have been captured by Mexican authorities. This tactic is designed to impede the response of Mexican security officials and first responders. There have been numerous instances of this tactic being employed in the Matamoros area, most notably in the Mexican military operation that killed Tony Tormenta in November 2010, when multiple roadblocks were set up that significantly affected the ability of anyone to move about the city. While these hijackings are rarely violent when victims comply and give up their vehicles, they are usually carried out by several armed men and have the potential to escalate very quickly. The targeting of the vehicles is based on size and convenience, not necessarily contents or occupants. Often, the vehicles are set ablaze to further complicate the process of clearing blocked intersections. This can result in the loss of precious cargo as well as company vehicles and equipment. While the cartels prefer to hijack already assembled and running vehicles, cargo theft is also a concern that plagues the northern Tamaulipas border area and impacts most industries operating in the region. Mexican Federal Highway 2, which runs from Matamoros to Nuevo Laredo, has been identified as one of the most dangerous roads in Mexico by the Mexican National Chamber of Auto-Transportation of Cargo (CANACAR). While most incidents of cargo theft in Mexico occur outside urban areas, high-value cargo has been targeted at warehouse depots and customs checkpoints in cities. However, due to Matamoros proximity to the U.S. border, travel time to the United States is short enough to mitigate the threat of cargo theft along this route to some extent. We are not aware of any recent examples of the theft of auto components or of anything specifically related to the CRH Group s facility in Matamoros, which Johnson Controls is acquiring, although no part of the Matamoros metro area is exempt from this threat. 10

11 Regarding other forms of crime in Matamoros, the Gulf cartel has not traditionally engaged in largescale extortion schemes against companies, unlike its rival, Los Zetas, who are known to be quite ruthless in this practice. In fact, maquiladora leaders commented in 2010 on how maquiladoras in Matamoros had seemingly been sheltered during the conflict between Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel over the previous year, compared to their maquiladora counterparts in Reynosa. However, given the state of flux in which the Gulf cartel currently finds itself, an increase in extortion schemes is likely in the Matamoros region over the next two to three years. It is important to note that media coverage of any new extortion operations will likely be hard to come by due to the threat of retaliation, which will make it more difficult for MNCs operating in Maramoros to anticipate and navigate around the threat. While in many larger Mexican cities the conflict between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas and between the cartels and Mexican security forces has allowed lower-level criminal organizations to flourish, opensource reports indicate that lower-level criminals in Matamoros are fleeing the city for fear of getting caught in the crossfire. As a result, Matamoros has been somewhat sheltered from petty crimes like pick-pocketing and mugging. However, home and business invasions and other burglaries have increased over the last six months as the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas have targeted rivals hiding among the civilian population and stolen valuables to help finance the fighting. STRATFOR expects this type of crime to persist and perhaps increase over the next two to three years as the fighting between Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel continues. Reynosa While the Reynosa and northern Tamaulipas region boasts arguably the highest volume of drug traffic in Mexico, the conflict that recently erupted between Los Zetas and the New Federation along the Tamaulipas-South Texas border has prompted both groups to venture into other criminal activities to help fund the conflict. Home and business invasions have increased dramatically. For example, on the night of April 9, a group of armed men raided a facility in Reynosa owned by Schlumberger, a global oil services company, making off with five company trucks and several uniforms, perhaps to be used in future break-ins at the facility or other Schlumberger installations in Mexico. Extortion of businesses is widespread in Mexico, and a refusal to meet extortion demands has led to several business owners being kidnapped and held for ransom. Threats and extortion attempts against the gambling industry in northern Tamaulipas state have caused at least 12 such businesses to close their doors. (At least two deaths in the area are thought to be related to businesses that failed to pay protection fees to criminal groups.) Due to a high level of impunity in the Reynosa region and the relative ease of access to the United States, residents of South Texas are being kidnapped in increasing numbers and brought to Reynosa where they are held captive while ransom payments are negotiated. More often than not, these cross-border KFR cases result in the death of the victim when businesses or family members refuse to pay the ransom or simply cannot come up with the amount of money demanded. Moreover, firefights between Los Zetas and the New Federation as well as with the Mexican military in the Reynosa area have prompted many businesses to cancel shifts and/or send workers home early. Some workers even have refused to leave their homes for work after a firefight has taken place in the city for fear of being caught in the crossfire. Cargo theft is also a serious concern for any company operating in Reynosa. There are some 140 maquiladoras in 11 industrial parks in the Reynosa area, and these industrial parks offer a concentrated target-rich environment for enterprising criminals. In 2009, three high-value shipments were hit by cargo-theft gangs in Reynosa, resulting in several million dollars in losses. Although it is a serious concern, the threat of cargo theft in Reynosa is not as great as it is in the more interior regions of Mexico. Proximity to the border mitigates the threat because the cargo has a shorter distance to travel before reaching the United States. The cartel tactic of hijacking large trucks and private vehicles and using them to block roadways is also a cause of concern in Reynosa, though these blockades do not occur frequently enough to warrant further precautions, nor do the vehicles involved appear to be targeted for their cargo. While there 11

12 have not been any reports of drivers being harmed in these incidents, armed gunmen taking over a Johnson Controls vehicle could pose a serious risk of bodily harm to employees. Other, more common crimes, such as pick-pocketing, mugging, car theft and carjacking, do occur in and around Reynosa, but they occur nowhere near as frequently as they do in larger metropolitan areas such as Mexico City. Many criminal groups that operate on both sides of the border in this region, such as Texas-based Tango Blast, specifically target the auto industry in stealing vehicles and auto parts. STRATFOR believes this kind of crime will increase in the Reynosa area over the next two to three years as the security situation worsens before it improves. Many of these conditions still persist in Reynosa, although the criminal landscape of the area seems to have changed slightly. There are unconfirmed rumors of a truce between elements of the Gulf cartel that control the urban areas of Reynosa and the Los Zetas elements that operate in the more rural areas around the city. There are still firefights and grenade attacks, but the frequency of such incidents has subsided somewhat over the last three months. It is important to note that any truce between these Gulf and Los Zetas elements would not be expected to remain in place more than a few months, as which point we could see the violence return to levels seen in April Juarez Of all cities and regions in Mexico, the Juarez area has been hit perhaps the hardest by the dramatic increase in criminal activity. Kidnapping, extortion and corruption are rampant throughout the city and surrounding areas. Perhaps the strongest indicator of the level of corruption in Juarez is the fact that La Linea, the VCF enforcement arm, is comprised of current and former members of the Juarez police department, underscoring the concern that law enforcement personnel still on municipal and federal payrolls also are working actively for the cartels. La Linea has been one of the primary instigators of the escalating violence in the city, serving as hit men for the VCF and as muscle to force businesses and other entities to produce cuotas, or extortion payments. VCF and La Linea are not the only organizations in Juarez extorting businesses in exchange for protection. Nearly every criminal group operating in the Juarez area uses extortion to supplement their incomes, especially as the groups try to fund their operations against each other, from local street gangs like Los Aztecas and the Mexicles to the VCF and Sinaloa cartels. According to recent insight from STRATFOR sources, the VCF is believed to be limited to the downtown area of Juarez while Sinaloa forces allegedly control all other parts of Juarez, including the main trafficking corridors. Since the VCF is the primary organization that conducts extortion campaigns, businesses and employees in the downtown area of Juarez can expect more extortion-related threats than those who work in other parts of the city. Kidnapping is also prevalent in the Juarez region, and it often is employed against persons or businesses that refuse to pay their cuotas. Also targeted are high-net-worth individuals or people portraying themselves as such. Again, the sophistication of kidnapping operations ranges from professional teams with specialized roles to amateur gang operations. Large corporations also fall victim to extortion attempts by criminal groups operating in Juarez. The degradation of the security environment in the city and the increase in extortion has prompted most MNCs and maquiladoras to spend more money on security at their Juarez facilities. While such measures aid in the protection of company assets and employees at work, criminal elements also have started targeting employees at their homes or while they are in transit. Management and executives who live and work in the in the Juarez area have been furnished armored cars and executive protection, so criminals have begun targeting lower-level employees. The impact on company morale becomes a kind of psychosis that spreads throughout the workforce and, in many cases, results in low employee attendance. STRATFOR sources involved in the computer industry in Mexico recently reported employees were being pulled off of company buses and later killed, presumably because the company refused to meet extortion demands. 12

13 More common crimes are also prevalent throughout the city. Naturally, security forces are not nearly as concerned with more petty offenses as they try to stop targeted assassinations and kill or capture cartel enforcers, so little is done to detain and prosecute common criminals. While the more violent, headline-grabbing crimes involve those in the drug trade, common criminals target victims of opportunity and do not discriminate. Monterrey Corruption, while a pervasive problem throughout Mexico, is especially prevalent in Monterrey. Los Zetas have co-opted a large number of local, state and federal law enforcement personnel in the Monterrey metro area through the common ploy of plata o plomo, or silver or lead. This is the cartel reminder to public officials that they have two choices: They can cooperate with the cartels and receive plata (silver, or money) or resist the cartels and receive plomo (lead, or bullets). This message can be seen in the large number of targeted assassinations of law enforcement officials in the Monterrey area who likely did not respond appropriately to Los Zetas demands. Also, as part of its offensive against Los Zetas, the New Federation has killed 25 Nuevo Leon police officers allegedly corrupted by Los Zetas and has vowed to kill 20 more. Widespread police corruption and the deteriorating security situation have led to a breakdown of law and order in northern Mexico, where other criminal groups are now able to operate more freely. The corruption can manifest itself in many ways, from having to bribe a police officer to get out of a speeding ticket to being detained unlawfully by a police officer and turned over to a criminal group and held for ransom. As elsewhere in Mexico, the increasingly chaotic and permissive environment in the Monterrey area has led to an uptick in petty crimes as common criminals take advantage of distracted security personnel. Although carjacking, car theft, pick-pocketing and mugging occur in the city, however, these crimes are still less common in Monterrey than they are in other large cities in Mexico. In Monterrey, pickpockets and street beggars are common in tourist areas and crowded parts of town, while muggers operate mainly at night in isolated areas. As the industrial and manufacturing hub of Mexico, Monterrey is ripe for cargo theft. While about 50 percent of such incidents occur in the Mexico City area, the Monterrey area is the second most active area for cargo theft in Mexico. Large volumes of everything from raw materials to high-end finished goods travel in and out of Monterrey every day, creating a target-rich environment for cargo thieves. Additionally, being about 130 miles from both the Nuevo Laredo and Reynosa border crossings, within the 200-mile border zone in which most cargo theft occurs, the Monterrey area provides criminals ample time to stalk, stop and interdict shipments. Mexico s two major highway corridors, Federal Highway 85 to Nuevo Laredo and Federal Highway 40 to Reynosa, are the lifelines that pump products from Monterrey into the United States. Since there are no alternative routes, these highways offer lucrative hunting grounds for Mexican cargo thieves, who are growing increasingly active. The threat of kidnapping also is increasing in the Monterrey area, even though the city has not experienced the same level of KFR cases that other regions in Mexico have seen. On April 21, for example, more than 50 armed men stormed two hotels in the heart of Monterrey and kidnapped seven individuals before fleeing the area. The group even went so far as to block major intersections with hijacked vehicles and a construction crane to impede the security response. STRATFOR has been anticipating an escalation in kidnappings in the Monterrey area due to the large concentration of wealth in the region and to the defensive posture Los Zetas have had to assume because of their ongoing conflict with the New Federation. The threat of kidnapping in Monterrey has increased to such an extent that the U.S. State Department ordered the departure of all minor dependents of U.S. diplomatic personnel in the region in August According to anecdotal reports from the U.S. State Department and open-source information, kidnapping-for-ransom cases have increased dramatically over the last six months, including the targeting of U.S. business executives. 13