Peloponnesian War: Sparta

Transcription

1 : Sparta Background Guide EagleMUNC Boston College Model United Nations Conference Chair: Jack McGrath Website: March

2 A Letter from the Chair Ἀσπάζομαι, Λακεδαιμόνιοι! Greece, the cradle of Western civilization, now sits in your hands! The birthplace of literature, philosophy, mathematics, and more; a land fragmented by political particularism, but unified by a shared sense of nationality. 1 The complexities of ancient rule are nearly impossible to enumerate, but it is the task of this body, the Spartan γερουσία (Gerousia the Council of Elders), to maintain and expand the city-state s influence commercially, culturally, and militarily despite the moves of your rivals. While the intricacies of foreign affairs will certainly affect the council s path, it is necessary to recognize the oft-misunderstood status of Greek populations. It would be inaccurate to presume that every Greek possessed the cunning of Odysseus or the stoic power of Pallas Athena. Even in democratic Athens, women and slaves were completely neglected in political processes. Nonetheless, these underrepresented groups were the glue of society. In Sparta, women were strong matriarchs during times of war. Tensions of this sort will play a key role in this simulation. Sparta, at the heart of the Peloponnese, was one of the few Greek city-states to have agricultural diversity. The vast majority of the lands to the north and east are untenable mountainous or infertile. The scarcity of natural resources is one of the reasons that many Greek civilizations looked beyond their boundaries to address the needs of their respective populaces. Athens, for example, developed a strong navy, beginning cross-cultural exchanges with Anatolian peoples and Egyptian merchants, building a network of influence across the 1 Sarah B. Pomeroy, et al., Ancient Greece: A Political, Social, and Cultural History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 10.

3 Aegean. Thus, this body sits with distinct advantages and disadvantages vis-à-vis its Grecian rivals. Will the Gerousia forge alliances and push for a unified, Spartan-led Greece? Will the idiosyncrasies of different city-states lead to irreconcilable differences? These are your questions that you will answer. May the gods of Olympus bless you with their wisdom! ἴθι εὐτυχής! Jack McGrath Class of 2016, Boston College History / Political Science mcgratjw@bc.edu

4 Historical Background Although Spartan rule of the Peloponnese was virtually unchallenged after the elimination of the Persian threat in 449 B.C., the makeshift peace between Greek city-states was tenuous at best. The Greeks had achieved a great deal in science, philosophy, the arts, extending their influence far beyond their formal borders, profiting from exchanging ideas with other cultures. Consequently, there was a general will to preserve Hellenic civilization by avoiding in-fighting whenever possible. The dynamism of Greek culture, born out of the incredible diversity that one could observe from polis to polis was increasingly an issue. For example, the growth of democracy looked incredibly threatening to certain political orders, but oligarchical systems persisted everywhere, despite nominal claims towards elected rule. The Spartans and Athenians achieved peace in 445 B.C. From that point on, Athens increased their influence in the west and northeast, desiring greater access to ports to further their increasing interconnectedness with other civilizations. They founded a colony in Italy in 443 B.C. Sicily adopted Athenian currency as a form of payment. Thrace became increasingly important, as lucrative trades in dyes, furs, and grain whetted the palettes of Athenian elites. Essentially, Athens was striving for Panhellenistic expansion, whereby cultural factors would lead to its increased power. Nonetheless, military concerns persisted. Samos, an important port, rebelled, nearly beating the Athenian military away from one of its most precious sea holdings. This revolt spread to Byzantium. To address the former, a nine-month siege ultimately resulted in the capitulation of the Samian military in 440 B.C. Byzantium was cut off through strategic settlements along key supply points. Critically, Sparta determined to

5 not involve itself in the Samian rebellion on the advice of other members in the Peloponnesian League. The Thirty Years Peace disintegrated on account of further crises in the 430s B.C. Corcyra, an island off of Greece, was embroiled in civil war in 435 B.C. between oligarchs and democrats. Corinth, an overseer of the island, sent a fleet to beat back the rebelling democrats, but was defeated. The Spartan and Athenian Divisions in Greece The Corcyreans did not belong to the Peloponnesian League or Athens network of alliances initially. Corcyra did possess a substantial fleet, and thus Athens did not want to see the city-state fall to one of its chief rivals, Corinth. At Sybota in 433 B.C., the two forces clashed

6 as Athens intervened, seeing Corcyra s fleet in distress. The battle was a stalemate, with both sides claiming victory. Athens continued its meddling in the Peloponnesian League s affairs. Potidaea was a political anomaly in Greece an ally of Corinth and the Peloponnesian League, yet a formal member of Athens alliance. Athens ordered Potidaeans to dismiss their Corinthian overlords, reject Corinth s influence, deconstruct sea defense systems (presumably to allow a vastly superior Athenian navy to exercise control uninhibited), and hand over hostages. Potidaea, close in proximity to Macedonia, was geographically significant, containing much of the timber necessary for the proliferation of Athenian ships. Perdiccas, king of the Macedonians, has encouraged a move against Athens and compelled Corinthian sympathizers to revolt in Potidaea. Two thousand men, volunteers by all accounts hailing from Corinth and other Peloponnesian states, head to the embattled citystate now. Concurrently, Athens has provoked Megara, claiming that the polis is holding its escaped slaves. Megara had also given Corinth support during the Battle of Sybota. Megarian merchants were banned from all Athenian ports. The economy was devastated by these sanctions, and Athens refused to revoke them. This crisis saw the introduction of open confict between Athens and Sparta, inaugurating the Archidamian age of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. (named for the Spartan King Archidamus). Pericles, the man integral in the Athenian decision to fight, only fought during this portion of the war, instituting a defensive strategy a counterintuitive maneuver that supports the leader s famed eloquence. By avoiding open battle and attacking trading interests

7 across the Peloponnese by concentrating its citizenry in its urban base, Athens hoped to frustrate Sparta to the point of peace. Plague struck Athens a few years later, creating an added level of chaos. Having been demoralized by disease, the Athenians began suing for peace against the will of Pericles, who himself perished from the plague in 429 B.C. Anti-Athenian revolts at strategic trading posts like Mytilene in the Aegean aided the Spartans during the 420s B.C. Athens continued to exploit its strong navy, raiding towns along the coasts under their new leader, Demosthenes. In many ways, class defined Spartan life. Slaves, known as helots, tended to fields and served their masters at home while citizens trained for war. In the absence of masters, the helots were a massive liability to the Spartan state, as they threatened to destabilize the regime. Athens targeted this weakness in 425 B.C. at Pylos. This is where the war turned in Athens favor. Attempting to recover a Sicilian outpost, an Athenian fleet seized the peninsula of Pelos and supported Messenian political exiles that were decidedly anti-spartan. Sparta attempted to recover the land, but was isolated at Sphacteria, where upwards of 100 Spartan soldiers surrendered as calls for peace began. Athens opted to continue leveraging its supremacy. In 424 B.C., the Athenian army made a rare foray at Delium, where they were decisively defeated by the Boeotians. At Amphipolis, a strategically important city that protected Athenian gold interests, an Athenian contingent was forced to surrender, as Thucydides was

8 unable to reach the city before the Spartan invasion. Cleon, a leading Athenian politician, made efforts to regain the city in 422 B.C. to his own peril. The Peace of Nicias was achieved in 421 B.C., as Athenian politician Nicias negotiated terms with the primary Spartan forces, but the decentralized nature of the Spartan alliance network ensured that the ceasefire would remain precarious. The deal included a provision for fifty years of peace, the restoration of fortresses, trading of prisoners, the neutrality of Delphi, and the return of Amphipolis and Panactum to Athens in exchange for Pylos. There were additional provisions that Athens would support Sparta in the case of another helot revolt. Current Issues Corinth, Boetia, and Megara refused to accept the Peace of Nicias, preventing Sparta from returning Panactum and Amphipolos. Corinthians, now mistrusting their Spartan allies, have attempted to forge a new alliance with Argos to prevent Spartan-Athenian hegemony the Argive alliance. Elis, a city-state that contended with Lepreium, entered into this league to avoid Spartan arbitration. Thracian Chalcidans followed suit. Boeotia and Megara remained neutral on account of their political systems, as mistrust has only continued to grow. The domestic political situation in Sparta has also shifted, as the ephors, who split power with the king that negotiated the Peace of Nicias, has left office. Now, Sparta sits on the precipice of disaster if its internal and external networks of support collapse. Sparta has critical geopolitical decisions to make in the coming years. The survival of the militaristic state is in jeopardy if the current situation continues unresolved.

9 Bloc Positions This body will consider the second part of the Peloponnesian War, following the Peace of Nicias, from the perspective of Sparta. The primary concern of the delegates should be consolidating Spartan power and organizing their relationships with possible allies. Some may want to focus on establishing relationships between Sparta and its allies, while others in the body may want to consider Sparta s militaristic approach to power as a way of securing its hold over Sparta. Alliances are ever-changing and with the ever increasing desire of the Persians to interfere in Greek affairs, it is up to the delegates to consider the amount of cooperation and involvement that Sparta will have with those who it initially opposed. The goal of this body is to ensure the survival of Sparta in the coming years. The state faces threats from its neighbors that may lead Sparta down a turbulent path. It is up to this body to ensure that Sparta achieves military and foreign policy victories, while securing control at home. Athens and Sparta Balance of Power: Athens is in Yellow. Sparta is in Red.

10 Questions to Consider 1. What is the optimal way to maintain legitimacy among allies without renegotiating the basic terms of the Peace of Nicias? 2. What diplomatic leverage can be used to maintain peace? 3. Is the maintenance of peace necessary? Would it not be better for a unified, Spartan-led state to ensure peace without the encumbrances of the Athenians or Argives? 4. What lessons have been learned from the war with Athens? 5. What external maneuvers will unsettle Athens to level the playing field? Works Cited Sarah B. Pomeroy, et al., Ancient Greece: A Political, Social, and Cultural History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1874). R.F. Tannenbaum, Who Started the Peloponnesian War? in Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics 2, no. 4 (1975): Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969). Image 1: Image 2: