SHIP FIRE IN THE CHANNEL

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SHIP FIRE IN THE CHANNEL Divisional Officer Kettle of Cornwall Fire Brigade describes a recent incident which occured on a container ship off the northwest coast of Guernsey.

1 SHIP FIRE IN THE CHANNEL Divisional Officer Kettle of Cornwall Fire Brigade describes a recent incident which occured on a container ship off the northwest coast of Guernsey. On Saturday 20 December 1997, the State of Guernsey Fire Brigade and Cornwall County Fire Brigade became involved in a joint operation aboard the 29,000 tonne roll-on roll-off container ship, Kukawa. The British registered vessel, with a crew of 33, was 25 miles northwest of Guernsey on passage from West Africa to Rotterdam. The ship, which was about 40% laden, was carrying a cargo of cut timber, cocoa and fruit, mainly in containers and some as loose cargo. THE INCIDENT A fire occurred in the engine room of the vessel at about 12.45pm and the Captain transmitted a distress message, which was received by the coastguard control at St Peter Port, Guernsey. The State of Guernsey Fire Brigade was alerted at pm. At this time it was unclear as to the situation aboard the vessel, but the Brigade's local plan was instigated and crews were mobilised by air and sea at 2.12pm. Brixham Coastguard in Devon took control of the incident. As information was received back from the vessel, additional resources were mobilised, including the coast- guard tug, Fal Minara, which remains on station in the southwest approaches for such emergencies, a French tug and two French firefighters. Cornwall County Fire Brigade were alerted at 4.22pm and a reconnaissance team landed on the vessel at 5pm via helicopter from RNAS Culdrose. THE SHIP The ship had five main decks and six decks in the superstructure, which was located aft. Within the superstructure was a box through which the machinery space uptakes passed to the funnel. It was reported that a fuel line

2 had ruptured on the starboard engine, sending a fireball up through the boiler flap space and funnel uptakes. All the dampers and vents were operated by the crew and the engine room drenched with carbon dioxide from the fire suppression system. When the Guernsey fire- fighters gained access to the engine room area they deter- mined that the fire had been extinguished by the carbon dioxide. Unfortunately, the fireball had spread the fire into the superstructure via cable runs and unprotected openings. The ship had lost all power and the firemain had to be supplemented via two light portable pumps, positioned on the stern door platform. OPERATIONAL TACTICS A severe fire continued to burn within the superstructure, making it difficult to commit firefighters inside, hence defensive operations were maintained. It was decided that the best way forward was to take the vessel in tow and proceed to Falmouth in Cornwall, a natural port of refuge, providing full dock facilities and deep water moorings. The vessel arrived off Falmouth at midday on Sunday, 21 December. Relief crews from Cornwall were placed on board to maintain boundary cooling of the superstructure. A further strategic and tactical meeting of various representatives cook place on the vessel and the harbour master gave permission for the vessel to be taken alongside. This decision was a significant factor in the ultimate successful outcome of the incident as it enabled the Brigade to maximise its resources. By this time, the fire had spread further within the superstructure and the bridge had to be evacuated. Two cabin windows failed under the pressure of the fire, allowing more air into the compartments, which were being continually boundary cooled. Top ventilation was carried out via the bridge and this appeared to assist with containment. Due to the tides the vessel could not be taken alongside until 9.00pm, so for almost six hours containment continued. During this time pump failures resulted in the loss of all boundary cooling efforts for almost 45 minutes. DOCKSIDE FIREFIGHTING At 9pm, the Kukawa was moored in Falmouth docks and the Chief Fire Officer was then given a full appraisal of the situation. The full resources of Cornwall County Fire Brigade were now readily available and offensive firefighting began. The firefighting continued throughout Sunday and Monday. At one stage, 10

3 pumps, an aerial ladder pump and a control unit were engaged at the dockside. At 5.10pm on Monday 22 December, a fire surrounded message was returned by the Incident Commander. One crew remained through the night, finally leaving the scene at 10.30am on Tuesday 23 December, when the vessel was handed back to the owners and the salvage company. The ship came out of the incident still intact, although the superstructure is in need of major repair. The fire did not reach the cargo and there were no injuries sustained by either the crew or by firefighters. Additionally, a stowaway was located and handed over to the authorities. The vessel currently lies in Falmouth docks, awaiting repair before probably returning to sea. The Kukawa incident was the third offshore response that Cornwall County Fire Brigade carried out in The above is an article that appeared in the Fire Magazine (March 1998)

4 SHIP FIRE -MV KUKAWA POST INCIDENT ANALYSIS The MV Kukawa was approximately 25 miles off Guernsey, in French waters. A 30,000 tonne Ro-Ro container ship, carrying cut timber and fruit in containers and loose cargo from West Africa to Rotterdam. 40% laden SATURDAY 20/12/ Kukawa transmitted an urgent (Pan Pan) broadcast. She had suffered an engine room fire and flooded the space with Carbon Dioxide. It was stated no assistance was required. Coastguard Rescue Helicopter Whisky Bravo from Portland was requested to scramble Ship Triton Diamond arrived on scene Bnxham MRSC were unable to communicate with Kukawa and had lost radar contact with the vessel Kukawa reported her engine room fire was extinguished. She had suffered no casualties and required no assistance Engine room fire had re-ignited and she was again flooding the space with carbon dioxide. Guernsey Harbour Master placed a 9-man firefighting team on (Guernsey) standby Helicopter WB was advised she would be transferring the Guernsey firefighting team to Kukawa A French Dauphin helicopter had arrived at Guernsey with 2 French firefighters. Alderney RNLI Lifeboat was tasked to proceed to the incident Tug Englishman advised she was proceeding The Channel Island firefighting team, which consisted of 6 firefighters and 2 paramedics, were proceeding to Kukawa aboard Helicopter WB. Triton Diamond advised Brixham MRSC that the fire was extinguished. The 2 French firefighters on Guernsey, would be subsequently ferried out by WB Coastguard Tug from Falmouth, Far Minara, gave an ETA of 2030 hrs. On scene were the 6 firefighters, 2 paramedics, 2 lifeboats, Helicopter WB and Triton Diamond. The Kukawa was still on fire, despite previous reports The firefighting team aboard Kukawa reported heavy smoke coming from the accommodation and no pressure in her fire main. A back up team with breathing apparatus was required.

5 1607 Back up firefighting team from Guernsey and kit, aboard WB and on their way Further firefighters were needed. Cornwall assistance was requested, along with helicopter transport, that was tasked by AROC Kinloss. Additionally, a Nimrod was tasked by Kinloss to become controller of air assets As daylight was fading, a decision was made to evacuate all non-essential personnel off the Kukaw 1704 Rescue 193 proceeding, with firefighting team embarked at Falmouth Docks. A Liaison officer was despatched to Falmouth MRCC Fire spread to Kukawa s lower accommodation decks. It was necessary to evacuate her bridge. In so doing, communications were lost Communications loss reported by Triton Diamond, she added a full abandonment of Kukawa was taking place. Helicopter Rescue 193 was tasked to assist Communications were re-established. Only non essential personnel (10 in total) had been evacuated Cornwall firefighters embarked on Kukawa. No water for firefighting. The fire had spread upwards from the engine room and in to the boiler flat. The Kukawa s Master was failing to relay messages accurately. A formal liaison and command structure was established with the Guernsey crews already embarked. LPP was lashed low down on the ship s loading ramp. Kukawa s fire main was charged at water jets resulted and boundary cooling of the accommodation and machinery spaces commenced Triton Diamond reported the fire on board Kukawa had diminished Coastguard ETV Far Minara arrived on scene It was confirmed that Far Minara would tow Kukawa to Falmouth, a voyage of around 100 miles A message was received from Guernsey Fire Control that the fire was getting worse Far Minara reported her tow line was connected to Kukawa Fire was spreading through the accommodation and personnel on board might have to abandon. There was some confusion with messages passed through Far Minara, as there were no read backs. SUNDAY 21/12/ Rescue 194 departed from Falmouth Docks with relief firefighting crew. On board the

6 Kukawa, the fire was still spreading upwards and boundary cooling of the accommodation space continued The transfer of relief firefighters and their supplies had to be aborted. There were 2 primary reasons. With the aft end fire, the area R194 hoped to use for the transfer was obstructed by the tow wire from Far Minara. Additionally, the weather on scene was such, that should an engine have failed, on the helicopter, there was insufficient power to be able to pull the aircraft out of a hover on the remaining engine. Rescue 194 returned to Culdrose with the relief team Falmouth MRCC formally assumed co-ordination for this incident Kukawa in Falmouth Bay. Relief fire crews and supplies were transferred on board. Guernsey fire crew were disembarked Under the command of Far Minara, with harbour tug in attendance, Kukawa was brought safely alongside in Falmouth Docks CFO briefed on situation. 20 fire-fighters on standby. Incident Command Unit! ALP/Airshelta s and ambulance on scene. DO Thompson assumes role of Incident Commander [IC] Informative jets I ALP boundary cooling. Fire venting through upper decks MONDAY 22/1 2/ DO Collins assumes role of IC 0545 Assistance.... make pumps lnformative...good progress..14 Breathing apparatus [BA] wearers..6 jets... anticipate 10 pumps for next 24 hours DO Webster now IC 1349 Informative....severe conditions F deck.., good progress being made Informative.... decks B to E clear, damping down F deck,..smoke logging G deck BA / 4 jets Fire surrounded 1941 STOP crews remaining overnight... TUESDAY 23/12/ Crews now making up, vessel being handed back to salvage company.

7 The following identified the major issues raised, although not laid down in order of importance, each has been placed under a specific heading. The Action column identifies the actions that should be put in place to resolve the item. The reference column indicates who may be responsible for resolving the issue. (a) COMMAND & CONTROL COMMENT Incident/Sector Commander must keep crews fully briefed of incident progress BA teams must he briefed/debriefed at Sector Commander s location. Crews of 3 Numbers of people on board, even off-shore, unclear. Crews wearing boarding tallies on board when vessel alongside. Initial crews committed offshore for 18 hours - H & S hazard. Adequate use not made of crews with experience both in ship f/f and regular BA when ship alongside CCFB not advised of incident until almost 4 hours after first call for help. No paramedic available to fly out with recce teams. Two gangways set when ship alongside, but not controlled. One is access, one egress. The ALP was misused due to an apparent break down in communications, i.e. boundary cooling ineffective. ACTION Regular updates to all crews. Could be in the form of a written or typed communication Proper briefing - use of plans. Team leader debrief. BACO/SC Accurate records must be kept. Provide individual nominal roll tallies to all personnel which can contain computerised qualifications and health cares records. Tallies handed-in when accessing vessel. Do not commit crews until a procedure has been confirmed on how to relieve them. Provide additional training to key station 3.1/1.1/4.1 HM Coastguard to advise CCFB at outset of any incident. PO/DOO to make appropriate decision. Discuss with W.A.T Provide signs and monitor use of gangways so tally system can be properly monitored. Ensure Channel 9 is correctly used and any specialist appliance is clearly identified on the ICU. REF OFFICERS PRINCIPAL OFFICERS SPO/BTM MRCC/PO/ DOO s SQO ICU OFFICER a/kukawadb. 15/04/98

8 COMMENT The ICU was located in the wrong position initially. Too much emphasis was placed on organising relief s and not enough on direct command and control. A meeting place that needs to be more tactically controlled.!! Sector Commanders could have been briefed with more details and provided with appropriate plans. The Command structure appeared to be suffering from lack of adequate information The tactical offensive firefighting roles were criticised, i.e. ventilation via bridge and gas cooling nozzle techniques. Some questioned other tactics. ACTION Position ICU in most strategic position, i.e. adjacent to other facilities if possible, i.e. shelter, offices etc. The ICU officer must restrict the vehicle to key staff only. Review the adequacy of the existing vehicle and consider a more effective ICU. Control must be responsible for relief s- not the ICU. IC must clearly define the roles, record them on the ICU and maintain liaison/communication. A training need that needs to be addressed. Promote the key firefighting tactics through further training in tactical firefighting including ventilation. Consider the use of 38 mm hose to replace 45mm (more efficient) REF IC I.C.U.O FCO COMMAND OFFICERS SPO/BTM (b) COMMUNICATIONS French firefighters on board, unable to communicate due to language barrier Ship to shore communications were unacceptable. Due to the distance, communication was completely lost with CCFB crews. Subsequent messages relayed via other parties were disjointed, unclear and caused concem locally. Captain of Kukawa and tugs were sending wrong information from OiC. Investigate language courses for key personnel. (i) Ensure HMCG provide dedicated line to FB liaison officer at MRCC. Possibly using RAF Nimrod as link via dedicated marine waveband. (ii)brigade purchase mobile satellite 12k. (Would enhance communication for any major incident) Ensure messages are written down by OiC. Also make use of Dictaphones to maintain a log of events. SPO HMCG OiC s alkukawadb. 15/04/98

9 COMMENT Initially calls from the vessel were controlled by Brixham 0G. This was another link in a tenuous chain. No CCFB liaison at Bnxham. Brigade hand held radios required continual supply of batteries which seemed very excessive throughout incident. This caused several failures in comms.. BA crews were being committed without comms. - this is unacceptable Whilst offshore, Officers cellphones failed to operate due to not being on a European network. Too much chatter over handheld radios. (i) ACTION (i) When CCFB working offshore, incident must be controlled by Falmouth MRCC, to link direct with FB liaison officer located in MRCC Ensure correct battery mangement, possibly by dedicated person. (ii) Ensure batteries are checked for charging in accordance with weekly (iii) Brigade to investigate fixed charging facilities on appliances and additional mobile charges - Not to be located on IOU. Place on OSU. All BA teams to wear comms. and adopt formal radio procedures. Upgrade Officers cellphones to European network (i) Adopt formal procedures (ii) Provide earpieces for key personnel, carry on IOU REF HMCG COMMS OFFICER COMMS OFFICER COMMS OFFICER (c) EQUIPMENT Navy provided immersion suits for recce crews etc. i.e. helo transfer - no ear defenders or head protection. (i) Replace Brigade Immersion suits as a matter of urgency and ensure that they are correctly serviced and maintained. 3.1 FALMOUTH (ii) Transfer of personnel via helo must include full PPE with ear defenders and head protection. alkukawadb. 15/04/98

10 COMMENT Wet BA boards made it difficult with chinagraph pencils to produce crucial information. This is a very old chestnut - and is unacceptable. BA logbooks were not maintained and their overall management was found to be poor. Personnel were arriving at BACO with books. The Cairn Metro fire helmet was criticised as being unacceptable for ship firefighting, helo work and confined space incidents. ACTION (i) Ensure BA boards are properly cleaned after use, using the cleaner provided by BA workshops. (ii) Review writing material and investigate divers writing materials. Change policy on this item and carry log books on appliance. BA brackets not the set. These can be collated by the BASU team. Brigade to investigate alternative head protection with suitable eye protection as standard fitting. REF BA OFFICER alkukawadb. 15/04/98

11 COMMENT (d) WELFARE The catering for crews at Falmouth docks, after the first night, for which the WRVS supplied, ultimately collapsed. Crews were not fed, welfare facilities were poor and not well managed. This caused much discussion. ACTION The policy for catering at incidents was amended by BPT in April This should ensure a more suitable approach. Catering must be managed initially by the OiC/IC. REF COPMLETED APRIL 98 Several buildings were made available within the docks area. Airshelters were also erected. However, again this was not managed adequately, particularly with the inclement weather. (i) Nominate welfare officer who must liaise with IC and be responsible for managing everybody s welfare. OiC s/ics It should be noted that throughout the period, no major injuries were sustained by firefighters or ships crews. Minor injuries to firefighters totalled 14. Injuries to be investigated and action appropriate to the case will be taken. SPO/H&SO alkukawadb. 15/04/98

12 COMMENT (e) MOBILISING The initial helo was alerted too early and was left at the RV buming valuable fuel, awaiting FB. Fire Control had difficulty in contacting the key volunteers at the outset because no list is held in Control. ACTION MRCC to seek ETA of FB at RV and advise RNAS Culdrose accordingly to avoid a repetition. (i) Provide GI file on FIRES 3 with details of all volunteers. (ii) Investigate providing the cadre of volunteers with tone pagers REF HMC FCO This incident required experienced BA wearers and it was felt that the message was not imparted to crews/stations when mobilised by Fire Control. Crews were being mobilised during unsociable hours, unnecessarily, some felt. This could not always be avoided and FC must control the provision of reliefs, subject to the IC s overall needs, i.e. specials etc. Incident Commander must advise FC of the needs, and FC must convey this to the station. OiC s must attempt to fulfil these needs. With a protracted incident, wherever possible avoid changing crews in the middle of the night. If necessary, adopt a watch system so reliefs can be properly forecast. Again this would be dependent on the pressures put on the crews at the time. FC/OIC s F/CONRTOL alkukawadb. 15/04/98

13 NOTE These observations are the key issues raised during the debrief only Glossary of abbreviations: Pan Pan ARCC MRSC/MRCC BACO SC IC OIC PO DOO WAT ICU BASU OSU SPO BTM Maritime assistance message. non - emergency Air Reconnaissance Control Centre Coastguard Centre s Breathing Apparatus Control Officer Sector Commander s Incident Commander Officer in Charge Principal Officer [Chief or Assistant Chiefs] Duty Operations Officer Westcountry Ambulance Trust Incident Command Unit [Control Unit - Oscar One ] Breathing Apparatus Support Unit Operational Support Unit Senior Performance Officer Brigade Training Manager alkukawadb. 15/04/98

REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE GROUNDING OF THE M.F.V. "ELSINOR" AT FOILNABOE, IRELAND ON THE 15TH SEPTEMBER, 2001.

REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE GROUNDING OF THE M.F.V. "ELSINOR" AT FOILNABOE, IRELAND ON THE 15TH SEPTEMBER, The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 5 th, June 2002 under