NORTHERN SEA ROUTE: MODERN STATE AND CHALLENGES

Transcription

1 Proceedings of the ASME rd International Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic Engineering OMAE2014 June 8-13, 2014, San Francisco, California, USA OMAE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE: MODERN STATE AND CHALLENGES Nataliya Marchenko The University Centre in Svalbard, Longyearbyen, Norway State Oceanographical Institute, Moscow, Russia ASTRACT It is well-known that navigating the waterway from the primary trade hubs in northern Europe to the Asia-Pacific ports and contrariwise along the Russian Arctic Coast (Northern Sea Route - NSR) is much shorter and faster, than southern ways via Suez or around Africa. The NSR can significantly save costs (through saving time and fuel) and avoids the risk of attack by pirates. In addition, an increase in oil and gas activity in the North, forecasts of global warming and an ice-free Arctic have stimulated interest in Arctic navigation. However, Arctic transportation poses significant challenges because of the heavy ice conditions that exist during both the winter and summer. The profitability of using the NSR is called into question if possible high tariffs are included in the cost estimates. For many years, the NSR was principally used for internal Russian transport and since the end of the 1980s up until 2010, it was in stagnation with total amount of cargo transported annually stood at less than two million tons. Important political decisions in the 90s and increased economic feasibility intensified traffic and freight turnover. In 2013, the NSR Administration (NSRA) was established, new rules for navigation were approved and tariff policies were modified. In 2013, the NSRA issued 635 permits to sail in NSR waters, and 71 transit voyages have since been completed. The total amount of transit cargo was 1.36 million tons. More than 40% of the total number of permits were issued to vessels without ice class [1] according to the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping [2]. There are strong technical requirements for vessels attempting to sail the NSR; regardless, several accidents occurred in Two vessels were dented by ice in the Chukchi Sea in A tanker was holed in September 2013 and created a real danger of an ecological disaster from fuel leakage for several days. Despite the expectation of an ice-free Arctic, the ice conditions in 2013were rather difficult, and the Vilkitsky Strait (a key strait in the NSR between the Kara and Laptev seas) was closed by ice for almost the entire navigation period. In this paper, we review the current situation in the Russian Arctic, including political and administrative actions, recent accidents and the associated conditions and lessons learned. NORTHERN SEA ROUTE (NSR): DEFINITIONS AND ADVANTAGES There are two shipping routes in the Arctic that are referred to as the northern sea route (NSR): one lies along the Russian coastline, and the other runs along the Canadian coastline. The former route is called the Northeast Passage, and the latter route is called the Northwest Passage. The shrinking of the Arctic Sea ice in the 21 st century has accelerated, and many shipping routes are being considered. The Transpolar Passage has been actively discussed over the past several years [3, 4], as well as the latitudinal Arctic Bridge Route from Russia or Norway to the northern Canadian port of Churchill. In Figure 1, which can be found on the website of The Arctic Institute [5], data from the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment [6] and the Arctic Portal Library [7] are combined to show different Arctic routes. Figure 1 Arctic shipping routes (taken from [5]) 1 Copyright 2014 by ASME

2 In the 20 th century, the Northeast Passage became a practical transportation route that became known as the NSR. However, it is still difficult for typical commercial vessels to transit the Northwest Passage because of severe and unpredictable ice conditions and the shortage of powerful icebreakers. At the beginning of the 21 st century, a reduction in pack ice made both waterways more navigable. However, still in common sense (as is usually stated in the media) the NSR is a shipping lane that runs from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific along the Russian Arctic coast, from European ports such as Rotterdam, Hamburg, Kirkenes and Murmansk along Siberia to the Bering Strait and on to the ports of Nakhodka, Yokohama, Dalian, etc. This route is considerably shorter than the corresponding southern routes. Therefore, the delivery of goods from Northern Europe to the Asia-Pacific region and contrariwise can occur in a third of the time required for (or a week faster than) a transit through the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. For example, the distance between Hamburg and Yokogama via the NSR is equal to 6920 nautical miles, which is 39% shorter than the route via Suez channel of nautical miles [8, 9]. The Tschudi Shipping Company AS [10] performed calculations to illustrate time-saving opportunities for bulk-carriers traveling from Kirkenes to Asian ports: Table 1 lists these results, which can be found on the internet (e.g., [11]) and the literature (e.g., [12]). Table 1 Distances and potential number of days saved for transport to Asian from Kirkenes (Norway) and Murmansk (Russia) (taken from [12] with reference to [10]) Figure 2 Comparison of the NSR and the southern route ( taken from [13]) The NSR is operated by Russian authorities. In 2013, Russian legislation officially defined the NSR boundaries as extending from Novaya Zemlya in the west (68 35 E) to the Bering Strait in the east ( W). Within these boundaries, all vessels are required to follow special rules known as the Rules of navigation on the water area of the Northern Sea Route [14] and comply The Federal Law of Shipping on the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route [15]. Therefore, the NSR is interpreted in this article as corresponding to routes within the aforementioned boundaries, and we use the term Northeast Passage to denote the route from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean via the Barents, Kara, Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchi seas. There are several options for navigation in the Russian Arctic depending on the ice conditions (Figure 3). The route was originally used to transport goods eastward to Asia, but shipping westward also became common in the 21 st century. Figure 2 is a rendering of the NSR from the national Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun for voyages by cargo ships owned by China Ocean Shipping in August 2013 and also shows the calculated times for voyages within this scenario [13]. This publication demonstrates the rising interest of Asian states and companies in the NSR. Figure 3 Traditional navigation routes in the Russian Arctic and NSR boundaries, as defined by [1] During the navigation periods in , a variant of the NSR that runs to the North from the New Siberian Islands became practically useful. Further north, multiyear ice exists throughout the winter, increasing the likelihood of collisions with solid ice floes and ice jets. Even during the warm periods seen over the last several years, the possibility of encountering sea ice while navigating in the Arctic should always be considered, especially in long-term planning. Modern developments related to the NSR and the current climatic situation have created significant expectations for 2 Copyright 2014 by ASME

3 navigation of this route in the future. Under the most favorable conditions, the NSR can be considered to be competitive with the traditional southern route through the Suez and around Africa, such as in 2012, when the NSR was ice-free for all of the navigational periods. From a more conservative perspective, the NSR could become a convenient, seasonal alternative to the southern route. The NSR will undoubtedly be used to maintain the existing local industries (i.e., the Cu-Ni industry in Norilsk and the oil-gas industry in the Yamal Peninsula) and in the future (Stockman Field). This route must be profitable to become a practical transit lane. Profitability depends on several factors that we will discuss in this article. Before discussing the future of the NSR, we briefly review the relevant background for the NSR, following [16-18]. NSR: EARLY HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 20 st CENTURY Plans for a northeastern passage began to develop at the state level as early as the 16 th century. In 1525, a first draft of the route had been created. The Great Northern Expedition ( ), led by V. Bering, investigated the waters of the Arctic Ocean and its coastline. In 1763, M. V. Lomonosov composed the first map of the Arctic Ocean and presented the Northeast Passage project to the Admiralty Collegium. However, attempts to overcome the ice using sailing vessels (on expeditions led by V. Ya. Chichagov during ) were unsuccessful. The real transformation of the Northeast Passage into an existing transport lane began at the end of 19 th century with the use of steam ships and icebreakers (such as the Ermak, which was built in 1898). In , Russia built three icebreakers (the Taymyr, the Vaygach and the Petr Veliky) and purchased four foreign icebreakers. These vessels were able to overcome the sea ice and enter the Arctic. The "Hydrographic Expedition of the Arctic Ocean" ( ) completed a detailed hydrographic inventory along the coast. This study was important for the development of navigational tools. Following the October Revolution of 1917, the economic interests of the USSR became a powerful stimulus for Arctic exploration. The so-called Kara barter expeditions in initiated commercial navigation in the Russian Arctic, and Siberian grain was transported to the faminestricken districts of the Arkhangelsk province. The General Directorate of the NSR (which has been called the NSR Administration (NSRA) since 1971) was established in In the same year, the steam-powered icebreaker Sibiryakov traversed the NSR in a single season for the first time, demonstrating the potential of commercial exploitation of the route. The number of vessels and the tonnage of transported goods subsequently increased, new ports were built, and an ice patrol service was established. The Second World War interrupted northern activities for a long time. After the Second World War, economic activity in the northern and eastern regions of Russia increased significantly. The Arctic fleet was replenished with powerful icebreakers and cargo ships. In 1959, the world's first nuclear-powered icebreaker, the Lenin, provided the capacity to drastically expand navigation time in the Arctic and increase turnover in the NSR. In the 1960s, these passive tactics had been changed to linear motion: icebreakers paved channels in the fast ice 15 to 20 days before its natural breaking, thereby overcoming tight-knit ice isthmuses. The Arctic navigation period increased from one to one and a half months in the 1920s up to four to five months in the 1960s. Since 1978, navigation in the western part of the Kara Sea has become a year-round event, interrupted only by the ice break-up of the Yenisey River. NSR development culminated at the end of the 1980s. In 1987, turnover in the NSR reached a maximum of 6.85 million tons, and 16 icebreakers (i.e., eight nuclear and eight diesel icebreakers) supported 380 transport vessels. In 1989, there were 18 icebreakers, the Arctic lighter Sevmorput, 20 vessels of improved ice classes and 108 ice class vessels on the NSR. However, the total cargo turnover decreased consistently through the 90s (from 5.5 tons in 1990 to 3.9 tons in 1992 to 2.3 tons in 1994) and annual levels of tons were maintained until 2003 [19] (Figure 4). Generally, the volume of traffic and activity in the Arctic was greatly reduced during Russia s transition to a market economy, and ice navigation practically ceased, except for the Murmansk Dudinka route. At the same time, Russian Arctic infrastructure was being continuously degraded. The population of the northern towns decreased by several times. Only 15 of the 67 polar stations and observatories, including the maintenance facilities for the NSR, remain. The emergency services division, the supply depots and the fleet maintenance facilities for the NSR, which were located in the settlements of Dikson, Tiksi and Pevek, have been eliminated [19]. Figure 4 Cargo volume on the NSR from1985 to 2007 (taken from [20]): the Y-axis represents the cargo volume (in thousands of tons), and the X-axis is the year; the blue line is the total cargo volume, the red line is the number of voyages, and the green line is the number of involved vessels For several decades (since the early 1920s) the NSR has been used in internal transport to deliver various goods and fuel to local ports and coastal communities. In 1987, M. S. 3 Copyright 2014 by ASME

4 Gorbachev proposed collaboration on the NSR and icebreaker support for non-russian carriers. In 1991, President B. N. Yeltsin confirmed the decision, and in 1995, the Guide for transit navigation along the Northern Sea Route was published [21]. These actions opened the NSR to commercial use. Several international scientific projects (INSROPE, ARCDEV and ARCOP) were initiated and implemented to describe the economic conditions of the NSR in the 1990s. These results of these projects showed that international navigation could be efficient with the support of Russian icebreakers [9]. NSR IN THE 21 st CENTURY At the beginning of the 21 st century, it became clear that the Russian economy as a whole could not function normally without utilizing the resources of the Arctic. The primary goals, tasks, priorities and mechanisms of state policy were outlined in the document Foundations of the Russian Federation's state policy in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond, which was signed by president D. A. Medvedev on the 18 th of September 2008 [22]. In this document, the Arctic is considered to be a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation. The use of the NSR as a national unified transport route for communications of the Russian Federation in the Arctic was proclaimed as a Russian national interest. This political vision was further developed in the recently created Strategy of the development of the Russian Arctic and national security for the period up to 2020, which was signed by president V. V. Putin in February 2013 [23]. The state spent huge sums of money and relied on the considerable efforts of many generations for the development of the NSR. Since September 2010, there have been three high-level political forums on the Arctic in Russia. The development of the Arctic region has become an important concern for the Russian state. The Russian government considers that the NSR plays a very important role in international transit. Cargo volume began to grow slowly and was approximately 2 million tons in The basic flow of goods that are processed in the western region of the NSR (Kara Sea) includes approximately 1.2 million tons of cargo from the Norilsk industrial region. Only 50, ,000 tons of traffic have passed through the eastern region of the NSR (the East Siberian and Chukchi seas) [24]. Since 2006, the Russian company MMC "Norilsk Nickel" has conducted regular, year-round sea shipments along the NSR using its own ARC-7 Arctic ice class vessels without using icebreaking services. According to the annual 2012 report [25], the MMC "Norilsk Nickel" fleet consists of five "Norilsk Nickel"-type container ships, each of which have a carrying capacity of approximately 15, 000 tons, and a universal tanker Yenisey, which has a carrying capacity of approximately 15,000 tons. These ships can overcome ice up to thicknesses of 1.5 meters. The company conducts cargo transportation by sea of up to 1.2 million tons annually on the Murmansk/Arkhangelsk-Dudinka route. In addition to transporting goods and ensuring production processes, the company delivers socially important goods to residents of the Norilsk industrial region. A new icebreaker, 50 Let Pobedy ( 50 Years of Victory"), was launched in In 2008, the Federal Agency Rosatomflot became part of the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom. Nuclear-powered vessels and nuclear service ships were transferred to Rosatomflot. The active fleet consisted of the following vessels: four nuclear-powered icebreakers, each with double 75,000-hp nuclear reactors (Rossia, Sovetsky Souz, Yamal, 50 Let Pobedy); two icebreakers (Taymyr, Vaygach), each with a single 40,000-hp reactor; and the nuclear-powered lighter container Sevmorput, which also has a 40,000-hp reactor. The status of these icebreakers can be obtained from the Rosatomflot website [26]. A turning point in the renewal of the NSR occurred in There were several important achievements in this year, some of which were realized for the first time. These achievements consisted of the following voyages: an experimental escort trip by the large-capacity tanker Baltika ( which had a 100,000-ton capacity and a 44-m width) from Murmansk to Ningbo, China; a 41-day trip by the cruise ferry Georg Ots from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok in 16 days along the NSR; the bulk carrier Nordic Barents became one of the first non-russian vessels to deliver iron ore from Norway to China via the NSR; and the Swedish icebreaker tug Tor Viking became the first-ever winter escort along the entire NSR for nine days in December. The nuclear icebreakers Taymyr, Rossiya and 50 Let Pobedy assisted the vessels at various stages. This progress continued in In August 2011, an even larger tanker, the Vladimir Tikhonov, which has a deadweight of 162 thousand tons, traversed the NSR in record time and became the largest tanker ever to navigate the Arctic routes. In October 2011, the tanker Mar Adriana traversed the NSR. In 2012, the first tanker to transport liquefied gas, the Reka Ob (Ob River), was chartered by a group of "Gazprom" and navigated the NSR. The voyage from Hammerfest, Norway to Japan took 28 days. Previously, in October 2012, the Reka Ob had safely completed the same voyage in the opposite direction without cargo. These two voyages of the tanker Reka Ob fully confirmed the technical and commercial availability of the NSR [27]. The development of the NSR over the last three years is shown in Figures Copyright 2014 by ASME

5 Figure 5 Transit cargo on the NSR from 2010 to 2013, (data taken from [28]) Figure 6 Number of transit vessels on the NSR in recent years ( ) (data taken from [28]). Figure 7 Number of foreign vessels operating under different flags from (data taken from [28]) 2013 Several important events in 2013 made the NSR a bonafide transport/transit lane. After many year wait, a legal and administrative base for the NSR was created in The Federal Law of Shipping on the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route was signed on the 28 th of July, 2012 by Russian President V. V. Putin and has been in force since the 27 th of January The federal state institution Administration of the Northern Sea Route (NSRA) was established in March 2013, and A. N. Ol shevsky was appointed as its leader [1]. On the 12 th of April, 2013, the Ministry of Justice registered the Rules of Navigation for NSR waters, which was approved by order of the Ministry of Transport on the 17 th of January, On the 15 th of April, 2013, the NSRA began operations and launched its website [1]. The goal of the administration is to organize navigation in NSR waters. Its primary functions include organizing icebreaking activities; performing navigational and hydrographic studies; overseeing legal security in sailing; performing studies on the prevention and elimination of oil spills in the NSR; and interacting with emergency services to prevent and mitigate emergency situations involving natural and man-made disasters on the NSR. Applications are submitted to the NSRA, which then considers the applications and issues permissions for navigation through the NSR. The NSRA also issues certificates for conventional ice pilotage on the NSR; compiles research on the weather, ice, navigational and other conditions; coordinates the installation of navigational aids; works to harmonize regions and carries out hydrographic survey operations on the NSR. Other very important functions of the NSRA include the organization of search and rescue operations; eliminating the consequences of pollution from vessels carrying harmful substances, sewage or garbage; and timely data retrieval from Russian hydrometeorological services for forecasting and ice analysis. Navigation on the NSR in 2013 continued in line with the developments of 2012, but a new condition was in effect for NSR administration, control and regulation: all ship owners had to apply for permission and follow the NSRA decisions. According to [ 1 ], 635 permissions to sail in NSR waters were issued in Eighty three applications were rejected, mostly because of insufficient documentation on liability, insurance, ice class certification and so on. More than 40% of these permissions were issued for vessels with no ice class, and 27% were for vessels with Ice 1-Ice 3 classes, which are designed to operate in non-arctic ice conditions and must be convoyed in ice-covered water [2]. Arc 4 and Arc 5 class vessels were the most prevalent among the ice-strengthened vessels (Figure 8). Fewer than half of the ships carried liquid cargo but transported more than 67% of the total volume in tonnage because of their large size. A diversity of resources were transported, including gas condensate belonging to the Novatek company from the port of Murmansk to 5 Copyright 2014 by ASME

6 Malaysia and South Korea, diesel fuel from Murmansk to Pevek and Nakhodka, tankers from the JSC "Murmansk Shipping Company and naphtha from Murmansk to Japan and from Norway to Japan. Approximately 20% of the total volume was bulk cargo and was delivered by only four vessels. Forty six vessels traversed from west to east and 30 vessels crossed from east to west. Most of the transit vessels were in the ice class Arc 4, and only a few ships were in the lower class Ice 3 [28]. constructed in Sabetta (a new port was established in 2012), Dudinka, Tiksi, Pevek, Providence and Anadyr [1]. The success of these initiatives will determine the commercial viability of the NSR. SAFETY OF NAVIGATING THE NSR The increased traffic in the NSR has made navigational safety very important from many different perspectives (ecological, human, political and rescue operation planning). The estimated risk of shipwrecks on the NSR is significantly smaller than in the world s oceans [19]. P = shipwrecks/ (years*operating vessels) Figure 8 Proportions of vessels with different ice classes that received permission to navigate the NSR in 2013 (data used taken from [1]) A total of 25 vessels sailed under non-russian flags from 11 states. Figure 7 shows the countries whose flags were carried by these ships. The average speed of the vessels during their passage through the NSR varied from 7-9 knots in July to 9-11 knots in August. The maximal average speed (14.1 knots) was achieved by MV Yong Sheng (which flew a Hong Kong Flag and was operated by COSCO SHIPPING) in delivering 16,651 tons of general cargo from Busan, South Korea to Rotterdam, the Netherlands from August to September. The fastest vessel in 2013 was the Nordic Odyssey, which sailed under the Panama flag and was operated by Nordic Bulk Carriers to deliver 66,000 tons of iron ore from Murmanks to Huanghua, China. This vessel traversed the NSR in September in 7.4 days at an average speed of 13.5 knots [28]. China's Yong Sheng voyage marked the beginning of large-scale container transportation and Chinese expansion on the NSR. At the peak of the navigation season, there were approximately ships that sailed daily through NSR waters. In general, more than half of the vessels were located in the Kara Sea. The Russian government is expending significant funds to ensure the safe navigation, to develop hydrometeorological support and to organize the new Marine Rescue Coordination Center in Dikson. Rescue bases will be There were 10 shipwrecks over the 80 years of NSR exploitation and four shipwrecks over 40 years of intensive exploitation, when approximately 250 ships sailed the route. Using these figures, the probability of a shipwreck occurring in the NSR was calculated to be 0.04% (i.e., four wrecks, were divided by 40 years of intensive exploitation, that multiplied by 250 ships). According to Lloyd s Register, the probability of a shipwreck occurring in the world ocean is % (a ship is lost every one to two days for 75,000 vessels in operation). The last shipwreck on the NSR occurred in 1983 when the freighter Nina Sagaydak was struck by an ice jet in the Chukchi Sea. More than 30 vessels were damaged during this extremely harsh autumn. Only small accidents have occurred since It is very important to understand that the low accident rate on the NSR results from the extremely strict restrictions on vessels entering the NSR and the provision of powerful icebreaking support. Furthermore, the Arctic is a very fragile region with a low self-purification capacity. Even small fuel leaks resulting from ship damage can lead to an ecological disaster. Forced abandonment of a damaged ship is very likely to result in fatalities under severe, high-latitude conditions. Therefore, any type of failure should be avoided, risks should be minimized and environmental emergency responses; search/ rescue resources and techniques should be improved and made more efficient. It is very important to learn from past experiences to achieve these goals. ICE CONDITIONS Sea-ice features inherent to the NSR have been considered in detail in [17, 29, 30], therefore, only situations that have occurred in recent years will be analyzed here. Ice conditions almost returned to normal in 2013 having reached the minimum extent, concentration, thickness and other characteristics in The entire Arctic is visualized in Figure 9, where the current sea ice extent is compared with the average sea ice extent over The sea-ice extent was below average in 2013 but remained within the standard deviation (see Figure 9). 6 Copyright 2014 by ASME

7 Figure 11 Overall assessment of expected ice conditions in the Arctic seas during the first half (September-October) of the 2013 navigation period [34] Figure 9 Arctic Sea-ice extent (i.e., area of ocean with at least 15% sea ice): the Y-axis shows the extent in millions of square kilometers, and the X-axis shows the months; the black line is the average extent over ; the grey band is the 2 standard deviation limits; the green dashed line is the sea ice extent in 2012 (i.e., the long-term minimum) and the brown line is the sea-ice extent in 2013 (compiled using data from [31]) Ice conditions on the NSR can be described in terms of the extension of ice massifs, where clusters of heavy hummocks have ice cohesions between seven and 10 on a 10- point scale. Long-term studies have shown that ice massifs form in certain Arctic regions. Ice massifs can seriously hamper navigation because nearby ice offers a very high resistance to ship motion. The Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute in St. Petersburg prepares ice condition maps and long-term forecasts. To estimate the ice condition background, the forecast is compared to average values that were calculated for [32]. The long-term forecast, a map of anomalies in the ice massif area in the Arctic seas and a map of expected ice conditions are published on the AARI website (and can also be found on the NSRA website during the navigation period see Figures 10-11). Figure 10 Anomalies in ice massif area in the Arctic seas during the first half (July-August) of the 2013 navigation period (deviations from long-term averages are shown in %) [33] In Figure 10, the shaded areas indicate the ice massif anomalies and their average extension (from ), and the deviation for each massif is indicated by a green bar and shown as a percentage. The ice massifs in 2013 occupied a smaller than average area, but this difference was not significant for some regions. Complex ice conditions on the NSR prevailed throughout the 2013 navigational season. The initial navigational conditions in the Kara Chukchi seas and the west part of the Laptev Sea were easy and of medium difficulty in the East Siberian sea and eastern part of the Lapter Sea. Except for the eastern part of the Kara Sea, navigation was easy during the second half of 2013 throughout the NSR (Figure 10). This exception created problems. The Northern Kara and Severnaya Zemlya ice massifs were partly maintained until the beginning of ice formation, and the Vilkitsky Strait (the key strait for the NSR) was constantly covered by ice for almost the entire navigation season. Thus, icebreaker support had to be used for transit voyages and led to an accident with the tanker Nordvik (see below). NSR: RECENT ICE-INDUCED ACCIDENTS Several accidents have occurred in recent years, despite rather easy ice conditions. On the 11 th of July, 2011, in the East Siberian Sea, the tanker Perseverance, carrying 60,000 tons of gas condensate onboard, leaned against the stern of (i.e., collided with) the nuclear-powered icebreaker Taymyr. The incident occurred under heavy ice conditions when the icebreakers Yamal and Taymyr were overcoming the cross hummock and rapidly lost speed [35]. There was no environmental pollution. The damage was assessed to be minimal and was located four meters above the waterline. However, the accident raised questions concerning safe speeds and distances for shipping convoys. Selecting the right speed and distance always poses a great challenge for captains because these factors affect profitability. Maintaining a large distance from an icebreaker can cause the canal ice to close, whereas maintaining a small distance creates a collision risk. 7 Copyright 2014 by ASME

8 Two ships, both operated by Neste Shipping, were damaged by ice on the NSR in Ice conditions were still quite harsh in early June and resulted in damage to the west-bound ship Mt Stena Poseidon. Mt Palva sailed from Murmansk on the 14 th of July, 2012 with a NSR passage time of 8.6 days. The ice conditions were harsh in some places, and the vessel sustained some damage. The damage to both vessels was primarily caused by contact with ice blocks. Damage could have been avoided by the vessels reducing their speeds [36]. Figure 12 Schematic of Nordvik accident, created using sea ice map provided by AARI [37] In September 2013, the tanker Nordvik, which was loaded with diesel fuel, was holed by an ice floe and suffered an ingress of water in NSR waters [2]. The Nordvik was supposed to deliver fuel from Ob Bay to the port of Khatanga (Figure 12). The vessel had been given permission by the NSRA to sail in the Kara and Laptev seas under light ice conditions and only under escort by an icebreaker. The Federal Agency for Sea and River Transport stated that the tanker acted in violation of the permit by entering waters with medium ice conditions without an icebreaker escort. Experienced captains submitted that it was quite possible that the ice conditions had changed rapidly and that the tanker had unintentionally ended up in an area with heavy ice conditions. The Commission has not yet decided the case proceedings. Nevertheless, on the 4 th of September, the 138-meter long, 6403-dwt tanker Nordvik was struck and holed by ice while sailing in the Matisen Strait to the north of the Taimyr Peninsula. The tanker quickly began taking in water through one of the ballast tanks. The ship s owner, Khatanga Commercial Port, was negotiating with the nuclear icebreaker operator Rosatomflot to have the tanker escorted to the port of Khatanga. However, all four icebreakers were occupied escorting a Russian military group of 10 different vessels of the Northern Fleet that were led by the heavy missile cruiser Petr Veliky. On the 10 th of September, the hole (which measured 100 cm x 10 cm) was plugged with a cement box to stem the water ingress. No information is available on any oil leakage. On the 11 th of September, a total of 1800 liters of diesel oil was reloaded from the Nordvik into the tanker Boris Vilkitsky. The next day, the Nordvik and the Boris Vilkitsky were accompanied by two nuclear-powered icebreakers (the Taymyr and the Vaygach) out of the Matisen Strait. On the 14 th of September, the tankers reached open water, departed the NSR waters three days later and sailed to the Anabar River. The case was settled but raised the question of ecological safety in the Arctic. The popular headline at the time was Four icebreakers for missile cruiser none for damaged tanker [38]. The accident showed that ice conditions in the Arctic remain harsh and unpredictable. The course of events revealed that vessels or ship owners do not always follow the NSRA rules and orders. Seafarers on NRS can not expect the aid will be provided immediately. At the beginning of September 2013, another rescue operation unfolded in the Eastern Sector of the Arctic. The Russian icebreaker Admiral Makarov had to make a voyage to the point coordinates N, W, where two French adventurers had triggered their distress beacon. The team "Quest through the Pole" had left point Barrow on the 6 th of July to cross the Arctic via the North Pole to Spitsbergen on a specially constructed catamaran. Until the 30 th of August, the adventurers exhausted every effort to continue their mission before being finally forced to give up because of bad meteorological conditions. The adventurers could not return home on their own and had to ask for help. These travelers were extremely lucky in that an icebreaker was available and able to reach their location before the weather became extremely dangerous. NSR FEE AND ICEBREAKING SUPPORT Commercial use of the NSR necessitates the consideration of icebreaker fees (tariffs). From the 1990s until 2011, the NSR fees were much higher than those for the Suez Channel. These fees made the route unprofitable. In 2011, the Federal Tariff Service of the Russian Federation introduced a flexible fare (the FTS of Russia 122-t /1 for the 7 th Jun, 2011) for icebreaker services o n the NSR, which allows tariffs to be applied below the limit and adjusts tariffs to market conditions. Today, the fees for NSR use are set by the Russians, and non-russian ship owners claim that these fees are often overestimated. Currently, it is three times more expensive to charter an atomic icebreaker than to charter a cargo ship. This rate is approximately 100 thousand USD per day. This service is not economical for most non-russian ship owners who wish to use the NSR with an ice-free surface. The Murmansk Rosatomflot has become unprofitable and is now subsidized by the state in the amount of 1.2 billion RUB annually (approximately 33 million USD per year) [26]. New 8 Copyright 2014 by ASME

9 Russian laws concerning the NSR base the payment for icebreaking support on the volume of services provided. Currently, all the income from the NSR is collected by Rosatomflot as rates for icebreaker assistance. An additional source of revenue for Russia from the NSR is in the form of deductions from insurance premiums for traversing the NSR. It is unclear how this source of revenue will relate to future revenues and expenses of the Russian NSR. Nevertheless, the Russian State remains interested in the control and development of international transit navigation through the NSR. Five icebreakers will work on the NSR in 2014: three Arktika-type nuclear icebreakers (the Sovetsky Souz (1989), the Yamal (1992) and the 50 let Pobedy (2007)), and two Taymyr-type icebreakers (the Taymyr (1989) and the Vaygach (1990)). The icebreakers built from 1980 to 1990 are in need of reconstruction and replacement. In November 2013, construction of the world s largest and most powerful nuclear-powered icebreaker began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. The vessel will be powered by two nuclear reactors and will be 173 meters long and 34 meters wide, which is 14 meters longer and 4 meters wider than the largest current icebreaker 50 let Pobedy. The new icebreaker is expected to become operational in The vessel will cost 1.1 billion and enable the NSR to be used year-round. There will be three icebreakers in the LK60 series with an overall power of 60 MW and a variable draught from 8.5 to 10.8 meters. Rosatomflot also decided to restore the nuclear lighter container Sevmorput, which will become operational again in February As the old icebreakers are very close to the end of their usable life and new icebreakers are not yet ready, icebreakers will soon become scarce. The increase in traffic on the NSR necessitates a longer preparation time for convoys. The NSR passage time could easily reach days, including the waiting time for the icebreakers [36]. Longer waiting time could critically affect trade via the NSR because the competitiveness of the route is based on voyage times being shorter than those for voyages via the Suez Canal. Better planning could significantly shorten the waiting time. INSURANCE ISSUES The third international conference on Marine Insurance in Russia was held in November 2013 in Moscow by the Union of Marine Insurers. At the conference, the expertise of the insurance companies and their demands were used to identify the primary navigational risks in the Arctic, as given below [39]. Distant routes and harsh conditions for salvage Difficult navigation conditions (i.e., low temperatures, sea ice, fog, part of the navigation takes place in darkness (i.e., in the polar night)) Raft restrictions Communication difficulties Lack of infrastructure, ship repair facilities Requirement that crew has experience in ice navigation Lack of icebreakers Sailing of large vessels in convoys under icebreaker support Sailing of vessels without ice class designations All of these factors cause insurance premiums to increase or in the insurer refusing to provide coverage. SUMMARY Russian and international experts expect the total amount of cargo shipped on the NSR to increase in the near future [3, 18] because of hydrocarbon production and the use of transit (both Russian and international) ships as well as an increase in the navigation period. Using the baseline scenario for the program, it was estimated that the total amount of cargo transported through the NSR could increase to 28.8 million tons by This growth will primarily depend on the rate of extraction of mineral resources and increases in international transportation. The salient issue here is the increase in the polar navigation time, which depends on the development of the primary infrastructure such as ports, the icebreaking and transport fleet, and rescue and emergency support. Improvements in the infrastructure to ensure safety and flexible tariff policies will attract consumers. Economic feasibility and the recent actions of the Russian Authority indicate that such improvements are very real. Possible competition from the Northwest Passage and overland routes will motivate these efforts. Navigation during 2013 showed that despite global warming expectations, ice conditions on the NSR remained heavy and unpredictable. Icebreaker support and the experience of ice piloting will play a key role in the future. Environmental issues are very important in the fragile Arctic. Significant public concern and activities have compelled politicians and industry to significantly increase safety in the Arctic. High expectations have been imposed in this regards on the Polar Code, which was developed by the International Maritime Organization. This mandatory international code on the safety of ships operating in polar waters is designed to cover the full range of design, construction, equipment, operations, training, search and rescue and environmental protection issues that are relevant to ships operating in the inhospitable waters surrounding the two poles. After several years, work on the Polar Code may conclude in 2014 [40]. The establishment of the Polar Code will force all of the services operating in the Arctic to follow strict regulations. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank the SAMCoT project (funded by the Research Council of Norway), the SMIDA project (funded by the Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Education) and her colleagues for supporting this study. 9 Copyright 2014 by ASME

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