Appendices. Introduction to Appendices
|
|
- Ezra Horton
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Appendices Introduction to Appendices To assist the reader in understanding how some of the analytical tools such as dependency diagrams, fault tree analysis (FTA) and Markov analysis may be applied to typical systems, four Appendices are included. These appendices address the following systems: Appendix A. Safety Analysis Flight System Appendix B. Safety Analysis Electronic Flight Instrument System Appendix C. Safety Analysis Electrical System Appendix D. Safety Analysis Engine System The analyses in the Appendices are presented in a simple mathematical fashion to provide the reader with purely advisory and illustrative material. The failure rate probabilities offered are for the purposes of illustrating the analysis methods and to draw simple conclusions; they are not representative of any real equipment or technologies. The analyses should not be considered as definitive of the standard that would be demanded during formal aircraft system design. Nevertheless, it is hoped that they will aid the reader in appreciating some of the design issues that need to be considered early on in the design process. Refer to Chapter 4 for further relevant sections. During formal design, engineers utilise professional, qualified design tools to undertake the appropriate analysis in a rigorous fashion. At the same time, these tools provide the required documentation to the standard necessary to convince the certification authorities that the design is safe. Civil Avionics Systems, Second Edition. Ian Moir, Allan Seabridge and Malcolm Jukes John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2013 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
2 Appendix A Safety Analysis Flight System This example evaluates the catastrophic failure case of total loss of the pitch axis of a fly-bywire flight control system. It is a much simplified analysis, but serves to illustrate the principles and differences between the dependency diagram approach and the fault tree approach. A.1 Flight System Architecture The flight control system architecture is shown in Figure A.1. The primary means of controlling the aircraft in the pitch axis is by means of two elevators attached to either side of the rear of the tailplane horizontal stabiliser (THS). Each elevator section is operated by two hydraulic actuators powered from one of the three aircraft centralised hydraulic systems: yellow (Y), green (G) and blue (B), as indicated. Normally one actuator on each side is the controlling actuator, while the other is in damping mode, but for the purposes of this analysis we shall assume they are all the same, and that the aircraft is still controllable (albeit with some performance limitations) provided just one actuator is operational. We shall assume the actuators fail into a neutral position. Elevator actuator demand is digitally signalled from four flight control computers. In normal mode the two elevator/aileron computers (ELACs) implement the control functions for the primary flight control surfaces. Should these computers fail, then reduced functionality is available from the spoiler/elevator computers (SECs) which normally control the secondary flight control surfaces. Each of these computers utilises a dual command:monitor architecture, but for the purposes of this analysis we shall assume that fly-by-wire demands in the pitch axis are available provided one of the four computers is operational. In manual flight, the captain or first officer input their pitch commands through a side-stick controller, one per crew member. In autoflight, pitch commands are sourced from the autopilot. Envelope protection requires the provision of aircraft attitude and air data. For the purposes of this simplified analysis we shall assume the aircraft is being flown manually within its permitted flight envelope. Civil Avionics Systems, Second Edition. Ian Moir, Allan Seabridge and Malcolm Jukes John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2013 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
3 Appendix A: Safety Analysis Flight System 535 Trim Wheel Mechanical Linkage THS Motors G Y THS B Y Elevators s Autopilot IRS ADC Primary Flight Computers ELAC Autotrim Normal Alternate Normal G B SEC SEC Autotrim Alternate Secondary Flight Computers Figure A.1 Fly-by-wire flight control system pitch axis The aircraft is trimmed in the pitch axis by slow long-term movements of the tailplane horizontal stabiliser (THS). In normal operation this function is commanded automatically by the flight control computers via two hydraulic motors and a ball screw drive. Total loss of these computers will leave the aircraft in a trim condition. Emergency backup in the pitch axis is provided by a mechanical linkage from the trim wheel located in the centre console between the two crew members. A.2 Dependency Diagram Figure A.2 provides the simplified dependency diagram for the architecture described. Considering first the primary flight control system: Pitch axis control is lost if both left-hand right-hand elevators fail indicated by the parallel nature of the branches. Each elevator is lost if both of its actuator channels are unavailable. An actuator channel is lost if either the actuator fails the hydraulic system that powers it fails the demand signal is lost indicated by the series nature of the each branch. The actuator arrangement as shown is quadruplex, but there is a problem in that the aircraft has only three hydraulic systems. The blue hydraulic system is used on both elevators. Loss of the blue hydraulics system is a common mode failure. It is not easy to model this in a
4 536 Civil Avionics Systems Side Stick Captain Side Stick F/Officer 4.0x x10-16 ELAC 1.0x10-4 ELAC 2 SEC1 SEC2 ELAC = Elevator/Aileron Computer SEC = Spoiler/Elevator Computer 10.x10-8 Blue Green Yellow Blue 9.1x x10-4 Note: Ignore Blue actuator for Elevator common mode faults Left Hand Elevator Right Hand Elevator Primary Pitch All failure rate probabilities are per flight hour 9.5x x10-15 Total Pitch TrimWheel Back-Up Motor 3.0x10-4 Motor Ball Screw 1.5x10-5 THS 1.2x x10-8 Figure A.2 Fly-by-wire flight control system dependency diagram (simplified) dependency diagram, so the simple approximation is to ignore the second blue channel and the treat the actuator channels as triplex. This will yield a pessimistic, but safe result. Demands to the actuators are computed by the four flight control computers. Crew input commands are sourced from two side-stick controllers (captain and first officer). For the primary flight control function, if we assume the probability of failures per hour are as follows (note: these figures are for illustrative purposes only and do not represent the failure probabilities of actual equipment), then: Side-stick controller: per flight hour (MTBF 500,000 hrs): duplex = per flight hour. Flight control computer: per flight hour (MTBF 10,000 hrs): quadruplex = per flight hour. Elevator actuator: signal transmission: per flight hour plus hydraulic system: per flight hour (MTBF 5000 hrs) plus hydraulic actuator: per flight hour (MTBF 4000 hrs) So single actuator lane = per flight hour: triplex = per flight hour. Thus the probability of loss of the primary flight control system is per flight hour.
5 Appendix A: Safety Analysis Flight System 537 For the trim function, if we assume the probability of failures per hour are as follows: Trim wheel: per flight hour (MTBF 500,000 hrs). motor: per flight hour [ /hr] (MTBF 3333 hrs): duplex = per flight hour. Ball screw: per flight hour (MTBF 100,000 hrs). Thus the probability of loss of the mechanical backup trim function is per flight hour. Although we could compute the catastrophic loss of flight control in the pitch axis as per flight hour, it is somewhat unrealistic as the aircraft would never be flown by the emergency backup system for anything other than a dire emergency, and then only to make an emergency landing at the nearest available airfield. The duty cycle of the emergency system is somewhat uncertain and a judgement would need to be made as to what figure to use. A.3 Fault Tree Analysis Figure A.3 provides the simplified fault tree for the architecture described. The fault tree approach facilitates a more complete model of the system architecture in respect of the 2.5x x10-8 LHI G Databus 1 2.5x10-4 LHO RHO 6.3x10-8 B Databus 2 Databus 3 1.0x x10-16 Elevator 4.1x10-11 All failure rate probabilities are per flight hour 1.0x10-4 ELAC 1 ELAC 2 SEC 1 SEC 2 1.0x10-16 RHI Y Databus 4 Sidestick Captain Sidestick F/ Officer 4.0x10-12 Primary Pitch 4.5x10-11 Total Loss of Pitch Trim Wheel 3.0x10-4 Hyd Motor G Hyd Motor Y 1.0x x10-8 Ball Screw 1.2x10-5 Mechanical Back-Up 5.4x10-16 Figure A.3 Fly-by-wire flight control system fault free diagram (simplified)
6 538 Civil Avionics Systems actuator power sources and the dual use of the blue hydraulic system by actuators driving both the left-hand and the right-hand elevators. In Figure A.3 the elevators are modelled as: Two inner sections (left hand and right hand), either of which is lost if either the associated actuator fails the associated hydraulic system fails the associated data bus signal fails: = per flight hour each; and Two outer sections, both of which are lost if both actuators fail both data bus signals fail the associated hydraulic system fails: = per flight hour. Using the same probabilities as before: The probability of loss of all four elevator sections (left-hand inner right-hand inner both outer sections) becomes per flight hour (c.f for the dependency diagram method); The probability of loss of the primary flight controls system (both controllers all four flight control computers the elevators) becomes per flight hour (c.f for the dependency diagram method). The difference between the two methods reflects the improved fidelity of the fault tree analysis, but it is not that significant in the overall scheme of things. It is the order of magnitude that is important when assessing the architecture against the safety objective, in this case to be less than per flight hour for a catastrophic event. The probability of loss of the primary flight control system for a three-hour flight time is obtained by factoring the probability of failure of each component by the time at risk. Thus, for example, the probability of failure of all four flight control computers during a three-hour flight time is ( per flight hour) 4 = per flight. The probability of loss of the primary flight control system for a three-hour time of risk becomes (fault tree method) which indicates that a more robust architecture may be needed for long haul and ETOPS flight operations, as is indeed the case in the flight control system architectures for the Airbus A340, the A380 and the Boeing 787.
The organisation of the Airbus. A330/340 flight control system. Ian Sommerville 2001 Airbus flight control system Slide 1
Airbus flight control system The organisation of the Airbus A330/340 flight control system Ian Sommerville 2001 Airbus flight control system Slide 1 Fly by wire control Conventional aircraft control systems
More informationApplicability / Compatibility of STPA with FAA Regulations & Guidance. First STAMP/STPA Workshop. Federal Aviation Administration
Applicability / Compatibility of STPA with FAA Regulations & Guidance First STAMP/STPA Workshop Presented by: Peter Skaves, FAA Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for Advanced Avionics Briefing Objectives
More informationFlight control checks Flight Control Events
Operational Liaison Meeting Fly-By-Wire Aircraft 2004 Flight control checks Flight Control Events Customer Services Contents Introduction Typical Flight Control Events Enhanced SOP F/CTL CHECKS Conclusion
More informationAIRBUS FlyByWire How it really works
AIRBUS FlyByWire How it really works Comparison between APOLLO s and Phoenix PSS Airbus FlyByWire implementation for FS2002 Copyright by APOLLO Software Publishing The FlyByWire control implemented on
More informationAdvanced Flight Control System Failure States Airworthiness Requirements and Verification
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Procedia Engineering 80 (2014 ) 431 436 3 rd International Symposium on Aircraft Airworthiness, ISAA 2013 Advanced Flight Control System Failure
More informationFly-by-wire. Contents. Development. Fly-by-wire
Fly-by-wire From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Fly-by-wire (FBW) is a system that replaces the conventional manual flight controls of an aircraft with an electronic interface. The movements of flight
More informationCanadair Regional Jet 100/200 - Automatic Flight Control System
1. INTRODUCTION The automatic flight control system (AFCS) provides integration of the autopilot and flight director systems. The AFCS system consists of two interlinked flight control computers (FCC 1
More informationGlobal Avionics Training Specialists, LLC
Global Avionics Training Specialists, LLC BOMBARDIER CANADAIR CHALLENGER SPZ-8000/CL-601-3A AVIONICS SUITE LINE MAINTENANCE FAMILIARIZATION COURSE SYLLABUS I. INTRODUCTION A. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The SPZ-8000
More informationOverview ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices for Aerodrome Safeguarding
Overview ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices for Aerodrome Safeguarding References The Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) ICAO SARPS Annex 14 Vol. I, 7 th Edition, July
More informationAIRBUS FLY-BY-WIRE A TOTAL APPROACH TO DEPENDABILITY
IFIP/WCC/topical event «fault-tolerance for trustworthy and dependable information infrastructure» August 2004 Presented by Pascal TRAVERSE And Isabelle Lacaze & Jean Souyris AIRBUS FLY-BY-WIRE A TOTAL
More informationResearch on Controlled Flight Into Terrain Risk Analysis Based on Bow-tie Model and WQAR Data
2017 Asia-Pacific Engineering and Technology Conference (APETC 2017) ISBN: 978-1-60595-443-1 Research on Controlled Flight Into Terrain Risk Analysis Based on Bow-tie Model and WQAR Data Haofeng Wang,
More informationAIRBUS FLY-BY-WIRE A TOTAL APPROACH TO DEPENDABILITY
SAE Aerospace Control & Guidance Systems committee Presented by Pascal TRAVERSE And Isabelle Lacaze & Jean Souyris AIRBUS FLY-BY-WIRE A TOTAL APPROACH TO DEPENDABILITY Reference: by Pascal TRAVERSE, Isabelle
More informationAddendum: UAV Avionics
Addendum: UAV Avionics Dr. Bérénice Mettler University of Minnesota Jan. 29, 2012 (v.1/24/13) Dr. Bérénice Mettler (University of Minnesota) Addendum: UAV Avionics Jan. 29, 2012 (v.1/24/13) 1 / 8 Overview
More informationGUERNSEY ADVISORY CIRCULARS. (GACs) UPSET PREVENTION AND RECOVERY TRAINING GAC 121/135-2
GUERNSEY ADVISORY CIRCULARS (GACs) GAC 121/135-2 UPSET PREVENTION AND RECOVERY TRAINING Published by the Director of Civil Aviation, Guernsey First Issue August 2018 Guernsey Advisory Circulars (GACs)
More informationKEY FEATURES IN SHORT
KA C90/B200/350 KA C90/B200/350 It is the fixed base simulator of commercial turboprop multi-crew aircraft. The simulator meets all the requirements determined for EASA CS-FSTD(A) FNPTII +MCC level. The
More informationEASA Safety Information Bulletin
EASA Safety Information Bulletin EASA SIB No: 2014-29 SIB No.: 2014-29 Issued: 24 October 2014 Subject: Minimum Cabin Crew for Twin Aisle Aeroplanes Ref. Publications: Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012
More informationdel Airbus en el mundo de la
Ing Ivan Ramirez Centro de ensayos de Airbus en Toulouse-Francia Automatización del Airbus en el mundo de la aviación Fly by wire aircraft Page 2 Contents Fly by wire principles Flight Handling Page 3
More informationAnalyzing Risk at the FAA Flight Systems Laboratory
Analyzing Risk at the FAA Flight Systems Laboratory Presented to: Workshop By: Dr. Richard Greenhaw, FAA AFS-440 Date: 29 November, 2005 Flight Systems Laboratory Who we are How we analyze risk Airbus
More informationGlass Cockpits in General Aviation Aircraft. Consequences for training and simulators. Fred Abbink
Glass Cockpits in General Aviation Aircraft. Consequences for training and simulators Fred Abbink Content Development of Air transport cockpits, avionics, automation and safety Pre World War 2 Post World
More informationCirrus SR22 registered F-HTAV Date and time 11 May 2013 at about 16 h 20 (1) Operator Place Type of flight Persons on board
www.bea.aero REPORT ACCIDENT Bounce on landing in strong wind, go-around and collision with terrain (1) Unless otherwise mentioned, the times given in this report are local. Aircraft Cirrus SR22 registered
More informationAviation studies projectgroep 1K
0 Foreword The airline Amsterdam Airlines Leeuwenburg (ALA) will expand its fleet with new aircraft. The final selection should be made between the Boeing 737NG or Airbus A320. Before this choice can be
More informationPitot/Static System. Avionics. Single ADC LEFT PITOT TUBE AIR DATA COMPUTER RIGHT PITOT TUBE COPILOT ASI PILOT COPILOT ASI VSI PILOT
Pitot/Static System Single ADC Avionics LEFT PITOT TUBE CO ASI RIGHT PITOT TUBE ASI TRANSPONDER FLIGHT RECORDER FLIGHT DIRECTOR AUTO CO CO VSI CABIN AIR PRESSURE VSI AURAL WARNING UNIT (MACH WARNING) AURAL
More informationBoeing 777 Triple Triple Redundant Flight Controller
Fault-tolerance Seminar Summer term 2005 Boeing 777 Triple Triple Redundant Flight Controller Prof. Dr. Polze Renneberg 1 Boeing 777 Table of Contents General Remarks/Scope Features and Technologies of
More informationSimulator General Description
KLM 767-300ER Full Flight Simulator Technical Description Simulator General Description Operator/Sponsor Location Manufacturer KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Schipol International Airport/KLM Flight Training
More informationPublications and Training Solutions Course Syllabus:
COURSE TITLE: Pro Line 4 CRJ200 Flight Line Maintenance Flight Line Maintenance (Level I) PREREQUISITES: Students should have a basic knowledge of aircraft avionics systems and a working command of the
More informationMODEL AERONAUTICAL ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA
MODEL AERONAUTICAL DISPLAY PROCEDURE MOP019 APPROVED: MAAA PRESIDENT Date: 18/09/2013 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION... 1 2. PURPOSE... 1 3. SCOPE... 1 4. REFERENCES... 1 5. DEFINITIONS... 2 6. POLICY...
More informationFLIGHT SAFETY Technology and the Human Factor. A pilot s perspective by Prof. dr ir J.A. Mulder Delft University of Technology
FLIGHT SAFETY Technology and the Human Factor A pilot s perspective by Prof. dr ir J.A. Mulder Delft University of Technology Contents How safe is it? The common causes of accidents The Flight Deck: past,
More informationNational Air Transport Facilitation Program Kingdom of Bahrain
National Air Transport Facilitation Program Kingdom of Bahrain Introduction: Speed is the comparative advantage of air transport on all other modes of transportation. The success of state depends on the
More informationCase No COMP/M SEXTANT / DIEHL. REGULATION (EEC) No 4064/89 MERGER PROCEDURE. Article 6(1)(b) NON-OPPOSITION Date: 29/08/2000
EN Case No COMP/M.2095 - SEXTANT / DIEHL Only the English text is available and authentic. REGULATION (EEC) No 4064/89 MERGER PROCEDURE Article 6(1)(b) NON-OPPOSITION Date: 29/08/2000 Also available in
More informationECLIPSE 500. Aircraft Overview. Do Not Use For Flight
ECLIPSE 500 Aircraft Overview Do Not Use For Flight 1. Aircraft Overview 1.1 General The Eclipse 500 is a twin-turbofan aircraft powered by two Pratt & Whitney Canada PW610F-A engines. It is a five- to
More informationEE Chapter 12 Design and Maintenance of Aircraft System
EE 2145230 Chapter 12 Design and Maintenance of Aircraft System 12.1 Requirements for Electrical Systems Proper maintenance of aircraft requires that the electrical systems be kept in the best possible
More informationAeroplane State Awareness during Go-around (ASAGA)
Aeroplane State Awareness during Go-around (ASAGA) INTRODUCTION Towards the end of the 2000 s, the BEA observed that a number of public air transport accidents or serious incidents were caused by a problem
More informationInternational Civil Aviation Organization
International Civil Aviation Organization THE FOURTH MEETING OF STUDY AND IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE ( SITF/4) Nadi, Fiji, 26-28 October 2005 Agenda Item 13: Discuss issues observed during the trial and
More informationAvionics Certification. Dhruv Mittal
Avionics Certification Dhruv Mittal 1 Motivation Complex Avionics systems have been regulated for a long time Autonomous systems are being researched and built in avionics right now Research in avionics
More informationAll-Weather Operations Training Programme
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA CIVIL AVIATION DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION OC NO 3 OF 2014 Date: OPERATIONS CIRCULAR Subject: All-Weather Operations Training Programme 1. INTRODUCTION In order to
More informationF I N A L R E P O R T ON SERIOUS INCIDENT OF THE AIRCRAFT SR-20, REGISTRATION D-ELLT, WHICH OCCURED ON MAY , AT ZADAR AIRPORT
THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA Air, Maritime and Railway Traffic Accident Investigation Agency Air Traffic Accident Investigation Department CLASS: 343-08/17-03/03 No: 699-04/1-18-15 Zagreb, 8 th June 2018 F
More informationCAAC Continuing Airworthiness of Domestic Designed Transport Airplanes
CAAC Continuing Airworthiness of Domestic Designed Transport Airplanes By: Sun Yingjun 2015 Content 1 Basic Regulation Frame 2 Introduction of CAAC AC-21-19 3 Organization 4 Working Documents 2 1. Basic
More informationFINAL REPORT. Aircraft Type and Registration: No. and Type of Engines:
AAIU Synoptic Report No: 2006-022 AAIU File No: 2005/0062 Published: 9/10/06 In accordance with the provisions of SI 205 of 1997, the Chief Inspector of Accidents, on 4/10/05, appointed Mr. John Hughes
More informationSpecial Conditions: Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (BHTI), Model 525 Helicopter; Mode
This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 12/07/2017 and available online at https://federalregister.gov/d/2017-26418, and on FDsys.gov [4910-13] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
More informationAIRWORTHINESS PROCEDURES MANUAL CHAPTER 26. Modifications and Repairs
November 2017 Page 1 of 10 CHAPTER 26 1. Introduction Modifications and Repairs 1.1 CAR M states that a person or organisation repairing an aircraft or component should assess the damage against published
More informationTANZANIA CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES INSPECTORATE. Title: CONSTRUCTION OF VISUAL AND INSTRUMENT FLIGHT PROCEDURES
Page 1 of 8 1. PURPOSE 1.1. This Advisory Circular provides guidance to personnel involved in construction of instrument and visual flight procedures for publication in the Aeronautical Information Publication.
More informationFlight test organisation
Flight test organisation Dominique ROLAND Dirk RICHARD DOATLM/GA Test Pilot DOATL/Former Army helicopter pilot Issue: 1 Revision: 2 Who is this course for? DOATL: DOA Team Leaders You will learn about:
More informationCLASS RATING INSTRUCTOR FOR SINGLE PILOT SINGLE ENGINE AEROPLANES
CLASS RATING INSTRUCTOR FOR SINGLE PILOT SINGLE ENGINE AEROPLANES TRAINING SYLLABUS 1 The syllabus is divided into three sections as follows:- ANDREWSFIELD AVIATION LIMITED SYLLABUS Section One Section
More informationAlpha Systems AOA Classic & Ultra CALIBRATION PROCEDURES
Alpha Systems AOA Calibration Overview The calibration of the Alpha Systems AOA has 3 simple steps 1.) (On the Ground) Zero calibration 2.) (In-flight) Optimum Alpha Angle (OAA) calibration 3.) (In-flight)
More informationTABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION...
Staff Instruction Subject: Airworthiness Evaluation of the Installation of IFR Equipment to Allow the Removal of the VFR Only Operating Condition from the Special Certificate of Airworthiness Amateur-Built
More informationflightops Diminishing Skills? flight safety foundation AeroSafetyWorld July 2010
Diminishing Skills? 30 flight safety foundation AeroSafetyWorld July 2010 flightops An examination of basic instrument flying by airline pilots reveals performance below ATP standards. BY MICHAEL W. GILLEN
More informationAdvisory Circular (AC)
Advisory Circular (AC) Flight Test Considerations For The Approval Of The Design Of Aircraft Modifications File No. 5009-6-513 AC No. 513-003 RDIMS No. 528350-V3 Issue No. 01 Issuing Branch Aircraft Certification
More informationAir Law and ATC Procedures Subject: AIR LAW AND ATC PROCEDURES
Air Law and ATC Procedures Subject: Classroom Instruction: YES (Workshop) Appr. # of Instruction Hrs: 3 Internal Examination: YES ITSS (online) / Offline International Law: Conventions, Agreements and
More informationOVERSEAS TERRITORIES AVIATION REQUIREMENTS (OTARs)
OVERSEAS TERRITORIES AVIATION REQUIREMENTS (OTARs) Part 173 FLIGHT CHECKING ORGANISATION APPROVAL Published by Air Safety Support International Ltd Air Safety Support International Limited 2005 ISBN 0-11790-410-4
More informationD DAVID PUBLISHING. Development and Achievement of the T-50 Flight Control s Consolidated OFP. 1. Introduction. 2. Consolidated OFP s Needs
Journal of Aerospace Science and Technology 1 (2015) 67-72 doi: 10.17265/2332-8258/2015.02.003 D DAVID PUBLISHING Development and Achievement of the T-50 Flight Control s Consolidated OFP Soon Ryong Jang,
More informationIntegrated Flight Instrument Systems
Unit 91: Integrated Flight Instrument Systems Unit code: F/601/7250 QCF level: 5 Credit value: 15 Aim This unit aims to develop learners understanding of the principles and applications of aircraft flight
More informationAERONAUTICAL INFORMATION CIRCULAR Belgium and Luxembourg
AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION CIRCULAR AIM Belgium Control Tower Tervuursesteenweg 303 1830 Steenokkerzeel BELGIUM FAX: +32 (0) 2 206 24 19 AFS: EBVAYOYX Email: aip.production@belgocontrol.be URL: www.belgocontrol.be
More informationTABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION...
Advisory Circular Subject: In-Flight Entertainment Systems Issuing Office: Aircraft Certification Activity Area: Qualification No.: 500-022 File No.: 5009-32-4 Issue No.: 01 RDIMS No.: 1193699-V9 Effective
More informationBY MARK LACAGNINA. Stefan Sonnenberg/Airliners.net
BY MARK LACAGNINA Check Flight Stefan Sonnenberg/Airliners.net 22 flight safety foundation AeroSafetyWorld November 2010 Goes Bad The crew was unaware that the A320 s angle-of-attack sensors were frozen.
More informationTechnical Standard Order
Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration Aircraft Certification Service Washington, DC TSO-C145a Effective Date: 09/19/02 Technical Standard Order Subject: AIRBORNE NAVIGATION SENSORS
More informationMulti/many core in Avionics Systems
Multi/many core in Avionics Systems 4th TORRENTS Workshop December, 13 th 2013 Presented by Jean-Claude LAPERCHE - AIRBUS Agenda Introduction Processors Evolution/Market Aircraft needs Multi/Many-core
More informationInvestigation Report. Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung. Identification. Factual Information
Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation Investigation Report 5X002-0/07 May 2010 Identification Type of Occurrence: Serious Incident Date: 24. January
More informationAVIONICS L. Independent Guided Study
MODULE DESCRIPTOR TITLE SI MODULE CODE CREDITS 4 AVIOICS 55-4909-00L LEVEL 20 JACS CODE H430 SUBJECT GROUP Engineering Design Technology DEPARTMET Engineering and Mathematics MODULE LEADER J. Holding MODULE
More informationCHAPTER 5 AEROPLANE PERFORMANCE OPERATING LIMITATIONS
CHAP 5-1 CHAPTER 5 PERFORMANCE OPERATING LIMITATIONS 5.1 GENERAL 5.1.1 Aeroplanes shall be operated in accordance with a comprehensive and detailed code of performance established by the Civil Aviation
More informationBiweekly , report of Safety Information Publications between 07/03/ /03/2011
2011-0048 2011-03-18 ) LTD AVRO146RJ, 146 Time Limits / Maintenance Checks - Airworthiness Limitations - Amendment / Implementation CF-2011-04 2011-03-17 BOMBARDIER DHC-8 Cracking of the Outer Wing Fuel
More informationBRITISH GLIDING ASSOCIATION
BRITISH GLIDING ASSOCIATION SYLLABUS OF TRAINING BGA SOLO CERTIFICATE AND BRONZE AND CROSS COUNTRY ENDORSEMENTS V4 June 08 Copyright British Gliding Association 1 BGA SOLO CERTIFICATE (The A Certificate)
More informationFeasibility of Battery Backup for Flight Recorders
KEYWORDS Aviation Cockpit Voice Recorder Flight Data Recorder Battery backup Feasibility of Battery Backup for Flight Recorders Duncan W. Schofield AlliedSignal Inc., Air Transport & Regional Avionics
More informationNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Office of Aviation Safety Washington, D.C Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Actuator Factual Report
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Office of Aviation Safety 20594 Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Actuator Factual Report June 5, 2014 A. ACCIDENT DCA12RA025 Location: 70 nm South of Monterrey, Mexico Date:
More informationUNIQUE DEPENDABILITY ISSUES FOR COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE FLY BY WIRE SYSTEMS
UNIQUE DEPENDABILITY ISSUES FOR COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE FLY BY WIRE SYSTEMS Ying C. (Bob) Yeh Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Seattle, WA, USA ying.c.yeh@boeing.com Abstract: Key words: The fundamental concept
More informationNational Microelectronics Institute Available from:
Wright, S. (2015) Model based testing of avionics. In: Model Driven Engineering 2015, West Sussex, England, 17 June 2015. https://nmi.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/uwe-steve-wright-model-based-testingof-avionics.pdf:
More informationAir Accident Investigation Unit Ireland FACTUAL REPORT
Air Accident Investigation Unit Ireland FACTUAL REPORT SERIOUS INCIDENT Boeing 747-430, D-ABVH North Atlantic 19 November 2012 Boeing 747-430 D-ABVH North Atlantic 19 November 2012 FINAL REPORT AAIU Report
More informationCIVIL AVIONICS SYSTEMS. Second Edition. Ian Moir. Aerospace Consultant, UK. Allan Seabridge. Aerospace Consultant, Malcolm Jukes.
CIVIL AVIONICS SYSTEMS Second Edition Ian Moir Aerospace Consultant, UK Allan Seabridge Aerospace Consultant, UK Malcolm Jukes Aerospace Consultant, UK Wiley Contents About the Authors Series Preface xix
More informationOVERSEAS TERRITORIES AVIATION REQUIREMENTS (OTARs)
OVERSEAS TERRITORIES AVIATION REQUIREMENTS (OTARs) Part 174 METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES FOR AVIATION Published by Air Safety Support International Ltd Air Safety Support International Limited 2017 First Issue
More informationHARD. Preventing. Nosegear Touchdowns
Preventing HARD Nosegear Touchdowns In recent years, there has been an increase in the incidence of significant structural damage to commercial airplanes from hard nosegear touchdowns. In most cases, the
More informationBack to Basics: Testing in Aircraft with Electronic Flight Instrument Displays
Robert L. Nuckolls, III AeroElectric Connection 6936 Bainbridge Road Wichita, KS 67226-1008 Back to Basics: Testing in Aircraft with Electronic Flight Instrument Displays Excerpt from FAA October 2007
More informationThe 10 Year Market (Estimation: No. of Aircraft x list prices, in US $ Billions)
The 10 Year Market (Estimation: No. of Aircraft x list prices, in US $ Billions) 120 110 41.7 BRJ-X 110 117,500 lb. ERJ-190-200 ~105,000 lb. A318 ~125,000 lb. B737-600 144,500 lb. B717-200 121,000 lb.
More informationResearch on Fault Tolerant Controls within GARTEUR
Research on Fault Tolerant Controls within GARTEUR Hafid Smaili National Aerospace Laboratory NLR Training, Human Factors and Cockpit Operations Department Flight Mechanics, Systems and Integration Action
More informationInstrument failure, Airbus A , G-EUOB
Instrument failure, Airbus A319-131, G-EUOB Micro-summary: After a CLUNK and the failure of a number of systems, the crew declared an emergency. Event Date: 2005-10-22 at 1926 UTC Investigative Body: Aircraft
More informationIndonesia AirAsia Flight Accident. Investigation
Indonesia AirAsia Flight Accident. On 28 December 2014, ATC lost contact with an Airbus A320 (PK-AXC) being operated by Indonesia AirAsia on a scheduled passenger flight from Surabaya to Singapore which
More informationMODEL AERONAUTICAL ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA
MODEL AERONAUTICAL ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA GENERAL RULES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE OPERATION OF MODEL AIRCRAFT MOP014 APPROVED M.A.A.A. PRESIDENT Date: 16/02/2007 Table of Contents 1. PURPOSE...1 2. DEFINITIONS...1
More informationCyber-hijacking Airplanes:
Cyber-hijacking Airplanes: Truth or Fiction? Dr. Phil of Bloomsburg University @ppolstra http://philpolstra.com Captain Polly of University of @CaptPolly Why This Talk? Lots of bold claims concerning
More informationA350 Technology. Aviation Technical Education Council. Name Thierry HARQUIN. Orlando, Florida 21 April th March 2007
Presented by: 14th March 2007 Presented by Frank L. Johnson Manager Maintenance Training Name Thierry HARQUIN JobTitle Systems senior manager Engineering A350 Technology Aviation Technical Education Council
More informationAMC and GM to Part-SPO Amendment 3
Annex III to ED Decision 2015/021/R AMC and GM to Part-SPO Amendment 3 The Annex to Decision 2014/018/R (AMC/GM to Annex VIII (Part-SPO) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012) is amended as follows:
More informationEFIS-D10A DYNON S BEST-SELLING. Specifications STC APPROVED FOR TYPE CERTIFICATED AIRCRAFT NOW NOW
DYNON S BEST-SELLING EFIS-D10A NOW ACTUAL SIZE EFIS-D10A NOW Specifications WEIGHT EFIS-D10A: 1lb 7.4oz GPS-251 for EFIS-D10A: 7.4 oz Backup Battery: 6.4 oz EDC-D10A Remote Magnetometer 3.6 oz (optional):
More informationAirfield Geometric Design Prof. Amedeo Odoni
Airfield Geometric Design Prof. Amedeo Odoni Istanbul Technical University Air Transportation Management M.Sc. Program Air Transportation Systems and Infrastructure Module 5 May 25, 2015 Objective and
More informationAIRPORT PLANNING. Joseph K CHEONG. Lima, September 2018
AIRPORT PLANNING Joseph K CHEONG Technical Officer, Airport Operations & Infrastructure, ICAO HQ Secretary, Aerodrome Design and Operations Panel Lima, September 2018 TOPICS THE AVIATION SYSTEM CHICAGO
More informationNavigation 101 Chapter 3 RNP-10
853d Electronic Systems Group Navigation 101 Chapter 3 RNP-10 853 ELSG/NT Electronic Systems Center Hanscom AFB, MA 20 Mar 07 ESC 07-0399 Briefing Overview RNP-10 Fundamentals Avionics Systems Qualifications
More informationCHAPTER AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Vol. 1 03--00--1 AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL YTEM Table of Contents REV 3, May 03/05 CHAPTER 3 --- AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL YTEM Page TABLE OF CONTENT 03-00 Table of Contents 03--00--1 INTRODUCTION 03-10
More informationRunway Length Analysis Prescott Municipal Airport
APPENDIX 2 Runway Length Analysis Prescott Municipal Airport May 11, 2009 Version 2 (draft) Table of Contents Introduction... 1-1 Section 1 Purpose & Need... 1-2 Section 2 Design Standards...1-3 Section
More informationEUROCAE ED-250: ROAAS MOPS
EUROCAE ED-250: ROAAS MOPS Runway Overrun Alerting and Awareness System Minimum Operational Performance Specifications GRSS 2017 Lima, Peru Pierre GEORGES Safety Strategy, DGT, Dassault Aviation WG-101
More informationCHALLENGES TO INSTALLATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IN ROTORCRAFT
FAA & Industry Rotorcraft Forum January 31 February 2, 2012 CHALLENGES TO INSTALLATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IN ROTORCRAFT Pat Moe, Director of Flight Engineering WHO ARE WE? is a manufacturer of automatic
More informationSECTION B AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION
SECTION B AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION 1 2 NEPALESE CIVIL AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS SECTION B AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION CHAPTER B.1 ISSUE 4 JANUARY 2009 1. INTRODUCTION TYPE CERTIFICATES 1.1 Before a
More informationAirworthiness Directive Schedule
Airworthiness Directive Schedule Aeroplanes 25 February 2016 Notes: 1. This AD schedule is applicable to Mitsubishi MU-2B-26A and MU-2B-60 aircraft manufactured under FAA Type Certificate No. A10SW. 2.
More informationAirbus A320 Training Courses
Airbus A320 Training Courses 2017 Airbus A320 Type Ratings Line Training Packages Jet Flight Training Ltd Telephone +44 333 800 3777 (Local Call Rate) Brighton Airport, Shoreham by Sea, BN43 5FF United
More informationMODEL AERONAUTICAL ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA
MODEL AERONAUTICAL ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA GENERAL RULES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE OPERATION OF MODEL AIRCRAFT MOP014 APPROVED: MAAA PRESIDENT Date: 31/10/2017 Paragraph 2.0 Definitions Brief description
More informationGlobal Operational Data Link Doc 10037
Global Operational Data Link Doc 10037 Global Operational Data Link (GOLD) Familiarization with Performance Based Communications and Surveillance (PBCS) Workshop Dakar, Senegal 11-15 September 2017 Prepared
More informationGlobal Avionics Training Specialists, LLC
Global Avionics Training Specialists, LLC CESSNA CITATION V SPZ-500C/CITATION V INTEGRATED FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE FAMILIARIZATION COURSE SYLLABUS I. INTRODUCTION A. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION.
More informationEUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY Joint Aviation Authorities
EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY Joint Aviation Authorities Joint al Evaluation Board BELL 412EP Final Report, dated 05 May 2011 European Aviation Safety Agency Postfach 10 12 53 D-50452 Koeln, Germany
More informationPublications and Training Solutions Course Syllabus:
COURSE TITLE: Pro Line II Avionics Flight Line Maintenance (Level I) PREREQUISITES: Students should have a basic knowledge of aircraft avionics systems and a working command of the English language. Students
More informationREPORT IN-017/2011 DATA SUMMARY
REPORT IN-017/2011 DATA SUMMARY LOCATION Date and time Thursday, 9 June 2011 at 09:40 UTC 1 Site Tenerife North Airport (GCXO), Tenerife AIRCRAFT Registration Type and model Operator EC-KDP PIPER PA-34-200T
More informationSpacecraft Avionics. Lecture #26 December 2, 2014 Avionics overview Shuttle systems Constellation systems MARYLAND U N I V E R S I T Y O F
Lecture #26 December 2, 2014 Avionics overview Shuttle systems Constellation systems 1 2014 David L. Akin - All rights reserved http://spacecraft.ssl.umd.edu Avionics Functions from J. F. Hanaway and R.
More informationGOVERNMENT OF INDIA INVESTIGATION REPORT
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA CIVIL AVIATION DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATION REPORT EMERGENCY LANDING INCIDENT AT MANGALORE TO AIR INDIA AIRBUS A-320 A/C VT-ESE WHILE OPERATING FLIGHT AI-681 (MUMBAI-COCHIN) ON 27-02-2017.
More informationPublications and Training Solutions Course Syllabus:
COURSE TITLE: PRO LINE 4 GULFSTREAM G200 Level 1 Operations & Flightline Maintenance EQUIPMENT TYPE: EQUIPMENT NOMENCLATURE PART NUMBER IAPS Card Cage (V5.2) ICC 4005 822-1407-001 IAPS Card Cage (V6.1)
More informationAMC and GM to Part-CAT Issue 2, Amendment 3
Annex I to ED Decision 2015/021/R AMC and GM to Part-CAT Issue 2, Amendment 3 The Annex to ED Decision 2014/015/R 1 (AMC/GM to Annex IV (Part-CAT) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012) is amended
More informationTYPE CERTIFICATE DATA SHEET A3WE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION A3WE Revision 19 BOEING 727 Series 727-100 Series 727C Series 727-100C Series 727-200 Series 727-200F Series February 20, 1991 TYPE CERTIFICATE
More information