Subject: Qualification, Service, and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers Proposed Rule

Transcription

1 September 19, 2011 U.S. Department of Transportation Docket Operations, M-30 West Building Ground Floor, Rm. W New Jersey Avenue, SE Washington, DC Attention: Docket No. FAA Subject: Qualification, Service, and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers Proposed Rule Dear Sir or Madam: ASTAR USA, LLC, a certified commercial air operator conducting all cargo operations, respectfully submits our comments to the Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) docketed at FAA and titled, Qualification, Service, and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers. We appreciate the opportunity to provide these comments and request that they are given due consideration. We fully support initiatives to enhance the safety of our operations and the aviation industry as a whole. While we recognize the FAA s motivation and intent to do just that in the writing of the NPRM and its revised status in the SNPRM, it is our opinion that the present rule will not effectively accomplish this. If the SNPRM as written, is pressed forward and published as a final rule, it will not contain important recommendations from several ARCs and task forces which have been working on topics specifically addressed in the regulations being revised. We respectfully recommend the FAA withdraw this proposed rule and convene an ARC to undertake the task of rewriting Subparts N & O. A group of FAA and industry professionals utilizing available information and data, in a structured design process (ISD), can develop a proposed rule that will meet the FAA s goals and incorporate the most recent recommendations. Recognizing the legislative mandates of PL and their implementation timelines; the FAA could release findings from several of the ARCs via existing or developed Advisory Circulars (Draft of Stall and Stick Pusher Training ). This would allow the industry to take advantage of recommendations without the delay of the rule s 5 year implementation, thus having a more immediate impact on safety. Our submission continues with detailed comments of 6 major issues, followed by line-by-line comments to the proposed rule. Sincerely, Eric J. Bergesen Director, Flight Operations Eric.Bergesen@astaraircargo.us ASTAR USA, LLC 7310 Turfway Rd Suite 400 Florence, KY

2 Major Issues ASTAR has identified with the Proposed Rule Docket No. FAA , Qualification, Service, and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers Summary This submission addresses those portions of the SNPRM that are applicable to pilot and flight engineer training. ASTAR recognizes the FAA s effort to improve safety by enhancing training program regulations in an effort to reduce aviation accidents. We share in their goal of continually improving safety. Indeed, ASTAR participates in several Voluntary Safety Programs, commonly exceeds the minimum requirements set forth by the FAA, and frequently implements changes to existing programs based on information derived through internal established processes. While we support the FAA s goal, we believe this rule, if published in its present form, will actually prove detrimental to existing programs, prove extremely difficult to implement and carry non productive and burdensome changes to the industry. We believe the impact on safety will be negligible as the rule is presently written, while carrying unnecessary cost burdens. ASTAR is proud of its safety record and is continually looking for methods to further enhance safety in our operation. We do not believe this rule contributes to that effort. We believe the FAA should rescind the proposed rule and convene an ARC to address a rewrite of the applicable regulations. This ARC would then be able to incorporate the valuable recommendations from the several task forces and other ARCs that were convened under PL We would support an effort by the FAA to immediately implement existing guidance on Stall and Stick Pusher training as well as development of training guidelines for loss of control. Both of these areas could be successfully incorporated into industry training programs in a more efficient timeline than that proposed under the SNPRM. Major Concerns A. Going to final rule from this SNPRM ensures that implementation of the recommendations arising from the ARCs legislated by Public Law will be unnecessarily delayed and could prove contrary to this rulemaking effort. B. The impact on AQP carriers has been underestimated; as has the impact on larger carriers who operate programs under Subparts N & O and already exceed the requirements of current regulations. C. The cost-benefit analysis remains flawed and fails to meet the intent of Executive Order of September 30, D. The Technical Report published by the FAA failed to demonstrate that a true Instructional System Design (ISD) process was used. Furthermore, there is little indication that the vast amount of AQP training data collected by the FAA was used in establishing the requirements of this rule. E. In its preamble to the NPRM and SNPRM to subparts BB/CC, the FAA says, We (FAA) believe that current AQP training programs already meet the safety improvements contained in this NPRM. By choosing not to require AQP for all air carriers, the FAA has missed an opportunity to mandate one level of safety in air transportation. F. Many of the restrictions in this rule are built around the assumption that all operators will have access to FSTDs that are capable of meeting the high fidelity requirements imposed. This does not recognize that some operators fly older aircraft for which there are no high fidelity simulators available. Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 2

3 Issue A: Going to final rule from this SNPRM ensures that implementation of the recommendations arising from the ARCs legislated by Public Law will be unnecessarily delayed. Congress created many Aviation Rulemaking Committees and Task Forces in Public Law Many of those ARCs are still in progress and many of their reports have not been issued. This SNPRM could directly conflict with the conclusions of congressionally mandated ARCS. Moreover, the SNPRM will supersede the thousands of hours of work conducted by the committees and experts and proposes rules that should be based on their findings. As an example: Section 209 of PL is entitled FAA Rulemaking on Training Programs. It requires an expert panel to review Part 121 and 135 training programs. This panel (or ARC) is tasked with taking a detailed look at the best methods and optimal time needed for flight crewmember training; initial and recurrent testing requirements; optimal length between training events; best methods to evaluate; classroom instruction requirements; best methods to allow specific academic course to be credited toward total flight time; and crew leadership training. All of these are topics covered by this SNPRM, without the benefit of the ARC s report or supporting data. Likewise, we note the Section 204 ARC tasked with Air Carrier Safety and Pilot Training and Section 208 ARC, Implementation of NTSB flight crewmember recommendations. The work of these numerous ARCs and Task Forces should have been considered before this SNPRM was published. Otherwise, the work of these dedicated professionals, as mandated by Congress, proves useless. Issue B: The impact on AQP carriers has been underestimated; as has the impact on larger carriers who operate programs under Subparts N & O and already exceed the requirements of current regulations. Unpaired crews. We also raise the issue of un-paired crews to demonstrate the underestimated impact this SNPRM will have on carriers. AQP crew substitution data would have been an excellent resource in determining the level of qualification for crew makeup, but there is no evidence this was used. Statements such as performed better are highly subjective and not relevant. Graded proficiency standards are highly relevant; however there is no evidence that graded proficiency standards were used to support the FAA s opinion. AQP carriers, who already meet the FAA s training goal per preamble language, will be forced to prove an equivalent level of safety for unpaired crew training. While there are volumes of data to prove that unpaired training has been conducted very successfully, it would be difficult to prove an equivalent level of safety. Instead that data should have been utilized in the development of this proposal. No shortened curricula after 27 months. Another overly restrictive section is , which would not allow for a shortened curriculum for requalification training when a pilot has been unqualified for more than 27 months. There should be additional consideration for abbreviated curriculums for pilots unqualified beyond 27 months up to 60 months. Again, this practice currently exists at major carriers and is justified by industry data and best practices. This overly prescriptive portion of the proposed rule should be rewritten by using an ISD process justified by Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 3

4 data and current industry practices. This again challenges AQP carriers to meet an equivalent level of safety, despite no data supporting the FAA s proposal. Check Pilot and Simulator Instructor Recency of Experience. Check Pilots should not have recency of experience (number of landings) requirements that are any different than that of a line pilot. Simulator Instructors should not have any recency of experience requirements unless they serve as line crewmembers 1 because there is no data to suggest that these proposed requirements will benefit safety or that they are currently impacting safety. We do not support proposed regulations such as this which add no safety benefit but are a burden on industry and divert resources. Additional requirements for these types of instructors will be very costly and involve building expensive tracking mechanisms distinct from pilot takeoff and landing tracking. Most operators are equipped with automated procedures to track takeoffs and landings in their approved record keeping systems. These systems are not suited to handle different requirements for a similar type of employee (pilot vs. check pilot or different takeoff and landing requirements). These systems cannot distinguish whether a check pilot is flying as a normal line pilot on a given day (without check pilot responsibilities). Without this tracking ability, for compliance purposes, carriers would have to default to monitoring three takeoffs and landings for all pilots. More importantly, there is no data to suggest that these proposed requirements will benefit safety or that they are currently impacting safety. No Need for Initial Captain Line Observations. Section (b)(2)(i)(d) would allow for Aircrew Program Designees (APD s) or the FAA to conduct an observation during operating experience for PICs who have just completed initial or upgrade training. We must question the need for this observation in the first place. The original intent of initial PIC observations was to validate that there was a transfer of learning between simulator training and the airplane for an individual pilot. This began at a time when the FAA was questioning whether simulation was the proper avenue for pilot training. This proposed rule clearly signals the FAA s acceptance of and mandatory use of simulation in pilot training programs. Therefore, this requirement should be deleted. A qualified Check Pilot is going to validate the training and give a line check during operating experience. Another observation given by an APD or the FAA towards the end of operating experience is redundant, creates an unnecessary use of FAA and carrier resources, and no longer serves a purpose. Line Check Requirements. The proposed stipulates the requirement for a PIC two-leg Line Check. Each PIC must serve one leg as the pilot flying and the other leg as the pilot monitoring. Among most major airlines, one leg per 24 months has become standard. Line checks are not the most valuable way to determine pilot proficiency and increasing the line check to two legs will not maximize training resources. We believe the rule should remain at one leg with the PIC determining the pilot flying and pilot monitoring duties as he or she would do on a typical line flight. This allows the PIC to consider multiple operational issues. For example, if two legs are required and the PIC flies the first leg, he or she might not be able to be the Pilot Monitoring on a second leg due to the operational environment (low visibility, special airport, conditions, etc). The same is true of a one leg requirement. The PIC needs the flexibility to determine who will act as Pilot Flying and who will perform the duties of the Pilot Monitoring. Without flexibility, the line check could be extended, adding training burdens and cost without benefit. This again presents problems for AQP carriers in trying to prove an equivalent level of safety. 1 See proposed definition of Simulator Only Instructor. Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 4

5 The actual increase in costs of the two leg line check will be substantial for most carriers with little or no derived benefit to flight safety. Most operators will experience a significant decrease in the amount number of line checks accomplished by a given check airman. This will increase the required number of check airmen, increasing training costs and staffing requirements. The FAA should eliminate the two-leg line check. The nine month training/checking mandated in the proposed rule will provide much greater insight into line pilot s performance than increased line checks. The simulator training and checking events afford the carrier a much better opportunity to evaluate the proficiency of its pilots as a whole and as individuals. Simulator sessions provide a much more rigorous environment in which to train and evaluate pilots. Each pilot is observed acting as the Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring while facing abnormal and emergency situations. A vast majority of line checks do not involve any abnormalities or decision making in high stress situations. Relief Pilot Requirements. Section proposes new restrictions on pilots that are providing relief to either the PIC or SIC during the en route cruise portion of the flight. The relief pilot must have completed consolidation on the aircraft type. In most cases, fleets that utilize relief pilots (have augmented crews) only fly long-haul international route segments. This restriction does not allow for the new relief pilot to fly on any segments that the fleet operates. On occasion, there are a limited number of shorter flight segments on such fleets that operate without a relief pilot. These flights are typically so infrequent that these non-consolidated pilots will have limited opportunities to fly and thus limiting their ability to consolidate. This proposed rule adds complexity, cost, and unnecessarily restricts new pilots from getting experience and flight time in their new aircraft type. Additionally, in most cases, it would be impossible for the newly qualified pilot to ever fly the aircraft in an augmented crew. Their particular fleet may only operate in an augmented environment. This proposed rule has the unintended consequence of artificially forcing carriers to schedule fleets on routes that would not require augmented crews. This would create a huge expense for large aircraft that is not built for such a mission and would not operate in an efficient manner. This rule would be impossible to implement on many fleets at many carriers. The methodology of the rule is not consistent in that the PIC does not have to have completed consolidation prior to flying on augmented crews. There is no data to suggest that this proposed rule improves safety or is warranted. Forcing takeoff and landing currency in the aircraft among all relief pilots deteriorates the proficiency of all pilots. On long-haul aircraft there are not enough operating cycles to provide enough landings to allow all pilots to stay current in the aircraft. Spreading these aircraft landings among relief officers reduces the available landings for those pilots who will actually make landings in line operations. Additionally, some labor agreements prevent forcing a pilot into the First Officer or Captain position as opposed to the relief pilot position. This forces additional crewmembers to have to re-qualify for takeoffs and landing in the simulator. Proposed (b)(3)(vi) also would require a relief pilot to meet the takeoff and landing requirements of proposed One pilot at the controls is always going to be takeoff and landing current. These relief pilots are only at the controls during a cruise portion of flight and even then the other pilot is takeoff and landing current. This new requirement would add additional burdens and cost to operators without addressing any documented safety issues arising from relief officer currency. This portion of the proposed rule provides an economic advantage for foreign carriers operating into the United States. These international carriers are not bound by the same overly restrictive standards as we would be. The combination of highly trained and experienced pilots in augmented crews and Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 5

6 technology advanced aircraft create a very safe operation, in the event of an incapacitated pilot or during the Captain s rest break. We support the proposed modification to in the SNPRM that allows the Line Check Pilot to take a break during operating experience for transition, conversion and upgrade pilots. In all of these cases, these pilots are highly experienced as either the PIC or in the aircraft type. Breaks were a common practice for decades, on augmented crews, until the FAA issued an interpretation in 2003 prohibiting the practice. The Check Pilot can make an educated determination of the fitness of the crew before leaving the flight deck. Check Pilot and Simulator Instructor Duties and Responsibilities. In (d)(2)(i), the proposal specifies a new requirement that Check Pilots and Simulator Instructors perform a minimum of six events per year. This appears to be based on similar language found in the FAA Inspector s Handbook located in the Flight Standards Information Management System. While this might be a good number to shoot for, there are circumstances where it should not apply. Many operators have managers that maintain Check Pilot or Simulator Instructor qualifications. These individuals are intimately involved in the program and operation of the airline on a daily basis. They may not be able to obtain exactly six events but can conduct the events with great proficiency. If these experienced Check Pilots were to only conduct four or five events in a year, they would remain highly proficient. There are no documented safety issues addressed by this requirement. We recommend the FAA remove this language from the rule. In (c) the proposed rule adds new layers to the approval process for Check Pilots and Instructors by requiring FAA acceptance. We believe the carrier is fully qualified and capable of approving all Simulator Instructors without new layers of FAA acceptance. This becomes cumbersome for the operator and overly saturates FAA personnel responsible for certificate oversight. We have processes in place to ensure the qualifications of instructors. This responsibility falls on the operator to ensure Simulator Instructors have sufficient training to make them proficient to conduct such reviews. This proposed rule adds more levels of complexity by adding requirements for a certain number of events each year and how to re-qualify an Instructor or Check Pilot. These instructors and pilots are well qualified to do their various duties. Those duties, while having different titles, are not exclusive of one another. Each individual is trained to know all of the maneuvers and procedures on their given fleets. If a person conducts numerous Proficiency Tests, they can also conduct proficiency Reviews, Checks and training events. The same can be said of a Line Check Pilot that conducts operating experience. That Check Pilot is looking for the same proficiency and successful outcome as would be a Check Pilot conducting a Line Check. Therefore, the operator needs to have the flexibility to conduct the appropriate training for an Instructor or Check Pilot that needs to re-qualify, whether it be military, medical or some other reason that has caused an absence from duty. Issue C: The cost-benefit analysis remains flawed and fails to meet the intent of Executive Order of September 30, We believe that the FAA failed to adequately consider the economic impact of a number of requirements proposed in this rule. Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 6

7 Unpaired Crews. The requirement to conduct all simulator training utilizing paired crews would be a significant cost increase burden for ASTAR and indeed for all carriers. Outdated Supporting Information. The FAA Regulatory Evaluation claims the benefits of this rule will net some industry cost savings, however the FAA has failed to give adequate credit for existing training program enhancements and technological advances which have been incorporated over the last two decades. For example, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), which includes the FAA as a member, has successfully implemented 40 safety enhancements, including: Terrain Avoidance Warning System (TAWS) FAA rulemaking CFIT SOPs Advisory Circular guidance CFIT avoidance, vertical angles Revisions to approach plates Visual Glide Slope Indicators (VGSI) requirements implemented RNAV 3D and RNP approach procedures FOQA and ASAP programs CFIT prevention training, both technical skill and CRM requirements Loss-of-control prevention, policies, systems and training Runway incursion prevention, policies, systems and training Taking these and many other enhancements into account, the FAA draft economic analysis overstates the potential benefits/cost savings purported to be achieved by implementation of the proposed rule. The programs listed above have already made a sizeable improvement in air carrier safety which was not included in the FAA s assumptions Additional FAA Resources. In addition, this proposal burdens the FAA Principal Operation Inspectors (POIs) and associated field inspectors with a great deal of additional approval volume. It is likely that FAA response time to other important operator initiatives will slow significantly, or the FAA will need to increase the numbers of available inspectors. Here are just a few of the items being added to the POI s workload: All manuals and all sections must now be approved Special airport pictorials must now be approved Proficiency Review authority requires FAA letter of authorization Significant increase in the volume of material to be reviewed with each revision All training equipment, in addition to FSTDs, requires specific approval Each APD that substitutes for FAA in Check Captain observations must be specially designated New POI will determine language in , , and Unnecessary Check Airman title and authority changes will drive new approvals for all check airmen at every carrier Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 7

8 Longer training footprints drive more FAA manpower for approval, oversight, and surveillance Form and content of all tests must be specifically approved - QPS Attachment 2 (B)(1)(d) FAA must accept all ground and flight instructors and the activities each is authorized to perform (c) Issue D: The Technical Report published by the FAA failed to demonstrate that a true Instructional System Design (ISD) process was used. Furthermore, there is little indication that the vast amount of AQP training data collected by the FAA was used in establishing the requirements of this rule. The FAA used outdated methodologies to build the tasks and principles in the proposed training requirements and did not provide supporting information, including training data. The FAA failed to utilize this valuable data to develop this proposed rule. With the exception of this proposed rule, all major aviation training proposals/rulemakings in the U.S., Canada, Europe, and ICAO, within the past decade, have embraced and often required a data driven Instructional Systems Design (ISD) process to be followed for the development of training programs. Required instruction time is the result of course design, it is not the starting point for course design. It is therefore a major concern that the evidence indicates the FAA used little formal (ISD) process in developing the rule s requirements; used flawed training data, non-current accident data, and other methods; and used unreliable sources in estimating the impact of the proposed rule. Some elements of an ISD process appear to be present in the proposed rule, e.g., objective statements and media analyses; however, since the methodology for developing the proposal was not documented or provided (in particular the development of specific training requirements, tasking and hourly requirements), comment is nearly impossible without rebuilding the proposal using a documented ISD process and then comparing the results. Technical Report. The FAA has relied heavily on its Flightcrew Member Training and Qualification Review and Analysis Technical Report to dispose of many comments to the NPRM and to justify other changes contained in this proposed rule. Of particular note, is how the FAA uses this report to validate its time estimates for how long it will take to complete a simulator proficiency check for two pilots. In its summary of findings, the FAA states Industry estimates of 22 simulator sessions to complete the recurrent requirements over the course of 36 months under the NPRM are overstated. Basing its findings on the simulator trial, the FAA further states, The required tasks proposed in the NPRM and SNPRM for recurrent proficiency checks can be completed within a 4-hour simulator session. Because so much of the FAA s response in the Technical Report is contingent on this simulator trial, it is necessary to highlight the shortcomings and lack of true validation that can be derived from it. There are two primary points to be made. First, the trial did not meet even the most basic premise of an objective evaluation. If the proposed rule is to be applied to Part 121 airline pilots and check airmen, then we believe the FAA should have made every attempt to secure the services of representative test subjects. The FAA described the actual simulator trial by clarifying that the two pilots being evaluated and the qualified check airman were all FAA aviation inspectors. As a carrier seeking approval of a new program under AQP, I would never Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 8

9 consider offering a trial conducted under such circumstances as part of my approval process, nor would my ERT consider approving it. The second point to be made is that a single simulator trial does not constitute a valid test. Every operator with an approved AQP training program has experience with Small Group Tryouts for new curricula. In these SGTs, operators are required to provide an FAA approved sample of pilots who include neither instructors nor pilots that have participated in the development of the new curriculum. Additionally, there must be enough pilots to constitute an average of four to seven complete crews. The reasons for using multiple crews to validate a new curriculum are many, but primary among them is the basic scientific method requirement that the tests be repeatable. For that reason, the conclusions of a single test and one with non-representative test subjects are suspect at best. If we ask the FAA to meet its own requirements for demonstrating a new curriculum, then the single simulator session reported in the Technical Report completely fails to validate any of the premises of this SNPRM. No carrier (or FAA POI) would approve training programs with the validation or small group tryout consisting of only two pilots in a single simulator session. Unpaired Crews. I have also addressed the topic of unpaired crews as part of my flawed cost-benefit analysis, but it is also important to highlight the FAA s failure to use a true ISD process. Training using unpaired crews (e.g., ground school and flight simulator training and checking where two first officers/relief pilots or two captains are paired together as a crew) has existed for decades, and is necessary when carriers are required to staff differing proportions of captains and first officers/relief pilots on a given fleet of aircraft. This scenario is often found at long haul carriers when an augmented crew is required due to the flight time limitations of sections and Often a ratio of two to three second in-command (SIC) pilots (e.g., first officers/relief pilots) for every one pilot-in-command (PIC) (e.g., captain) is found for aircraft fleets needing augmented crews. As written, the proposed rule would eliminate unpaired crew training and checking. We have yet to see any records regarding what data, if any, was consulted by the FAA. AQP Data Support. As a carrier training under Subpart Y (AQP) we have established systems for collecting detailed crew performance data. This extensive AQP data is available and provided to the FAA, as is the data from other AQP carriers. We expect it to be used as the basis in this type of rulemaking and we expect that the data be made available in support of new rulemaking. We use our data to continually analyze, modify, improve and monitor our programs by identifying those areas that require attention. We would expect the FAA to follow the same type of process, especially with such a monumental undertaking as to rewrite Subparts N & O. Issue E: In its preamble to the NPRM/SNPRM to subparts BB/CC, the FAA says, We (FAA) believe that current AQP training programs already meet the safety improvements contained in this NPRM. By choosing not to require AQP for all air carriers, the FAA has missed an opportunity to mandate one level of safety in air transportation. Since the inception of the AQP in the United States, literally tens of millions of performance data points have been gathered concerning the exact training tasks addressed in the proposal. All of this data has been provided to the FAA s AFS-230 Office, a requirement of carriers who voluntarily subscribe to AQP, yet it appears that none of the data has been used in the development of the tables and performance standards which stipulate the content and hours of required training. Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 9

10 This proposed rule is a major step backward in aviation rulemaking and training development. As written, it employs antiquated development methodologies and principles ignoring volumes of data and documentation on robust training programs that were developed using scientific and industry recognized methodologies and principles. The FAA itself has recognized these methodologies in stating the goals of the proposed rule We believe that current AQP training programs already meet the safety improvements contained in this NPRM. 2 Issue F: Many of the restrictions in this rule are built around the assumption that all operators will have access to FSTDs that are capable of meeting the high fidelity requirements imposed. This does not recognize that some operators fly older aircraft for which there are no high fidelity simulators available. Table 3-B, Minimum FSTD Required For Credit, contains 16 tasks which require a level D FSTD for completion. There is a footnote to this table which allows for substitution of a level C FSTD for these tasks if the pilot meets the minimum flight time prescribed. ASTAR operates DC8 aircraft, for which there are a very limited number of available simulators. We train under an approved AQP in a level B simulator with data that supports the success of this program. It was short sighted of the FAA to focus solely on the more prevalent advanced FSTDs typically available and place undue restrictions on carriers such as ASTAR. We will incur significant additional costs to travel crews away from domicile to access one of the few available level C FSTDs. The additional training requirements in these few available devices will present scheduling problems as carriers compete for training time. Furthermore, we will be forced to train our crews in a simulator that will not accurately reflect the equipment and layout of our existing device and aircraft. Not only is this circumstance far from ideal, but it is a counter to the FAA s own guidance. Line by Line Review and Comment of Proposed Regulations PART 121 OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS (b)(2) Preparation of manuals. We agree that every operator should have a manual containing the approved operating procedures for each type of aircraft. We strongly suggest that the regulation make provision for the FAA to approve such a manual under any name a given carriers chooses, rather than specifically the Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM). The industry typically recognizes the FCOM as a manufacturer developed and approved manual and utilizes other naming conventions to designate those developed by the operator. This rule, as written, will cause ASTAR and many other operators to incur significant costs to rename, republish, and reissue every manual that fills the purpose of this rule but does not have the name FCOM. This change has no identifiable safety benefit and should be amended appropriately Manual contents. While there is not a significant difference between what is currently required and this new section, there have been no known incidents/accidents tied to this change. Modification only increases complexity and cost for operators, and does not enhance safety or increase efficiency. There is no positive cost/benefit. Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 10

11 requires the FCOM to contain all information currently contained in manufacturers AFM. This will unnecessarily duplicate the AFM information required by , resulting in significant amounts of unnecessary information in the FCOM making it more difficult to find and use critical information when needed during flight operations. It would require significant re-writes of most operator FCOMs and/or other Operations Manuals.. The proposed rule language reads. Each task specified in each of the crewmember and aircraft dispatcher Qualification Performance Standards (QPS) must be tailored to the specific aircraft type as provided in the FAOM, FCOM, or ADPM and must be trained or evaluated as indicated in the appropriate QPS. This training program language is out of place in this regulation about manuals. This requirement should be placed into rules associated with the training program Manual procedures requirements. Safety is the top priority for ASTAR, as evidenced by our continually exceeding the FAA s minimum regulatory safety requirements. We agree that operational procedures can and should be enforced. However, it should be the sole responsibility of the carrier to enforce other non-safety, company policies that may be included in a manual. We ask that the FAA clarify that only applies to operational/safety related manual requirements and not supplementary information as described in FAA handbook , Volume 3, Chapter 32, Section , Company Flight Manuals. As the FAA recognizes in the rule text and section-by-section analysis (Transcript page 129), the purpose of this section is to ensure crewmembers perform, at a minimum, regulatory required functions necessary for safety, such as standard operating procedures, abnormal procedures, non-normal procedures, emergency procedures, airplane performance, and airplane limitations Crewmember and dispatcher record identifies comments and evaluations made by a check person as part of the required training record for flightcrew members. This requires training records be maintained for 5 years that include instructor comments and reasons for performance evaluations on tasks. This will result in fewer useful comments from Check Airmen and could create collective bargaining agreement issues and conflicts, while unnecessarily biasing future individual evaluations. Every time a pilot attends an evaluation, the Check Airman should perform an unbiased evaluation, measured against a specific performance standard. Having access to previous comments introduces an unnecessary bias towards maneuvers or procedures. Additionally, many training record systems are not capable of keeping detailed comments. This would require costly modifications to existing systems for operators with little or no derived benefit. ASTAR currently utilizes comments in a de-identified setting as part of our process to continually analyze and improve our training programs. This is a productive use of comments and we do not see the benefit to attaching them to a particular pilot s record. A pilot s training record is not the appropriate repository for disciplinary actions.. This type of record is appropriately kept in a personnel file where access is limited, and the individuals privacy protected in this matters. The training record should simply show the training and evaluations, whether those events were successfully accomplished and if remedial training was conducted if applicable. This is also one of many examples throughout the SNPRM where there is currently an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) studying and making recommendations on this particular subject. Proposing regulation at this point, without the benefit of their work, is inefficient at best. We ask that the FAA also clarify the intent of this rule in regards to training that may be conducted as part of the ASAP process. The effectiveness of the ASAP program would be jeopardized if operators were required to keep all comments associated with this type of training as well. Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 11

12 Communication records: Domestic, flag, and supplemental operations. We recommend this change be stricken from the SNPRM based on the fact that the FAA has not identified any incidents or accidents that necessitate this change. This modification does not enhance safety or increase efficiency, but does increase complexity and cost for operators, with no positive cost/benefit. Additionally, the 120 day implementation timeframe is unreasonable given the modifications and/or additions that may be required to existing operator technologies. SUBPART BB REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFICATION, SERVICE, AND USE OF CREWMEMBERS General Applicability. IOE pilots were added to Attachment 3 of Appendix Q (Seat Dependent Task Training section) and to the definitions in They need to be added to this paragraph. Designated flight engineer examiners are introduced here but never referenced or mentioned anywhere else in the SNPRM. The changes in this regulation are another example of this SNPRM modifying existing titles and positions currently in use by the industry and defined by the FAA. There is no benefit derived, but there is a cost associated with updating company manuals and working with collective bargaining groups to identify comparable positions between old and proposed Interim requirements for training programs transitioning from the requirements of subparts N and O of this part. This section should make it clear what constitutes an approved AQP. ASTAR believes that air carriers should be given up to 119 days after publication of the final rule to determine if they are going to operate under Subpart BB or transition to Subpart Y. As written, paragraph (e) For certificate holders who have an approved AQP curriculum under subpart Y of this part, or have applied for approval of a training program under subpart Y of this part on or before [date 119 days after publication of the final rule] requires clarification that or have applied for approval specifically refers to AQP Phase I (one) documentation and request for approval per (b)(2)i. It must also state that if a mature AQP reverts from Phase IV or V to Phase II or III, that the provisions of paragraph (e) remain applicable, i.e., the AQP is still considered approved for the purposes of this paragraph Certificate holder responsibility for compliance with this subpart. Proposed section requires certificate holders to take responsibility for compliance with subpart BB. Paragraph (a) of section extends carrier training program responsibility to third parties that may assist a carrier in compliance with subpart BB. ASTAR takes training very seriously and vigorously complies with all training regulations. Likewise, we ensure all vendors assisting with a training program comply with regulatory requirements. However, this section appears to impose a strict liability standard on carriers. The FAA should recognize and clarify that carrier responsibility from a FAA enforcement perspective may be limited for: (1) vendor actions or omissions without carrier knowledge or approval or (2) actions related to a carrier policy, not a regulatory or safety requirement. Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 12

13 Definitions. Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). Portions of AFM definition appear to be missing. Should specify that it is the manufacturer s manual. Need to differentiate this definition from the definition of FCOM. Check airman (pilot). Should be Check Pilot for consistency; Check airman (flight engineer) should be Check flight engineer for consistency. New Check Airman titles do not fit current industry practice and will be cumbersome and costly from an administrative, operational and contractual perspective while doing nothing to improve safety or reduce accidents. There is no logical or meaningful reason to make such sweeping changes in check airman titles which will result in countless documentation changes not just for operators, but for the FAA and FSIMS guidance as well. Distance Learning. Appears in tables and is defined in the preamble, definition needs to be added here. We suggest defining it as learning that is accomplished by any training method not including an instructor and a gathering of trainees collocated in a traditional classroom. The general nature and specific characteristics of training media used for distance learning vary widely. Examples include paper media, videotape, computer based training (CBT), CDs, web-based training, and virtual classroom. The media used should meet the requirements of the respective training objective. Distance learning may be as much 100 percent creditable toward the knowledge and cognitive skill training objectives defined in the certificate holder s approved curriculum(s). Eligibility Period. Line Check must be added to ensure inclusion in the eligibility period definition. The NPRM provided a definition for Flight Crewmember. This SNPRM no longer provides that relevant definition. Indeed, it no longer uses that term at all. The editorial change that has taken place with the introduction of the term Flightcrew Member rather than the common industry and previously used Flight Crewmember is unnecessary at best. This change will do nothing to enhance safety or improve training programs. There are no accidents that could have been prevented had we spelled this term differently. This is an unnecessary change that carries costs to change manuals and has zero benefit. Revert to the former spelling convention. Flightcrew Member Operating Manual (FCOM). Definition needs clarification. If the naming convention of Flightcrew Member is adopted then the acronym for this manual should actually be changed to FMOM. Rather than that, we recommend reverting the naming convention as mentioned in the previous comment. Is it intended to replace CFM or AFM? There is confusion with the manufacturer s use of the term FCOM. The definition should say that it is A document and not an FAA-approved document. Company manuals should continue to be accepted documents. Manual requirements should not be included in a training rulemaking effort. Ground Instructor. Need to add definition for clarification. Definition should also reference subject matter experts (SMEs) and other people that speak to classes. SMEs and other speakers do not require the same training as ground instructors and can offer great and meaningful participation in classes. Initial Operating Experience (IOE) Pilot. Should be simply Operating Experience (OE) Pilot to reflect changes made by the FAA previously. All operating experience is not tied to initial training, so should not be categorized as such. Again, the new Check Airman title, OE Pilot, does not fit current industry practice and will be cumbersome and costly from an administrative, operational and contractual Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 13

14 perspective while doing nothing to improve safety or reduce accidents. This is a needless and costly change for operators with zero safety benefit. Line Familiar. Used but not defined in the SNPRM. We suggest defining it as a flight crewmember or instructor who is familiar with a certificate holder's line operations. This person is either line qualified or otherwise qualified by participation in an approved line observation program. Line-observation program. Definition needs to be added for clarification of instructor requirements and crew substitutes. We suggest defining it as a program where a check person or flight instructor maintains line familiarity with the certificate holder s procedures if (1) the check person or flight instructor meets the landing requirements of paragraph (d)( 1) or (d)(1) by completing (b) or (b) through aircraft operations other than line operations under this part, or (2) by completing (c) or (c) in a qualified and approved FFS. The check person or flight instructor must have observed the line operations of at least one of the certificate holders for whom the person or flight instructor performs evaluations in the preceding 12 months. Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT). Should read abnormal OR emergency situations to match Should also have non-normal as an option. Should not require an FFS, only an appropriate FSTD. Operating Cycle should be defined to include takeoff, climb, en route, descent and landing. Full gate to gate with taxi-in and taxi-out should not be a requirement of an operating cycle in light of the requirement in (a)(3)(i) for two operating cycles. Two gate to gate operating cycles would result in a disproportionate amount of time on the ground and less time for more meaningful airborne/crm exercises. LOFT Environment Training. Should not require an FFS, only an appropriate FSTD. Operating Cycle. Operating cycle in the context of LOFT should be defined to include takeoff, climb, en route, descent and landing. Full gate to gate with taxi-in and taxi-out should not be a requirement of an operating cycle in light of the requirement in (a)(3)(i) for two operating cycles. Two gate to gate operating cycles would result in a disproportionate amount of time on the ground and less time for more meaningful airborne/crm exercises. Pilot Flying. Need definition for clarification. We suggest the pilot who is in direct control of the aircraft and ensures that all requirements for safe flight are met. Pilot Monitoring. Need definition for clarification. We suggest the pilot not in direct control of the aircraft, who jointly monitors and verifies that all requirements for safe flight are met. Procedure. Standard operating procedures are applicable to normal and non-normal, abnormal and emergency events. The three separate definitions of procedure do not reflect industry practice. This is another example of changes to existing terms and philosophies that have no basis in merit and are not supported by data. Procedure. (1) Recommend deletion of 1, 2 and 3. All points can be defined in the over arching definition above. This is another example of changes to existing terms and philosophies that have no basis in merit and are not supported by data. Procedure. (2) Delete Procedure. (3) Delete Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 14

15 Qualified. Medical certificate should be removed from this section (or followed by as appropriate ) because it is discussed in and will cause confusion in the context of qualification. Medical certificates are not required to act as a Flight Instructor or Check Pilot in a simulator. Special training. Definition requires special training to be incorporated into other training programs, such as initial, transition, upgrade, recurrent and requalification. This conflicts with (d)(1) which says it will be incorporated into existing curriculums if appropriate. The latter definition is correct as special training may or may not be integrated into the approved training plan based on duration of event or circumstance. Task Familiar. Not defined in the SNPRM. The concept of task familiar is found in both AC A, and in 8900 Volume 3, Chapter 21. It is appropriate to include that concept here. We suggest defining it as a person who has had training in a particular task and is sufficiently familiar with that task to be able to adequately perform that task for certain specific, limited purposes. Training or Evaluation Duty Position. Correct IOE Captains to IOE Pilots. We reiterate our comment that use of the term IOE should be changed back to OE Designation of related aircraft. Aircraft are already defined as related by Flight Standardization Board reports. An operator should not have to seek approval of this FAA designation Certification requirements: Crewmembers, flight instructors, check pilots, check captain, and check flight engineers. This section requires clarification to prevent confusion. To act as a PIC of an aircraft, a pilot must have a PIC type rating; to act as a SIC of an aircraft, a pilot must only have a SIC type rating. A Relief pilot only has to have appropriate ratings to act in place of the person they are relieving. If relieving PIC, they need PIC type rating, if relieving an SIC, SIC type rating. This section also introduces the term check captain that has been deleted from the rest of this SNPRM Pilot monitoring (not flying) duties. Delete in accordance with FCOM. Manual requirements do not belong in a training regulation. There might be times when a pilot is instructed to behave in a way other than specified by the FCOM to complete a training objective (incapacitated pilot, get into upset event for training purposes, check pilot training, etc.). This section requires evaluation of Pilot Monitoring duties and will require new Pilot Monitoring standards and new grading/data collection methods and is unduly burdensome on carriers Modification of training program. Title of section is misleading and doesn t adequately describe the contents of the section. Paragraph (a)(2) is nonsensical, programmed hours are proposed by the certificate holder and approved by the Administrator. This paragraph should mirror paragraph (b)(1)(iii), i.e., The number of programmed hours of academic and job performance training and evaluation necessary based on review of the related aircraft, the operation, and the duty position. Paragraph (b)(1)(iv)(c) requires clarification. It appears that job performance training is required in one of the related aircraft (paragraph A) and evaluation in the aircraft that job performance training was not conducted (paragraph C). This will force certificate holders to rotate through training/checking in simulators for all related aircraft every 9 months. This is an unjustified increase over current requirements and creates an undue burden on certificate holders. This is contrary to the requirements of Flight Standardization Board (FSB) reports. Comments of ASTAR USA, LLC Page 15