UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C."

Transcription

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Issued by the Department of Transportation on the 4 th day of November, 2016 Order Issued November 4, 2016 Joint Application of DELTA AIR LINES, INC. AEROVIAS DE MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V. Docket DOT-OST Under 49 U.S.C and for Approval of and Antitrust Immunity for Alliance Agreements I. SUMMARY ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE By this Order, the Department of Transportation (the Department) tentatively grants approval of, and antitrust immunity (ATI) for, the proposed alliance agreements submitted by Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Delta) and Aerovias de México, S.A. de C.V. (Aeromexico) (collectively, the Joint Applicants ). 1,2 The Joint Applicants have submitted their application for antitrust immunity during a time of significant change in the U.S.-Mexico air services market. Demand in the market the second largest international market for the United States has grown rapidly in recent years and is expected to continue to do so. Recognizing the need to enable more air service to meet the demand, the United States and Mexico recently negotiated a modernized air services agreement that contains all of the elements of an Open Skies agreement. At the same time, however, the non-transparent slot allocation regime and infrastructure constraints at Mexico City s Benito Juarez International Airport (MEX) may impede competition and the ability to fully realize the benefits of the modernized agreement. In addition, the Joint Applicants control nearly 50% of the MEX slots, the allocation of which is dependent on confusing and often unwritten rules, making it extremely difficult for new entrants to launch competitive service. Also, there are salient infrastructure constraints at New York s John F. Kennedy (JFK) airport. We understand that the Mexican authorities are attempting to address the slot allocation regime at MEX, but satisfactory solutions to resolve these issues are unlikely to be achieved soon. These circumstances normally would not support a discretionary grant of antitrust immunity; however, 1 The common names of the carriers are used throughout this Show Cause Order. 2 The agreements are the Joint Cooperation Agreement and those agreements enumerated in section 2.1 thereof.

2 the Joint Applicants have supplied sufficient information in the record to enable us to identify slot divestitures and other remedies that would allow the transaction to proceed without causing significant competitive harm while realizing the benefits of this transaction. The proposed significant divestiture would support necessary competitive entry into the Mexico City-U.S. market and would permit the Joint Applicants to pursue their goals of increased efficiency, growth, and enhanced competition. The Joint Applicants have requested a grant of immunity from the U.S. antitrust laws in order to allow Delta and Aeromexico to operate a joint venture (JV) between the United States and Mexico. 3 If the application is given final approval, the Joint Applicants will create a metalneutral joint venture between the United States and Mexico, including any behind- and beyondgateway flights in those countries. 4 The Joint Applicants will coordinate their network planning, pricing, and sales activities, as well as enhance the alignment of their respective frequent flyer programs (FFP) and other benefits. Based on our evaluation of the application, we tentatively conclude that, as conditioned, the alliance will not substantially reduce or eliminate competition, however, the application does raise questions as to whether the Joint Applicants would be able to exert market power at MEX and JFK where there is limited opportunity for new entry. In order to protect consumers in these markets, we tentatively propose that the Joint Applicants divest 24 slot-pairs at MEX and six (6) slot-pairs at JFK to U.S. or Mexican low-cost carriers (LCCs) and low-fare carriers for transborder service. This remedy would allow for new, competitive entry at these airports that would not otherwise be possible. We are also proposing other conditions on our approval, including limiting our grant of ATI to five years and requiring that the Joint Applicants remove certain anticompetitive provisions from the alliance agreements. We are also proposing standard conditions, such as the obligation to submit traffic data and annual alliance reports. We have tentatively concluded that, if the Joint Applicants implement these remedies and conditions, the potential benefits of the alliance will outweigh any potential competitive harm. 5 We have also tentatively concluded that a grant of ATI is required by the public interest because the proposed JV would provide a number of valuable public benefits including a third network competitor on par with the current first and second largest competitors, increased transborder capacity, enhanced price and service options, expanded reach of Delta s existing network into smaller, regional Mexican markets, and enhanced efficiency of both carriers transborder services, all net benefits to consumers. 3 See Docket DOT-OST , Delta Air Lines, Inc. and Aerovias de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. - Approval of and Antitrust Immunity for Alliance Agreements, hereinafter Joint Application at 1. 4 In a metal-neutral joint venture the airline partners are able to integrate their price and service options across both of their networks so that the customer is offered the best possible travel options between origin and destination, regardless of which airline operates the segments and thus collects the ticket revenue. 5 The Mexican Government s competition authority, COFECE, has also examined, and approved with conditions, Delta and Aeromexico s proposed alliance. COFECE s decision is discussed in more detail below. 2

3 Therefore, subject to the proposed remedies and conditions, we tentatively grant approval of the application, and antitrust immunity to, the applicants. We direct any interested parties to show cause why we should not adopt these tentative findings and conclusions in a Final Order. Parties have 14 calendar days from the service date of this Order to file answers and seven (7) business days from that date to file replies. II. SUMMARY OF THE RECORD On March 31, 2015, Delta and Aeromexico filed a joint application requesting approval of, and antitrust immunity for, agreements covering foreign air transportation between the United States and Mexico. On April 17, 2015, the Joint Applicants also filed a joint motion seeking confidential treatment for supporting documentation and information pursuant to Rule 12 of the Department s procedural regulations (14 C.F.R ). The alliance agreements at issue in the application would allow Delta and Aeromexico to operate a metal-neutral joint venture between the United States and Mexico. The Joint Applicants argue that, [a]ntitrust immunity for the Alliance Agreements is necessary for Delta and Aeromexico to achieve the synergies and public benefits that will flow from the [joint venture]. 6 They further argue that such a grant would not lead to a substantial reduction in competition and would provide substantial public benefits. Specifically, the Joint Applicants argue that a grant of antitrust immunity would allow them to better compete against the existing transborder services of United Airlines (United) and American Airlines (American). The Joint Applicants state that a grant of antitrust immunity will allow them to optimize schedules, enhance their product offering, initiate new transborder services, and to align FFPs and other services. On April 8, 2015, the Department issued a Notice suspending the procedural schedule. On April 30, 2015, the Department issued a Notice granting interim access to confidential documents submitted with the application, limited to interested parties who filed confidentially affidavits. On July 31, 2015, the Department issued an Order requesting additional information from the Joint Applicants. The Department determined that this information was necessary to analyze the application and reach a decision. On August 7, 2015, the Department also sent a letter to Aeropuerto Internacional de la Ciudad de México (AICM), the operators of MEX and Licenciado Adolfo López Mateos International Airport (TLC) in Toluca, requesting additional information on access to slots and facilities at those airports. The Joint Applicants replied on November 6, The Department received and docketed a response from the Secretary of Communications and Transportation (SCT), who oversees AICM, on October 2, On May 13, 2016, the Department issued a second Order requesting additional information from the Joint Applicants and sent a second letter to AICM requesting additional information on slot administration and any plans to modify the slot regime at MEX. We received responses to those requests on June 2 and 3, 2016, respectively. 6 See Joint Application, DOT-OST , March 31, 2015, at 3. 3

4 On June 15, 2016, the Department issued a Notice declaring the record substantially complete and establishing a procedural schedule for public comments. Answers were due July 6, 2016, and replies were due July 15, Eleven parties filed answers and three parties, including the Joint Applicants, filed replies. Following the due date for replies, six parties filed surreplies and other responses. 7 Their filings are summarized below. Travelers United, Inc. (Travelers United) filed in opposition to the application, stating that, given the current level of consolidation in the marketplace, no further grants of antitrust immunity are warranted. Travelers United believes that, at best, the proposed joint venture would provide no public benefits and would likely result in higher fares for consumers. Travelers United also argues that the joint venture would control approximately 50 percent of the slots at MEX. Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (Atlanta airport), Wayne County Airport Authority (WCAA), Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA), Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC), the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce (Atlanta Chamber), and the City of Atlanta all filed supportive answers noting the public benefits that they believe will accrue to their respective communities if a grant of ATI is made. Atlanta airport states that, if ATI is granted, consumers will benefit from new direct service options that will better meet the demands of Atlanta businesses and consumers, and that efficiencies created by the joint venture will improve the experience for customers while lowering costs through increased competition. WCAA notes the benefits it has received from previous grants of ATI by the Department, including new services to Amsterdam, Paris, Frankfurt, Munich, and Rome. The WCAA believes that a grant of ATI in this instance will provide similar benefits by better connecting the state of Michigan to Mexico and points beyond in Latin America. LAWA states that Los Angeles is the top U.S.-Mexico market and has the largest Mexican population outside of Mexico City. LAWA believes that, given the strong historic, cultural, and economic ties between the region and Mexico, the proposed alliance would result in increased service between Mexico and multiple west coast cities, as well as increased capacity on existing routes. The MAC states that over 450,000 passengers travelled between the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport (MSP) and Mexico in 2015, representing significant passenger demand that would be benefit from the proposed alliance. It also states that there are several major corporations headquartered in Minnesota that have significant operations in Mexico. The Atlanta Chamber and the City of Atlanta both submitted comments stating their belief that the proposed alliance would benefit consumers through new direct service options, increased capacity on the busiest U.S.-Mexico routes, and enhanced competition. 7 The Department will grant all outstanding motions for leave to file late or unauthorized pleadings. 4

5 JetBlue Airways Corporation (JetBlue) filed an answer opposing the grant of ATI to the Joint Applicants. JetBlue argues that the new air service agreement between the United States and Mexico does not contain all the elements of an Open Skies agreement and, therefore, the Department should not consider the application. Further, JetBlue states that the Joint Applicants exercise a monopoly on slots at MEX. JetBlue argues that an opaque and confusing slot regime at MEX, coupled with the lack of a secondary market for slots, make it virtually impossible for new entrants to gain access to MEX, raising significant competition concerns. JetBlue believes that, if ATI is granted, it should be conditioned on a significant slot divestiture at MEX to alleviate competitive concerns, and that ATI should not be granted until such a remedy has been put in place. JetBlue recommends that the Joint Applicants divest at least 30 commercially viable slot pairs at MEX and four (4) slot pairs at JFK. Additionally, JetBlue seeks a commitment that AICM adopt the International Air Transportation Association s (IATA) Worldwide Slot Guidelines (WSG) and ensure that JetBlue and other similarly situated LCCs receive priority allocation of any new slots at MEX. JetBlue also argues that any grant of ATI in this case should be limited to three years, to allow the Department to reassess public benefits. Finally, JetBlue argues that the Department should require the ATI recipients to publicly file annual reports in the docket detailing progress made by the Joint Applicants in achieving their stated goals, identifying specific actions they have taken to implement the alliance agreements, and a discussion of public benefits that have been realized. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Hawaiian) filed an answer stating its belief that the public interest is best served by open access to international air transportation markets. It goes on to argue that there is currently no Open Skies agreement in place between the United States and Mexico. Further, Hawaiian states that there are significant barriers to entry in Mexico City that protect incumbent carriers from competition. Hawaiian believes that ATI should only be granted if a full Open Skies agreement exists between the United States and Mexico, if the Department is satisfied that MEX s slot allocation procedures are transparent and that competitive carriers can acquire sufficient slots to compete effectively, if the grant of ATI is limited to three years, and if independent carriers receive equal access to Origin and Destination (O&D) Survey data that are submitted by foreign airlines pursuant to grants of immunity. 8 ABC Aerolíneas, S.A. de C.V., d/b/a Interjet (Interjet) filed an answer arguing that the opportunities for competition offered by the new Open Skies agreement between the U.S. and Mexico should not be stifled by lack of access to constrained airports, namely MEX and JFK. Interjet states that a grant of ATI would enable the JV to exercise unmatched market power over service between JFK and MEX. Interjet further argues that the most effective remedy for the Department to prevent undue monopoly power in the JFK-MEX market would be to require Delta to divest a significant number of its JFK slots at desirable times. Southwest Airlines, Inc. filed an answer stating that the U.S.-Mexico market not only suffers from an unbalanced competitive structure and significant barriers to entry for LCCs, but also a 8 The O&D is a 10% sample of airline tickets from Reporting Carriers collected by the DOT Bureau of Transportation Statistics Office of Airline Information. Data includes origin, destination, fare, and other itinerary details of passengers transported. The collection is used to determine air traffic patterns, air carrier market shares, and fare levels. 5

6 near complete lack of transparency for access to Mexico s two most important airports: MEX and Cancun (CUN). Southwest argues that, as a condition of any grant of ATI, the Department should: require the Joint Applicants to divest at least 21 peak-hour slot pairs at MEX, with additional one-for-one divestitures for any additional new services the Joint Applicants initiate at MEX until a new Mexico City airport is opened; require Delta to de-peak its Saturday schedule at CUN to allow at least nine peak-hour operations by U.S. LCCs; require the Joint Applicants to make available at least two gates at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) terminal 2 to accommodate Southwest s expanded Mexico service; and delay the effectiveness of ATI for one-year to allow new entrant LCCs to establish competitive service. The Joint Applicants filed a reply arguing that the application does in fact meet the Department s public interest standards and a grant of ATI would be consistent with past decisions. The Joint Applicants assert, contrary to objections, that the U.S.-Mexico air services agreement does contain all of the elements of an Open Skies agreement. The Joint Applicants further argue that ATI alliances have proven beneficial to consumers and that the parties have made a strong showing of consumer benefits, including increased efficiencies, expanded service, and better products. The Joint Applicants also assert that the objectors have failed to demonstrate that a grant of ATI would substantially reduce competition and that the Department should not implement any of the conditions proposed by the commenters. Concesionaria Vuela Compañía de Aviación, S.A.P.I. de C.V. d/b/a/ Volaris (Volaris) filed a reply in which it did not argue the merits of the application, but commented on the conditions in the U.S.-Mexico market and the availability of slots at MEX. Volaris argues that any slot divestitures that may be required should be available to Mexican carriers. Volaris states that allowing all U.S. and Mexican LCCs to gain access to divested slots will provide the needed competitive discipline and greatly expand the range of competitive choices for consumers. Southwest filed a reply associating itself with JetBlue s Answer, noting how both carriers have experienced difficulties in accessing the U.S.-Mexico City market. Southwest, however, disagreed with JetBlue s belief that Mexican carriers should be eligible to receive any divested slots. Southwest continues to believe that all divested slots should be allocated to U.S. LCCs. American submitted a surreply contesting the arguments of Southwest, JetBlue, and Hawaiian, that only low-cost carriers should be eligible to receive divested slots, stating that such restrictions are unprecedented and unsupportable. Further, American also argues that the Department should not limit an ATI grant to three years as proposed by Hawaiian and JetBlue. Southwest also filed a surreply disputing the Joint Applicants assertion that commercially viable MEX slots are readily available. Southwest argues that an opaque and biased slot regime at MEX necessitates slot divestitures in this proceeding. Southwest also reiterates its argument that the proposed JV does not provide demonstrable public benefits and should not be approved without the divestitures and conditions proposed by Southwest, including significant MEX slots, de-peaked operations at CUN, and access to two gates at LAX. Volaris submitted an Answer in response to Southwest s surreply, arguing that its limited slot holdings at MEX would not allow Volaris to introduce new U.S.-MEX services without 6

7 dismantling its Mexican domestic services. Volaris argues that it, along with all U.S. and Mexican LCCs, should be eligible to receive any MEX slots divested as a result of this proceeding. Southwest filed a further Consolidated Response in reply to the surreplies of American and Volaris. In it, Southwest argues that, for different reasons, both American and Volaris should be barred from receiving any MEX slot divestitures. Counter to American s argument, Southwest provides several examples of past instances of divestitures in aviation-related competition matters where recipients have been limited to LCCs. 9 Southwest also argues again that Volaris has significant MEX holdings, currently used for domestic service, that it could reallocate to transborder service, and therefore should be barred from receiving any divested slots. American filed a response to Southwest s Consolidated Reply arguing that American or any other carrier should not be precluded from acquiring any divested slots, and that all carriers should have an opportunity to compete for them. JetBlue filed a Consolidated Surreply in response to the filings of the Joint Applicants, Southwest, Volaris, and American. JetBlue argues that the Joint Applicants assertions that slots are readily available at MEX is incorrect and not supported by the record; that a fair and equitable slot remedy for LCCs is necessary to offset the competitive effects of a grant of ATI in this proceeding, and American should not be eligible to participate in any slot remedy. Finally, JetBlue states that the Department should not consider the Joint Applicants ATI request unless it can develop a meaningful slot remedy that will promote competition at MEX. III. PREDICATE FOR CONSIDERING ATI It is the longstanding policy of the Department not to consider requests for ATI in a market until all the elements of an Open Skies agreement are available to carriers. 10 As a threshold matter, JetBlue has argued in its comments that the current bilateral air services agreement between the United States and Mexico 11 does not contain all of the elements of an Open Skies agreement (specifically, unrestricted own-metal fifth-freedom rights 12 ), and therefore the Department should not consider the case further See Consolidated Response of Southwest Airlines Co. DOT-OST , August 9, 2016 at See Order ; Order at 2; Notice Suspending the Procedural Schedule, April 8, 2015, DOT-OST , at Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of the United States of American and the Government of the United Mexican States < Entered into force on August 21, The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, granted by one State to another State to put down and to take on, in the territory of the first State, traffic coming from or destined to a third State. See Freedoms of the Air International Civil Aviation Organization. < 13 See Answer of JetBlue Airways Corporation, DOT-OST , July 6, 2016, at 5. 7

8 The Department does not agree. The modernized U.S.-Mexico air service agreement, recently brought into force, contains all of the elements of an Open Skies agreement, as defined by the Department in Order The agreement explicitly provides carriers of both countries the right to conduct own-metal fifth-freedom operations. The Department removed any ambiguity regarding those rights through an exchange of letters in which both civil aviation authorities have agreed that approval for own-metal fifth-freedom operations will not be withheld, but recognizes the different approaches to licensing by the United States and Mexico. These letters have been available to interested carriers and we are placing them in the docket along with this Order. The United States views own-metal fifth-freedom rights as an integral part of the bilateral agreement. Should the situation prove otherwise, the regulatory predicate for a grant of ATI would no longer exist and the Department s findings could be rendered invalid. IV. DECISIONAL STANDARDS The request before us consists of approval of, and a grant of antitrust immunity for, a Joint Cooperation Agreement (JCA) between Delta and Aeromexico. 14 The JCA provides for commercial cooperation on all scheduled, nonstop routes between the United States and Mexico, 15 including full coordination of pricing, revenue management, marketing, sales, and distribution activities, code-sharing on all transborder routes and connecting services within the United States and Mexico, fully reciprocal FFPs, and revenue sharing. Under 49 U.S.C and , the Department engages in a two-step analysis of foreign air transportation agreements submitted for our approval. We first examine the application under 41309(b) to determine whether the agreement(s) are adverse to the public interest because they would substantially reduce or eliminate competition (the Competitive Effects Analysis ). If we make that determination, 41309(b)(1)(A) directs the Department to decide whether the agreements are nevertheless necessary to meet a serious transportation need or to achieve important public benefits. If we make that finding, and conclude that those public benefits cannot be achieved by other reasonably available and materially less anticompetitive means, we must approve the agreements pursuant to 41308(b). A party opposing approval of antitrust immunity has the burden of demonstrating that the agreements would substantially reduce or eliminate competition, and that less anticompetitive alternatives are available. The party seeking approval of antitrust immunity, however, has the burden of demonstrating that the agreements meet a serious transportation need or achieve important public benefits. If the Department concludes, after our initial review of the application under 41309(b), that the agreements are not adverse to the public interest, 41309(b) directs us to approve the agreements. In that case, the Department next examines whether there are sufficient public benefits to grant ATI under 41308(b) (the Public Benefits Analysis ). Congress has authorized the Department to exempt airlines from the antitrust laws to the extent necessary to allow a proposed transaction to proceed, provided the exemption is required by the public interest. 14 Joint Cooperation Agreement, March 27, 2015, hereinafter the JCA or JCA Agreement. 15 Excluding all-cargo and private charter flights. 8

9 The Department s public interest analysis under both 41309(b) and 41308(b) entails a balancing of any anti-competitive effects and public benefits. The standard in 41308(b) ( required by ) is higher than that in 41309(b) ( not adverse to ). Integrated joint ventures allow airlines to achieve merger-like efficiencies in covered markets. Because approval of the application would have intended commercial effects similar to those resulting from a merger, the Department also examines the application under the Clayton Act test. The Clayton Act test is used to predict the competitive effects of a proposed merger, and requires us to consider whether a grant of ATI is likely to substantially reduce competition and facilitate the exercise of market power. The Department applies the Clayton Act test to determine whether approval of the application would allow the ATI Applicants to profitably charge supra-competitive prices or reduce service or product quality below competitive levels in any relevant market. In examining whether an alliance is likely to create or enhance market power, we examine: (1) whether the alliance would significantly increase market concentration; (2) whether the alliance would cause potential competitive harm; and (3) whether new entry into the market would be timely, likely, and sufficient either to deter or to discipline the potential competitive harm. Where new entry would not otherwise be sufficient to address competitive harm, or where there are external factors such as infrastructure constraints in the marketplace that exacerbate competitive harm, remedies may be necessary to address potential competition problems caused by the alliance. V. COMPETITIVE EFFECTS ANALYSIS Section 41309(b) requires a determination as to whether the agreements are adverse to the public interest because they would substantially reduce or eliminate competition. The Department conducts an analysis of the competitive effects that would result from approving the application on three levels of analysis of relevant competitive markets: at a broad network level, at a country-pair level, and at a city-pair level. Consistent with our standard practice, we also consider the potential competitive effects of slot constraints at major airports, in this case MEX and JFK Network Level The Joint Applicants both operate large, global airlines offering service from their home countries to locations in Europe, Asia, South America, and elsewhere. The scope of the proposed JV, however, limits cooperation to transborder routes between the United States and Mexico and any behind or beyond connecting flights within those two countries. 17 Accordingly, most of our analysis will focus on the potential competitive effects in transborder markets between the U.S. and Mexico. 16 See, e.g., Order , February 13, 2010, DOT-OST , at See Joint Application, DOT-OST , March 31, 2105, at 3. 9

10 Our network-level analysis entails an examination of the competitive effects that the proposed alliance will have at the broad network level, including any impacts on passengers traveling from behind or to beyond the Joint Applicants home countries. Aeromexico s transborder services target the largest U.S. cities, along with major cities with large Mexican populations such as Las Vegas, Sacramento, and San Antonio. Aeromexico also serves a handful of smaller markets in California and Texas via its regional carrier, Aeromexico Connect. 18 In contrast, Delta s services are concentrated on linking its hub airports: Atlanta, Detroit, JFK, Minneapolis-St. Paul, LAX, and Salt Lake City to large markets in Mexico, with particular focus on Mexico City and leisure markets like Cancun. In this case, at the network level, with the exception of MEX, any anticompetitive impacts will be modest given the proposed JV s limited scope, applying only to the transborder market and any domestic connecting segments. As such, both competitive benefits and harm are largely restricted to the transborder market. As shown in Figure 1 below, the vast majority (91.4 percent) of traffic between the United States and Mexico is true origin and destination, involving no third countries. Only 6.5 percent of transborder traffic involves passengers originating behind the U.S. connecting onward to Mexico, and only two percent involves a U.S.-originating passenger connecting in Mexico to travel beyond Mexico. Accordingly, we tentatively find that any network competitive effects and benefits outside of the transborder market will be de minimis. Figure 1: U.S.-Mexico Traffic: Origin and Destination by Region 91.4% US - Mexico Behind US - Mexico US - Beyond Mexico Behind/Beyond 0.1% 2.0% 6.5% Source: DOT analysis of MIDT, T-100 and O&D data. In view of the limited scope of the proposed JV and the low barriers to entry at most airports for existing and potential competitors, we tentatively find that approving the application will not substantially reduce or eliminate competition at the network level. As will be discussed further below, the Department has significant concerns regarding the impact on routes and traffic flown involving MEX, because about two-thirds of all domestic and one-third of all international 18 Aerolitoral, S.A. de C.V., d/b/a Aeromexico Connect is a wholly owned subsidiary of Aeromexico. 10

11 passengers in Mexico arrive or depart from MEX, 19 and existing infrastructure and slot administration rules limit competitive entry there Country-Pair Level When assessing competitive effects in the U.S.-Mexico market, the level of market concentration is a key indicator of whether the Joint Applicants will be in a position to exert market power. The data suggest that the proposed JV could enhance competition at the country-pair level. The first (American, 22.5%) and second (United, 20.2%) competitors currently control 42.7 percent of the U.S.-Mexico market with Aeromexico (13.5%) and Delta (11.9%) a distant third and fourth, respectively. American and United also have a structural advantage in the market in that they both have large hub operations (Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston, respectively) that enable them to serve most markets in Mexico with a range of aircraft, including smaller, short-range aircraft. As shown in Figure 2, a combined Aeromexico and Delta would have an initial market share of 25.4 percent, placing it in a better competitive position vis-a-vis American and United. Figure 2: Onboard Passenger Share in the U.S.-Mexico Market Pre-Transaction Passengers Share Post-Transaction Passengers Share American 5,977, % Aeromexico+Delta 6,761, % United 5,374, % American 5,977, % Aeromexico 3,595, % United 5,374, % Delta 3,166, % Volaris 2,560, % Volaris 2,560, % Southwest 1,456, % Southwest 1,456, % Alaska 1,452, % Alaska 1,452, % Other 2,992, % Other 2,992, % Total 26,573, % Total 26,573, % Source: DOT T-100 Segment. YE June 30, Scheduled service only. Given the significant low-cost carrier (LCC) presence (approximately 32%), lower barriers to market entry in many markets (particularly in light of the new U.S. Mexico air services agreement) 21, and the relatively un-concentrated market overall, there is a significant ability for market participants to thwart any potential of the Joint Applicants to exert market power at the broader country level. The Department therefore tentatively finds that approving the application will not substantially reduce or eliminate competition in the U.S.-Mexico market, except in markets involving MEX. 3. City-Pair Level The Department s city-pair analysis identified all transborder markets and assessed them based on passenger density (e.g., number of O&D passengers per day), stage length (route distance), 19 See COFECE Report Translation, DOT-OST , June 1, 2016, at Ibid at The shorter distances involved in the transborder market also allow for entry with smaller, less expensive aircraft, including regional jets. 11

12 and the number of carriers that compete on that route. 22 Using a share shift analysis, Aeromexico and Delta were then combined to reflect a single operating entity, and pre- and posttransaction shares were then compared to isolate markets that would be significantly impacted. Markets that are reduced from three to two carriers or from two to one carrier in the share shift analysis pose a significant competitive concern. Markets that go from four to three carriers warrant some caution, particularly in large or highly concentrated markets. Conversely, the Department identified 15 markets that would see an increase in the number of viable competitors. 23 Figure 3: Carriers Carriers Bi-directional Percent of Total Markets Pre-ATI Post-ATI Passengers Passengers , % , % ,068, % , % , % , % , % ,033, % , % 10. No Change 1,547 15,776, % Total 1,687 20,250,240 - Source: DOT analysis of MIDT, T-100 and O&D data. Of those markets that pose competitive concerns (rows 1-2 of Figure 3), further examination reveals them to be small or very small markets that together make up less than one percent of all market passengers. Of these, there are nine (9) markets in which the Joint Applicants combination results in a two-to-one reduction. These nine markets are all extremely small, however, amounting to less than 6,900 total annual O&D passengers. In the case of markets that would go from three to two carriers, the Joint Applicants combination generally results in the smaller market share of the two remaining competitors. Reviewing the four to three carrier markets (row 3), the two overlap routes discussed below constitute the bulk of affected passengers. When adjusted to remove the overlaps, this group represents just 3.7 percent of total passengers. These remaining markets range from medium to very small in which the Joint Applicants combination does not represent the largest concentration. 22 A competitor is defined as a carrier that has a greater than five percent market share. 23 An increase in the number of competitors occurs where the combination of the Joint Applicants shares create a competitor having a greater than five percent market share, the competitor threshold. For example, the Chicago-Los Cabos market had two competitors above five percent market share, United and American, with Aeromexico and Delta each having a less than five percent share. The combination of Delta and Aeromexico, however, yields three competitors, because the combined share of the Joint Applicants rises above the five percent threshold. 12

13 Roughly 95 percent of markets, which constitute 90 percent of transborder passengers, will see no significant decrease in competition resulting from the JV. The Department therefore tentatively concludes that approval of the application will generally not substantially reduce or eliminate competition at the city-pair level, except those involving MEX. We will examine the two nonstop overlap routes individually below. 4. Overlap Routes Currently the Joint Applicants overlap on two nonstop routes: Los Angeles (LAX) to Guadalajara (GDL); and New York-Kennedy (JFK) to Mexico City (MEX). A. Los Angeles - Guadalajara The LAX GDL route involves the second largest transborder city-pair market, with about 750,000 annual passengers, of which 97% are originating and terminating their journeys in those two cities. Approximately 80 percent of the Joint Applicants passengers are O&D, with the remaining connecting, mainly from other U.S. west coast cities. Figure 4: American 2% Interjet 0.4% United 4% Delta 10% Los Angeles - Guadalajara Volaris 41% Alaska 15% AeroMexico 28% Source: DOT Analysis O&D Passenger Share Year Ending March The city-pair market is served by a broad mix of carriers, as seen in Figure 4. The diverse group of carriers offering service, with the largest being an LCC; the lack of market concentration on the part of the Joint Applicants (combined, they would have the second-largest market share); and the likelihood of new services being added with the implementation of the new air services agreement, together make it unlikely that the Joint Applicants will be able to exercise dominance on this overlap route. The Department therefore tentatively concludes that there would not be a substantial reduction or elimination of competition on this route if the application were approved. B. New York-JFK Mexico City The JFK-MEX route is an important business market connecting the two largest cities in North America and involves slot-constrained airports at both points. The market is much more concentrated than LAX-GDL, with only four carriers providing nonstop service. As seen in Figure 5 below, the Joint Applicants would control approximately 81% of JFK MEX O&D traffic. The Department s analysis also indicates that competitive connecting service is not a viable competitive alternative, as 96 percent of the traffic on the route travels nonstop. 24 The Department examined the market using T-100 data and found substantially similar results. 13

14 Figure 5: JFK-Mexico City Interjet 17% American 2% Delta 25% AeroMexico 56% Source: DOT Analysis O&D Passenger Share Year Ending March The Joint Applicants argue that the Department should consider Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), where slot controls were recently removed, 26 as a substitute for JFK. The Joint Applicants therefore argue that there are up to six competitors in the market, rather than only three (counting Delta and Aeromexico as a single entity). Further, they argue that, because JetBlue and American already have significant slot portfolios at JFK, they will likely enter the market because the new U.S.-Mexico air services agreement removes the limits on the number of carriers in a market. Although EWR was recently downgraded to an IATA WSG Level 2 airport, opening the possibility of some new entry, demand for the airport is still extremely high and approval for scheduled service, particularly in high-demand, congested hours, may not be possible. The new agreement provides opportunities for other carriers to enter this concentrated market. Entry, however, requires acquiring slots at both JFK and MEX. The record indicates that nonincumbent carriers have had a difficult time acquiring viable slot times at both airports, and that it is unlikely that a market solution will present itself. Without access to slots, potential competitors will find it impossible to initiate new service to compete with a combined Delta and Aeromexico. The Department tentatively views the concentration and barriers to entry in this market as having a substantial impact on competition in the foreseeable future, unless appropriate conditions are imposed. 5. Special Discussion Concerning Mexico City Mexico City is the principal air service market in Mexico by orders of magnitude. With 21 million inhabitants, it is the largest city in North America. One out of every five Mexicans resides in the Mexico City region. These socio-economic factors, resulting in Mexico City being the singular mega-hub for the country, are the drivers of the observed aviation demand 25 The Department examined the market using T-100 data and found substantially similar results. 26 See Change of Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) Designation, 81 FR 19861, April 6,

15 distributions in the country. The airport s importance stems not only from it serving as the exclusive access point to the city, but also its preeminent role in the Mexican aviation network. There is no suitable substitute airport for MEX. The nearest commercial airport is Toluca International Airport (TLC), approximately 44 miles west of MEX by road, whereas MEX is located near downtown Mexico City. A number of factors make TLC unattractive to consumers including lower air service levels, highway tolls, and high taxi fares. 27 All five of the largest Mexican carriers have their largest operations at MEX, which is vital to their ability to link smaller markets with their broader networks. Domestic capacity at MEX accounts for one-third of all Mexican domestic capacity, and is greater than that of the next four largest Mexican airports combined. With 52 domestic destinations, MEX has twice the number of destinations served than other Mexican hub airports. Approximately two-thirds of all domestic and one-third of all international passengers in Mexico have their origin or destination at MEX. 28 In terms of network connectivity and scale, there are no substitutes for the airport in the country, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 29 The broad network and resulting capacity depend on the immense demand for air travel, both domestic and international, at MEX. In the year ending first quarter 2015, approximately five million O&D passengers traveled between the U.S. and Mexico City, almost 25% of all transborder O&D. Of these, two-thirds flew nonstop directly to/from MEX. 30 In terms of overall traffic, six million passengers flew on a segment between the U.S. and Mexico City, of which 80% started or ended at MEX, while 20% connected onwards. Of these travelers, a combined Aeromexico-Delta would command by far the largest passenger share at 48%, followed in distant second and third by United and American. 31 The four legacy carriers combined inclusive of Aeromexico control 83% of the U.S. to MEX market with minimal participation by any non-legacy U.S. carrier. 6. Infrastructure Issues Two of the largest markets covered by the proposed JV involve slot-constrained airports, namely MEX and JFK. We will examine each airport separately. A. MEX As shown by the statistics above, the importance of access to Mexico City to the proper functioning of the transborder market cannot be overstated. The airport s slot regime restricts 27 COFECE found that in 2010, 75.2% of people living in TLC s catchment area chose instead to fly out of MEX. See COFECE Report Translation, DOT-OST , June 1, 2016, at See COFECE Report Translation, DOT-OST , June 1, 2016 at While the Mexican government has proposed to construct a new, larger Mexico City airport as a replacement for MEX, it is unclear when the new airport would enter into service. 30 DOT analysis of MIDT, T-100, and O&D data. 31 United s share is 18%; American s is 16%. 15

16 commercial operations during peak (saturated) hours, 32 which effectively means that slots are required for any viable transborder services, particularly for U.S.-based carriers that would rely almost exclusively on local MEX O&D traffic to support such services. There is ample evidence in the record that MEX is severely constrained, slot administration at the airport is opaque and diverges from industry standard practices, and new entry or expansion by potential competitors is severely limited. 33 As Southwest and JetBlue have commented, accessing landing and takeoff slots, particularly at commercially viable times, has been nearly impossible. 34 The Department has been unable to determine that MEX follows, or has committed to follow, any consistent or transparent guidelines for slot administration that would address the significant barriers to entry. On February 19, 2016, COFECE s investigative arm published a preliminary investigation into the slot administration regime at MEX. 35 The investigation sought to assess the overall level of competition at MEX and focused on the role of the airport operator and the slot regime in place at the airport. The report identified numerous, serious concerns, including: There is a disparity in information available to carriers regarding availability of slots. Operating practices permit, due to lack of clarity and enforcement, improper use of slots. Significant operations improperly occur without slots; there is scant evidence of enforcement of slot rules. Utilization of slots is low due to liberal cancellation allowances and availability of short-term slots with carriers at MEX not using 37% of seasonal slots on average. o Aeromexico s slot utilization rate is below the average, with the carrier not utilizing, on average, 39% of its takeoff and landing slots. 36 AICM only addresses needs of incumbents; current Mexican law actually gives priority to incumbents, making new entry even more difficult. Air carriers can retain slots even if they are not operating, preventing new entry. Unlike other slot-constrained airports, MEX does not follow the IATA WSGs or have functionally equivalent transparent rules for slot allocation and administration. Taken together, the above factors constitute a system that allows the largest incumbent carriers extreme flexibility with their slot portfolio to significantly weaken use-it-or-lose-it rules, and provides the ability for incumbent carriers to prevent access to slots by new entrants and other potential competitors. This situation inhibits competition by limiting the ability of new carriers to enter the market as well as existing carriers ability to provide competitive discipline. The COFECE report makes clear that Aeromexico, holding almost half of the slots at MEX, is able to use its unique position at the airport to exert market power and to leverage the slot regime 32 Officially declared as See COFECE Report Translation: DOT-OST , at See COFECE Report Translation, DOT-OST , June 1, 2016 at See Answer of Southwest Airlines Co. DOT-OST July 7, 2016 at 6; Answer of JetBlue Airways Corporation, DOT-OST , July 6, 2016 at See COFECE Report Translation, DOT-OST , June 1, See COFECE Report Translation, DOT-OST , June 1, 2016 at

17 to potentially exclude competitors. 37 COFECE s investigation concludes that the current system of slot allocation and administration at MEX presents a barrier to entry to an essential input and is anticompetitive. The preliminary report proposes several reforms. COFECE will adopt a final recommendation on reforms pending review of the staff report. That process is unlikely to be completed before our statutory deadline for issuing a decision in this case. During the course of this proceeding, the Department sent two letters to MEX s airport administration seeking information on the slot administration procedures in place at MEX. The answers received did not address barriers to entry in the transborder market or provide a commitment or plan to reform the existing procedures. 38 AICM did not answer the Department s questions on whether it would implement any of COFECE s recommendations and, if so, in what timeframe. 39 Based upon longstanding competition policy principles, as well as established aviation policy, the Department would have serious concerns about granting ATI to any airlines under these circumstances. Given the circumstances at MEX, with its immense share of the transborder aviation market, severe access constraints, and the declaration by Mexico s competition authority that MEX slots are an essential input and are administered anticompetitively, a grant of ATI would be unjustified without stringent conditions. We therefore tentatively find that it is necessary both (1) to limit the duration of a grant of ATI while efforts to reform the slot rules continue and (2) to ensure that competitors are able to gain access to an adequate number of MEX slots to effectively compete in the interim. B. JFK JFK is a highly congested airport serving the largest city in the United States. It is a slotconstrained airport and is considered a Level 3 airport under the IATA WSG. Because of the high level of demand at the airport, few slots are available for carriers seeking to initiate daily, year-round service during the most desirable times for U.S.-Mexico service. Furthermore, the FAA has received numerous complaints over the years that incumbent carriers often choose not to transact with LCCs or other new entrants in order to prevent potential competitors from acquiring slots through the secondary market. 40 Several carriers have commented on the record that they have been unable to acquire JFK slots at reasonable times. 7. Competitive Effects Analysis Tentative Conclusions Based on our analysis, the Department tentatively concludes that approving the Joint Application will not substantially reduce or eliminate competition at the network or country-pair level, except with respect to JFK and MEX. The Department further tentatively finds that there will be no substantial reduction or elimination of competition at the city-pair level, aside from the 37 Id. 38 See Answer from the Mexican Secretariat of Communications and Transportation (SCT): Answer from the General Directorate of Civil Aviation (DGAC) on slot policy, DOT-OST , at See Aeropuerto Internacional de La Ciudad de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. - Response to Request for Additional Information, DOT-OST , June 2, 2016, at See Slot Management and Transparency for LaGuardia Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, and Newark Liberty International Airport, 80 Fed. Reg. 1274, January 8, 2015, at

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Order 2017-3-1 Served March 2, 2017 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Issued by the Department of Transportation on the 2 nd day of March, 2017

More information

BEFORE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. COMMENTS OF CANADIAN AIRLINES INTERNATIONAL LTD.

BEFORE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. COMMENTS OF CANADIAN AIRLINES INTERNATIONAL LTD. BEFORE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. ) 14 C.F.R. PART 93 ) Docket No. FAA-1999-4971 ) Notice No. 99-20 ) ) COMMENTS OF CANADIAN AIRLINES INTERNATIONAL

More information

BEFORE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D. C.

BEFORE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D. C. BEFORE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D. C. In the Matter of Petition for Waiver of the Terms of the Order Limiting Scheduled Operations at LaGuardia Airport Docket FAA-2010-0109 COMMENTS

More information

Antitrust Review of Mergers and Alliances

Antitrust Review of Mergers and Alliances Antitrust Review of Mergers and Alliances Istanbul Technical University Air Transportation Management, M.Sc. Program Aviation Economics and Financial Analysis Module 13 Outline A. Competitive Effects B.

More information

BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C. COMMENTS OF WESTJET

BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C. COMMENTS OF WESTJET BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C. In the Matter of Petition for Waiver of the Terms of the Order Limiting Scheduled Operations at LaGuardia Airport

More information

Antitrust Law and Airline Mergers and Acquisitions

Antitrust Law and Airline Mergers and Acquisitions Antitrust Law and Airline Mergers and Acquisitions Module 22 Istanbul Technical University Air Transportation Management, M.Sc. Program Air Law, Regulation and Compliance Management 12 February 2015 Kate

More information

Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). SUMMARY: Under this notice, the FAA announces the submission deadline of

Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). SUMMARY: Under this notice, the FAA announces the submission deadline of This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 05/09/2018 and available online at https://federalregister.gov/d/2018-09894, and on FDsys.gov [4910-13] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

More information

Carve-Outs Under Airline Antitrust Immunity: In the Public Interest?

Carve-Outs Under Airline Antitrust Immunity: In the Public Interest? September 2009 (1) Carve-Outs Under Airline Antitrust Immunity: In the Public Interest? Jan K. Brueckner & Stef Proost University of California, Irvine & KU Leuven, Belgium www.competitionpolicyinternational.com

More information

Exemption No UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, DC 20591

Exemption No UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, DC 20591 Exemption No. 10466 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, DC 20591 In the matter of the petition of MN Airlines, LLC d/b/a Sun Country Airlines

More information

Cleveland Hopkins International Airport Preliminary Merger Analysis

Cleveland Hopkins International Airport Preliminary Merger Analysis City of Cleveland Frank G. Jackson, Mayor Operational Issues Cleveland Hopkins International Airport Preliminary Merger Analysis As of today, Continental and United have not even admitted that they are

More information

OPERATING LIMITATIONS AT NEW YORK LAGUARDIA AIRPORT. SUMMARY: This action extends the Order Limiting Operations at New York LaGuardia

OPERATING LIMITATIONS AT NEW YORK LAGUARDIA AIRPORT. SUMMARY: This action extends the Order Limiting Operations at New York LaGuardia This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 05/25/2016 and available online at http://federalregister.gov/a/2016-12220, and on FDsys.gov [4910-13] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

More information

BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. ) Joint Application of ) ) DELTA AIR LINES, INC. and ) AEROVIAS DE MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V. ) DOT-OST-2015-0070 ) Under 49 U.S.C. 41308 and 41309

More information

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Order 2014-12-10 Served: December 15, 2014 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Issued by the Department of Transportation on the 15 th day of

More information

Communications with respect to this document should be addressed to:

Communications with respect to this document should be addressed to: BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. Application of FRONTIER AIRLINES, INC. For an exemption under 49 U.S.C. 40109 (Chicago (ORD, Illinois- Cancun, Mexico

More information

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Order 2018-7-3 Issued by the Department of Transportation on the 6 th day of July, 2018 Served: July 6, 2018

More information

Operating Limitations At John F. Kennedy International Airport. SUMMARY: This action amends the Order Limiting Operations at John F.

Operating Limitations At John F. Kennedy International Airport. SUMMARY: This action amends the Order Limiting Operations at John F. This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 06/21/2016 and available online at http://federalregister.gov/a/2016-14631, and on FDsys.gov [4910-13] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

More information

International Civil Aviation Organization WORLDWIDE AIR TRANSPORT CONFERENCE (ATCONF) SIXTH MEETING. Montréal, 18 to 22 March 2013

International Civil Aviation Organization WORLDWIDE AIR TRANSPORT CONFERENCE (ATCONF) SIXTH MEETING. Montréal, 18 to 22 March 2013 International Civil Aviation Organization WORKING PAPER 5/3/13 English only WORLDWIDE AIR TRANSPORT CONFERENCE (ATCONF) SIXTH MEETING Montréal, 18 to 22 March 2013 Agenda Item 2: Examination of key issues

More information

Selection of Alaska to Operate U.S.-Havana Air Service Would Best Achieve the Department's Principal Objectives in This Proceeding...

Selection of Alaska to Operate U.S.-Havana Air Service Would Best Achieve the Department's Principal Objectives in This Proceeding... TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Alaska's Service Proposal... 4 II. Selection of Alaska to Operate U.S.-Havana Air Service Would Best Achieve the Department's Principal Objectives in This Proceeding... 5 A. Alaska's

More information

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Order 2013-5-6 Served: May 7, 2013 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Issued by the Department of Transportation on the 7 th day of May, 2013

More information

Airline Alliances and Systems Competition Houston Law Review Symposium 30 Years of Airline Deregulation

Airline Alliances and Systems Competition Houston Law Review Symposium 30 Years of Airline Deregulation Airline Alliances and Systems Competition Houston Law Review - 2008 Symposium 30 Years of Airline Deregulation by James Reitzes, The Brattle Group Diana Moss, American Antitrust Institute January 25, 2008

More information

Case No IV/M DELTA AIR LINES / PAN AM. REGULATION (EEC) No 4064/89 MERGER PROCEDURE. Article 6(1)(b) NON-OPPOSITION Date:

Case No IV/M DELTA AIR LINES / PAN AM. REGULATION (EEC) No 4064/89 MERGER PROCEDURE. Article 6(1)(b) NON-OPPOSITION Date: EN Case No IV/M.130 - DELTA AIR LINES / PAN AM Only the English text is available and authentic. REGULATION (EEC) No 4064/89 MERGER PROCEDURE Article 6(1)(b) NON-OPPOSITION Date: 13.09.1991 Also available

More information

WASHINGTON, APPLICATION OF AEROVIAS DE MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V. FOR RENEWAL OF EXEMPTION AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON, APPLICATION OF AEROVIAS DE MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V. FOR RENEWAL OF EXEMPTION AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. Application of AEROVIAS DE MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V. ) > Docket OST-95-263 - 2 q for Renewal of an Exemption from > 49 U.S.C. 5 41301 (Cancun-Atlanta) > > APPLICATION OF AEROVIAS DE MEXICO,

More information

BEFORE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

BEFORE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C. BEFORE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C. In the matter of Docket No. FAA-2007-029320 Operating Limitations at New York s John. F. Kennedy International Airport COMMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. APPLICATION OF. ABC AEROLÍNEAS, S.A. de C.V., d/b/a INTERJET FOR AN EXEMPTION

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. APPLICATION OF. ABC AEROLÍNEAS, S.A. de C.V., d/b/a INTERJET FOR AN EXEMPTION BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. Application of ABC AEROLÍNEAS, S.A. de C.V. d/b/a/ INTERJET for an Exemption pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40109 to engage in Scheduled Foreign Air Transportation

More information

OPEN SKIES TREATY Last Updated 2/18/10 Compiled by Dave Harris

OPEN SKIES TREATY Last Updated 2/18/10 Compiled by Dave Harris OPEN SKIES TREATY Last Updated 2/18/10 Compiled by Dave Harris mothflyer@gmail.com The following was excerpted from Wikipedia. The Legislative Committee does not necessarily endorse or agree with some

More information

BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. Motion of DELTA AIR LINES, INC. Docket DOT-OST-2016-0048 in the matter of 2019 U.S.-Haneda Combination Services Allocation Proceeding ANSWER

More information

Revisions to Denied Boarding Compensation, Domestic Baggage Liability Limits, Office of the Secretary (OST), Department of Transportation (DOT).

Revisions to Denied Boarding Compensation, Domestic Baggage Liability Limits, Office of the Secretary (OST), Department of Transportation (DOT). This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 05/27/2015 and available online at http://federalregister.gov/a/2015-12789, and on FDsys.gov 4910-9X DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Office

More information

oneworld alliance: The Commission s investigation under Article 101 TFEU

oneworld alliance: The Commission s investigation under Article 101 TFEU oneworld alliance: The Commission s investigation under Article 101 TFEU ACE Conference, Norwich Benoit Durand Benoit.Durand@rbbecon.com com 24 November, 2010 The Commission s approach in oneworld The

More information

Case No IV/M British Airways / TAT (II) REGULATION (EEC) No 4064/89 MERGER PROCEDURE. Article 6(1)(b) NON-OPPOSITION Date: 26/08/1996

Case No IV/M British Airways / TAT (II) REGULATION (EEC) No 4064/89 MERGER PROCEDURE. Article 6(1)(b) NON-OPPOSITION Date: 26/08/1996 EN Case No IV/M.806 - British Airways / TAT (II) Only the English text is available and authentic. REGULATION (EEC) No 4064/89 MERGER PROCEDURE Article 6(1)(b) NON-OPPOSITION Date: 26/08/1996 Also available

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. APPLICATION OF CARIBBEAN AIRLINES LIMITED FOR AN EXEMPTION

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. APPLICATION OF CARIBBEAN AIRLINES LIMITED FOR AN EXEMPTION BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. Application of CARIBBEAN AIRLINES LIMITED for an exemption from 49 U.S.C. 41301 (Jamaica/Caribbean Points-U.S. DOCKET DOT-OST-2010- APPLICATION

More information

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Order 2010-7-8 Served: July 20, 2010 Issued by the Department of Transportation on the 20th Day of July 2010

More information

Policy Regarding Airport Rates and Charges

Policy Regarding Airport Rates and Charges BEFORE THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C. Policy Regarding Airport Rates and Charges Docket No. FAA- 2008-0036 COMMENTS OF AIR CANADA Communications with respect to this document should

More information

Submission to Ministry of Transport: International Air Transport Policy Review. New Zealand Air Line Pilots Association

Submission to Ministry of Transport: International Air Transport Policy Review. New Zealand Air Line Pilots Association Submission to Ministry of Transport: International Air Transport Policy Review New Zealand Air Line Pilots Association Ministry of Transport - International Air Transport Policy 2 Objective of NZ international

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. Joint Application of UNITED AIR LINES, INC. AND SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES SYSTEM Docket OST-99-5251 for renewal of blanket Statements of Authorization

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. ) Docket Frequency Allocation Proceeding. ) December 13, 2007

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. ) Docket Frequency Allocation Proceeding. ) December 13, 2007 BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. ) 2007/2008 U.S.-Colombia Combination ) Docket Frequency Allocation Proceeding ) DOT-OST-2007-0006 ) ) December 13, 2007 ANSWER OF THE METRO ATLANTA

More information

Airport Slot Capacity: you only get what you give

Airport Slot Capacity: you only get what you give Airport Slot Capacity: you only get what you give Lara Maughan Head Worldwide Airport Slots 12 December 2018 Good afternoon everyone, I m Lara Maughan head of worldwide airports slots for IATA. Over the

More information

FAA Draft Order CHG Designee Policy. Comments on the Draft Order published online for public comment

FAA Draft Order CHG Designee Policy. Comments on the Draft Order published online for public comment FAA Draft Order 8900.1 CHG Designee Policy Comments on the Draft Order published online for public comment Submitted to the FAA via email at katie.ctr.bradford@faa.gov Submitted by the Modification and

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEEDINGS WASHINGTON, D.C.

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEEDINGS WASHINGTON, D.C. BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEEDINGS WASHINGTON, D.C. ------------------------------------------------------, third-party complainant v. Docket DOT-OST-2015-

More information

ACI EUROPE POSITION. A level playing field for European airports the need for revised guidelines on State Aid

ACI EUROPE POSITION. A level playing field for European airports the need for revised guidelines on State Aid ACI EUROPE POSITION A level playing field for European airports the need for revised guidelines on State Aid 16 June 2010 1. INTRODUCTION Airports play a vital role in the European economy. They ensure

More information

BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. Application of ) ) AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. ) ) for an exemption ) Docket DOT-OST-2010-0222 pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40109 ) (Various U.S. Points

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. In the matter of the application of CONCESIONARIA VUELA COMPAÑÍA DE AVIACIÓN, Docket DOT-OST-2014- S.A.P.I. DE C.V. d/b/a VOLARIS for an exemption

More information

DECISIONS ON AIR TRANSPORT LICENCES AND ROUTE LICENCES 4/99

DECISIONS ON AIR TRANSPORT LICENCES AND ROUTE LICENCES 4/99 UNITED KINGDOM CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY DECISIONS ON AIR TRANSPORT LICENCES AND ROUTE LICENCES 4/99 Decision of the Authority on its proposal to vary licence 1B/10 held by British Airways Plc and licence

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. ) DOCKETS OST-2000-8202 ) OST-2001-10369 Application of ) OST-2005-21605 ) OST-2005-23435 AEROVIAS DE MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V. ) OST-2008-0313 ) OST-2008-0366

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. Application of AVIATION SERVICES, LTD. DOCKET DOT-OST-2010-0153* (d/b/a FREEDOM AIR (Guam for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity

More information

Airport Slot Allocations In The EU: Current Regulation and Perspectives.

Airport Slot Allocations In The EU: Current Regulation and Perspectives. Airport Slot Allocations In The EU: Current Regulation and Perspectives. Olivier d'huart December 2009 Objectives of the study Identify what the current situation of slot allocation is in the European

More information

ORDER REQUESTING PROPOSALS

ORDER REQUESTING PROPOSALS Order 2017-2-4 Served: February 13, 2017 DEPARTMENT UNITED OF STATES TRANSPORTATION OF AMERICA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Issued by the

More information

REAUTHORISATION OF THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN AIR NEW ZEALAND AND CATHAY PACIFIC

REAUTHORISATION OF THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN AIR NEW ZEALAND AND CATHAY PACIFIC Chair Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee Office of the Minister of Transport REAUTHORISATION OF THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN AIR NEW ZEALAND AND CATHAY PACIFIC Proposal 1. I propose that the

More information

1. INTRODUCTION 2. OTAS AND THE MFN CLAUSE

1. INTRODUCTION 2. OTAS AND THE MFN CLAUSE HOTEL ONLINE BOOKING SECTOR: THE COMMITMENTS OF BOOKING AND THE MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSES. A CASE CONDUCTED IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONAL COMPETITION AUTHORITIES Giulia Cipolla 1 Keywords: Italian

More information

Airport Incentive Programs: Legal and Regulatory Considerations in Structuring Programs and Recent Survey Observations

Airport Incentive Programs: Legal and Regulatory Considerations in Structuring Programs and Recent Survey Observations Airport Incentive Programs: Legal and Regulatory Considerations in Structuring Programs and Recent Survey Observations 2010 ACI-NA AIRPORT ECONOMICS & FINANCE CONFERENCE Monica R. Hargrove ACI-NA General

More information

Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). SUMMARY: Under this notice, the FAA announces the submission deadline of

Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). SUMMARY: Under this notice, the FAA announces the submission deadline of This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 10/02/2017 and available online at https://federalregister.gov/d/2017-21045, and on FDsys.gov [4910-13] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

More information

Investor Update Issue Date: April 9, 2018

Investor Update Issue Date: April 9, 2018 Investor Update Issue Date: April 9, 2018 This investor update provides guidance and certain forward-looking statements about United Continental Holdings, Inc. (the Company or UAL ). The information in

More information

AIRPORT NOISE AND CAPACITY ACT OF 1990

AIRPORT NOISE AND CAPACITY ACT OF 1990 AIRPORT NOISE AND CAPACITY ACT OF 1990 P. 479 AIRPORT NOISE AND CAPACITY ACT OF 1990 SEC. 9301. SHORT TITLE This subtitle may be cited as the Airport Noise and /Capacity Act of 1990. [49 U.S.C. App. 2151

More information

I R UNDERGRADUATE REPORT. National Aviation System Congestion Management. by Sahand Karimi Advisor: UG

I R UNDERGRADUATE REPORT. National Aviation System Congestion Management. by Sahand Karimi Advisor: UG UNDERGRADUATE REPORT National Aviation System Congestion Management by Sahand Karimi Advisor: UG 2006-8 I R INSTITUTE FOR SYSTEMS RESEARCH ISR develops, applies and teaches advanced methodologies of design

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. ANSWER OF DELTA AIR LINES, INC. TO OBJECTIONS

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. ANSWER OF DELTA AIR LINES, INC. TO OBJECTIONS BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 1999 U.S.-ITALY COMBINATION SERVICE CASE Docket OST-98-4854 ANSWER OF DELTA AIR LINES, INC. TO OBJECTIONS Communications with respect to this document

More information

NETWORK DEVELOPMENT AND DETERMINATION OF ALLIANCE AND JOINT VENTURE BENEFITS

NETWORK DEVELOPMENT AND DETERMINATION OF ALLIANCE AND JOINT VENTURE BENEFITS NETWORK DEVELOPMENT AND DETERMINATION OF ALLIANCE AND JOINT VENTURE BENEFITS Status of Alliances in Middle East Compared with other world regions, the Middle East is under represented in global alliances.

More information

MIT ICAT. Price Competition in the Top US Domestic Markets: Revenues and Yield Premium. Nikolas Pyrgiotis Dr P. Belobaba

MIT ICAT. Price Competition in the Top US Domestic Markets: Revenues and Yield Premium. Nikolas Pyrgiotis Dr P. Belobaba Price Competition in the Top US Domestic Markets: Revenues and Yield Premium Nikolas Pyrgiotis Dr P. Belobaba Objectives Perform an analysis of US Domestic markets from years 2000 to 2006 in order to:

More information

Basic Policies on Operation of National Airports Utilizing Skills of the Private Sector

Basic Policies on Operation of National Airports Utilizing Skills of the Private Sector (TRANSLATION)(for Reference Only) Basic Policies on Operation of National Airports Utilizing Skills of the Private Sector I. The Purpose and Objectives in Operating etc. National Airports etc. by Utilizing

More information

2016 Annual Shareholders Meeting

2016 Annual Shareholders Meeting 2016 Annual Shareholders Meeting Safe harbor This presentation contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. In the matter of the application of CONCESIONARIA VUELA COMPAÑÍA DE AVIACIÓN, Docket DOT-OST-2016- S.A.P.I. DE C.V. d/b/a VOLARIS for an exemption

More information

Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) Program: Eligibility of Ground Access Projects Meeting

Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) Program: Eligibility of Ground Access Projects Meeting This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 05/03/2016 and available online at http://federalregister.gov/a/2016-10334, and on FDsys.gov [ 4910-13] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

More information

US Airways Group, Inc.

US Airways Group, Inc. US Airways Group, Inc. Proposed US Airways/Delta Merger Will Not Reduce Competition November 17, 2006 0 1 Forward-Looking Statements Certain of the statements contained herein should be considered forward-looking

More information

REGULATORY POLICY SEMINAR ON LIBERALIZATION POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION PORT OF SPAIN, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, APRIL, 2004

REGULATORY POLICY SEMINAR ON LIBERALIZATION POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION PORT OF SPAIN, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, APRIL, 2004 REGULATORY POLICY SEMINAR ON LIBERALIZATION POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION PORT OF SPAIN, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, 27-29 APRIL, 2004 JAMAICA S EXPERIENCE WITH AIR TRANSPORT LIBERALIZATION INTRODUCTION Today, the

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. REPLY OF EASTERN AIR LINES GROUP, INC.

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. REPLY OF EASTERN AIR LINES GROUP, INC. BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. ) 2016 U.S.-CUBA FREQUENCY ) ALLOCATION PROCEEDING ) DOCKET OST-2016-0021 ) REPLY OF EASTERN AIR LINES GROUP, INC. Communications with respect to

More information

Why Airline Antitrust Immunity Benefits Consumers

Why Airline Antitrust Immunity Benefits Consumers September 2009 (1) Why Airline Antitrust Immunity Benefits Consumers Daniel M. Kasper & Darin Lee LECG, LLC www.competitionpolicyinternational.com Competition Policy International, Inc. Why Airline Antitrust

More information

WORLDWIDE AIR TRANSPORT CONFERENCE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF LIBERALIZATION. Montreal, 24 to 29 March 2003

WORLDWIDE AIR TRANSPORT CONFERENCE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF LIBERALIZATION. Montreal, 24 to 29 March 2003 26/2/03 English only WORLDWIDE AIR TRANSPORT CONFERENCE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF LIBERALIZATION Montreal, 24 to 29 March 2003 Agenda Item 1: Preview 1.1: Background to and experience of liberalization

More information

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION FORM 8-K UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS, INC. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION FORM 8-K UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS, INC. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, DC 20549 FORM 8-K CURRENT REPORT Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Date of Report (Date of earliest event

More information

Citi Industrials Conference

Citi Industrials Conference Citi Industrials Conference June 13, 2017 Andrew Levy Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer Safe Harbor Statement Certain statements included in this presentation are forward-looking and

More information

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STATEMENT OF R. HEWITT PATE DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL ANTITRUST DIVISION BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, COMPETITION, AND BUSINESS RIGHTS COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

More information

Airline Cooperation and MITA

Airline Cooperation and MITA Airline Cooperation and MITA Friday 12 May 2017: Module 13 Andrew Charlton Charles Stotler Matthew Feargrieve Richard Gimblett 8-13 May 2017 OVERVIEW I. Introduction II. Forms of Cooperation III. MITA

More information

GAO. AIRLINE COMPETITION Issues Raised by Consolidation Proposals. Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S.

GAO. AIRLINE COMPETITION Issues Raised by Consolidation Proposals. Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. GAO United States General Accounting Office Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST Thursday February 1, 2001

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Applications of ) ) US Airways and United Airlines ) For Approval of Codesharing ) OST 2002-12986 Alliance ) ) AND ) ) Delta

More information

ACI EUROPE POSITION PAPER. Airport Slot Allocation

ACI EUROPE POSITION PAPER. Airport Slot Allocation ACI EUROPE POSITION PAPER Airport Slot Allocation June 2017 Cover / Photo: Madrid-Barajas Adolfo Suárez Airport (MAD) Introduction The European Union s regulatory framework for the allocation of slots

More information

RESPONSE BY THE NATIONAL AIRLINES COUNCIL OF CANADA (NACC) AND THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF CANADA (ATAC)

RESPONSE BY THE NATIONAL AIRLINES COUNCIL OF CANADA (NACC) AND THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF CANADA (ATAC) RESPONSE BY THE NATIONAL AIRLINES COUNCIL OF CANADA (NACC) AND THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF CANADA (ATAC) TO THE PROPOSED FEDERAL BENCHMARK AND BACKSTOP FOR CARBON PRICING INTRODUCTION The National

More information

Airport Slot Management in Europe. NEXTOR workshop Aspen Wye River, June 6-8, 2007 Prof. Jaap de Wit, University of Amsterdam

Airport Slot Management in Europe. NEXTOR workshop Aspen Wye River, June 6-8, 2007 Prof. Jaap de Wit, University of Amsterdam Airport Slot Management in Europe NEXTOR workshop Aspen Wye River, June 6-8, 2007 Prof. Jaap de Wit, University of Amsterdam Issues to be discussed: Existing slot allocation system in Europe Slot trading

More information

Etihad Airways P.J.S.C.

Etihad Airways P.J.S.C. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Order 2009-5-20 Issued by the Department of Transportation on the 17 th day of May, 2010 Served: May 17, 2010

More information

New Market Structure Realities

New Market Structure Realities New Market Structure Realities July 2003 Prepared by: Jon F. Ash, Managing Director 1800 K Street, NW Suite 1104 Washington, DC, 20006 www.ga2online.com The airline industry during the past two years has

More information

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Order: 2014-9-16 Served: September 24, 2014 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Issued by the Department of Transportation on the 24 th day of

More information

Office of Aviation Analysis (X50), Department of Transportation (DOT).

Office of Aviation Analysis (X50), Department of Transportation (DOT). This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 05/01/2014 and available online at http://federalregister.gov/a/2014-09830, and on FDsys.gov 4910-9X DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 14

More information

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. ) Application of ) ) Southwest Airlines Co. ) ) For exemptions from 14 C.F.R. Part 93, ) Docket DOT-OST-2000-7182 Subparts

More information

GUIDELINES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SLOT MISUSE IN IRELAND

GUIDELINES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SLOT MISUSE IN IRELAND GUIDELINES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SLOT MISUSE IN IRELAND October 2017 Version 2 1. BACKGROUND 1.1 Article 14.5 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, as amended by Regulation (EC) No

More information

AMERICAN AIRLINES GROUP REPORTS DECEMBER TRAFFIC RESULTS

AMERICAN AIRLINES GROUP REPORTS DECEMBER TRAFFIC RESULTS Corporate Communications 817-967-1577 mediarelations@aa.com Investor Relations 817-931-3423 investor.relations@aa.com FOR RELEASE: Monday, AMERICAN AIRLINES GROUP REPORTS DECEMBER TRAFFIC RESULTS FORT

More information

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Order 2012-5-12 Served: May 14, 2012 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Issued by the Department of Transportation on the 14 th day of May, 2012

More information

APPLICATION OF ABC AEROLÍNEAS, S.A. DE C.V., D/B/A INTERJET,

APPLICATION OF ABC AEROLÍNEAS, S.A. DE C.V., D/B/A INTERJET, BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. Application of ABC AEROLÍNEAS, S.A. de C.V., d/b/a INTERJET for an Exemption pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40109 to engage in Scheduled Foreign Air Transportation

More information

AIR CANADA REPORTS 2010 THIRD QUARTER RESULTS; Operating Income improved $259 million or 381 per cent from previous year s quarter

AIR CANADA REPORTS 2010 THIRD QUARTER RESULTS; Operating Income improved $259 million or 381 per cent from previous year s quarter AIR CANADA REPORTS 2010 THIRD QUARTER RESULTS; Operating Income improved $259 million or 381 per cent from previous year s quarter MONTRÉAL, November 4, 2010 Air Canada today reported operating income

More information

Transforming Intra-African Air Connectivity:

Transforming Intra-African Air Connectivity: z Transforming Intra-African Air Connectivity: The Economic Benefits of Implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision PREPARED FOR IATA in partnership with AFCAC and AFRAA PREPARED BY InterVISTAS Consulting LTD

More information

AIR TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT Universidade Lusofona January 2008

AIR TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT Universidade Lusofona January 2008 AIR TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT Universidade Lusofona Introduction to airline network planning: John Strickland, Director JLS Consulting Contents 1. What kind of airlines? 2. Network Planning Data Generic / traditional

More information

AIR CANADA REPORTS THIRD QUARTER RESULTS

AIR CANADA REPORTS THIRD QUARTER RESULTS AIR CANADA REPORTS THIRD QUARTER RESULTS THIRD QUARTER OVERVIEW Operating income of $112 million compared to operating income of $351 million in the third quarter of 2007. Fuel expense increased 49 per

More information

The entry into force of the EU-US. US Open Skies Agreement. Pablo Mendes de Leon Airneth Annual Conference, 17 April 2008

The entry into force of the EU-US. US Open Skies Agreement. Pablo Mendes de Leon Airneth Annual Conference, 17 April 2008 The entry into force of the EU-US US Open Skies Agreement Pablo Mendes de Leon Airneth Annual Conference, 17 April 2008 Contents: I. Introduction/ historical notes II. The mandate III. Achievements IV.

More information

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Order 2012-1-24 Served: January 26, 2012 Essential Air Service at Issued by the Department of Transportation

More information

AA.com CONTACTS: American Airlines Japan Airlines Yuko Kato, Weber Shandwick Sze Hunn Yap, Public Relations Tokyo, Japan Tokyo, Japan 03-5427-7378 03-5460-3109 ykato@webershandwick.com sze_hunn.yap@jal.com

More information

Slot Allocation Methods in Liberalized International Aviation:

Slot Allocation Methods in Liberalized International Aviation: Slot Allocation Methods in Liberalized International Aviation: Recommendations to Improve Secondary Trading June 2009 Japan International Transport Institute Slot Allocation Methods in Liberalized International

More information

Safety Regulatory Oversight of Commercial Operations Conducted Offshore

Safety Regulatory Oversight of Commercial Operations Conducted Offshore Page 1 of 15 Safety Regulatory Oversight of Commercial Operations Conducted Offshore 1. Purpose and Scope 2. Authority... 2 3. References... 2 4. Records... 2 5. Policy... 2 5.3 What are the regulatory

More information

Airport Incentive Programs: Federal and Other Restrictions and Recent Developments

Airport Incentive Programs: Federal and Other Restrictions and Recent Developments Airport Incentive Programs: Federal and Other Restrictions and Recent Developments G. Brian Busey Co-Chair Airports and Aviation Group ACI-NA Spring 2009 Legal Issues Conference May 13, 2009 2009 Morrison

More information

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEEDINGS WASHINGTON, DC. March 4, 2015

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEEDINGS WASHINGTON, DC. March 4, 2015 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEEDINGS WASHINGTON, DC March 4, 2015 Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Enforcement of the Musical

More information

Frequent Fliers Rank New York - Los Angeles as the Top Market for Reward Travel in the United States

Frequent Fliers Rank New York - Los Angeles as the Top Market for Reward Travel in the United States Issued: April 4, 2007 Contact: Jay Sorensen, 414-961-1939 IdeaWorksCompany.com Frequent Fliers Rank New York - Los Angeles as the Top Market for Reward Travel in the United States IdeaWorks releases report

More information

Air Connectivity and Competition

Air Connectivity and Competition Air Connectivity and Competition Sainarayan A Chief, Aviation Data and Analysis Section, ATB Concept of Connectivity in Air Transport Movement of passengers, mail and cargo involving the minimum of transit

More information

Schedule Compression by Fair Allocation Methods

Schedule Compression by Fair Allocation Methods Schedule Compression by Fair Allocation Methods by Michael Ball Andrew Churchill David Lovell University of Maryland and NEXTOR, the National Center of Excellence for Aviation Operations Research November

More information

QUALITY OF SERVICE INDEX

QUALITY OF SERVICE INDEX QUALITY OF SERVICE INDEX Advanced Presented by: David Dague SH&E, Prinicpal Airports Council International 2010 Air Service & Data Planning Seminar January 26, 2010 Workshop Agenda Introduction QSI/CSI

More information

Aviation Insights No. 8

Aviation Insights No. 8 Aviation Insights Explaining the modern airline industry from an independent, objective perspective No. 8 January 17, 2018 Question: How do taxes and fees change if air traffic control is privatized? Congress

More information

Economics of International Airline Joint Ventures. Bryan Keating Georgetown Airline Competition Conference July 17, 2017

Economics of International Airline Joint Ventures. Bryan Keating Georgetown Airline Competition Conference July 17, 2017 Economics of International Airline Joint Ventures Bryan Keating Georgetown Airline Competition Conference July 17, 2017 International Airline Joint Ventures Connect Complementary Networks No individual

More information