1.10 Aerodrome Information

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Jordan Richardson
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1 1.10 Aerodrome Information Samoa is a group of 16 islands in the South Pacific. The two main islands are Upolu and Savai'i. Upolu is approximately 33 miles long by 13 miles wide with the highest point being Mount Fito at 3650 ft. Savai'i, 12 miles to the Northwest, has terrain rising to 6200 ft. Faleolo International airport is situated on the coast on the Northwest side of Upolu Island, approximately 17nm West of Apia. A mountain range to the South of the airport runs East- West, the length of the island. A mountain 3.5 miles to the Southeast of the field rises to 2350 ft, the highest point of 3650 ft is 14 miles from the airfield. Terrain on either side of the approach rises to over 550 feet on the small island of Apolima to the north of the approach path, and over 450 feet on the island of Manono to the south of the approach path. Approaches into Faleolo are typical of many into Pacific airports, being over water and prone to the black hole effect at night. Airport Location Map of Samoa The runway, orientated 08-26, is 2700 metres long, 45 metres wide and has no parallel taxiway. Runway 08 has a turning bay abeam the threshold that is quite restrictive for widebody aircraft, and has no taxi guidelines. Runway 26 is accessed directly from the apron via a stub taxiway. The control tower is located to the South of the parking apron. There is a 150 metre stopway past the threshold of runway 08 and a 300 metre stopway past the threshold runway 26. Runway 08 has a marked downhill slope, from the threshold to about the halfway point it descends 49 ft. During approach to land this gives a visual illusion of the runway appearing to be longer than it actually is. 31 August 2002 CAA of NZ Page 71 of 203

2 Jeppesen Sanderson Airport Chart - Faleolo The Samoa Airport Authority maintains the airfield and facilities. A comprehensive programme of improvements including runway and apron extension and resealing, construction of a new taxiway for runway 26 and enlargement of the turning node for runway 08 commenced at the beginning of June 2000 and was scheduled for completion in October Page 72 of 203 CAA of NZ 31 August 2002

3 The Samoan Director of Civil Aviation, under the Samoan Ministry of Transport, has regulatory authority for Faleolo Airport. The Samoan Civil Aviation Regulations 1998 came into force on the 1 st of January Paragraph 3 of these Regulations adopted the Civil Aviation Rules of New Zealand. Samoan Civil Aviation Regulations (1998) state: Subject to paragraph 2, the Civil Aviation rules of New Zealand in force at the commencement date and subsequent amendments thereto shall be adopted as Regulations under the Act. Manono Island Apolima Island Threshold Runway 08 Threshold Runway 26 View of Faleolo International Airport Looking West 31 August 2002 CAA of NZ Page 73 of 203

4 1.11 Flight Recorders Flight Data Recorder The Flight Data Recorder is a Solid State Allied Signal Aerospace (Honeywell) unit, part number DXUS. Teledyne manufactures the Flight Data Acquisition Unit, part number B1, which supplies a 64 word per second data frame to the FDR. FDR data verified the crew s report, the only discrepancy being the altitude at which the missed approach commenced. The aircraft s position at this point was approximately 5½ nm short of the runway. Analysis of the FDR information revealed the following: NOTE: Unless stated, all altitudes quoted are FDR Pressure Altitude values. Times quoted are as recorded by the FDR. Data captured during descent and initial approach prior to localizer intercept showed no anomalies, except, at time 09:47:14, glide slope deviation showed at approximately 40 o arc inbound toward the localizer that glideslope DDM value changed from a no valid data value, to an on glideslope value within 1 data frame (1 second). The normal indication expected should show DDM deviation slowly increasing or decreasing in value toward zero DDM, dependent upon position relative to glideslope, as the aircraft travels toward the glideslope. At time 09:49:51 FCC glideslope capture occurred 1 dot to the left of the localizer at 2690 ft, 220 KIAS, with approximately 700 fpm ROD. At this position the aircraft is approximately 1000 ft below the projected glideslope. Approximately 5 seconds after glideslope capture, the ROD increased to fpm, and speed remained between 218 and 220 KIAS. Speedbrakes were extended from 2100 ft down to 1700 ft. The aircraft was configured at flap 20, gear down at 1350 ft. Landing flap was selected at 1000 ft. Throughout this portion of the descent ROD remained relatively constant at around 1100 fpm although ground speed was decreasing at a relatively constant rate from 215 knots at glideslope capture to 140 knots at the autopilot disconnect point. At time 09:52:00, the autopilot was disconnected at 420 ft PA (478 ft RA) with the ROD at 1100 fpm. The autothrottle remained engaged. Immediately after autopilot disconnect, N1 s accelerated from 43%, through 50% 3 seconds later (ROD 896 fpm), reaching 100% (ROC 376 fpm) 7 seconds after autopilot disconnect. Minimum height during the go-around was 340 ft PA (384 ft RA). This was at approximately 5½ miles from the threshold of runway 08. Gear was retracted at 360 ft PA (400 ft RA) ROC 1040 fpm. At the lowest point of the profile, the flight data recorder also recorded a loss of localizer signal for approximately 5 seconds. The aircraft climbed straight ahead to 2500 ft, then altered to a heading approximately 5 o left of the inbound track, continuing to climb to 3500 ft, to a point approximately abeam the runway 08 threshold. The turn rate then increased to intercept the 340 o FA VOR radial after which the aircraft then proceeded to join the 12 nm arc from the North for a second approach on runway 08. Page 74 of 203 CAA of NZ 31 August 2002

5 Throughout the approach, (from approximately 40 o of arc South of the localizer) and go-around, the glideslope DDM showed an on glideslope value until the aircraft was abeam the runway. The glideslope DDM value then changed to no valid data within 1 data frame, but showed several spikes of an on glideslope value over the subsequent 30 seconds. During the second approach, positioning around the 12 nm arc from the North, the glideslope DDM value again changed from no valid data to an on glideslope value within 1 data frame, at around 40 o of arc from the localizer and remained at an on glideslope value during the remainder of the approach and through the landing roll. NOTE: This is consistent with the signal radiated from the glideslope antenna. The signal is a maximum in the direction of the approach falling to almost zero abeam the glideslope facility with a much-reduced signal behind the glideslope facility. It also falls off with distance from the glideslope facility. Beyond a sector of about plus or minus 40 o at 15 miles the radio signal would be too low to activate the glideslope receiver. A typical facility will have a beam width of 30 o to 60 o. The ICAO requirement ( 8 o ) is much less. The aircraft touched down off the second approach at time 10:06:00. From initial localizer capture to touchdown elapsed time was 16 minutes 19 seconds. Analysis of the profile for the first approach revealed a subtle steepening of the approach angle from approximately 3.3 o, at glideslope capture, to 4.3 o prior to the commencement of the missed approach. This would account for the steady rate-ofdescent despite the reducing ground speed LLZ CAPTURE (225/672 FPM) FLAP 1 (220/704 FPM) ALTITUDE (FEET) G/S CAPTURE (218/ 1072 FPM) 14 DME FA (approximate) (12.5 IAP DME) VHF TRANSMISSION PLANNED PROFILE SPOILERS FLAP 5 (213/1152 FPM) VHF F5 FLAP 15 GEAR DOWN G/S CAPTURE (200/1104 FPM) GEAR LOCKED DOWN (187/1008 FPM) FLAP 20 FLAP 25 (169/1024 FPM) LOW DRAG APPROACH IAP G/S CALCULATED 3.5º LAND 3 AUTOPILOT DISCONNECT NM (142/1152 FPM) FLAP 30 (155/1040) 7.3 DME FA (approximate) (5.8 IAP DME) TERRAIN 0.5nm LEFT 580' VHF GEAR UP TIME (SECONDS) NZ 60 Profile - First Approach Apia NOTE: Distances shown on the above profile are approximate. The FDR fitted to ZK-NCJ does not record DME. Distances were computed using IRS longitudinal information adjusted for latitude and corrected for the residual error. 31 August 2002 CAA of NZ Page 75 of 203

6 Flight Path of NZ 60 Page 76 of 203 CAA of NZ 31 August 2002

7 Cockpit Voice Recorder The Cockpit Voice Recorder data was not preserved. SOP requires the CVR circuit breaker to be pulled for a serious incident. The crew interpreted the event according to Company occurrence reporting instructions as an incident and their subsequent actions were taken in accordance with those instructions. As required by Company procedures they raised an Operations Occurrence Report. They also filed a Facility Malfunction report with Faleolo tower and requested a NOTAM be raised. On return to Auckland the Captain also followed up the initial notification by contacting the Company Duty Line Manager Wreckage and Impact Information Nil Medical and Pathological Information Medical Certificates All three pilots hold a valid class 1 medical certificate Fatigue Air New Zealand, through the Flight Crew Fatigue Reporting process and Fatigue Management Programme, maintains a database of all reported fatigue events. A review of this database shows that there are no recorded fatigue reports with respect to the AKL APW sector around the time of day at which this incident occurred. A review of the achieved roster patterns, including duty and flight hours for all flight crew members preceding the date of the incident and the day of the incident, indicates that: Sufficient rest periods had been provided to ensure that the flight crew were well rested. The type of duties performed by all three flight crew members for the 8 days preceding this incident preclude circadian disruption as being a contributory cause. A member of the Company Flight Crew Fatigue Study Group conducted a post-incident interview with the flight crew. Subsequent to the interview the Flight Crew Fatigue Study Group determined that fatigue was not contributory to this incident Other Relevant Physiological Information The crew reported no significant personal, domestic or other individual concerns that may have had an impact on this incident. 31 August 2002 CAA of NZ Page 77 of 203

8 1.14 Fire There was no fire associated with this incident Survival Aspects Not applicable Tests and Research Proving Flight One On 16 th August 2000, the ILS for runway 05 at Auckland was notified as being removed from service via NOTAM and ATIS, and Airways Corporation technicians disabled the glideslope SBO transmission, leaving only CSB transmission radiating with a DDM value of approximately The purpose of the proving flight was to: replicate and capture the flight deck glideslope indications as reported at Faleolo. observe the effects of an autocoupled approach with the ILS glideslope radiating CSB only. identify possible defences that may be valid for a similar condition. Boeing ZK-NCL flew five approaches in various configurations. During each approach as the aircraft established inbound, the glideslope indication materialised on the EADI indicating on glideslope and throughout the approach remained indicating on glideslope, regardless of position relative to the true glideslope. Glideslope capture consistently occurred very shortly after APP was armed. Page 78 of 203 CAA of NZ 31 August 2002

AIRCRAFT SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT OCCURRENCE NUMBER 00/2518 B ER ZK-NCJ NZ 60 ERRONEOUS GLIDESLOPE CAPTURE, AUTOCOUPLED APPROACH, AND GO-AROUND

AIRCRAFT SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT OCCURRENCE NUMBER 00/2518 B767-319ER ZK-NCJ NZ 60 ERRONEOUS GLIDESLOPE CAPTURE, AUTOCOUPLED APPROACH, AND GO-AROUND FALEOLO AIRPORT, SAMOA 29 JULY 2000 Intentionally blank