Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration

Transcription

1 EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OF AIR NAVIGATION EUROCONTROL Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration Part II: UAS VLOS Operation in Classes C and F/G Airspace Edition Number : 0.1 Edition Date : Status : Working Draft Intended for : General Public EUROPEAN AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

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3 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration DOCUMENT CHARACTERISTICS TITLE Human Factors Case for the UAS - ATM Integration Part 2: UAS - VLOS operation in Classes C and F/G airspace Publications Reference: ISBN Number: Document Identifier Edition Number: 0.1 Edition Date: Abstract This document describes the Human Factors (HF) Case for the Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the European Air Traffic Management (ATM) System in Scenario 2. This scenario is concerned with UAS operation in Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) in uncontrolled airspace (Class F/G) or if operation takes place in the CTR - in controlled airspace (Class C). The HF Case was carried out in four steps: (1) the Fact Finding, (2) the HF Issues Analysis, (3) the HF Action Plan, and (4) the Action Implementation. The key outcome of the HF case is a set of HF requirements for the UAS-ATM integration. Keywords Human Factors Unmanned Aircraft Air Traffic Control Air Traffic Management Human Factors Case Integration Doris Dehn Authors Contact(s) Person Tel Unit Doris Dehn CND/COE/PM/HP STATUS, AUDIENCE AND ACCESSIBILITY Status Intended for Accessible via Working Draft General Public Intranet Draft EATM Stakeholders Extranet Proposed Issue Restricted Audience Internet ( Released Issue Electronic copies of this document can be downloaded from html Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 1

4 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration DOCUMENT APPROVAL The following table identifies all management authorities who have successively approved the present issue of this document. AUTHORITY NAME AND SIGNATURE DATE Page 2 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

5 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD The following table records the complete history of the successive editions of the present document. EDITION NUMBER EDITION DATE REASON FOR CHANGE PAGES AFFECTED Publications EUROCONTROL Headquarters 96 Rue de la Fusée B-1130 BRUSSELS Tel: +32 (0) Fax: +32 (0) Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 3

6 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration Contents DOCUMENT CHARACTERISTICS... 1 DOCUMENT APPROVAL... 2 DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD... 3 LIST OF FIGURES... 6 LIST OF TABLES... 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY... 7 CHAPTER 1 Introduction Background: The UAS-ATM Integration Activity Objectives of the HF Case Approach used in the HF Case Scope of the HF Case Scenario 2 Assumptions Document Purpose and Structure CHAPTER 2 Stage 1: Fact Finding Objective Conduct of the Fact Finding Comparison between the Current and the Proposed ATM system Impact on ATM Actors Outcome CHAPTER 3 Stage 2: HF Issues Analysis Objective Conduct of the HF Issues Analysis Overview of HF Categories and Identified Issues Overview of Mitigations Ideas Outcome CHAPTER 4 Stage 3: HF Action Plan Objective Types of HF Actions Suggested HF Actions for the UAS-ATM Integration Activity Research Studies HF Requirements for Concept Development Outcome CHAPTER 5 Step 4: Action Implementation Objective Page 4 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

7 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration 5.2 Research studies Literature search and study Workshop with the British Model Flying Association (BMFA) HF Requirements and Recommendations for the UAS-ATM Integration The UA pilots The Air Traffic Controllers The Pilots of Manned Aircraft The UAS design UAS Mission Planning The regulatory and procedural framework Outcome CHAPTER 6 Conclusions Suitability of the HF Case Process Restriction of the Present HF Case ANNEX 1 HF Issues Analysis Material A1.1 Participant List A1.1.1 HF Issues Analysis 23./24. April A1.1.2 HF Issue Analysis 22. June A1.2 List of Identified Issues, Impacts, and Mitigations ANNEX 2 Workshop with the British Model Flying Association REFERENCES ABBREVIATIONS Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 5

8 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Process used in the HF Case Figure 2: HF Categories LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Baseline and proposed ATM system Table 2: HF Categories and HF issues identified Table 3: What-ifs, impact and possible mitigation Table 4: HF Categories and HF Issues identified Table 5: Mitigations related to the UA Pilot Table 6: Mitigations related to the Air Traffic Controller Table 7: Mitigations related to the Pilots of Manned Aircraft Table 8: Mitigations related to the UAS Design Table 9: Regulatory and procedural framework Table 10: Proposed HF Actions Research to clarify issues Table 11: Proposed HF Actions HF Requirements to mitigate issues Table 12: HF requirements pertaining to the UA pilot Table 13: HF requirements pertaining to the Air Traffic Controller Table 14: HF requirements pertaining to the pilots of manned aircraft Table 15: HF requirements pertaining to the UAS design Table 16: HF requirements pertaining to the UAS mission planning Table 17: HF requirements pertaining to the regulatory and procedural framework Page 6 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

9 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The EUROCONTROL Agency has initiated a major programme of work intended to ensure the safe and efficient integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the pan-european Air Traffic Management (ATM) Network. As part of the programme, a Human Factors (HF) Case [1] was carried out. The HF Case is a structured process which serves to ensure that all ATM-related HF issues arising from the integration of UAS into the ATM system are adequately addressed. This document describes the HF Case for Scenario 2 of the UAS-ATM integration activity. Scenario 2 is concerned with UAS operation in Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) in uncontrolled airspace (Class F/G) or if operation takes place in the CTR - in controlled airspace (Class C). In Stage 1 of the HF Case, an initial HF Impact Assessment is carried out. This impact analysis was based on documents from the UAS-ATM integration activity and other related activities as well as research literature on HF of UAS. Three actors were considered: the UA pilot, the air traffic controller, and pilots of manned aircraft. A number of specific problems were identified for the operation of an unmanned aircraft in VLOS, which influence the interaction of UA pilots with Air Traffic Control (ATC). In Stage 2, a more detailed HF Issues Analysis is conducted. The HF Issues Analysis for Scenario 2 took place on April 2009 and 22 June It involved 10 internal and external participants with expertise in ATC, Operations (including manned, unmanned and model aircraft), Human Factors and Safety. A total of 47 HF issues (consistent with the scenario assumptions) were identified. These issues related to the any of the following areas: Human & System; Working Environment; Organisation & Staffing; Training & Development; Procedures, Roles & Responsibilities, and Teams & Communications. In addition, ideas on how to mitigate the identified issues were generated. In Stage 3, an HF action plan is made. For a project in the concept feasibility stage such as the UAS-ATM integration activity potential actions relate to (a) conducting further HF research to analyse the identified issues, and (b) formulating HF requirements for further refinement of the proposed concept. A need for research was identified in the area of human limitations related to VLOS operation, in particular, perceptual constraints of the UA pilot. The set of HF requirements for the UAS-ATM integration should serve to ensure that all identified HF issues are adequately addressed. In Stage 4, the actions as specified in the HF action plan are carried out. First, a literature search was carried out on human perceptual limitations in the context of remotely operated aircraft. Second, a workshop was held with representatives of the British Model Flying Association (BMFA) to discuss issues related to the remote operation of aircraft in VLOS. On the basis of the HF Issues Analysis and the results of the research actions, a set of HF requirements was formulated. This set of requirements comprised 66 items related to: the UA pilot, pilots of manned aircraft, the air traffic controller, the UAS design, the UAS mission planning and the regulatory framework for the UAS-ATM integration. Some of the identified HF requirements (related to collision avoidance strategies and the UA navigation) are not easily reconcilable with the concept of UAS operation in VLOS and, therefore, may require changes to the proposed concept. Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 7

10 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1.1 Background: The UAS-ATM Integration Activity Despite rapidly increasing levels of UAS technological sophistication, safety concerns mean that UAS are at present normally segregated from other airspace users. Furthermore, comprehensive UAS type certification specifications, as a basis for granting UAS airworthiness, are only now in the process of development by bodies such as EUROCAE and NATO. These realities inhibit UAS employment in a wide range of applications that are particularly well suited to unique UAS capabilities such as flexibility, agility, long-endurance and low cost. The EUROCONTROL Agency considers that from an ATM perspective, future increased segregation of airspace to accommodate growing numbers of UAS is not viable. Instead, UAS should be considered legitimate airspace users, along with manned aircraft, to be integrated into the pan-european ATM Network. On that basis, EUROCONTROL is providing the European lead on ATM aspects of UAS flight outside segregated airspace. Indeed, the pace of work to integrate UAS into the pan-european ATM network is increasing steadily, and involves a large number of organizations, agencies and representative bodies. EUROCONTROL s contribution is to develop and progress policy on ATM for civil and military UAS. EUROCONTROL has therefore established a UAS ATM Integration Activity consisting of a 2- stream approach, drawing upon particular Agency expertise in the areas of SESAR, ATM, Safety, Legal, Spectrum, Communications, Navigation, Surveillance (including ACAS), Security, Human Factors and Research & Development. The first stream of the Agency work programme will address the ATM integration of UAS in the short to medium term - up to within the framework of the existing ATM regulatory, operational and technical environment. The associated activities will seek to support a safe, initial airspace integration of certain UAS, affording short to medium term operational deployments for key UAS applications and providing substantial societal benefits. Such initial integration will be undertaken in compliance with safety requirements stemming from the prerequisite ATM safety assessments. The second stream of the work programme will aim to fully support the SESAR development and deployment phases as regards ensuring full consideration of UAS within the future Page 8 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

11 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration SESAR ATM Target Concept. Indeed, the Agency considers that several technological advancements being developed by industry for UAS can be key enablers for all aircraft - manned and unmanned - in support of the SESAR ATM Target Concept (e.g. advanced sense and avoid systems, secure command and control functionalities, automatic/autonomous modes of flight). 1.2 Objectives of the HF Case As part of the UAS ATM Integration Activity, a Human Factors (HF) Case [1] was carried out. The HF Case is a structured process which serves to systematically identify and manage HF issues during an ATM project, from the beginning of the project life cycle to the end. The objective of this HF Case for the UAS ATM integration Activity is to a) identify HF issues that arise from the integration of UAS in the ATM system, b) if necessary, propose further studies and assessments to obtain a deeper insight into the identified issues, and c) formulate requirements (concerning equipment, procedures, and operator competencies) that need to be fulfilled to ensure a safe and efficient handling of UAS within the overall ATM system. 1.3 Approach used in the HF Case The HF Case is a five-stage process to systematically identify and mitigate HF Issues as early as possible in the project life-cycle. The HF Case stages are (see Figure 1): Stage 1 - Fact Finding: This stage records the factual information about a project, including its background, the proposed ATM change, key stakeholders and documentation. The objective is to scope the project from an HF perspective to identify what will change, which actors will be affected and how they will be affected. Stage 2 - Issues Analysis: This stage identifies and prioritises the project-specific HF Issues and their potential impacts on the human and the ATM system. Stage 3 - Action Plan: In this stage, an Action Plan is developed which describes actions and mitigation strategies to address the HF Issues identified for the project. Stage 4 - Actions Implementation: This stage implements the Action Plan. The output is the HF Case Report which provides findings and conclusions from the actions taken to address the HF Issues from Stage 3. Stage 5 - HF Case Review: This stage provides an independent review of the HF Case. It suggests recommendations for improvements to the HF Case methodology. The present report only covers Stages 1 to 4 of the HF Case review. Stage 5, the HF Case review has not been carried out for the UAS-ATM integration activity. Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 9

12 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration Figure 1: Process used in the HF Case 1.4 Scope of the HF Case The HF Case was scoped along two dimensions: 1. The operator roles. The present HF Case does not aim at covering all HF issues related to UAS. Rather, it focuses on those issues that arise from the UAS interfacing with the ATM system. This means that the interaction between the various actors (UA pilots, pilots of manned aircraft and air traffic controllers) is at the centre of the analysis. Factors that may be relevant for any of the three actors but do not have a direct effect on ATM (e.g. long-term staff planning, job satisfaction) are considered outside the scope of the analysis. 2. The UAS operation scenario. The HF Issues Analysis was based on two scenarios for UAS operation. The first scenario concerns UAS operation under IFR in Class A, B, or C enroute airspace. The second scenario concerns UAS operation in Visual Line of Sight under VFR. The present document is only concerned with Scenario 2. This scenario is described below. Page 10 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

13 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration 1.5 Scenario 2 Assumptions The HF Case was defined in its scope by the description of an operational scenario. This scenario which is referred to as Scenario 2 describes UAS operation in Visual Line of Sight Operation (VLOS) in uncontrolled airspace (Class F/G) or in controlled airspace (Class C) in the Control Zone (CTR)around the aerodrome. The main assumptions in this scenario are: If operation within CTR, Class C + Aerodrome Control Service o Class C: ATC responsible for separation IFR/IFR and IFR/VFR o Aerodrome surface operations are excluded o Operation above the aerodrome is excluded If operation outside CTR, Class F/G (uncontrolled) UAS operated under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Direct Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) at all times o 500 m around the UAS operator o Less than 2000ft above ground Duration of operation ranges from few minutes up to hours of available daylight Communication: VHF communication UAS-ATC, fixed line phone/gsm (for contingency) Navigation: Visual Observation Surveillance: no Mode A/C or S transponder, primary radar may not detect UA due to small size Wide range of UA, but usually of small size and slow speed (less than 100 kts IAS) A full description of the scenario can be found in [2]. 1.6 Document Purpose and Structure The purpose of this document is to report on the HF Case carried out for Scenario 2 of the UAS ATM Integration Activity. The document is structured as follows: Chapter 1 is this chapter. Chapter 2 describes the results of the Fact Finding stage. Chapter 3 outlines the conduct and findings of the HF Issues Analysis. Chapter 4 describes the HF actions planned to address the identified HF issues. Chapter 5 outlines the results of the Action Implementation. Two kinds of actions are distinguished: research to investigate HF issues in more detail, and HF requirements to be taken into account for further concept development and implementation. Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 11

14 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration CHAPTER 2 Stage 1: Fact Finding 2.1 Objective The objective of Stage 1 of the HF Case was to carry out an initial HF impact assessment for the UAS-ATM integration activity. That is, the activity is scoped and understood from an HF point of view. In order to do so, the following questions are raised and answered: What is the proposed change to the ATM system? Who (i.e. what actors) will be affected by the proposed change to the ATM system? In which way will those actors be affected? Note that at this stage, the HF impact analysis is high-level and is not exhaustive or complete. Its main aim is to foster the understanding of the activity in terms of its likely impact on human operators in the ATM system. Stage 1 also serves to assess the suitability of the HF Case process for the activity, and results in a go/no go decision for further stages of the HF Case. 2.2 Conduct of the Fact Finding The Fact Finding was based on review of the available literature and documentation. This comprised: the Project Management Plan for the UAS-ATM Integration Activity, other projectrelated documentation, documentations from related activities (such as CAP722 or the UA OAT Task Force), and research literature on HF problems related to the UA piloting task (e.g. [3][4][5][6][7]). The document review was complemented by a discussion with the Activity Manager. Page 12 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

15 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration 2.3 Comparison between the Current and the Proposed ATM system Table 1 provides a brief summary of the difference between the current ATM system and the ATM system as proposed in the UAS-ATM integration activity. As the table show, the main difference relates to the fact that there will be a new airspace user. Table 1: Baseline and proposed ATM system Element Affected Airspace User Baseline ATM System In non-segregated airspace (all classes), airspace use is restricted to certified aircraft. As UAS are currently not certified, they cannot be operated there. Occasional usage of UA involve: (a) segregated airspace or (b) special permissions. Proposed ATM system Non-segregated airspace is used by certified aircraft, either manned or unmanned. 2.4 Impact on ATM Actors Table 2 lists the actors affected by the proposed change and describes in which way they are affected. Note that the list of actors is restricted to the core actors in Scenario 2 (i.e. UAS operation in VLOS). Table 2: HF Categories and HF issues identified Actor Baseline ATM System Proposed ATM system UA pilot/flight crew n/a (new actor) The UA pilot controls the UA from the ground control station (GCS). The main difference with a conventional (manned) piloting task can be seen in the fact that the UAS pilot is not colocated with the aircraft. With respect to sensory information, this means: - Visual perception of the UA and the environment occurs through observation by the UA pilot, and can be limited (depending on the distance between the pilot and the UA). - There is no flight-related information from the proprioceptive and kinaesthetic system (e.g. gravitational forces on the body, aircraft movement) - Flight-related olfactory information (e.g. smell, which can indicate a malfunction) is available only to a limited extent (depending on the distance between UA and pilot). - There is limited tactile information: information on the feel and touch of the GCS is available; however, tactile information on the state of the UA (e.g. vibration) is not available. - Auditory information is limited: aural alarms and alerts can be conveyed at the GCS; Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 13

16 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration Actor Baseline ATM System Proposed ATM system Aerodrome Controller The Aerodrome Controller controls only manned aircraft. This means: - The Aerodrome Controller only interacts with pilots who are co-located with their aircraft. - Depending on met conditions, pilots of manned aircraft usually have the ability to visually establish surrounding traffic as well as the infrastructure at the aerodrome (RWY/TWY signs, stopbars, etc.) however, auditory information from the UA itself (e.g. engine noise) may or may not be available to the pilot (depending on the distance between the pilot and the UA). With respect to the control of the UA, the fact that the pilot is not co-located with the UA means can lead to a higher likelihood of control errors (e.g. turning the UA to the left can require probability a control input to the right, depending on the position of the UA in relation to the position of the pilot). The Aerodrome Controller controls both manned and unmanned aircraft. This means: - The Aerodrome Controller interacts with pilots who are co-located with their aircraft as well as with pilots who are located remotely. - The size of a UA may be so small that it becomes difficult for the Aerodrome Controller to visually establish the UA. - There may be a limited ability of the UA pilot to visually establish surrounding traffic and aerodrome infrastructure (i.e. UA ability to sense other traffic), which will affect interaction and communication with the aerodrome controller. [Note: Visibility of aerodrome infrastructure is not relevant for Scenario 2: the type of UA described in the scenario will not to be operated from the aerodrome]. - UA performance (take-off and landing behaviour) may be rather dissimilar from manned aircraft [Note: This observation is not relevant for Scenario 2: the type of UA described in the scenario will not to be operated from the aerodrome]. - Due to their inability to sense and avoid other traffic on the ground, UA require special procedures at the airport, for instance towing from the runway to the stand, or the use of an escort vehicle. [Note: This observation is not relevant for Scenario 2: the type of UA described in the scenario will not to be operated from the aerodrome]. Pilots of manned aircraft Pilots of manned aircraft are surrounded only by other manned aircraft. Pilots of manned aircraft are surrounded by manned and unmanned aircraft. In uncontrolled airspace (Class F/G), pilots are responsible to separate each other using rules of the air. The same holds for VFR flights in Class C airspace. Due to the small and potentially unknown - size of UA, self-separation can become a more challenging task. Note that for the UA pilot (as a new airspace user) no comparison between the current and the proposed system can be made. Rather, the observations in the column proposed ATM system relate to differences in the task of a pilot operating a manned aircraft in comparison to a pilot operating an unmanned aircraft. Page 14 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

17 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration 2.5 Outcome A decision was taken to proceed with the following stages of the HF Case. The reason was that the Fact Finding revealed a considerable impact on the tasks of the airspace users, that is, pilots of manned and unmanned aircraft. In contrast, the impact on ATC the aerodrome controller is limited in Scenario 2, as ATC is either not providing separation (in uncontrolled airspace) or only providing separation between IFR and VFR flights (in Class C airspace). Also, the type of UAS considered in Scenario 2 will not be operated from the aerodrome (e.g. taxiways or runways). Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 15

18 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration CHAPTER 3 Stage 2: HF Issues Analysis 3.1 Objective A crucial element in the HF Case is the HF Issues Analysis, which is carried out in Stage 2. The objective of the HF Issues Analysis is: To identify HF issues associated with the integration of UAS into the ATM system. To determine the potential impact if the issues are not properly addressed, in terms of o the impact on the human operator o the impact on the ATM system. To propose strategies for resolving HF issues and their impacts. 3.2 Conduct of the HF Issues Analysis The HF Issues Analysis for Scenario 2 was conducted in two parts. Part 1 was carried out at EUROCONTROL on April 2009 with a group of 10 external and internal participants. Part 2 served to complete the HF Issues Analysis and was carried out on 22 June 2009 with 4 internal participants. The HF Issues Analysis was conducted as a structured brainstorm session. Participants brought expertise from different areas relevant to the project, such as: Air Traffic Control (ATC), Operations (including manned, unmanned and model aircraft), Human Factors and Safety. The participant list can be found in Annex A1.1. In order to structure the brainstorm, six HF categories were used (see Figure 2): (1) Human in System, (2) Working Environment, (3) Organisation & Staffing, (4) Training & Development, (5) Procedures, Roles & Responsibilities, and (6) Teams & Communications. Page 16 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

19 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration Within each category, keywords were used as triggers to elicit the HF issues. 4 Figure 2: HF Categories Issues were formulated as a set of What-if s, reflecting factors that may hinder the successful integration of UAS into the ATM network. As an example, the following What-if could be generated: What-if the controller is not aware of the performance envelope of a particular UAS? For each of the What-ifs identified, the impact on human performance (in the above example: an inappropriate instruction issued by the controller), the impact on the ATM system (e.g. decrease in safety or efficiency) as well as potential mitigations were identified (e.g. training and HMI requirements). Table 3 outlines this process. 5 Table 3: What-ifs, impact and possible mitigation What-if Impact on Human Performance Impact on the ATM System Mitigation Ideas List of What if s Analyze each row Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 17

20 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration 3.3 Overview of HF Categories and Identified Issues Table 4 provides the description of the HF categories used for the generation of What-ifs ( HF Issues ). The table also summarises the results of the issues generation, in terms of the number and type of issues generated in each HF category. In some cases, the assignment of issues to categories is rather arbitrary, as issues can touch on more than one category. Nevertheless, for the analysis and consideration of issues in later stages of the HF Case, it does not matter to which category issues were assigned. The categories merely serve to guide the issues generation process and provide triggers to consider as many topics as possible. A substantial number of issues generated in the HF Issues Analysis were assessed as outof-scope in the post-session analysis and discarded form further analysis. These issues mainly related to: impacts related to operating the UA from the aerodrome, or moving from BVLOS to VLOS. The table below only summarises those issues that were considered as within the scope of Scenario 2. Table 4: HF Categories and HF Issues identified Procedures, Roles, & Responsibilities (22 issues) Procedures Description: Procedures relate to a clearly outlined set of operations, in this case related to the integration of UAS into the ATM system. Topics to consider comprise: Standard operating procedures (e.g. separation of UA from other traffic, rules of the air, interaction between UAS and ATC), Emergency procedures (in case of: control link failure, communication failure, fly away). Results: 10 issues were generated, with the majority being related to: UA going out of VLOS (e.g. pilot error, lost control link, fly-away, frequency conflict), UA leaving the designated operational area in Class C airspace, Adequacy of rules of the air and see & avoid (for separation of UA and other aircraft). Roles & Responsibilities Description: Roles & Responsibilities refer to a set of functions that are assigned to a specific actor. For Scenario 2, potential actors comprise: Actors involved in operating the UAS (i.e. the UA pilot, possibly observers), Other airspace users (pilots of manned aircraft, balloons, gliders, microlights, other UA), The Aerodrome Controller/ other Aerodrome staff (depending on the airport, functions may be split into several roles), The Flight Information Service personnel. Topics to be considered include: Allocation of tasks between different roles; tasks to be considered comprise: separation provision, collision avoidance, terrain avoidance, provision of traffic information, Task demands and task complexity associated to a specific role. Page 18 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

21 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration Results: 12 issues were generated, mainly related to: UA pilots visual limitations in determining the UA s distance from other objects (including other UA, manned aircraft, and obstacles) UA pilots problems to visually establish the UA (e.g. UA pilot losing sight of UA or misidentifying UA, UA obscured by the sun), Manned aircraft pilots inability to determine their distance from a UA, ATCo s problems to visually establish the UA (e.g. inability to establish the UA, confusion with other different UA). Human and System (8 issues) Human-machine interaction Description: Human-machine interaction refers to the way the actors interface with a technical system. For the ATCo, the general system interaction should be the same as for manned aircraft. However, issues to be considered relate to: Display of UAS on the radar screen (primary radar may not detect small UA, Mode-S transponder or ADS-B functionality), Any information on the UAS provided at the controller working position. For the UA pilot, the range of issues is broader, but should be restricted to those that have an impact on the interaction with ATC/ATM. Potential topics to consider comprise: Input devices for controlling the UAS, Output devices & information display. Results: 5 issues were generated, related to: The inconsistent mapping between the orientation of the UA pilot and the UA (meaning that, depending on the orientation of the UA and the UA pilot, a lateral manoeuvre may require a control input in the opposite direction), Frequency conflicts between different UA (which can result in the UA pilot s inability to control the UA) and other failure conditions, The ATCo s inability to see the UA on the radar screen (in Class C airspace or CTR). Allocation of functions between human & machine Description: Allocation of functions between the human and the machine concerns the level of automation and support offered by the technical system. For the present scenario, automation can relate to the ATC task, the UAS operation, or the operation of manned aircraft. Topics to consider include: Automated functions pertaining to the control of the UAS, Controller support tools (e.g. arrival and departure manager although they may not be relevant in Scenario 2), Safety nets (e.g. ACAS). Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 19

22 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration Results: 3 issues were generated, mainly related to: UA pilots awareness of automated function (availability and activation status), ATCos awareness of UA automated functions (in Class C airspace or CTR). Teams & Communication (5 issues) Teams & Communication Description: Teams and Communication refers to teams and team members and the interaction & communication between them. Topics to consider include: Team structure (UAS pilot(s), pilots of manned aircraft, aerodrome controller(s)), Information exchange within and between teams, Communication methods (i.e. radio and phone), Communication delays, Phraseology, Position Hand-over. Results: 5 issues were generated, mainly related to: Use of dedicated observers in UA VLOS operation, UA pilot s command of aviation phraseology and English. Organisation & Staffing (5 issues) Recruitment & Selection Description: Recruitment & Selection refers to the way in which individuals are selected for a specific function. It is assumed that, for the controller and pilots of manned aircraft, there is no impact on Recruitment and Selection. For the UA pilot, topics to consider comprise: Competency requirements for the UA pilot (in terms of knowledge, skills, and experience), Behavioural tendencies of the UA pilot, Selection methods & tools for the UA pilot. Note: There may be no formal recruitment and selection process for UA pilots in Scenario 2. Knowledge, skills and abilities of the UA pilot are also covered under work area Training and Development. Results: 2 issues were generated, related to: the lack of selection processes and competence requirements for the UA pilots. Page 20 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

23 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration Organisation & Staffing (continued) Staffing Description: Staffing relates to the assignment of the workforce to a specific function. It is assumed that, for the ATCos and pilots of manned aircraft, there is no significant impact on staffing. For the UA pilot, topics to consider comprise: Staffing of the GCS, Time on duty and break times, Required ratings, Fitness for duty monitoring. Results: 3 issues were generated, related to: Inappropriate staffing of UA GCS, UA pilots duty time, UA pilots performance impairments (due to external location). Working Environment (4 issues) Working Environment Description: The working environment refers to the physical environment in which the individual works, including the general equipment and furniture. It is not expected to change for the ATCos or the pilots of manned aircraft. For the UA pilot, topics to consider comprise: Location and of the UA pilot and GCS (located outside a building, stationary vs. moving) physical environment (e.g. exposure of the UA pilot to weather, impact of temperature and noise) Note: The Human-Machine Interface is part of a different work area. Results: 4 issues were generated, related to: Impact of weather (e.g. temperature, rain, storm, haze, lightening) on either the UA pilot or the GCS UA pilots distraction by surrounding events (e.g. noise) Protection of UA pilot/gcs from unlawful interference. Training & Development (3 issues) Training & Development Description: Training and development concerns the systematic development of the knowledge, skills, and attitudes required by an individual to adequately fulfil a role or function. For the ATCos and pilots of manned aircraft, it refers to knowledge requirements related to UAS as new airspace users. For the UA pilot, it concerns knowledge and skills that are required to facilitate a seamless integration of UAS into the existing ATM system, Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 21

24 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration including: Technical competence: skills & knowledge related to the control of the UAS and interaction with ATC, Non-technical competence: cognitive skills [error management, decision making, etc.] and interpersonal skills. Results: 3 issues were generated, related to: UA pilots competence requirements (related to operation of UA in controlled airspace), ATCos competence requirements specific to UA (e.g. knowledge of UA performance characteristics and limitations of visual acquisition), manned aircraft pilots competence requirements specific to UA (e.g. knowledge of UA performance and limitations of visual acquisition). For a complete list of generated HF issues including those that were discarded as not relevant for Scenario 2 - see Annex A Overview of Mitigations Ideas Table 8 to Table 8: Mitigations related to the UAS Design Mitigation Area UA external features CNS equipage Automated functions & built-in constraints Human-Machine Interface: GCS Contingency measures and preprogrammed behaviour/procedures Examples Measures to increase UA visibility: paint scheme, strobe lights Measures to increase distinctiveness: paint scheme GPS SSR transponder or ADS-B Automated functions: sense & avoid (for collision avoidance with other aircraft and terrain) Built-in system constraints: electronic string (i.e. maximum distance UA and GCS) UA equipage: SSR transponder, ADS-B, GPS External features of the UA: Paint scheme, strobe lights GCS to clearly indicate status of automated functions Fail-safe modes: Reduce kinetic energy of UA in case of a lost link Pre-programmed routines for lost link and flyaways: automated recovery, return-to-launch-point, flight termination Page 22 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

25 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration Table 9 provide an overview of the mitigation ideas generated in the HF Issue Analysis. The different tables cluster mitigations with respect to the addressee or the topic of the mitigation. Table 5: Mitigations related to the UA Pilot Mitigation Area Competence requirements for UA pilots UA pilot responsibilities & team structure System support to UA pilot Working environment Staffing Examples Knowledge: rules of the air, conflict avoidance procedures, procedures to avoid CFIT, limitations of visual perception and control, operation in controlled airspace, aviation phraseology, UA automated functions Skills: Control of UA (including inconsistent mapping ), judgement of distance and separation between objects, ability to judge safe operational envelope Medical requirements: eye-sight, general health Use of dedicated observers for traffic observation Clear definition of tasks between pilot/observers Automatic functions (e.g. detect & avoid, fail-safe modes) Built-in system constraints (e.g. electronic string) Weather protection for UA pilot and GCS Protection from unlawful interference Careful choice of UA pilot location (e.g. minimise potential for outside disturbance, ensure visibility of obstacles) UA pilot time on duty Impact of weather on UA pilot s time on duty Availability of back-up pilots und support staff (e.g. observers) Table 6: Mitigations related to the Air Traffic Controller Mitigation Area Competence Requirements Procedures and working methods Examples Knowledge: UA automated functions, UA failure conditions and emergency procedures; UA types and missions, limitations of VLOS operation Procedures for UA operation in controlled airspace: use of designated areas in CTR; information on UA activity to other airspace users; provision of traffic information to UA pilots (reference scheme to be used?) UA emergency procedures Table 7: Mitigations related to the Pilots of Manned Aircraft Mitigation Area Competence Requirements Examples General information and awareness about UA, including UA performance characteristics and limitations of VLOS operation (e.g. difficulty of UA pilots to apply rules of the air). Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 23

26 Table 8: Mitigations related to the UAS Design Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration Mitigation Area UA external features CNS equipage Automated functions & built-in constraints Human-Machine Interface: GCS Contingency measures and preprogrammed behaviour/procedures Examples Measures to increase UA visibility: paint scheme, strobe lights Measures to increase distinctiveness: paint scheme GPS SSR transponder or ADS-B Automated functions: sense & avoid (for collision avoidance with other aircraft and terrain) Built-in system constraints: electronic string (i.e. maximum distance UA and GCS) UA equipage: SSR transponder, ADS-B, GPS External features of the UA: Paint scheme, strobe lights GCS to clearly indicate status of automated functions Fail-safe modes: Reduce kinetic energy of UA in case of a lost link Pre-programmed routines for lost link and flyaways: automated recovery, return-to-launch-point, flight termination Page 24 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

27 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration Table 9: Regulatory and procedural framework Mitigation Area UAS UA pilot Flight Rules Examples UAS certification: automated functions for control and navigation UA type-specific operational envelope for VLOS operation (i.e. maximum distance between UA and UA pilot) Competence standards for UA pilots: control of UA, separation from other airspace users, aviation phraseology, interaction with ATC (if operation in controlled airspace) Medical Requirements (eye-sight, general health) Review of Flight Rules for VLOS (i.e. rules of the air may be inappropriate) Phraseology Unambiguous reference system for traffic information to remotely-located pilot UAS failure and emergency procedures UAS mission planning Procedures for lost control link Procedures for fly-away (loss of VLOS) Obstacle surveys Weather forecast Staff planning Frequency control between UAS UAS ATC co-ordination Strategic/Pre-tactical co-ordination: Mission purpose and location, pre-programmed routines, security measures Tactical co-ordination: UA failures (lost link, flyaway), instructions and traffic information Security Measures Security measures to protect UAS from unlawful interference (taking into account importance and location of the mission) The complete list of mitigations can be found in Annex A1.2. Note also that the list of mitigations will be used as the basis for the formulation of HF requirements/recommendations. These will be reported as part of the Action Implementation Step of the HF Case. 3.5 Outcome The outcome of Stage 2 of the HF case is a list of HF issues, their likely impacts on the human and the ATM system, and potential mitigations for managing the issues. These outcomes which were described in this chapter provide the input for the next stage of the HF Case: The HF Action Plan. Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 25

28 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration CHAPTER 4 Stage 3: HF Action Plan 4.1 Objective The objective of Stage 3 of the HF Case is to outline the HF actions that will be taken in order to address the HF issues identified in Stage 2. When developing the HF Action Plan, the following types of information collected in the HF Issue Analysis are used: Impact on Human Performance and the ATM system. The impact of an HF Issue on human performance and the ATM system is used to prioritise issues in terms of how important it is to address the particular issue. Mitigation Ideas. The mitigation ideas for an HF issue can be used as the basis for identifying the actions that need to be taken to address the issue. 4.2 Types of HF Actions Generally, there are two types of actions that can be included in the HF action plan: 1. Further studies or research. Some of the identified issues may require further studies to be carried out in order to decide whether - and to which extent - the issue in fact poses a problem for human performance and the ATM system. Suggested further studies can comprise, among others, reviews of existing research, task analysis, simulations, and usability tests. 2. Interventions to mitigate an HF issue. An HF action can also consist in suggesting a practical intervention that serves to either prevent the issue from happening or to reduce the adverse effects on human performance and the ATM system. Examples for such practical interventions are: HMI design solutions, training plans, and design of procedures and working methods. Whether the HF action plan requires the mitigation to be carried out or formulates the mitigation as a requirement/recommendation for the (later) implementation of the ATM system change will depend on the system life-cycle. In the early and conceptual phases of Page 26 Working Draft Edition: 0.1

29 Human Factors Case for the UAS-ATM integration an ATM change, mitigations are likely to take the form of a requirement (e.g. the controller should posses general knowledge on UA flight termination procedures ), rather than putting the mitigation in place (e.g. making UA flight termination procedures part of the controller training plan). 4.3 Suggested HF Actions for the UAS-ATM Integration Activity Based on the results of the HF Issue Analysis, two sorts of HF actions can be identified for the UAS-ATM integration activity. The first sort refers to research studies; the second refers to a set of HF requirements Conduct Research For the identification of HF research needs, issues and mitigations were reviewed to see whether any clarification is needed on the human actors capabilities to perform the allocated tasks in a reliable manner. The following areas were identified as requiring further research into human capabilities and limitations (cf. Table 10). Table 10: Proposed HF Actions Research to clarify issues Topic Questions to address Comments HF action proposed Visual perception - Capabilities and limitations related to assessing separation of objects in the distance Ability of UA pilots to judge separation of two aircraft in a distance(up to 500 m/ 2000ft) Ability of UA pilots to judge separation of an aircraft from an obstacle in a distance (up to 500 m/ 2000ft) Applicability of rules of the air for separation of unmanned vs. unmanned and unmanned vs. manned aircraft Scenario 2 assumes that: 1. UA pilots separate themselves from other airspace users, using rules of the air. 2. Pilots of manned aircraft (VFR) separate themselves from other airspace users (including UA pilots), using rules of the air. It needs to be established whether the human actors (UA pilots and pilots of manned aircraft) can be reasonably assumed to perform this task. Literature survey Workshop model pilots with aircraft Ability of pilots of manned aircraft to establish UA and judge their distance In Scenario 2, the UA pilot needs to separate the UA from all other airspace users (if UA operation takes place in uncontrolled Class F/G airspace) or from other VFR flights (if UA operation takes place in Class C airspace). Given that the UA pilot is not co-located with the aircraft, see and avoid is a much more demanding task for a UA pilot than for a pilot of a manned aircraft. In order to determine whether two aircraft are on a collision course, the UA pilot has to assess the relative position of the two aircraft and their attitudes in the distance. Assessing the relative position of two aircraft in three dimensions requires depth perception. Edition: 0.1 Working Draft Page 27

30 Human Factors Case for the UAS ATM Integration Human depth perception relies on the conversion of a two-dimensional retinal image into a three-dimensional representation of the perceived environment. To do so, the human visual system uses a number of cues, such as binocular stereopsis, knowledge of an object s size, texture gradients and interposition/overlap of objects (e.g. [8][9]). When judging the relative position of two aircraft in the sky, some of these cues for depth perception may be inefficient or absent: stereopsis (i.e. the difference between the retinal images in the right and left eye) becomes less pronounced; the size of the other UA may not be known; texture gradients and reference objects are either absent in the sky or only available to a very limited extent. For this reason, it needs to be clarified whether a UA pilot can be reasonably assumed to separate the UA from other airspace users within an operational envelope of 500m and 2000ft. A similar question arises for the separation of the UA from obstacles: it is reasonable to assume that a UA pilot can separate the UA from obstacles up to a distance of 500m and 2000ft? Furthermore, there are issues related to the ability of pilot s of manned aircraft to visually establish a UA and to assess its distance from the own aircraft. This holds particularly if the UA is very small and/or the absolute size of the UA is unknown to the pilot. In order to investigate the above questions, it was decided to carry out a literature review and conduct a workshop with model aircraft pilots Formulate a set of HF Requirements The vast majority of generated mitigation ideas relate to potential interventions or safeguards that can be put in place to ensure a safe and efficient integration of UAS into the ATM system. These interventions/safeguards either decrease the likelihood of an unwanted situation to occur or, if the situation occurs, they reduce any unwanted effect of this situation. Safeguards can refer to competence and information requirements for UA pilots, pilots of manned aircraft and controllers, the UAS design, and the procedural and regulatory framework for the UAS-ATM integration (see Table 11). Table 11: Proposed HF Actions HF Requirements to mitigate issues Topic Questions to address Comments HF action proposed HF pre-requisites for the integration of UAS into the ATM system List of requirements, related to: UA pilots (i.e. task & competence requirements, system support, staffing, working environment) Manned aircraft pilots (i.e. knowledge requirements) ATCOs (i.e. knowledge requirements) UA system design Procedural and regulatory framework The formulation of HF requirements is based on expert reviews of issues and mitigations as well as on the results of the research studies. Formulation of a set of HF requirements HF Requirements are based on reviews of issues and mitigations as identified in the HF Issues Analysis and the results of the research studies. Note that the Eurocontrol UAS-ATM integration activity only identifies the pre-requisites for a safe and efficient integration of UAS into the ATM system. The actual implementation of the requirements is beyond the scope of Page 28 Working Draft Edition: 0.1