AERONAUTICAL STUDY REVIEW OF AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE REQUIREMENTS AT SUDBURY, ONTARIO

Transcription

1 AERONAUTICAL STUDY REVIEW OF AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE REQUIREMENTS AT SUDBURY, ONTARIO Prepared by: NAV CANADA Level of Service and Aeronautical Studies 77 Metcalfe Street, 5 th Floor Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5L6 April, 2007 The information and diagrams contained in this Aeronautical Study are for Illustrative purposes only and are not to be used for navigation. 1

2 Table of Contents 1.0 Purpose Background Analysis Methodology Consultation Issues Risk Analysis Mitigation Service Human Factors Business Case Business Case Methodology Business Case Scope Base Case and Options On-Going Benefits On-Going Customer Costs Considered One-Time Implementation Costs Conclusions Recommendations Tables Change Management Table Communication and Implementation Table Monitoring Appendix A Stakeholder Consultation List Appendix B Aircraft Movement Statistics Appendix C Hazard Identification & Risk Analysis Table Appendix D Sudbury Traffic Analysis 27 December, 2006 Appendix E Sudbury Airport On-Site Operational Analysis, August 29-31,

3 Executive Summary The purpose of this aeronautical study is to examine the requirements for air traffic services at the Sudbury airport. Sudbury presently has a 16-hour control tower and a 24-hour Contract Weather Office (CWO). This aeronautical study concludes that the traffic at Sudbury can be efficiently and cost effectively handled by replacing both the CWO and the control tower with a 24-hour FSS. This service option will meet customer requirements while continuing to maintain safety and airport accessibility. Some delays are expected to continue at peak periods for IFR traffic when weather is poor; however these short delays are not expected to be unduly restrictive or material in nature. 3

4 1.0 Purpose The purpose of this aeronautical study is to examine the requirements for air traffic services at the Sudbury airport and to recommend to senior management whether or not a change in the current level of service at Sudbury is appropriate. 2.0 Background Airport Control Services are provided in the Sudbury Class D control zone from 0700 to 2300 local time. The Sudbury control zone is contained within a 7 nautical mile radius of the Aerodrome Reference Point (ARP) from the surface of the ground, up to and including 4,000 feet ASL. The Class D Airspace, as per Canadian Aviation Regulations (CAR), paragraph (3), changes to Class E with Mandatory Frequency (MF) rules (CAR 692),overnight, when the tower is in not in operation. The current approved staffing level for the Sudbury control tower is one unit operations specialist (UOS) and seven air traffic controllers. The current staffing level is eight plus one UOS; one controller is not available for work. A Remote Communications Outlet (RCO) to London Flight Information Centre (FIC) is available for the provision of Flight Information Services Enroute (FISE) and a Peripheral air-ground link (PAL) to Toronto ACC is available on a 24/7 basis for ATC services. Fig. 1 Additional NAV CANADA services are: Very High Frequency Omni Directional Range with Distance Measuring Equipment (VOR/DME); Instrument Landing System (ILS); Non Directional Beacon (NDB); Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS); Very High Frequency Direction Finder (VDF); A 24-hour contract weather observation program (METAR); and Aerodrome Forecasts (TAFs) are issued at 02, 08, 14 and 20Z. Radar is available to 1,000 feet AGL from an antenna located at North Bay. The main runway at Sudbury is 6,600 long and 200 wide. The crosswind runway is 5,000 long and 150 wide. There is access without back-track to runway 04. An Aircraft Radio Control of Aerodrome Lighting (ARCAL) type K provides lighting control outside the hours of operation of the airport control service. The Sudbury airport is presently served by two scheduled air carriers, Air Canada Jazz, and Bearskin Airlines. The largest scheduled aircraft using the airport is the Dash 8. Sunwing has operated weekly charter flights using a Boeing 737 in recent winters. On March 31, 2000 the ownership of the airport was transferred from Transport Canada to the City of Greater Sudbury and now operates under the direction of the Sudbury Airport Community Development Corporation. In July 2002 a multi-million dollar renovation and expansion of the Air Terminal building commenced. The new Air Terminal Building was officially completed in October

5 3.0 Analysis 3.1 Methodology A preliminary analysis was carried out by a study team consisting of air traffic controllers, flight service specialists and pilots. A member of the study team spent three days in the Sudbury tower cab observing operations and recording activities and operating practices. A report of the observations is attached as Appendix E. A complete analysis of the traffic statistics for Sudbury was conducted and compared to other airports of similar traffic composition and frequency. A summary of the traffic statistics is attached in Appendix B. Subsequently, consultations were held with customers and stakeholders. A database was used to track all consultation input and to provide an effective means of correlating concerns and feedback. A business case was conducted to examine the financial aspects of the proposed changes and the results form part of this study. The study team then reviewed all information received through the consultation process and conducted a Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) on customer concerns and service requirements. Study Team Study Team Leader Marcel Pinon Manager, Level of Service and Aeronautical Studies-East Contributors Patrick Harbord Analyst, Level of Service an Aeronautical Studies Don O Rourke Analyst, Level of Service an Aeronautical Studies Renaud Dunn Analyst, Level of Service an Aeronautical Studies Chris Stevens Manager Airport Operations - Toronto FIR Dean Edwards Site Manager Timmins / Sault Ste Marie Tim Harold Manager, North Bay FIC, North Bay FSS, Sudbury Control Tower Peter Friedrichs Senior Analyst, Decision Support Mike Hohm Manager, Airspace & Planning 5

6 3.2 Consultation Representatives from the NAV CANADA Level of Service Review Team met with customers and other stakeholders in a number of different forums. The purpose of these meetings was to obtain needs, issues and concerns with respect to the level of service review. A list of stakeholders and customers consulted is included in Appendix A Issues A summary of the main issues raised through consultations is as follows: a) Congestion/delay Some customers felt that there may be an increased risk of delays if the Airport Control Service is replaced by an Airport Advisory Service (AAS) due to the absence of air traffic control procedures that expedite air traffic. b) Emergency flights Pilots of MEDEVAC and firefighting aircraft felt that they may not be able to obtain clearances as quickly as they could with a control tower. c) No ground control There was some concern from customers that FSS does not control aircraft on the ground which could increase delays. d) Snow removal and runway condition reporting The airport staff felt that the reporting of runway conditions and snow clearance response may not be as efficient with an FSS. e) Financial impact on the community The Sudbury Chamber of Commerce and the Airport Authority made representations regarding increased investments which have been made in the airport facilities to accommodate an increase in traffic which they feel will be brought about by the growing local economy. f) Automatic control transfer There is an automatic control transfer procedure between the ACC and the tower that transfers control of the IFR arrivals to the tower at the control zone boundary. ATC MANOPS also permits a tower to assume control of an inbound IFR aircraft with the IFR unit s consent. These procedures are routine in Sudbury during VFR and marginal VFR weather conditions, allowing for multiple arrivals and departures that would not be permissible with a FSS unless the pilot cancels their IFR clearance. This could potentially create arrival delays should an FSS replace the tower. g) ATC MANOPS B.2 ATC MANOPS B.2 permits the departure on an IFR aircraft while an IFR arrival is on approach until the arriving aircraft leaves a fix inbound not less than 4 miles from the instrument runway, provided airport control service is being provided. This separation is the most commonly used standard by the North Bay Speciality in the Toronto ACC to expedite IFR departures during peak IFR periods. This standard will not be permitted with AAS, potentially causing delays during marginal VFR and IFR weather conditions. h) Flight testing Bombardier uses the surrounding area for various instrument and aircraft testing. The company felt that their crew require the tower controllers to coordinate the local traffic to accommodate these flights since the crew primarily concentrate on the equipment inside the cockpit. 6

7 3.3 Risk Analysis The Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) process conducted by the study team considered potential hazards and risks that could be associated with the proposal to convert the Sudbury Tower to a Flight Service Station. In the case of a hazard that presented possible safety risks, mitigation was initiated. The complete HIRA tables, including the hazards, risks and scenarios can be found in Appendix C. 3.4 Mitigation There were no safety issues which required mitigation beyond that which is normally provided by airport advisory services and the associated standards and procedures. NAV CANADA has had previous experience in converting from an airport control service to the establishment of a new airport advisory service (Fredericton, (YFC), Saint John (YSJ), and North Bay (YYB). The process includes training with use of simulators, local knowledge training and establishment of appropriate site procedures. The same process will be used for mitigating risks associated with the operational conversion of the Sudbury airport control service to an FSS.. North Bay is especially suited as a case history as there is a close resemblance in traffic structure and stakeholder make-up Service A change from Air Traffic Control (ATC) to Airport Advisory Service (AAS) has the potential of increasing delays at peak hours. With a change from Tower to FSS: a) Congestion/delay Traffic levels at Sudbury can be handled by FSS procedures. While some delays can be anticipated, they do not constitute a safety concern and are not, generally, likely to be very different from what is experienced with airport control service today. The frequency and extent of the delays will vary depending on the prevailing weather conditions, the mixture of arrivals and departures and the hourly peaking/distribution of movements. The hour with the highest average IFR movements in 2005 was between 1800 and 1900 local with 7.3 itinerant IFR movements per hour. However, this peak increases to between nine and ten itinerant IFR movements for this period from Tuesday to Friday each week. These statistics lead to the conclusion that the risk both in the frequency and consequence of congestion related delays would be minimal in an AAS environment. The FSS will be equipped with radar (NARDS) and will be able to readily identify traffic and provide pilots with accurate traffic advisories. Accurate traffic information supports better pilot decision making and will assist pilots in more effectively planning their arrivals and departures. These decisions can reduce operational delay in some circumstances. b) Emergency flights On-site flight service specialists will give assistance and priority to aircraft on Medevac or emergency flights in coordination with the ACC. c) No ground control On-site flight service specialists will provide Airport Advisory Service (AAS) on the aerodrome s Mandatory Frequency (MF). The specialist will be able to maintain an accurate traffic picture in order to provide pilots with pertinent traffic information to prevent manoeuvring conflict on the ground. d) Snow removal and runway condition reporting 7

8 Runway Condition Reports will be filed through the FSS or FIC. There will be no delay in making these reports available to pilots. e) Financial impact on the airport community FSS will provide 24-hour access to Sudbury airport. No negative financial impact directly related to the change in level of service was found by the study team. The airport operator and the Sudbury Chamber of Commerce strongly disagree. f) Automatic control transfer The transfer of control of IFR aircraft from the Toronto ACC to the Tower will be discontinued in an AAS environment. Only one IFR aircraft will be cleared for an approach at a time. The traffic density at Sudbury is not sufficient to create substantial delays. g) ATC MANOPS B.2 Established IFR procedures for uncontrolled airports will take the place of procedures presently in place. These procedures are proven and work well in airports with similar traffic composition. h) Flight testing On-site flight service specialists will provide Airport Advisory Service (AAS) on the aerodrome s Mandatory Frequency (MF) within the control zone. The specialist will be able to maintain an accurate traffic picture in order to provide pilots with pertinent traffic information to prevent conflict on the ground and in the air Human Factors FSS have the same local knowledge as airport controllers. Pilots are provided with an advisory of local airport and traffic conditions and are required to separate themselves while flying in VFR conditions. In IFR weather conditions, flights will remain under the control of the ACC in Class E airspace. 3.5 Business Case A Business Case analysis was conducted on the replacement of the airport control service and the Contract Weather Office (CWO) with a 24-hour Flight Service Station. The merits of maintaining the on-going costs of airport control service were considered and compared with their benefits (avoided costs) over a specified time period. One of the key determinants of the level of air traffic service provided at an airport is the volume of aircraft traffic arriving and departing the location and flying within its control zone. As traffic volumes increase, the need to control and manage it to maintain safety and overall system efficiency also increases. Conversely, as traffic declines this need is expected to diminish. Aircraft movements at Sudbury have been variable over the last 5 years. Forecasts for itinerant movements, prepared by Transport Canada, indicate a modest growth. In order to ensure that the business case included all relevant costs and benefits, the reduction in the costs to NAV CANADA was compared to the potential increase in operating costs to customers resulting from the possibility of flight delays and disruptions. The traffic separation matrix and the TAAM (Total Airport and Airspace Modeller) models from the Sioux Lookout study were used as a template for Sudbury. A full TAAM simulation was not necessary as the volume and distribution of IFR traffic as well as the area of radar coverage for the two areas was very similar. Estimating these costs required knowledge of the airport s traffic volume, weather patterns and the application of fast time simulation. 8

9 3.5.1 Business Case Methodology The Business Case Analysis compared the economic benefits (or avoided costs) of making a change in level of service with the costs of implementation and on-going operation and maintenance over a specified period. It assessed the merits of the investment by systematically identifying and, where possible, quantifying the impacts of the decision to proceed. The benefits in this analysis are reduced NAV CANADA costs, primarily the on-going costs associated with salaries and benefits of the air traffic control staff and the contract cost of the Contract Weather Office (CWO). The proposed change in service will have a potential negative impact on the customer in the form of additional fuel burned as a result of increased congestion for IFR aircraft operating during busy periods due to a reduction in IFR capacity. The differences in these on-going costs yield the net benefits, which are compared with the one-time costs of converting the service from ATC to AAS. Differences in the delays between the base case and the conversion of control services to airport advisory service represents the time impact. This direct time was translated into an economic cost using an average site-specific aircraft operating cost for fuel. Separate airborne and ground aircraft fuel burn rates and corresponding costs were used to assess airborne and ground time differences, respectively. Incremental one-time costs for the option include ATC to AAS conversion, training, relocation, and buyouts for eligible ATC staff who may not wish to relocate Business Case Scope The analysis covers the period FY 2006 to 2016, with benefits commencing in FY When undertaking a Business Case analysis, only those costs that vary from the Base Case are considered. Costs that do not change have no effect on the analysis results Base Case and Options The Base Case is the basis of comparison for the proposed options. It typically represents the status quo situation, but in this Business Case it includes the approved change recommended in the Level of Service Review conducted in 2004 to add a RAAS service remoted to Timmins during the overnight hours when the airport control tower is closed. Therefore, the Base Case is control service for 16 hours per day (1200 to 0400 UTC), and RAAS for the remaining 8 hours. The proposed service options assessed were as follows: 1) 24 hour AAS, with weather observations provided by the on-site FSS 2) Reduce ATC hours from 16 to 12 and add 12 hours RAAS, hosted by Timmins On-Going Benefits The quantified benefits of the proposed options are represented by a reduction in the annual salary and benefits and other operating costs as a result of implementing an alternative service design On-Going Customer Costs Considered The loss or reduction of airport control service may negatively impact IFR aircraft operations due to increased separation standards and the resulting decrease in capacity. Decreased capacity creates delay during busy traffic periods (where traffic exceeds capacity), which results in increased fuel burn and deteriorating consistency and predictability of aircraft operations. Extended departure delays may also trigger other indirect costs for aircraft and crew re-positioning related to crew duty times and flight scheduling as well as out-of-pocket expenses for passenger meals, accommodation and/or alternative transportation. 9

10 3.5.6 One-Time Implementation Costs The one-time implementation costs are primarily associated with operational staff relocation, buyouts, and training. Only incremental costs were considered, and therefore, lost productivity impacts during training are not included Business Case Conclusion The business case results show a positive Business Case for converting the current airport control service and CWO to a 24 hour airport advisory service at Sudbury. 10

11 4.0 Conclusions The traffic analysis (see Appendices B, C and D) and on site observations by a team member (report in Appendix E) confirmed that there were no safety issues with the proposal to convert the 16-hour airport control service and 24-hour CWO to a 24-hour FSS. The Business Case also found that the cost benefit was positive and warranted proceeding with the level of service change. 4.1 Recommendations This study recommends closing the Sudbury control tower and the CWO and establishing a 24-hour FSS. 4.2 Tables Change Management Table The following table outlines the current and proposed services to be provided at Sudbury. Current Services Proposed Services Change ATC (07-23 local time) 24-hour AAS 16 hour control service replaced with 24-hour AAS 16-hour Ground Control Service 24-hour VCS FSS will provide VCS 24 hours per day. 16-hour Ground Control will be discontinued. 16-hour Real-time Wind & Altimeter 24-hour Real-time Wind & Altimeter Additional 8 hours of Real- Time Wind and Altimeter Airfield Lighting 16 hours Tower 8 hours- ARCAL FSS will operate lights 24 hours per day No ARCAL 24-hour METAR by CWO 24-hour METAR by FSS Weather observations provided by FSS 24-hour TAF 24-hour TAF No change PAL Toronto Centre 135.5MHz PAL Toronto Centre 135.5MHz No change RCO/FISE London MHz RCO/FISE London MHz No change Emergency frequencies 121.5MHz 16 hours by Tower Emergency frequencies 121.5MHz for 24 hours by FSS 121.5MHz is monitored for 24 hours per day 11

12 Current Services Proposed Services Change Tower frequency 125.5MHz for 16 hours and MF frequency for 8 hours per day MF frequency 125.5MHz for 24 hours per day Frequency remains the same 7-mile Class D control zone for 16 hours; reverts to Class E for 8 hours per day overnight when the airport control service is not provided 7- mile Class E control zone for 24 hours per day Class D airspace becomes class E airspace Airport Movement Surface Condition Reports (AMSCR) are compiled by the airport operator and available from airport controllers 16 hours a day and via the FIC and ACC 24 hours a day. Airport Movement Surface Condition Reports (AMSCR) are compiled by the airport operator and available from the FSS, ACC, and FIC 24 hours a day. On-field availability of AMSCR is increased from 16 hours to 24 hours a day. To further address the potential delay issue, consideration will be given to implementing changes to the `down and clear` procedure, the establishment of SVFR routes and the addition of pre-taxi clearance procedures at Sudbury. Various trials of these and other new procedures are underway at the time of writing this report and show good potential for broader implementation Communication and Implementation Table The following communication and implementation action timetable is to inform both internal and external stakeholders of their respective responsibilities and tasks related to the service changes and will be initiated once this study has been approved by the NAV CANADA Board of Directors. Responsibility Task Notable Dates Manager LOS East 1. Produce an appropriate schedule including assignment task milestones. 2. Advise Manager of ANS Programs Coordination of the results of this study who will in turn coordinate with the appropriate departments. 3. Prepare AIC and notice for posting and distribution. 4. Produce hand-out for ACC briefing (copy of AIC). 5. Produce a brochure. 6. Advise customers and stakeholders. 7. Review AIS amendments. 8. Perform scheduled monitoring activities Post review of study by Transport Canada. Post review of study by Transport Canada. 120 and 60 days prior to implementation date. Prior to implementation date. Prior to implementation date. Prior to implementation date. Prior to implementation date. 90-day and 1-year post 12

13 Responsibility Task Notable Dates (90-day and 1-year reviews). Implementation. Communications 1. Arrange for posting bilingual notice on Internet and dissemination to NAV CANADA customers. Prior to implementation date. General Manager Flight Information Region 1. Brief Toronto ACC staff. 2. Modify specialty processes and agreements as required. Prior to implementation date. Prior to implementation date. Sudbury Site Manager 1. Modify publications and agreements that deal with services provided at the Sudbury airport, 2. Brief Sudbury tower staff. Prior to implementation date. Prior to implementation date. AIS 1. Publish AIC and amend appropriate publications. Prior to implementation date. Contracting & Procurement 1. Terminate contract with CWO To coincide with the implementation date Manager Airport Operations 1. Coordinate transfer and relocations with HR/LR 2. Initiate and Coordinate FSS staffing To coincide with the implementation date. Technical Training 1. Develop a training curriculum for the FSS 2. Initiate and complete FSS staff Training Prior to implementation date Prior to implementation date 5.0 Monitoring The Level of Service and Aeronautical Studies Branch is responsible for monitoring the implementation and post implementation of approved recommendations to ensure that service changes are performing as expected and that no unforeseen risks or hazards are introduced. In the event of any discrepancy, appropriate corrective action will be identified and initiated. 1. AIS publication changes will be reviewed for accuracy. 2. ANS safety reporting will be monitored for events related to the service changes. 3. Occurrence reporting will be monitored for events related to the service changes. 13

14 4. Customer Service reports will be monitored for issues related to the service changes. 5. Quality and performance measures for weather observations will be monitored. 6. A 90-day and one year post implementation assessment will be completed. These reviews will assess the effectiveness of the service change in terms of aviation safety, customer service and NAV CANADA efficiency, and may include interviews with customers, the Airport Operator and other stakeholders as required 14

15 APPENDIX A List of Stakeholders Sudbury Chamber of Commerce Bearskin Airlines Bombardier Central North Flying Club Day Helicopter Services Eagle Flight Fedex Gateway Helicopters Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources Sudbury Airport Commission Sudbury Aviation Sunwing Vacations Thunder Airlines Transport Canada Wasaya Airways NAV CANADA Toronto ACC North Bay Speciality Private Pilot Owners - Sudbury Ontario Ministry of Health Voyageur Airlines Air Georgian Flight Exec Discovery Air Air Canada Jazz 15

16 APPENDIX B AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT STATISTICS 16

17 Sudbury Total Traffic Movements IFR VFR

18 Sudbury Total Traffic Threshold for Tower Total Traffic

19 Total Traffic By Hour (Local) 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 Movements 2,500 2,000 1,500 1, ,1392,358 3,0582,2162,5802,3873,6582,581 2,3572,3893,6563,8262,9911, ,543 3,6863,3333,4613,0143,9343,152 2,7022,3423,5143,7092,8641, ,042 2,7752,2092,7312,5153,5732,525 2,0771,8093,4073,1062,7321, Hour 2

20 APPENDIX C Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis Table (HIRA) 1

21 HIRA Sudbury Tower Closing Issue Code Issue Summary Narrative Response Hazards, Risks & Risk Scenarios Mitigation Aircraft Traffic With the closure of Sudbury Tower, there will be no positive control at Sudbury. This may result in an increased risk of air to air, air to ground and ground to ground collisions. A 24-hour FSS will provide Airport Advisory Service (AAS) at Sudbury and will be able to maintain an accurate traffic picture in order to provide pilots with pertinent traffic information. Initial Evaluation No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. Sudbury air traffic levels fall within the capabilities of FSS. Ground control With the closure of Sudbury tower, taxiing aircraft will no longer receive control services while on the manoeuvring area. A 24-hour FSS will provide Airport Advisory Service (AAS) at Sudbury and will be able to maintain an accurate ground traffic picture in order to provide pilots with pertinent traffic information. Initial Evaluation It has been demonstrated at other similar airports with similar traffic levels, complexity and airport layout, that FSS can give pilots and ground vehicle operators sufficient information to allow for safe ground separation. No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. Sudbury traffic levels fall within the capabilities of FSS. 1 of 8

22 HIRA Sudbury Tower Closing Issue Code Issue Summary Narrative Response Hazards, Risks & Risk Scenarios Mitigation Vehicles Vehicle control will be compromised by the closing of the Sudbury Tower. FSS will provide Vehicle Control Services (VCS) 24 hours per day. Initial Evaluation Vehicle Control is maintained. No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. Sudbury traffic levels fall within the capabilities of FSS. Traffic Growth Sudbury airport has embarked on an aggressive growth plan including runway expansion which may increase traffic growth above Transport Canada forecasts. NAV CANADA adjusts airport traffic services in response to changes in traffic levels. NAV CANADA will continue to monitor traffic levels to ensure the appropriate air traffic service is provided. FSS is expected to be able to handle a significant rise in traffic. Initial Evaluation Traffic levels are well within the capabilities of FSS. The LOS guidelines indicate that the traffic threshold for a tower is 60,000 movements (see appendix B). No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. 2 of 8

23 HIRA Sudbury Tower Closing Issue Code Issue Summary Narrative Response Hazards, Risks & Risk Scenarios Mitigation Alerting Loss of the tower will lead to delays in providing VFR alerting service and may cause a delay in Search and Rescue (SAR) notification. FSS uses the same procedures for providing alerting service as a tower (i.e. failure to make the expected contact with the specialist within 5 minutes will result in the initiation of alerting/emergency response procedures). In fact, the tower presently provides 16 hours per day alerting service which will be extended to 24-hour on-site alerting service with the introduction of FSS. Initial Evaluation Co-ordination with rescue services will improve with FSS due to the extended hours of operation. No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. Sudbury air traffic levels fall within the capabilities of FSS. Emergency Locater Transmitter (ELT) Monitoring ELT signals in the Sudbury area may not be readily identified resulting in a delayed response to an aircraft accident. FSS uses the same procedures for monitoring ELTs as a tower. In fact, the tower presently provides 16-hour per day ELT monitoring which will be extended to 24 hours with the introduction of FSS. Initial Evaluation Co-ordination with rescue services will improve with FSS due to the extended hours of operation. No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. 3 of 8

24 HIRA Sudbury Tower Closing Issue Code Issue Summary Narrative Response Hazards, Risks & Risk Scenarios Mitigation IFR Delays Icing Loss of the Airport Control Service will lead to IFR departure and arrival delays. There is an automatic control transfer procedure from the ACC to the Air traffic controllers (ATC) that allows the tower controller to assume control of the arrivals and departures within the control zone which results in increased capacity and thus reducing delays. IFR departures can obtain departure clearance from the FSS in a similar manner as they would from the Tower. In VFR weather, no delays are expected since pilots usually cancel their IFR clearance when in site of the airport or request a VFR departure authorization. When the inbound aircraft is in IMC conditions but the airport remains VMC and the inbound aircraft is unable to cancel IFR; departing aircraft may be delayed. When the airport is in IMC conditions, the potential for delays for arriving and departing aircraft is increased. Initial Evaluation The change from airport control service to AAS has the potential to cause additional delays. Delays can increase the aircraft s exposure time in icing. Hazard Exposure to icing creates hazardous flight characteristics. Risk Air to ground collision Scenario Aircraft is delayed in an extended hold while in icing conditions resulting in uncontrolled flight into terrain. Risk Estimation The risk of an accident is estimated very rare but with the potential of fatal or major injuries. Mitigation CAR and company operations procedures as well as pilot training set limits for flight into known icing conditions and also minimum equipment requirements. Residual Risk Evaluation The exposure time in icing is reduced through operating norms and regulations. Additional mitigation is not required as residual risk is considered to be low. Risk mitigation measures may be required. 4 of 8

25 HIRA Sudbury Tower Closing Issue Code Issue Summary Narrative Response Hazards, Risks & Risk Scenarios Mitigation IFR Delays Fuel Reserves Loss of the Airport Control Service will lead to delays that will use fuel normally reserved for safety margin. There is an automatic control transfer procedure from the ACC to the Air traffic controllers (ATC) that allows the tower controller to assume control of the arrivals and departures within the control zone which results in increased capacity and thus reducing delays. It is a pilot s responsibility to ensure that there is adequate fuel for the planned flight over and above the legal requirements. In the event of extended delays for whatever reason, the pilot will be advised either in flight or by NOTAM before departure leaving ample opportunity for a change in plans in order to avoid the risk of fuel shortage. Initial Evaluation The expectation for pilots to determine the safe operating margin for fuel reserves does not change even in the event of extended delays due to high volumes of traffic. No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. Airport Support Filing of Runway Condition Reports would be delayed. There would be no notification to the airport of deteriorating runway surface conditions or requirement for runway maintenance. Runway Condition Reports may still be filed through the FSS or FIC. No delay in making these reports available to pilots is anticipated. The Airport Operator is responsible for airport security. To the extent practical NAV CANADA will continue to provide notification to the aerodrome operator on aspects that could impact aerodrome operations. These commitments will be reflected in a revised APOA that will be developed in concert with the aerodrome operator. Initial Evaluation Runway condition reports will be available 24 hours per day. Coordination with the FIC will continue as it does today. No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. 5 of 8

26 HIRA Sudbury Tower Closing Issue Code Issue Summary Narrative Response Hazards, Risks & Risk Scenarios Mitigation Airport Lighting With the closure of the Tower, there will be no control of airfield lighting. Aerodrome lighting is an Airport Operator responsibility. Currently the lighting is operated through an ARCAL by pilots when the tower is not operating overnight. The new 24 hour FSS will operate the lighting on behalf of the airport operator. The ARCAL will no longer be required. Initial Evaluation Lighting will be controlled by the FSS 24 hours per day. No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. Wind & Altimeter With the closure of the Tower, real time wind and altimeter information will not be available for arriving and departing aircraft. Real-time wind and altimeter will be provided to pilots by the FSS. Initial Evaluation SVFR will be authorized by the ACC. IFR separation will be maintained. Traffic levels are such that no new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. SVFR With the closure of the Tower, SVFR approval may be delayed or refused. The Sudbury FSS will co-ordinate the SVFR authorization with Toronto Centre. SVFR corridors will be developed if necessary to expedite SVFR operations. Initial Evaluation No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. 6 of 8

27 HIRA Sudbury Tower Closing Issue Code Issue Summary Narrative Response Hazards, Risks & Risk Scenarios Mitigation Conflict Resolution Sudbury is used by Bombardier for flight testing. Flights are VFR but require the tower to coordinate the traffic as both pilots have to concentrate on the instrumentation during the approach and have little time to monitor traffic. A 24-hour FSS will provide Airport Advisory Service (AAS) at Sudbury and will be able to maintain an accurate traffic picture in order to provide pilots with pertinent traffic information. Initial Evaluation Traffic information will continue to be passed to pilots. No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. Traffic Information There is a safety concern that 6 Bearskin flights pass over the NW & W practice areas. All the flights seem to come in at the same time and the tower is there to point out the traffic. Note that the practice areas are outside the Sudbury control zone. A 24-hour FSS will provide Airport Advisory Service (AAS) at Sudbury and will be able to maintain an accurate traffic picture in order to provide pilots with pertinent traffic information. The FSS will be equipped with radar (NARDS) and will have the same traffic information as tower controllers would have had. Initial Evaluation Traffic information will continue to be passed to pilots. There should be no difference in the availability of information and traffic advisory outside of the control zone. No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. 7 of 8

28 HIRA Sudbury Tower Closing Issue Code Issue Summary Narrative Response Hazards, Risks & Risk Scenarios Mitigation Emergency Navigation Assistance With FSS, pilots may not receive adequate Emergency Navigation Assistance (ENA). VHF-DF service will still be available 24-hrs per day by FSS. FSS will also have access to a NAV CANADA Auxiliary Radar Display System (NARDS). Emergency navigation assistance within radar coverage will continue to be available through Toronto ACC. Initial Evaluation FSS have appropriate procedures to deal with Emergency Navigation Assistance (ENA) at YSB. ENA will be available 24 hour per day from the onsite FSS & through the ACC. No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. Local Knowledge The FSS staff at Sudbury may not have the local knowledge that the Tower staff at Sudbury has, including local reporting points. This will affect the quality of aircraft traffic advisories. Procedures are in place to provide FSS specialists with local area knowledge training. This includes geographical reference points, topography and local reference reporting points and nature of local airport operations. FSS will receive appropriate simulation prior to converting from ATC. Initial Evaluation FSS will have the appropriate local area knowledge prior to conversion. No new hazards or risks are introduced by the change to an FSS. 8 of 8

29 APPENDIX D Sudbury Traffic Analysis 27 December, 2006

30 SUDBURY TRAFFIC ANALYSIS - 27 DECEMBER, 2006 Radar data from the North Bay Low Sector for the period from 2300Z until 2357Z on the 27 th of December, 2006 was reviewed for this analysis. The traffic period was selected by the Air Traffic Controllers in the North Bay Speciality and the data is deemed representative of the IFR traffic flows during peak periods at the Sudbury Airport. The active runway for this analysis at Sudbury was runway 22. There were 9 aircraft (5 departures and 4 arrivals) observed in the following sequence; Departure/Arrival Airline Aircraft Type Time Departure BLS 373 SW4 2306Z Departure JZA 7814 DH8C 2318Z Arrival SKK 727 B Z Departure FLDC C Z Arrival BLS 372 SW4 2327Z Departure BLS 375 SW4 2330Z Arrival CGTQR PA Z Arrival BLS384 SW4 2338Z Departure JZA7804 DH8A 2342Z Procedures and agreements in place between the Area Control Centre (ACC) and the Tower allow for maximum utilization of the airspace in its current design. Extrapolating the existing traffic data indicates that the maximum IFR acceptance rate is 17 aircraft per hour for this scenario. The IFR acceptance rate decreases to 11 aircraft per hour in an AAS environment due to the requirement for increased IFR separation. The analysis attempted to determine the impact on the previously observed traffic flow if the current operation was converted to an AAS environment. The following assumptions were made for this analysis; 1) The traffic sequence would follow the original traffic flow with vectors to final. 2) Present published SIDS would be assigned to departures. 3) IFR clearances would be issued and relayed in a timely fashion. This would require the data position to be operational for peak periods. Staffing resources within the specialty are adequate. 4) Workload in the North Bay Speciality would be at a manageable level (i.e. Data position open if necessary). 5) The principles of the operational impact study presented by the Toronto ACC were applied. 6) MANOPS 475.7B.1 was used as a departure versus arrival standard. 7) 3 minutes used for backtrack; turn around in position and take off. 8) 1 minute used for exiting the runway after landing (i.e. down and clear). Based on the assumptions stated, the traffic as observed, the lack of ATC MANOPS & 5, 475.7B.2 and no Automatic Control Transfer; a reasonable expectation for the traffic sequence in MVFR/IFR weather (but not exclusive) would be; Departure/Arrival Airline Aircraft Type Time (DELAY) Departure BLS 373 SW4 2306Z Departure JZA 7814 DH8C 2318Z

31 Departure/Arrival Airline Aircraft Type Time (DELAY) Arrival SKK 727 B Z (+2 minute) Departure CFLDC C Z (+4 minute) Arrival BLS 372 SW4 2330Z (+3 minute) Departure BLS 375 SW4 2334Z (+4 minute) Arrival CGQTR PA Z (+5 minute) Arrival BLS 384 SW4 2343Z (+5 minute) Departure JZA7804 DH8A 2347Z (+5 minute) The traffic analysis resulted in a total of 28 minutes of estimated delay during the observed traffic period due to the requirement for increased IFR separation in an AAS environment. The delays are estimated to last from 2318Z to 2347Z at which point the radar tape shows traffic dropping off following the departure of JZA7804 and the delays would be nullified. It is generally assumed that at a level above 6 IFR movements per hour delays may be expected in an AAS environment. The frequency and extent of the delays would vary depending on the prevailing weather conditions, active runway, mixture of arrivals and departures and the hourly peaking/distribution of movements. The intent of the analysis was to apply the principles of the operational impact study as presented by the Toronto ACC staff to an actual traffic scenario in an attempt to quantify the impact on the IFR traffic flow.

32 Attachment A MANOPS References

33

34

35 APPENDIX E Sudbury Airport On-Site Operational Analysis August 29 31, 2006

36 Sudbury Airport On site operational analysis August 29, 30 & 31, 2006

37 1. INTRODUCTION The Level of Service Branch is performing an Aeronautical Study at Sudbury Airport to determine the appropriate airport traffic services. On August 29, 30 & 31, 2006, an on site operational analysis was conducted to supplement the Aeronautical Study. 2. OBSERVATIONS The Sudbury Control Tower is staffed for a combined air and ground position. In rare occasions (i.e. emergencies), air and ground positions are both opened. Staff utilization: one controller on the morning shift and one controller in the evening; a third controller comes in at 11:00 AM and leaves at 7:00 PM. Controllers receive IFR estimates and proposed IFR departure on the NFDPS printer from Toronto ACC. Parallel taxiways are not available for all the runways, this requires lengthy backtracks when Runways 22, 12 & 30 are in operation. Weather conditions were VFR for the observation period except for about three hours in the afternoon of August 29 th, where the ceiling lowered to 2300 feet, therefore Automatic Control Transfer (ACT) was cancelled for that period. Operations were primarily on runway 04 during the observation period with the exception of some arrivals and departures on runways 12 and 22 on August 31 st. The peak period for traffic was between 5:00pm and 7:00pm (ex: 1-C208, 2-SW4, 1-BE99 and 1-DH8A on the apron). There was an emergency around 4:00 PM on August 29, an MU2 with engine problem declared an emergency. The Airport controller provided conflict resolution (500 feet vertical separation) once. The Sudbury Tower has ACT procedures, which differs from an FSS environment. Removing ACT in the service delivery requires further analysis to evaluate the impact on delays to IFR traffic. The following describes the procedure for IFR Departures: Aircraft contacts Ground Control requesting IFR clearance; Controller provides IFR Clearance (airways information on the proposed data strip); pilot reads back the clearance; Ground Controller provides taxi instructions; Tower controller informs the ACC that the aircraft is taxiing and requests IFR release (validation); and Tower controller taxis the aircraft to position and clears the aircraft for take-off. 3. PROCEDURES AUTOMATIC CONTROL TRANSFER The Sudbury tower controllers, by agreement with the ACC, have ACT procedures which are in effect whenever the ceiling is 3,000 feet or more and visibility 7 NM or more. When ACT is in effect:

38 Control of IFR inbound aircraft are automatically transferred to the Tower; IFR inbound aircraft then basically become VFR for operational purposes; Airport controllers contact the ACC for IFR departure validation; then Airport controllers become responsible for separation between the IFR arrival and the IFR departure. Tower will then clear the IFR departure for take-off. * It is a regular operation for the tower controller to clear an IFR departure for take-off when there is an IFR aircraft on approach to runway 04. Similar operations were not observed on Runway 22. ACT is cancelled when weather conditions descend below 3000 feet or/and 7 NM. When ACT is suspended airport controllers will normally request control of inbound IFR traffic to expedite traffic. The procedures are as follows: Airport controller will request control of the IFR arrival in the zone if the Airport controller can see the arrival aircraft and is able to maintain visual contact of the aircraft; ACC approves control transfer of the IFR arrival aircraft and releases the IFR departure; and There is no release of the IFR departure if these conditions are not met. When weather conditions descend below VFR conditions (1000 feet and 3 NM), transfer of control of an arriving IFR aircraft does not apply, therefore it becomes similar to FSS operations, one IFR aircraft at a time. The one exception is that at locations with airport control service only a down call is required to the ACC versus a down and clear call with an FSS. In an FSS environment: IFR inbound aircraft may cancel IFR to accommodate IFR departure; ATS can not suggest or request an IFR aircraft to cancel IFR. IFR departure aircraft may request VFR departure to reduce delays; ATS can not suggest or request an IFR aircraft to cancel IFR. It requires ACC approval and ACC must specify a time, altitude, or location at which the aircraft is to contact the ACC for its IFR clearance. In IFR conditions, a requirement for a down and clear call is required before the next IFR arrival can be cleared for an approach.

39 Annex A Sudbury Airport ATS Comparison Airport Control Services Class D: IFR: Traffic information. Separation between IFR and IFR. VFR: Conflict resolution, upon request equipment and workload permitting. Traffic information. SVFR. Class D 7 NM TO 4000 ASL (2900 AAE) 12-04Z Issuing taxi authorizations and instructions. Selecting the most operationally suitable runway. Providing radar and non-radar traffic information. Issuing take-off clearances. Issuing landing clearances. Provides runway separation for all aircraft. Sequencing arriving aircraft in the traffic pattern. Limiting VFR operations within the control zone, if traffic warrants. Issuing holding instructions to arriving aircraft when required. Assigning altitudes to VFR aircraft under specific conditions. Providing radar service to airport traffic. Receiving point out by Toronto ACC. Sudbury control staff does not have the authority to separate IFR aircraft when departing or arriving. Sudbury control staff does not have the authority to conduct LAHSO. Sudbury control staff does not have the authority for the release of IFR departures. VDF. Ground Control Service (Ensure that the runway to be used by a departing or arriving aircraft is free, or will be free, of all known obstacles including vehicles, equipment and personnel before the departing aircraft commences its take-off roll or a landing aircraft crosses the runway threshold) Airport Advisory Services Class E: IFR: Traffic information: workload permitting. Separation between IFR and IFR. VFR: Traffic information only (AAS). SVFR. Class E 7 NM TO 4000 ASL (2900 AAE) 12-04Z Airport advisory services. Active/preferred runway. Providing radar and non-radar traffic information. Does not issue take-off clearance. Does not issue landing clearances. Does not sequence arriving aircraft in the traffic pattern. Does not limit VFR operations within the control zone, if traffic warrants. Does not issue holding instructions to arriving aircraft when required. Does not assign altitudes to VFR aircraft under specific conditions. Providing radar service to airport traffic. Does not receive point out by Toronto ACC. Sudbury FSS staff does not have the authority to separate IFR aircraft when departing or arriving. Sudbury FSS staff does not have the authority to conduct SIRO. Sudbury FSS staff does not have the authority for the release of IFR departures. VDF. Vehicle Control Service (Plan to have ground traffic off the intended runway, as applicable, before: A. an IFR aircraft passes the final approach fix; B. a VFR aircraft is established on the final approach leg; or C. an aircraft is ready for take off)